

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC
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My last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C.—between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war—yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Plataea, continued to hold Nisaea, the harbour of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connexion with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace—that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so—but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristcidés, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private

Negotiations
for peace
during the
winter after
the battle of
Amphipolis.

Peace called
the peace
of Nikias—
concluded
in March
421 B.C.
Conditions
of peace.

war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiôné, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies ; to restore Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê, and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiôné.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-hellenic festivals, either by land or sea ; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.¹

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace—and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates—still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Solium and Anaktorium ; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisaea ; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens : the Eleians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them moreover took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.² Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favourable vote of the majority, they

Peace accepted at Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian alliance.

The most powerful members of the alliance refuse to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and Eleians.

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-29.

² Thucyd. v. 18.

resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.¹

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn, than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favourable lot:—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.²

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Ischagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly

Position and feelings of the Lacedaemonians—their great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with Argos.

Steps taken by the Lacedaemonians to execute the peace.—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.

¹ Thucyd. v. 14, 22, 76.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.¹

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favourable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laonian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachēs. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace—awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachēs, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfill her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This

Separate alliance for mutual defence concluded between Sparta and Athens.

Terms of the alliance.

¹ Thueyd. v. 21, 22.

was the single provision of the alliance,—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedaemon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedaemonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylus, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed,—and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.¹ Moreover the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns; one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athénè in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan Ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.²

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laonian inclinations of her leading men, (at this moment Alkibiadēs was competing with Nikias for the favour of Sparta, as will be stated presently,) than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots—and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best—without obtaining the smallest

¹ Thucyd. v. 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the first (*οὐ πολλῷ ὥστε πορευόν*, v. 21)

may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedaemonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace—the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

² Thucyd. v. 24.

Athens re-stores the Spartan captives.

Mismanagement of the political interests of Athens by Nikias and the peace party.

equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring; whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay more—in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which ensures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first enclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, p. 100, together with our alliance.”¹ At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favour of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and

¹ Thucyd. iv. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἔγινασταιν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταποῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀνδρας.

powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favour, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. * Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her—but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit—and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive in reality? The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thucydiđes himself¹ admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydiđes states on more than one occasion,—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself,—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonour in reference to Athens.² He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter—for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisaea, Pylus, Kythéra, and Méthoné. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Lacouian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public recommendation of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadēs concurred. Probably the Spartan Ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly,

By the terms
of the alli-
ance, Athens
renounced all
the advan-
tages of her
position in
reference to
the Lacedae-
monians—
she gained
none of
those con-
cessions
upon which
she calcu-
lated, while
they gained
materially.

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. οὐκ εἶκες δν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἡ τε Λακεδαιμωνικάλιστα δῆ κακῶς ἤκουε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορᾶς.—

(Nikias) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ

(Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβαθ- λεσθαι, &c. (v. 46).—Οἰς πρώτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύ- βασις, &c.

with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away,—replaced only by an inferior successor the lamp-maker¹ Hyperbolus—and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes—there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence—“Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives.”

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis, if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed.² The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Boeotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.³

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established—the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The

Discontent
and remon-
strances of
the Ath-
enians
against
Sparta in
consequence
of the non-
performance
of the con-
ditions—
they repented
of having
given up
the captives
—excuses
of Sparta.

¹ Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.

² Thueyd. v. 21-35.

³ Thueyd. v. 32.

Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies—yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant.¹ Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Boeotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was (they said) all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Boeotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens,¹ for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus—or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place—leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favour had yet been performed—none even seemed in course of being performed; so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.² Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.³

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 35. λέγοντες δὲ ὡς μετ' Αθηναίων τούτους, ἣν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ χρόνους δὲ προβεβηκόσσουσι: Χρόνος εἰς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 35. τούτων οὖν δρῶντες πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρετούψι, &c.

But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were Nikias and their own philo-Laonian leaders; who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next —though favoured by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises— renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidēs and Euklēs: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the

New combinations in Peloponnesus — suspicion entertained of concert between Sparta and Athens — Argos stands prominently forward — state of Argos — aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed in that city.

number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides,¹ while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.² To a

¹ Thucyd. v. 28. Aristophan. Pac. 487, about the Argeians—*διχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἀλφίτα*.

He characterises the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the peace of Nikias — about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a

date in the play itself upon which he lays too great stress.

² Thucyd. v. 67. *'Αργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οὓς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ διπλησίου τῶν ἐσ τὴν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.*

Diodorus (xii. 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit, so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydidēs ἐπολλοῦ as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantinea. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would be a long time.

democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.¹ And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavoured to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy—and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence,

The Corin-thians pre-
vail upon
Argos to
stand for-
ward as head
of a new Pe-lo-
ponnesian
alliance.

It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment, during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to

an end.

¹ Thucyd. v. 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii. 75.

every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realise their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.¹

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive battle.² Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so—though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself³ a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when

¹ Thucyd. v. 28.

² Thucyd. iv. 134.

³ Thucyd. v. 29. Τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστησαν ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους δρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ

σχολὴν ἦγον.

As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 16 and 17, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.

the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatised or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta,—especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by ensuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.¹ Moreover the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineans hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta² (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organising a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority

Remon-
strances of
Lacedæ-
monian en-
voys at the
congress at
Corinth -
re-defence of the Co-
rinthians -
pretence of
religious
scruple.

¹ Thucyd. i. 125.

² Thucyd. v. 29. ‘Αποστάντων δὲ τῷν Μαντινέων, καὶ ἡ ἀλληλεπιδίνησσος ἐς θρυῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίζουτε πλέον τέ τι εἰδῆτας μεταστῆναι αὐτὸύς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἂμα δί’ ὅργης ξχοντες, &c.

should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to Gods or Heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathising deputies—Boeotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,¹ &c.,—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace—viz. that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Solium and Anaktorium; since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest—next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens; and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realise forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative—they requested to come again at the next conference.²

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part, doubtless, by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof—for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings—but still more by the discovery that

¹ Thucyd. v. 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντες τῶν σφίσι τῶν ἔνυμάχων, δοῦι οὐδέ αὐτοῖς δέξαντο τὰς σπουδὰς (παρεκδεσσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις, οἱ μὲν ἡ δικοῦντο, οἱ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 30.

their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgement by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta.¹ They were linked together by communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbours and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγάρης τὸ ἀντὸν λέγοντες ἡσύχαζον, περιοράμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν ἀντοῖς διληγαρχουμένους ἥστον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτεῖας.

These words, *περιοράμενοι* ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dabree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as a gloss, and thus to construe *περιοράμενοι* as a middle verb, “waiting to see the event,” or literally, “keeping a look-out about them.” But taking the text as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.

Most of the critics translate *περιοράμενοι* “slighted or despised by the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of *καὶ* before *νομίζοντες*, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite directions. “The Bœotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian democracy dangerous.” And this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great violence to the word *καὶ*.

Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate *περιοράμενοι* “feeling themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution of

Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means “stood as they were.” The Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to remain as they are, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of *καὶ*.

I submit that the word *περιορᾶ* does not necessarily mean “to slight or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take no notice of, to abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i. 24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμποντιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις δεδύεντο μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, &c. Again, i. 69. καὶ νῦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οὐχ ἔκαστα ἀλλ' ἔγγὺς ὅτας περιοράτε, &c. The same is the sense of *περιδεῖν* and *περιόφεσθαι*, ii. 20. In all these passages there is no idea of *contempt* implied in the word: the “leaving alone,” or “abstaining from interference,” proceeds from feelings quite different from contempt.

So in the passage here before us, *περιοράμενοι* seems the *passive* participle in this sense. Thucydides, having just described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discussion) that no similar *interference* was resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from joining her: “The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were—left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of Sparta.”

body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enrol Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting

The Eleians
become allies
of Argos—
their reasons
for doing so
—relations
with Le-
preum—
the Corin-
thians now
join Argos
also.

from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies.

To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,¹ and the Lacedaemonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens—the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favour. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favouring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Never-

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον ἔπειτα, πανσάμενων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ηλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δὲ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
For the agreement here alluded to, see a few lines forward.

theless the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.¹

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success, we are not told. The mere fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival

Refusal of
Iuga to
separate
from Sparta.
The Corin-
thians are
disheartened
—their
application
through the
Boeotians to
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην πρό-
φεροντες ἐν δὲ εἴρητο, & ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν
Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο τινες, ταῦτα
ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ίσον ἔχοντες
ἀφίστανται, &c.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities—that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Solium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive, in my opinion, the scope of the agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force—for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial immediate members, and

the *mediate* or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee that the imperial state should re-enter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantinea (mentioned a few pages back, p. 12) the Mantineans had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter. For Thucydides expressly states, that the Mantineans had subdued these Arcadian districts, during the very time while the war against Athens was going on—τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστρεψαντο ὑπήκοους, ἵτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὅντος (v. 29). The Eleians were in possession of Lepreum, and in receipt of tribute from it, before that war began.

Arcadian power, from doing the same : and so it proved,—for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens ; with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Boeotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Boeotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance : a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted—but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Boeotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Boeotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Boeotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Boeotians maintained their ten days' armistice ; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακήπτησεν δῆμος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναῖον.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks—“By *δῆμος* is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath.”

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all — either in words or by oath. There was a simple

absence of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of *ἀνακέπτη*, i. 66; iii. 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten days' armistice with the Boeotians—because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace ; whereas the Corinthians, having joined

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis.¹ These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused 2000 of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body, and of course greater fear of the bravest.²

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard—but also against danger (real or supposed) from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any real cowardice or military incompetence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men would be looked upon as more or less degraded; or at least, there would be enough to make them fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors, contracting suspicions of their designs, condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post; placing the whole of their pro-

Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

¹ Thucyd. v. 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

² Thucyd. iv. 80.

The Lacedæmonians emancipate the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea—they plant the Brasidean Helots at Lepreum.

Treatment of the Spartan captives after their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.

perty under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale.¹ This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it—the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydidēs, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state; and the Ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organising revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment (justly pointed out by modern historians), would not weigh much with the Ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiōnē at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will however now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war, not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiōnē and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions—were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles.² They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.³

¹ Thucyd. v. 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, silans, c. 30; Herodot. vii. 231. ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάτην, ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν, ² Thucyd. v. 32. μήτε πραιμένους τι, ή τωλοῦντας, κυρίους ³ Thucyd. v. 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Poppe—Χαλκιδῆς—in this place.

For the usual treatment of Spartan soldiers who fled from battle, see Xenophon, Rep. Laced. c. 9; Plutarch, Age-

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—King Pleistoanax as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobulus and Xenarēs) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.¹ And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, both in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Boeotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobulus and Xenarēs, together with many of their partisans,² originated, in concert with the Boeotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the

Political
relations in
Pelopon-
nesus—
change of
Ephors at
Sparta—
the new
Ephors are
hostile to
Athens.

Congress at
Sparta—
Athenian,
Boeotian,
and Corin-
thian depu-
ties, pres-
ent—long de-
bates, but no
settlement
attained of
any one of
the disputed
points— in-
trigues of
the anti-
Athenian
Ephors—
Kleobulus
and Xenares.

¹ Thucyd. v. 36. ² Thucyd. v. 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό | τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ Ξενάρους καὶ δοτοῦ φίλων ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, &c.

Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athēns. The Boeotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos—for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.¹

Such were the plans which Kleobūlus and Xenarēs laid with These Ephors try to bring about under-hand an alliance between Sparta and Argos, through the Boeotians—the project fails. the Corinthian and Boeotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favour the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Boeotians and Argos. The Boeotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the Boeotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors and the wishes of these Argeians. The Boeotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favour, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of the Boeotians”—bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent, that the Boeotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.² They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Boeotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace—for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connexion with Corinth had always been intimate, while the

¹ Thucyd. v. 36.

² Thucyd. v. 38. οἱόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, | σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. . . . ταῖς τέσσαροι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἴπερ καν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ δύλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ή ἡ ἄπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσι.

position of the four parties named was the same—all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorise them to proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connexion with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobûlus and Xenarê, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.¹

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylê²—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians.³ A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to surrender Pylus. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans

The Lacedæmonians conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians razed Panaktum to the ground.

¹ Thucyd. v. 38.

² See Colonel Leake, Travels in

Northern Greece, vol. ii. ch. xvii. p.

370.

Thucyd. v. 3.

stood pledged by their covenant with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognized import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum—while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobûlus and Xenarêdes desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants,—as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realising their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with

B.C. 420.
Application
from the
Argeians to
Sparta, to
renew the
expiring
treaty.
Project of
renewed
treaty agreed
upon. Curious
stipula-
tion about
combat by
champions,
to keep the
question
open about
the title to
Thyrea.

Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson—two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city—to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was eminently acceptable—the very event which they had been manoeuvring underhand to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other—prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea—there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollectcd, that, about 120 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side; in which, after desperate valour on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.¹ Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens—they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the

¹ Thucyd. v. 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρώτον ἔδικτη μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα: ἐπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἀργος πάντας φίλιον ἔχειν) ξυνεχάρσσαν ἐφ' οἷς ἡξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.

By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the treaty was

not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretary or authorised officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no official signature.

envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panaktum) of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylus. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedēs and two colleagues, arrived in Boeotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum (at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta), they discovered for the first time that the Boeotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless Andromedēs proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Boeotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners were thus *restored* (he pretended)—for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylus in exchange.¹

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Boeotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylus had been brought to a close. Both the alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedēs—that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution and precluding any farther tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols

Lacedæmonian envoys
go first to
Boeotia, next
to Athens—
they find
Panaktum
demolished
—they ask
for the
cession of Pylus
from Athens.

The envoys
are badly
received at
Athens—
angry feel-
ing against
the Lacedæ-
monians.

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

(to employ a modern phrase) : nevertheless not one of the conditions favourable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number)—while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedès, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.¹

Even Nikias, Lachès, and the other leading Athenians, to whose improvident facility and misjudgement the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy—if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadēs son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laonian sentiment which now agitated the Ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendour, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Aakid lineage through the heroes Euryssakēs and Ajax,—and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens²—that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomachē to the gens of the Alkmæonidae, he was related to Periklēs, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honour in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadēs, and a slave name Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him. But even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to

Alkibiadēs stands forward as a party-leader. His education and character.

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

² Thucyd. v. 43. 'Αλκιβιδῆς . . . ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὅν έτι τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἀλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιόματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.'

The expression of Plutarch, however, έτι μειράκιον, seems an exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).

Kritias and Chariklēs, in reply to the question of Sokratēs, whom they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men—defined a *young man* to be one under thirty years of age—the senatorial age at Athens (Xenophon. Memor. i. 2, 35).

the unavailing regret of Periklēs and his brother Aiphron.¹ His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of pre-eminence, and insolence towards others,² were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women³—and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would descend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence—amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadēs. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all Great energy its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a and capacity of Alkibiades in public affairs—his reckless expenditure—lawless demeanour—unprincipled character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military service. young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparetē, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadēs violently interposed to prevent her

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* c. 2, 3, 4; Isocrates, *De Bigis*, *Orat.* xvi. p. 353, sect. 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, *Alkibiad.* c. 1.

² Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, διὸ καὶ τις οἶστος ἐν ἡμοί ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι: δυτικοῦν.

This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Alkibiadēs, in the *Symposion*, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato, *Alkibiad.* i. c. 1, 2, 3.

Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, *Memor.* i. 2, 16-25.

Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθουν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλον ἔστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς ὑπομήμασι (Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 2).

³ I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 24. 'Αλκιβιάδης δ' αὐτὸς διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, &c.'

from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadēs. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer—he strikes Taureas,¹ a rival chorēgus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on—he strikes Hippónikus (who afterwards became his father-in-law), out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology—he protects the Thasian poet Hēgēmon, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called Metrōn; defying both magistrate and accuser, to press the cause on for trial.² Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiadēs to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness³ which marked his private life—a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited—and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favoured. In the speech which Thucydidēs⁴ ascribes to Alkibiadēs

¹ Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi. 16; Antipho apud Atheneum, xii. p. 525.

² Athenaeus, ix. p. 407.

³ Thucyd. vi. 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidēs, which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐστὴν διαιταῖ, &c. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi. 28. τὴν δὲ λῃγὴν αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴ παρανομίαν.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the *λοιδορίᾳ* of Antipho (Atheneus, xii. p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadēs, given in that Discourse called the *Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος*, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenēs (c. 12, p. 1414), is more discri-

minating than we commonly find in rhetorical compositions. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδην εὐρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολλῷ χείρον διακέλμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερφανώς, τὰ δὲ ταπεινώς, τὰ δὲ ὑπερδικώς, ζῆν προηρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους διμίλια πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικριθάμενον.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad tendencies of Alkibiadēs, full illustrations will be seen in his proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here ascribed to Sokrates is unfortunately far less borne out.

⁴ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memor-

before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behaviour, Alkibiadēs stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidaea in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratēs, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadēs also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratēs by protecting him against the Boeotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him: expensive duties, which (as we might expect) he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadēs in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the Ekklesia, when various citizens were

able narrative ascribed to Alkibiadēs in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, p. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratēs is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadēs with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2..

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of the palaestra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them—and the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the Lysis and the Charmidēs—also the Rivalles, where the scene is laid in the house of a γραμματιστής or schoolmaster. In the Lysis, Sokratēs professes to set his own con-

versation with these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their goodwill. Οὐτω̄ χρὴ, ὁ Ἰππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ξαπερ αὐτοὺς, χαννοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα (Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadēs as a youth, Euripid. Supplie. 906 (about Parthenopaeus), and the beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and conversation of their boyish years; though the subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.

handing in their contributions : and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present : the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favour, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.¹

To a young man like Alkibiadēs, thirsting for power and pre-eminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers² — Prodigus, Protagoras, and others ; but most of all, that of Sokratēs. His intimacy with Sokratēs has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadēs (like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokratēs by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation—his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations—his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination—his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate ; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokratēs,³ and to copy his formidable string of interro-

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 10.

² See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.

³ See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους, ὡμιλησάτην, δὺν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εἰδύς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥρμηδότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτεις ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τοις μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πρόττουσι τὰ πολιτικὰ Ἐπει τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων ὑπέλαθον κρέπττονες εἶναι,

Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσήγεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὅπερ ὁν ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχόμενοι οὐχ θυγοτοτὰ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπραττον, ὅπερ ἔνεκεν καὶ Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22, p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadēs and Kritias as frequenting the society of Sokratēs, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists : see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

gations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadēs, who not only owed his life to the generous valour of Sokratēs at Potidæa, but had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armour, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.¹ But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratēs with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodikus, and Protagoras not less than Sokratēs; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratēs was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadēs and Kritias, such society was highly useful.² It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including mental accomplishments as well as political success: it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private:—it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except

"Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii. 16) objiciunt comici, docere eum, quomodo pojorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato."

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by Sokratēs over Alkibiadēs, and of the deference and submission of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratēs goes so far as to say that Sokratēs was never known by any one as teacher of Alkibiadēs; which is an exaggeration in the other direction (Isokratēs, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222).

¹ Plato, Symposium, c. 35–36, p. 220, &c.

² See the representation given in the Protageras of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratēs goes to seek instruction from

Protageras—and of the objects which Protageras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction (Plato, Protageras, c. 2, p. 310 D; c. 8, p. 316 C; c. 9, p. 318, &c.: compare also Plato, Meno, p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4, p. 449 E—asserting the connexion, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, &c.).

It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called the Sophists, even as we find them in Plato—without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favour which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarised with the difference between truth and error; nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and polities. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralising effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.¹

¹ I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratis and the Sophists, depicting Alkibiadēs as “ensnared by the Sophists,” while Sokratis is described as a good genius preserving him from their corruptions (*Hist. of Greece*, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratis from the Sophists—when he describes the Sophists as “pretenders to wisdom,”—as “a new school,”—as “teaching that there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong,” &c.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation arises from a confusion between the original sense, and the modern sense, of the word Sophist, the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptance of the word at Athens, it meant not a *school* of persons professing common doctrines—but a *class* of men bearing the same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratēs, cont. Sophistas, *Orat.* xiii.; Plato, *Meno*, p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation—was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratis himself was so fond of dwelling (*Xenophon, Memor.* i. 6. 12), has plainly no essential bearing on the case. When Eschinēs the orator reminds the Dikasts, “Recollect that you Ath-

nians put to death the *Sophist Sokratis*, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias” (*Eschin. cont. Timarch.* c. 54, p. 74), he uses the word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratis, who had then been dead more than forty years—but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just as he would have said, *Hypokratis the physician, Phedrus the scyphar, &c.* Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and Isokratēs sophists (*Ats Rhetor. De Compis. Verborum*, p. 208 R.). The Nubes of Aristophanes, and the defences put forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratis was not only called by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School of the Sophists”—as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or falsehood, right or wrong,” &c. See a striking passage in the *Politicus* of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks (as I think) that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratis, will be careful how he advances them against the general profession to which Sokratis belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of Sophists, (as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, professors, lawyers, &c., and all bodies of men,) I do not doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonising exclusively Sokratis and his followers—will be felt when we recollect, that the well-known *Apologue*, called the *Choice of Hercules*, was the work of the Sophist Prodigus, and his favourite theme of lecture (*Xenophon, Memor.* ii. 1. 21–34). To this day, that *Apologue* remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with which it pre-

Alkibiadēs, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokratēs most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoilt youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadēs attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandisement. In the later part of life, Sokratēs was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadēs and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiadēs came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanour. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connexions, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his

Conflicting sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadēs —his great energy and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which he inspires.

sents one of the most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratēs, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that *Apologete*, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching "that there was no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood," &c., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the *Republic* (vi. c. 6, 7. p. 492–493), refutes the imputation against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that morality which was received as true and just in their age and society—nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor

(he says) is society itself: the Sophists merely repeat the voice and judgement of society. Without inquiring at present how far Plato or Sokratēs were right in condemning the received morality of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the corruption of the character of Alkibiadēs—wealth, rank, personal beauty, flatterers, &c.; but he does not name the Sophists among them (*Memorab.* i. 2. 24, 25).

extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigour in execution—not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all, was his extraordinary flexibility of character,¹ and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklēs—whom he resembled as well in ability and vigour as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means—Alkibiadēs was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens.² But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from meddling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the

¹ Cornel. Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenaeum, xii. p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Οὐ γὰρ ταῦταν δέ, τιμώτας ἐμ' ἔγώ, says Odysseus in the Philoktētēs of Sophoklēs.

² I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenēs (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of Alkibiadēs (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Precept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenēs—companion and pupil of Sokratēs, and originator of what is called the Cynic philosophy—contemporary and personally acquainted with Alkibiadēs—was full of admiration for his extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and audacious—but unschooled—ἀπάλδευτον. His scandals about the lawless life of Alkibiadēs, however, exceed what

we can reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenēs ap. Athenaeum, v. p. 220, xii. p. 534). Antisthenēs had composed a dialogue, called Alkibiadēs (Diog. Laert. vi. 15).

See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenēs (by A. G. Winkelmann, Zurich, 1842, p. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day Eupolis, Aristophanēs, Pherekratēs, and others seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against the excesses of Alkibiadēs, real or supposed. There was a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadēs, who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragn. Com. Gre. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες (vol. ii. p. 447-494) and Aristophanēs Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166: also Meineke's first volume, Historia Critica Comice. Greec. p. 124-136; and the Dissertat. xix. in Buttmann's *Mythologus*, on the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.

public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing¹ the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens^{*}. He never inspired confidence or esteem to any one ; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments : “the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him,”—was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet—while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him—“You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city at all ; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behaviour.”² Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy ; but the great harm which he did to her was, in his capacity of adviser—awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain perilous aggrandisement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiadēs now for the first time, I have somewhat

n.c. 420.
Alkibiadēs
ties to re-
new the
ancient, but
interrupted
connexion
of his an-
cestors with
Lacedaemon,
as proxenoi. anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 b.c.) the lion’s whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength, nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklēs, were democratical : his grandfather Alkibiadēs had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established connexion of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadēs himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment—doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper

¹ Thueyd. vi. 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4. p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws (in the first three chapters of the ninth Book of the Republic) of the citizen who erects himself into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens exactly suits the character of Alkibiadēs. See also the same

treatise, vi. 6–8. p. 491–494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his German translation of the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadēs the first.

² Aristophan. Rane, 1445–1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 16 ; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias, and with Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.¹

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favourable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta—Alkibiadès thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laonian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachê, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadès yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,² he immediately threw himself into anti-Laonian polities with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

¹ Thucyd. v. 43, vi. 90; Isokratès, De Bigis, Or. xvi. p. 352, sect. 27-30.

Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadès as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

² Thucyd. v. 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἡγετιστὸν, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Δάχητος

The Spartans
reject his
advances—
he turns
against
them—alters
his politics,
and becomes
their enemy
at Athens.

ἐπράξαν τὰς σπουδὰς, αὐτὸς διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαῖαν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμῆσαντες, ἥν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοέστο ἀνανεώσασθας. Ποντάρχοι οὐθέν τε νομίζων ἐλασσονισθεῖσι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, &c.

The moment was favourable, since the recent death of Kleon,
 He tries to bring Athens into alliance with Argos. for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favourable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favour of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiadès had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connexion with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiadès, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much however the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argelian plans of Alkibiadès. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedès arrived at Athens from Boeotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylus,—when it farther became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiadès that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen the discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his cor-

respondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Aeson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace; having been sent thither under great uneasiness

lest Argos should be left without allies, to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens—a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian and Mantineian.¹ The alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate, by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party—though Corinth had refused all concern in the second.²

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens³—Philocharidas, Leon and Endius; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos—to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Boeotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens—and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylus should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly,—the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favourable. It was indeed so favourable, that Alkibiadès became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laonian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his

Embassy
of the Laco-
dæmonians
to Athens,
to press the
Athenians
not to throw
up the alli-
ance. The
envoys are
favourably
received.

¹ Thucyd. v. 43.

² Thucyd. v. 48.

³ Thucyd. v. 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ

Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος,
&c.

private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.¹ This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanour of the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alkibiadēs) would speak emphatically in their favour. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylus—a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.² The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions,³ and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favour. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta, only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party, under all circumstances: if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiadēs, they could gain his strenuous

¹ Thueyd. viii. 6.

² Thueyd. v. 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδε τι δ' Ἀλκιβίδης τοὺς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα, τοὺς Ἀργεί-Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς. Ήν μὴ διωλογήσωσι ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἦκει, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τὰλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλδέμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ δια-

βαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχοντιν, οὐδὲ λέγοντιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτα, τοὺς Ἀργεί-οντος ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ.

³ Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ὅρκους ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπαι πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ θαυμάζοντας ἄμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σίνεσιν, ὡς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀδρός οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting, but without even warning, Nikias—which was exactly what Alkibiadēs desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiadēs himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came?¹ what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which their declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary; the assembled people, who, made aware of that previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips; lastly, most of all, Nikias himself—their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their case before the assembly—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment. There was an unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadēs himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all:² he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed his invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phænomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognised as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώ- λῷ μᾶλλον ή πρότερον καταμενοὶ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πάνυ βοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, φιλανθρώπως, ἐφ' οἷς ἀφῆμένοι δηήκοντες τε καὶ ἔτοιμοι ἥσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀργείους, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκετὶ ἡμείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολ-

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and

Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

from Thucydidēs. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiadēs through life, and presents indeed 'an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanēs heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of *Aeakus* and *Zeus* in his manner of over-reaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said—and a treachery towards their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.¹

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately : but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honour and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace : Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded

¹ Euripid. Andromach. 445–455; Herodot. ix. 54; Thueyd. iv. 50.

this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith—1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Boeotians, unless the Boeotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.¹

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobulûs and Xenarê, the anti-Athenian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Boeotians or compelled the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos—the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favour to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city), from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.²

Failure of
the embassy
of Nikias at
Sparta—
Athens con-
cludes the
alliance
with Argos,
Elis, and
Mantinea.

The words of this convention, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.³ [The express terms in

Conditions
of this con-
vention and
alliance.

¹ Thucyd. v. 46.

² Thucyd. v. 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

³ Thucyd. v. 47. ὅπερ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμάχων ὡν ἔρχουσιν ἐκάτεροι.

which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedaemon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.¹

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Aeginaean oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Aeginaean drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate

¹ Thucyd. v. 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμάχων ἀρχοντινέκατεροι.

ὧν ἀρχωσιν ἔκαστοι. The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμάχων ὡν

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.

cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympie festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenaea. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities—and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths."¹

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance² concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Boeotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.³

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad or 420 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.⁴ That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first

¹ Thueyd. v. 47.

² Thueyd. v. 48.

³ Thueyd. v. 48–50.

⁴ Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στή-

λην χαλκῆν κοινῆ Ὄλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνὶ (Thucyd. v. 47)—words of the treaty.

which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Panhellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or *Theôries*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.¹ Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came² to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the visit of the Athenians was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. No small curiosity was entertained to see what figure the *Theôry* of Athens would make as to show and splendour. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumours, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of *Olympic Zeus*.

Alkibiadê took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian

¹ Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in Olymp. 88 and 89 (428-424 b.c.). Rhodes was included among the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, *Aratus*, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian *Theôry*, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can be inferred; because even at this very Olympic festival of 420 b.c., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator—though all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the Eleians (Thucyd. v. 50).

Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad—July, 420 b.c., its memorable character.

Theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendour, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, &c., for the public sacrifice and procession.¹ But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation (it seems) was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against—not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian Theôrs provided for their countrymen visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public banqueting to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favour, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing re-appearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;² dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined

¹ Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil. iii. 3, 12.

² Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλῆνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μεῖψω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνδυμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμ-

πίᾳσε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπέπολεμησθαι διοριόμματα μὲν ἔπτα καθήκα, θσα οὐδεὶς παὶ ιδώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενέμην, καὶ τέλλα ἀξιώς τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασμένη.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we bring to our minds the special position both of

by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent ; though

Athens and the Athenian allies towards Olympia -- and of Alkibiadēs himself towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece--in the first half of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadēs obtained from Euripidēs the honour of an epinikian ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the poet alleges Alkibiadēs to have been first, second, and *third*, in the course; while Alkibiadēs himself, more modest and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and *fourth*. Euripidēs informs us that Alkibiades was crowned twice and proclaimed twice—*δις στεφθέντ' ἔλατι κάρυκι βοῶν παραδύναι*. Reiske, Coray and Schafer, have thought it right to alter this word *δις* to *τρὶς*, without any authority—which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word *δις*.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de Bigis of Isokratis, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadēs at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratis repeats the loose assertion of Euripidēs, *πρώτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος* (Or. xvi. p. 353, sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidēs against Alkibiadēs also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century B.C. That oration sets forth all the proceedings of Alkibiadēs in a very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story of Alkibiadēs having robbed an Athenian named Diomēdēs of a fine chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratis—see Andokid. cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadēs may have left one of the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadēs by the Chians, Ephesians, &c., as described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenae. i. p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran—in how many races—for all the seven could not (in my judgement) have run in one and the same race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course involved going *twice* times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii. 33; vi. 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by Sophoklēs (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly the expression of the poet—*δέκατον ἐκ πληρῶν δύον*—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklēs (compare Demosth. *Ἐρωτ. Αἴγ.* p. 111¹⁰), who refers indeed to a Pythian, and not an Olympie solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been common to both—and we know that the twelve turns (*δωδεκάγραμπτον—δωδεκάδρομον*) were common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v. 31).

Alkibiadēs was not the only person who gained a chariot-victory at this ninth Olympiad, 420 B.C.—Lichias the Lacedemonian also gained one (Thueyd. v. 50), though the chariot was obliged to be entered in another name, since the Lacedemonians were interdicted from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 316) says, “We are not aware that the Olympiad (in which these chariot victories of Alkibiadēs were gained) can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.”

In my judgement, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, and their numerous

not sufficient to repel the charge from himself (which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavourable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by such a stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favour.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the conse-

individual visitors—appears to me contrary to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424 would occur just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious Théôry, to pass by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i. 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce, for one year, and of the Peace of Nikias—expressly stipulate for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C., without impediment, these stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadès contended with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a

matter of course, that there was only *one* chariot-race at this Olympic festival—that all the seven chariots of Alkibiadès ran in this one race—and that in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained the prize: thus implying that Alkibiadès could not have gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable.

We know from Pausanias (vi. 13, 2) that even in the case of the Stadio-dromi or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets or batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of spectators. Alkibiadès and Lichas may therefore both have gained chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them can have gained the grand final prize—and which of the two that was, it is impossible to say.

The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred legislation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of alleged violation of the Olympic truce.

quence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions—after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behaviour of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites—thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though

offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called Théory, occupying a formal and recognised place at the solemnity.¹

As all the other Grecian states (with the single exception of Lepreum) were present by their Théories² as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan Théory “shone by its absence” in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme indeed was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken—so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster³—that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their Théors into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid 1000 hoplites from Mantinea as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack; while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot-racing. Lichas,⁴ a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a

Alarm felt
at the festi-
val lest the
Spartans
should come
in arms.

¹ Thucyd. v. 49, 50.

² Thucyd. v. 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἵερου, θυσίας καὶ ἀγάθων, καὶ οὐκοὶ έθνον· οἱ δὲ βάλλοι "Ελλῆνες έθεώρουν, πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.

³ Thucyd. v. 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρό-

νον τοῦτον ή τε Δακεδαιμόνων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπεράφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἔριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, &c.

⁴ See a previous note, p. 48.

chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Boeotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Boeotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum, and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.¹ Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedaemonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedaemonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.² The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadēs and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylae in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedaemonian power, and though always

¹ Thucyd. v. 50. Λίχας δ' Ἀρκειτλάου Λικεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγώνι ὑπὲρ ὁν βαθδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, διτὶ νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἔξουσιαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως, προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἄγωνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι διτὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obstructed himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the

disorder, by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).—It may be remarked that more summary measures would probably be required to maintain order in an open race-course than in a closed theatre. Some allowance ought reasonably to be made for this difference.

² It will be seen, however, that the Lacedaemonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards, during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellenn. iii. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 17).

under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory : and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succour it ; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops ; dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 51, 52.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE
OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favour of one so as to make an enemy of the other.¹

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring.

n.c. 419. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklēs. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Boeotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce—at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by

¹ Thueyd. v. 48-50.

Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiades, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollects with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold (insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokratēs) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before,¹ and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organising a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadēs exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—a spectacle at that moment new and striking.² He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labour of connecting their town with the sea by means of

Expedition
of Alkibiadēs
into the
interior of
Pelopon-
nesus.

¹ Plato, *Symposion*, c. 35. p. 220. position of Alkibiadēs in his usual loose δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτοθι χειμῶνες, πάγου οὐλοὶ δεινοτάτου, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 52. Isokratēs (*De Bīgīs*, sect. 17. p. 349) speaks of this ex-

position of Alkibiadēs in his usual loose and exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it as something very memorable at the time.

long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.¹ Yet the march of Alkibiadēs doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labour of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum (the south-eastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighbouring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.² The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march however was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the north-west, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this move-

¹ Thucyd. v. 52.

² Thucyd. v. 53, with Dr. Arnold's note.

ment meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.¹ But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavourable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an outmarch as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the 26th of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the 26th of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the 26th, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies, who however had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies however, perhaps the Corinthians, came

The sacred
month Kar-
neius—
trick played
by the
Argeians
with their
calendar.

¹ Thucyd. v. 54. οὐδεὶς δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύονται οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ἀν ἐπέμβησαν. without any regard to their feelings—quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her allies

as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 54. 'Αργεῖοι δὲ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνελού μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος, καὶ καγούτες τὴν ἡμέραν τὸντην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλοι ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαύριαν καὶ ἐδῆσαν· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς ἔμμαχους ἐπεκαλόῦντο· ὃν οἱ μὲν τὸν μῆνα προῦφασσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθοριαν τῆς Ἐπιδαύριας ἐλθόντες ἤσχαζον.

In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory.

The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and literal possible—"The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of the month before Karneius, and *keeping that day during the whole time*, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging it." By "during the whole time" is meant, during the whole time that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgement—they kept the 26th day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or so—they called each successive day by the same name—they stopped the computed march of time—the 27th was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (*Hist. Gr.* vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 331)—"they began their march on a day which they had *always* been used to keep holy." But the words on this construction introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main affirmation of the sentence.

The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes said to have been passed by the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestérion—next that it should be the month Boëdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorcétés might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Démêtér, both nearly at the same time. Demetrius, being about to quit Athens in the month Munychion, went through both ceremonies with little or no delay (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26). Compare also the speech ascribed to Alexander at the Granikus, directing a

second month Artemisius to be substituted for the month Daesius (Plutarch, Alex. c. 16).

Besides if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389. Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 2, 5; v. 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of it being the period of the holy truce—though it *really was not so*—οὐδὲ δποτε κάθηκοι δ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ δποτε ἐμβαλλειν μέλοιεν λακεδαιμονίοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τὸν μῆνας. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπειδὴ γνωσσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἐπεμψάν, διπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς. On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a sham plea (*ὑποφέρειν*). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence: accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summonses; and invaded the Argeian territory.

Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference—that the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such an analogous incident justifies the interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in Thucydidès.

But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the ancient Grecian calen-

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing propositions

dars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for adoption—with the same eyes as we should regard it now.

With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each different city. Accordingly the lunar month of one city did not (except by accident) either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (*ad Corp. Inscr. T. i. p. 734*)—“*Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines respondent, non quovis convenient anno, nisi cyclus intercalationum utriusque populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum qui non intercalant mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui praeedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis. quod tamen negligere solent chronologi.*” Compare also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, *Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde*, Götting. 1844, p. 21–27—where all that is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is well brought together.

The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. Hermann, p. 84–124): indeed the only single name resting on positive proof, is that of a month *Hermus*. How far the months of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta, we do not know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called *a system* of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar right without frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks above reckoning of time, characterises their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion

from these interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the ides of January to be the calends of March (*Cicero, Verr. ii. 52, 129*).

Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views of other Dorian states—since there does not seem to have been any recognised authority for proclaiming the commencement of the Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic, and the Corinthians the Isthmian truce. In saying therefore that the 26th of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, and that the 27th should not be recognised as arriving for a fortnight or three weeks, the Argeian government would only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before resorted to—though, in the case before us, it was employed for a fraudulent purpose.

The Spartan month *Hekatombaenus* appears to have corresponded with the Attic month *Hekatombaon*—the Spartan month following it, *Karneius*, with the Attic month *Metageithnion* (Hermann, p. 112)—our months July and August; such correspondence being by no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Göller speak of *Hekatombaenus* as if it were the *Argive* month preceding *Karneius*; but we only know it as a *Spartan* month. Its name does not appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless *Karneius* seems universal. See Franz, *Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc. No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxii. p. 640*.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes, are well known to every one. And even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See Hesychius—‘*Ἐν Κέφ τις ἡμέρα; Ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ εὑγνωτῶν οὐδεὶς γὰρ οἶδεν ἐν Κέφ τις ἡ ημέρα, διὶ οὐκ ἔστασιν αἱ*

of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadēs. What other deputies attended, we are not told: but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted, even at the opening of the debates, upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still however the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcileable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavourable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiadēs, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded: so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.¹

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighbouring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbour of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis,

ἥμέραι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔκαστοι θέλουσιν ἄγουσι. — See also Aristoph. Nubes, 605.

¹ Thucyd. v. 55. καὶ Ἀθηναῖον αὐτοῖς χλιδοὶ ἐβοήθησαν δπλίταις καὶ Ἀλκιβίδης στρατηγός, πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔξεστρατεῦσθαι: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔσει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Göller, either adopt or recommend; leaving out the particle δὲ which stands in the common text after πυθόμενοι.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἔξεστρατεῦσθαι (as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it) in the

sense of "had already completed their expedition and returned home." But no authority is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἔξεστρατεύειν: and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἔξεστρατευμένων (ii. 7), the same verb and the same tense—yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the less objectionable proceeding of the two, to dispense with the particle δέ.

and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylus, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadēs, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.¹ The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage—yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus—the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.²

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under King Agis,^{B.C. 418.} against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, &c.—were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 5000 Bœotian hoplites, and 2000 Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also 5000 light-armed, 500 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The

Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly violated by both.

¹ Thueyd. v. 56.

² Thueyd. v. 57.

Invasion of Argos by Agis and the Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians.

numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know ; nor probably did Thucydidēs himself know : for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as 3000 Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Plataea, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the Approach of morning, the Argeians left their position also, and the invaders marched with their allies, first to Argos itself—next, to different lines of Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phili-asians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point : while the Boeotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians : but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favourable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own

division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain : the Boeotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trētus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night ; while the Argeians,¹ hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, was found nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate : for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Boeotians marching along the undefended road through the Trētus would attack them in the rear. The Boeotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea, seem to have possessed any horsemen : a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle ; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front which appeared to be enclosed between them and their city—and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger : and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the

Superior forces and
advantageous position of
the invaders
—danger of
Argos—
Agis takes
upon him
to grant an
armistice to
the Argeians,
and withdraws
the army—dis-
satisfaction
of the allies.

¹ Thucyd. v. 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν ἡμέρας ἥδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, &c.

Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them—and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Boeotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.¹ For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Severe censure against Agis on his return to Sparta. Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read, with no small astonishment, that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasylus,² whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning

¹ Thucyd. v. 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ἔμπαχοι ἐποντὸ μὲν ὡς ἥγειτο

² Thucyd. v. 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέοντι αἰτίᾳ εἶχοι τοὺς σπειταμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους, &c.

from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences^{*} and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.¹

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Lachès and Nikostratus. Alkibiadēs came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadēs even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadēs contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea—to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance—and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.²

Tardy arrival
of Alkibiadēs,
Lachès, &c.,
with the
Athenian
contingent
at Argos—
expedition
of Athenians,
Eleians,
Mantineians,
and Argelans,
against the
Arcadian
town of
Orchomenus.

¹ Thucyd. v. 60.

² Thucyd. v. 62.

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleians contended strenuously for Tegea—the Eleians return home. a march against Lepreum; while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbour Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter—incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favourable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta,¹ when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid succour. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ or about 27½ Attic talents. He urgently entreated, that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been, before, a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.²

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea—the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head—the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.³ When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing,

¹ Thucyd. v. 64. οὐκ ἀφέστη-
κεν, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 63.

³ Thucyd. v. 64. ἐνταῦθα δὴ Βοηθεία
τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ
τῶν Ειλάτων παθῆμει δέεια καὶ οὐα σύπῳ

πρότερον. The outmarch of the Spartans just before the battle of Plataea (described in Herodot. vii. 10) seems however to have been quite as rapid and instantaneous.

they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence—the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Boeotians, as well as to the Phokians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos¹—which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Ilerakleion or temple of Héraklēs,² from whence he began to ravage the neighbouring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground—and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding “to heal mischief by mischief.” So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat—though actually within distance, no greater than the cast of a javelin, from the enemy.³

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea—both situated on a lofty, but enclosed plain, drained only by katabothra or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been

Maneuvres
of Agis to
bring on a
battle on
fair ground.

¹ Thucyd. v. 64. ξυνέκληγε γὰρ διὰ μέσου.

² The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of protection in encamping near a temple of Héraklēs, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 31.)

³ Thucyd. v. 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 4, 25.

kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage ; calculating that the Mantineans and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt—next retreat—and lastly disappear—their surprise was very great ; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position : upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis : but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed forward in his operations upon the water. He had either not march and new position done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as of the Argeians. he had expected : and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineans occupied the right wing, the post of honour, because the ground was in their territory : next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies : then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family trained in arms at the cost of the state : alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Orneæ : last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæ-

monians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover ; and even the¹ Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.¹ But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general : each *taxis* or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognised. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority —“commanders of commanders”—each of whom had his special duty in ensuring the execution of orders.² Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the Polemarchs (each commanding a Mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the Lochagi, or colonels of the respective Lochi. These again gave command to each Pentekontêr, or captain of a Pentekosty ; lastly, he to the Enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision called an Enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the Enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his Enômoty ; but the Pentekontêr and the Lochage were responsible also each for his larger division ; the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties—at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude³ and anxious haste in

The Lacedæmonians are surprised their sudden and ready formation into battle order.

Gradation of command and responsibility peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐς δὲ ἐμέμνηντο, ἐκ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἔξεπλάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλότεως ηὐ παρασκευή αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 66. Σχεδὸν γέρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν διλγούν, τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσι,

καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi. 5.

Αἱ παραγωγαὶ διπερ ὑπὸ κῆρυκος ὑπὸ

τοῦ ἐνωμοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: compare xi. 8. τῷ ἐνωμοτάρχῃ παρεγγυᾶται

εἰς μέτωπον παρ' ἄσπιδα καθίστασθαι, &c.

³ Thucyd. v. 66. εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς

obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained, with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Perioiki, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march ; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness.¹ Next to the Skiritæ, who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honour. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.²

Thucydidēs, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy : the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity, we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that

καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἁυτῶν, Diodor. xv. c. 32; Xenophon, Rep. Αγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἔκαστα ἐξηγουμένου Laced. xiii. 6.
κατὰ τὸν νόμον, &c.

¹ Xenophon, Cyrop. iv. 2, 1: see

² Thucyd. v. 67.

of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were 600 in number—the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 418 men; each enômoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enômöties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties—each pentekosty contained four enômöties.¹ Multiplying 418 by 8, and adding the 600 Skiritæ, this would make a total of 4184 hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire forcè on a pressing emergency, and that they had

¹ Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the Enômoty was the elementary division--the military unit: that the Pentekosty was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of Enômöties: that the Lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of Pentekosties. The Mora appears to have been a still larger division, consisting of so many Lochi (according to Xenophon, of four Lochi): but Thucydidès speaks as if he knew no division larger than the Lochus.

Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact certainly established, about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words *Enômoty*, *Pentekosty*, *Lochus*, &c. indicate any fixed number of men: our own names *regiment*, *company*, *troop*, *brigade*, *division*, &c. are all more or less indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men like an Enômoty (25, 32, 36 men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the command of its Enômotarch. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances.

Thucydidès states several distinct facts. 1. Each Enômoty had *four men in front*. 2. Each Enômoty varied in depth, according as every lochagus chose. 3. Each lochus had four pentekosties,

and each pentekosty four enômöties.—Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how those assertions are to be reconciled? Given the number of men in front, and the number of enômöties in each Lochus--the depth of the Enômoty is of course determined, without reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions appear distinctly contradictory; unless we suppose (what seems very difficult to believe) that the Lochege might make one or two of the four files of the same Enômoty deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture.

Another solution has been suggested, viz. that each lochagus had the power of dividing his lochus into more or fewer enômöties as he chose, only under the obligation that *four men* should constitute the front rank of each enômoty: the depth would then of course be the variable item. I incline to believe that this is what Thucydidès here means to indicate. When he says, therefore, that there were four pentekosties in each lochus, and four enômöties in each pentekosty—we must suppose him to allude to the army as it marched out from Sparta; and to intimate, by the words which follow, that each lochagus had the power of modifying that distribution in regard to his own lochus, when the order of battle was about to be formed. This, at any rate, seems the least unsatisfactory solution of the difficulty.

only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement ; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantinea should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was—or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbour. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. “They knew (says the historian¹) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment.” As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation : but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect,—which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack : the numerous pipers in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy ; who having no pipers or other musical

¹ Thucyd. v. 69. Λακεδαιμονίοι δὲ ἀγαθοῖς οδσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολε- ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλειστούς σώζουσαν μικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὃν ἡ πόλις ἦ λόγων δι' ὀλίγου καλῶς βηθέντων σταυτοῦ τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μυήμης παραίνεσιν.

instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,¹ fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right hand neighbour. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honour, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion; even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.²

¹ Thucyd. v. 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ κεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἔνυμαχοι, ἐντόνως καὶ ὅργῃ χωροῦντες, τῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα δημαλῶς μετὰ βυθοῦ βαίνοντες προέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διαπασθεῖν αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μέγαλα στρατηγεῖα ἐν ταῖς προσθδοῖς πυκισί.

² Thucyd. v. 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρίται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, ἀεὶ ταῦτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λα-

χοντες, &c.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydides here uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed: among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticised.

Movement ordered by Agis, on the instant before the battle : his order disobeyed. His left wing is defeated. Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians ; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklês and Hippónoidas, who had their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders : so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed : and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back ; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-waggons in the rear ; some of the elder troops who guarded the waggons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

Complete ultimate victory of the Lacedæmonians. But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right ; where Agis, with his body-guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippéis, and with the Spartan Lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy ;—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi—with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argós—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance—indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπῆσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς ἐνδύντας, τὸν Ἀργείους) Ἐγρέψαν, οὐδὲ ἐς χείρας καὶ ἐστὶν οὐς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ πολλοὺς ὑπομεῖναντας, ἀλλ᾽, ὡς μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἔγκαττληψιν. The

While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, *τοῦ, τοῦ μῆ*, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify *design* or *purpose*; *ἔνεκα* being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppe, Götler, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that *τοῦ μῆ* in this place means the same as *ώστε μῆ*: others affirm, that it is identical with *διὰ τὸ μῆ* or with *τῷ μῆ*. “*Formula τοῦ, τοῦ μῆ* (say Bauer and Götler), plerumque *consilium* significat: interdum *effectum* (*i. e.* *ώστε μῆ*); hic *causam* indicat (*i. e.* *διὰ τὸ μῆ*, or *τῷ μῆ*).” But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorised; while the second (which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself) is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence—for the passage of Thucydides (ii. 4. *τοῦ μῆ ἔκφεύγειν*) may be as well construed (as Poppe's note thereupon suggests) without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words *τοῦ μῆ φθῆναι* here in their regular and legitimate sense of *ἔνεκα τοῦ* or *consilium*. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They supposed that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been “*trodden under foot*,” were so trodden down by the Lacedæmonians in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit—qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydides in regard to this very battle. They were not all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them,—not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous

Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii. 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it was the Argeians in front (not the Lacedæmonians) who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file) in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 4, 11; Economic. viii. 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydides describes, three distinct subjects—1. The Lacedæmonians. 2. The Argeian soldiers who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers who trod them down in order to get away themselves.—Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative just as much as if he had written *καταπατηθέντας δέ π' ἄλλων*, or *δέ π' ἀλλήλων*, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative but not formally specified (*i. e.* those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves)—or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly—that the *design* or *purpose* (*consilium*) in the words *τοῦ μῆ φθῆναι* refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe *τοῦ μῆ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν*, as if the last word were an accusative case coming *after φθῆναι* and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgement, *τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν* is here the accusative case coming *before φθῆναι* and forming the *subject* of it. The words will thus read (*ἔνεκα*) *τοῦ τὴν*

the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing ; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineans and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineans—and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy.¹

There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates ; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Lachès and Nikostratus ; and 200 Mantineans. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy ; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleis-

έγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίους)—“in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them”—“might not come upon them too soon,” i. e. “sooner than they could get away.” And since the word *έγκατάληψις* is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates—i. c. *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔγκαταλαβόντας*—subject as well as attribute—for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—*ὅτινι οὖς καὶ κατακατηθέντας ὅπ' ἀλλήλων φεύγοντας (ορ βιαζόμενων), ένεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἔγκαταλαβόντας αὐτὸς (τοὺς φεύγοντας)*: “As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way

at once, without staying for hand-combat; and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape.”

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have *τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι* used in its regular and legitimate sense of *purpose* or *consilium*. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydides.

¹ Thucyd. v. 73; Diodor. xii. 79.

toanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned home.¹

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was Great effects of the victory in re-establishing the reputation of Sparta. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatised as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece.* It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinea any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled “artists in warlike affairs.” So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised—the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 73.

* Thucyd. v. 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν | Ἐλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἐς τε μαλακιαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ οἵσῳ ξυμφοράν,

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Arisklēs and Hipponeidas, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards on their return to Sparta.¹

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their &c. near Epidaurus. 3000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklēs at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation.² Shortly after the defeat, the 3000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a reinforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle³—and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success—now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished: but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Hèrē was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion—their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.⁴

καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βρα-
δυτῆτα, ἐν ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τόχη
ιὲν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακίζμενοι, γνώμη δὲ,
οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες.

¹ Thucyd. v. 72.

² Thucyd. i. 141.

³ Thucyd. v. 75.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 75.

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—philolaconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat at Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiadēs, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,¹ and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a

¹ Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantinea, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution—notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten—*Oἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες ἐν Μαντίνειᾳ, &c.*

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadēs and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 2, 15-17.

conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.¹

Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmonians. As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy, Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions : one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could ; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connexion with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance ; since Alkibiadēs, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty ; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos,—and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows :—

“ The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænali. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians and Argos. the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineans have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.² Every city in Peloponnesus, small or

¹ Thucyd. v. 76; Diodor. xii. 80.

² Thucyd. v. 77. The text of Thucydides is incurably corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause; though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to be

great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus—and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business.”¹

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alki-

allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an oath. In regard to this purifying oath it seems to have been essential that the oath should be *tendered* by one litigant party and *taken* by the other; perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν λῆγν (Valkenaer's conjecture) might be preferable to εἴμεν λῆγν.

¹ To Herodot. vi. 86 and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. 16, 6, which Dr. Arnold and other commentators notice in illustration of this practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny in his System des heutigen Romischen Rechts, sect. 309–313. vol. vii. p. 53–83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to the opposite in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgement in favour of the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect to this *jus iurandum delatum*, which Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

¹ Thucyd. v. 77. Ἐπιδείκναται δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἱ καὶ αὐτοῖς δοκῆαι δέ τι καὶ δλλο δοκῆ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐκαδὲ ἀπιάλλειν. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xxiv. vol. iii. p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words—but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantinea; all hostile in feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any change.

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (*ἐπιδείκναται*) has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is, that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.

biadēs at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea—and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

Treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis. “There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment.¹ If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”

Submission of Mantinea to Sparta. It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies,

¹ Thucyd. v. 79. Άι δέ τινι τάν πολιών ή ἀμφίλογα, ή τάν ἔντδς ή τάν ἔκτδς Πελοποννάσου, αἵτε περὶ δρων αἵτε περὶ κλλου τίνος, διακριθῆμεν.

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between Boeotia and Athens—and between Megara and Athens: the

Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Boeotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat. Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle, 1846. sect. 19. p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty—that of ensuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.¹ And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter—according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.² The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum (through the Brasideian settlers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon (about November or December 418 B.C.) had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic

Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.

¹ All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced by this treaty to be (if we repeat the language employed with reference to the Delphians peculiarly in the peace of Nikias) *αὐτόνομοι*, *αὐτοτελεῖς*, *αὐτοδίκοι*, Thucyd. v. 19. The last clause of this treaty guarantees *αὐτοδικίαν* to all—though in language somewhat different—*τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι*. The expres-

sion in this treaty *αὐτοπόλιες* is substantially equivalent to *αὐτοτελεῖς* in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydides the very convenient Herodotean word *δωσίδικοι* (Horodot. vi. 42), though there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful to his meaning.

² Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii. 81.

family. Accordingly Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.¹ In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Démostenès to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.² Having no intention however of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the peace of Nikias.³

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become

^{B.C. 417.} irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1000 hoplites from each city (the first joint expedition under the new alliance), against Sikyōn, for the purpose of introducing more thoroughpaced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyōnian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyōn: yet that city seems to have been, as

¹ Compare Thueyd. v. 80, and v. 83.

² The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i. 150) and the precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.

³ Thueyd. v. 80. *Kal οὐτερον Ἐπι-*

δαυπλοῖς ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπουδᾶς, αὐτὸν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα. We are here told that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but I know no truce previously between them, except the general truce for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with Sparta (iv. 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably therefore the joint enterprise against Sikyon was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyon had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.¹

This revolution (accomplished about February B.C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation ^{B.C. 417.} of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alkibiadēs thither two years before—accordingly she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favour Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Such cruelty moreover was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens—such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigour

Oligarchy
in Sikyon
and the
towns in
Achaea.

Violences
of the
Thousand
at Argos;
counter re-
volution in
that town;
restoration
of the de-
mocracy.

¹ Thucyd. v. 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι φύτεροι ἦδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἀργεί τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρα- κατέδυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἐπιτηδεῖα τοῖς τεύσαντες, τὰ τ' ἐν Σικυώνι ἐσ ὀλίγους Δακεδαιμονίους κατέστη. Compare Dio- μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαι- dor. xii. 80.

of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual licence to themselves. The behaviour and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanour of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:¹ a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women² to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as co-existent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the Gymnopædiae was in course of being solemnised at Sparta—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed; but the Lacedæ-

¹ Pausanias, ii. 20, 1.

² See Herodot. v. 87; Euripid. *Hecub.*

| 1152, and the note of Musgrave on line

| 1135 of that drama.

monians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.¹

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months,² from February to June 417 B.C. 417.—and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,³ who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favourable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause,—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardour: while Alkibiadēs brought assistance from Athens⁴—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants

¹ Thucyd. v. 82; Diodor. xii. 80.

² Diodorus (xii. 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydidēs does not allow more than four months for the duration of

the latter.

³ Thucyd. v. 82. ξυνήδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 82. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεῖ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναικεῖς καὶ οἰκέται, ἔτελχισσον, &c. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,¹ required a long time. Moreover the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.² Accordingly about the end of September (417 B.C.), King Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiae, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighbouring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.³

The close neighbourhood of such exiles—together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes

n.c. 416. Alkibiadēs at Argos : measures for the protection of the democracy. of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand.

To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadēs was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendency, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 300 marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party (B.C. 416). Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein however they sustained nothing but loss. And again about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against

¹ Pausanias, ii. 36, 3.

² Thucyd. i. 107.

³ Thucyd. v. 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the Argeians had already built their long walls down to the sea—πυθόμενοι τοὺς Ἀργείους φέ-

δομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης (xii. 81). Thucydidēs uses the participle of the present tense—τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα τείχη ἔλαντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες, &c.

Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices (always offered previous to leaving their own territory) so unfavourable that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so—to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.¹ Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices,—entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part)—and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ; from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.²

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens; very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea—hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—nevertheless neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 b.c.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylus became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we

B.C. 416.

Nominal
peace, but
 precarious
relations,
between
Athens and
Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, μέλλοντες εἰς τὴν Ἀργείαν στρατεύειν . . . ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινάς ὑποτοπήσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.

I presume μέλλησιν here is not used

in its ordinary meaning of *loitering*, *delay*, but is to be construed by the previous verb μέλλοντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv. 126. “prospect of action immediately impending.” compare Diodor. xii. 81.

² Thucyd. vi. 7.

may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.¹ Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.² Nor was the licence of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 b.c. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Relations of Athens with Perdikkas of Macedonia. Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues however had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 b.c. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis—now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.³

Negligence of Athens about Amphipolis; improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party; adventurous speculations of Alkibiadès. Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiadès, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin.

Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest

¹ Thucyd. v. 115.

² Thucyd. vi. 105. Andokidès affirms, that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31. p. 93-105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos was one of the causes of the resumption

of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thucydidès tells us that the persuasions of Argos to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta, were repeated and unavailing.

³ Thucyd. v. 83.

statesman Periklēs. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals ; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it ; the more so, as if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails—partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens, which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachēs, and Alkibiadēs, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadēs, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen : his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-maneuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadēs begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias—the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadēs in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis ; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of

Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadēs combined: for by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

Projected contention of ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadēs. Proposition supported by Hyperbolus. It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadēs.¹ The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadēs was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Chremēs, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadēs. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanēs as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx:² if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September 422 B.C.; the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidēs does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nikias. Thucydidēs only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracised, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a dis-

¹ Dr. Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called *Andokidēs* against Alkibiadēs, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix II. on that subject, vol. iii. p. 494, *seq.*).

The more frequently I read over this

Oration, the more do I feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes. I cannot think that Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding ch. xlvi. note.

² Aristophan. *Pac.* 680.

grace to the city."¹ This sentence of Thucydidēs is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydidēs.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Periklēs and Thucydidēs² son of Melēsias, the latter of whom was ostracised about 442 b.c. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover there was now full confidence in the numerous Dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals—thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party-dispute, the friends of Alkibiadēs probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, preferring to

Gradual
desuetude
of the ostra-
cism, as the
democracy
became
assured.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Τηπέρβολν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθῆρὸν ἀνθρώπου, ὡστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβου, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to Androtron (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot)—*ὡστρακισμένον διὰ φαυλότητα.*

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 13; *Aelian*. V. H. xii. 43; Theopompus, Fragm. 102, 103, ed. Didot.

² I ought properly to say, the last example fairly comparable to this struggle between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, to whom, as rival politicians and men of great position, Periklēs and Thucydidēs bore a genuine analogy. There had been

one sentence of ostracism passed more recently; that against Damon, the musical teacher, sophist, and companion of Periklēs. The political enemies of Periklēs procured that Damon should be ostracised, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4). This was a great abuse and perversion of the ostracism, even in its principle. We know not how it was brought about: nor can I altogether shut out a suspicion, that Damon was sentenced to banishment, as a consequence either of trial or of non-appearance to an accusation—not ostracised at all.

let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracising vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place : it was always however perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs or *Hetæries*, and according to some accounts, the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hyperbolus.¹ By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognised by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidēs himself distinctly implies this : for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth ; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens ; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders : but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadēs had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer 416 b.c., that the Athenians
n.c. 416. undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of
Siege of Mēlos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except
Mēlos by the Athenians. Thēra, which was not already included in their empire. Mēlos and Thēra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* c. 13; Plutarch, *Nikias* and *Alkibiadēs*, but between *Nikias*, c. 11. Theophrastus says that Phæax and *Alkibiadēs*. The violent opposition at first, and the coalition of votes and parties coalition afterwards, was not between may well have included all three.

with Athens ; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint,¹ until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias : thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian, and two Lesbian—1200 Athenian hoplites, and 1500 hoplites from the allies—with 300 bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed, Thucydidês professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians ; no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons : it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian prisoners of military age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydidês could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt : but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

Dialogue
set forth
by Thucy-
didês, be-
tween the
Athenian
envoys and
the Execu-
tive Council
of Mélos.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 91.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand ; in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians—or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he, that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides ; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it.¹ To this the Melians reply, that (omitting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in

¹ In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English Government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers' Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire :—

" L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C'étoit M. Jackson qui avoit été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pu y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit auprès du régent, il allégua de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d'une coalition contre l'Angleterre : il donna comme raison d'agir la nécessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François : et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu'on livrât à l'armée Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande le Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte

elle-même — promettant de garder le tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en possession de ce qu'on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdroit rien, que l'on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis — que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu'elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez-vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérions à cette infame proposition ?— Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre — M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus foible. Le prince congédia l'agent Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu'il alloit se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois." (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome viii. livre xxviii. p. 190.)

trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others. “We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta—it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us.”—“Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?”—said the Melians. “No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power.”—“But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connexion with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?”—“They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us,—but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you,—or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless we trust that in

point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the Gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice—and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us."—"We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favour. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, over-passing that which men believe in regard to the Gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the Gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever—and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behaviour towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honourable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, Refusal of the Melians to submit. the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval, were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words—"We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves—relying on that favourable fortune which the Gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable"—"Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were

present reality. 'You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes ; and with your all you will come to ruin.'

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town ; which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Philokratès. At length the provisions within were exhausted ; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydidès does not say ; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadès¹ was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community ; apparently not as kleruchs, or out-citizens of Athens,—but as new Melians.²

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mêlos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisaea, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigour of the laws of war ; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens ; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament em-

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadès, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the statements which the composer of the Oration of Androkides against Alkibiadès found current in respect to the conduct of the latter (sect. 128). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.

² Thucyd. v. 106. *τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτὸν φέγγεσαν, ἀπόλκους βατερούς πεντακο-*

Remarks
upon the
event.

ployed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted—and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians.¹ This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydidēs. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations,² thus dramatising the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers; as Dionysius of Halikarnassus³ long ago remarked, intimating his suspicion that Thucydidēs had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry* where their purpose needs it.⁴ Now the language of the envoy at Mēlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession (falsely called a school) named Sophists at Athens, is above all things

¹ Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 348.

² Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Thucydid. c. 37-42. p. 906-920 Reisk: compare the remarks in his Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de Præcipuis Historiis, p.

774 Reisk.

³ Plutarch, Alkibiad. 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναῖους ἀεὶ τὰ πράτταται τῶν ἐγουάτων τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, καθίσται καὶ φιλανθρωπίας.—To the same purpose Plutarch, Solon, c. 15.

remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness—a disdain not merely of sophistry in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued as if “*the good old plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can*”—had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists: whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word (putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called Sophists at Athens), is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification—so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this “good old plan” as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Aesop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mélos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed. •

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory:¹ and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mélos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea, if he can—a false plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the

¹ Compare also what Brasidas says [86.—*Ἔσχυος δικαιώσει, οὐ δέ τύχη* in his speech to the Akanthians, v. | *ἴδωμεν, &c.*

civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention—what might have been said with perfect truth as matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification—that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment—*Mήλου Αλωσις* (The Capture of Mêlos)—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phryni-chus—“The Capture of Miletus.” And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydidēs will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. • The capture of Mêlos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidēs, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel mani-festation, by his dramatic fragment of the envoys at Melos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxēs into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation—impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydidēs—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of

Place which
it occupies in
the general
historical
conception of
Thucydides.

time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are however his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian envoy—still less, those of the Athenian public—least of all, those of that much calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE
GELONIAN DYNASTY.

IN the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connexion between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461-416 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,¹ followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganise themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous immigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary

Expulsion
of the
Gelonian
dynasty
from Syra-
cuse, and
of other
despots from
the other
Sicilian
towns.

¹ See above, ch. xliii., for the history of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.

revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messenê, partly in the re-established city of Kamarina, in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.¹

But though peace was thus re-established, these large mutations of inhabitants, first begun by the despots,—and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, &c., which was brought about unavoidably during the process—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.² The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

Large
changes of
resident in-
habitants—
effects of
this fact.

¹ Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, takes no notice of the cause in which it originated —viz. the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in 10,000, Diodor. xi. 72), and the number of exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.

I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the events of this period, because it is definite as well as important (vol. iv. p. 9. chap. xviii. sect. 1).

"But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. Everywhere, then, the favourite measure of democracy, the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon: a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained."

Again—sect. iii. p. 23, he speaks of "that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands," &c.

Now, upon this we may remark—

1. The equal division of the lands of the state, here affirmed by Mr. Mitford, is a pure fancy of its own. He has no

authority for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi. 76) κατεκληρούχησαν τὴν χώραν, &c.; and again (xi. 86) he speaks of τὸν ἀναδασμὸν τῆς χώρας, the *re-division* of the territory: but respecting equality of division—not one word does he say. Nor can any principle of division, in this case, be less probable than equality. For one of the great motives of the re-division, was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or less, on the ground of compensation for loss, greater or less as it might have been. Besides, immediately after the re division, we find rich and poor mentioned just as before (xi. 86).

2. Next Mr. Mitford calls "the equal division of all the lands of the state" the *favourite measure of democracy*. This is an assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece (so far as my knowledge extends) can be produced in which such equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken by the popular Heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting emphatically against *re-division of the land or extinction of debts*.

² Thucyd. vi. 17.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the westward) by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messenê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikañs: on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorising the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.¹ Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus—and

¹ Diodor. xi. 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*, because in taking the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracising sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenēs at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or petalism) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan ^{Power and foreign ex-}
^{plots of Syracuse,} admiral Phaÿllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress ^{B.C. 453.} the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellēs being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalised by a large number of captives and a rich booty.¹

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandisement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities (with the exception of Hybla) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill top, called Menæ,

^{B.C. 452.}

Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town of Palkē.

¹ Diodor. xi. 87, 88.

down to a convenient spot of the neighbouring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki.¹ As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighbourhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikē, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired
 B.C. 451. is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from *Ætna*, and had received from them the name of *Ætna*:² Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed—insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when

¹ Diodor. xi. 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx. 216.

Kτίσει δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸν Ἰλιον ἵππον

'Εν πεδίῳ πεπόλυστο, πάλις μερόπιον ἀνθρώπων,
 'Αλλ' οὐτέ οὐτερέις φύκουν πολυπιδάκον Ιδρες.
 Compare Plato, De Legg. iii. p. 681, 682.

² Diodor. xi. 78.

the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of “Save the suppliant.”¹ Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted.² If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalē Aktē on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.³

¹ Diodor. xi. 91, 92. ‘Ο δὲ δῆμος ἔστερ τινι μηδ φωνῇ σάζειν ἀπαντεῖ βέβων τὸν ἵκετην.

² Xenophon, Hellen. i. 5, 19; Pausanias, vi. 7, 2.

³ Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius to Sicily—“The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duketius from Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged, him to establish a colony of

Duketius
breaks his
parole and
returns to
Sicily.

mixed people, Greeks and Sikels, at Calé Actē, on the northern coast of the island” (ch. xviii. sect. i. vol. iv. p. 13).

The statement that “the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or encouraged him to come back or to found the colony of Kalē Actē,” is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel prince into an ambitious manœuvre on the part of the Syracusan democracy. The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case,

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief
 which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to
 spare¹ Duketius had been adopted without the concur-
 sion of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer
 Sicily—death
 of Duketius. him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the
 island and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared
 war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between
 these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War
 actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took
 part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and
 especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera,
 these latter solicited and obtained peace.² The discord between
 the two cities however had left leisure to Duketius to found the
 city of Kalē Aktē, and to make some progress in re-establishing
 his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was over-
 taken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his
 plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously,
 reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island—re-
 gaining his former conquest Morgantinē, and subduing
 even the strong position and town called Trinakia,³ after a brave
 and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined
 with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was
 elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge
 schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island: with
 which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one
 hundred new triremes were constructed.⁴ Whether any, or what
 steps were taken to realise her designs, our historian does not tell

are as follows (xii. 8):—Οὗτος δὲ (Duke-
 tius) δάλγον χρόνον μείνας ἐν τῇ Κορύνθῳ,
 τὰς δ' ὀμοιογίας ξένσει, καὶ προσ-
 ποησάμενος χρησμὸν ὅπερ τῶν θεῶν ἔντοφ
 δεδόσθαι, κτίσας τὴν Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν
 Σικελίᾳ, κατέκλευσεν εἰς τὴν γῆσσον μετὰ
 πολλῶν οἰκητόρων συνεπελάθοντο δὲ καὶ
 τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνί-
 θης, δὲ τῶν Ἐρβιταλῶν δυναστεύων. Οὗτος
 μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν οἰκισμῶν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκ-
 τῆς δύνατον Ἀκραγαντῖνοι δὲ, ἀμα μὲν
 φθονοῦντες τοῖς Σιρακουσοῖς, ἀμα δὲ γυ-
 καλοῦντες αὐτοῖς διτὶ Δουκέτιον δυτα κοι-
 νὸν πολέμου διέσπασαν ἄνευ τῆς
 Ἀκραγαντίγων γυνώμης, πόλεμον
 ἔκθνευκαν τοῖς Σιρακουσοῖς.

¹ Diodor. xii. 8.

² Diodor. xii. 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinē, see Thucyd. iv. 65.

Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wessel's note), as well as Mannert (Geographie der Griechen und Römer, b. x. ch. xv. p. 446), intimate some scepticism; which I share so far as to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its magnitude and importance.

Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was the only Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. vi. 88; vii. 2).

³ Diodor. xii. 30.

us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power—indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phænomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that ^{Prosperity and power of} it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, ^{Agrigentum.} commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially, appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,¹ particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was renowned—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures,² with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing, that such prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the Gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenidēs and Zeno. Empedoklēs of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklēs and Pôlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more,

Intellectual movement in Sicily—Empedoklēs—Tisias—Korax—Gorgias.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 81.

² Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.

Gorgias at Leontini—acquired great reputation.¹ The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Empedoklēs, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.² The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini; whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and Sicilian cities^{—their condition and proceedings at the first breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C.} intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of war,^{431 B.C.} Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town—much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference³—were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were

¹ See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, Phœdr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, p. 534 R, and Epist. II. ad Ammœum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii. 1, 125. According to Cicero (*de Inventione*, ii. 2), the treatises of these ancient rhetoricians ("usque a principe illo et inventore Tisiā") had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them carefully, "nominatim," and had improved upon their expositions. Dio-

nysius laments that they had been so superseded (*Epist. ad Ammœum*, p. 722).

² Diogenes, Laert. viii. 64–71; Seyfert, Akratas und sein Gebiet, sect. ii. p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der Alten Philosophie, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 533 seqq.

³ Thucyd. iv. 61–64. This is the tenor of the speech delivered by Hermokratēs at the congress of Gela in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls all non-Sicilian Greeks *ἄλλοφύλους*.

numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus; perhaps Himera and Messenæ—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy.¹ Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connexion of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433–432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydidēs, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of

Relations
of Sicily to
Athens and
Sparta—
altered by
the quarrel
between
Corinth and
Korkyra and
the inter-
vention of
Athens.

¹ The inscription in Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt.* (No. 74. Part I. p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhegium, conveys little certain information. Boeckh refers it to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudēs at Athens (Olymp. 86, 4. B.C. 433–432, the year before the Peloponnesian war), renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture: and even the name of the archon, *Apseudēs*, which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be considered as certain.

If we could believe the story in Jus-

tin iv. 3, Rhegium must have ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war. He states, that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeræan exiles having first destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had invoked them — “ausi facinus nulli tyranno comprandum.” They married the Rhenine women, and seized the city for themselves.

I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears noticed in Thucydidēs, nor seems to consist with what he tells us.

Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.¹

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organising their first invasion of Attica and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of 500 ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready.² Of such expected succour, indeed, little was ever realised in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta show, that here as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighbouring towns,—a hope which must have contributed largely

Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Expectations not realised.

¹ Thucyd. i. 36.

² Thucyd. ii. 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν, τρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχόνταις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τάκεινων ἐλομένοις, νῦν ἐπετάχθησαν ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐδύμενον, &c.

Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppe, and Göller: compare Poppe, ad Thucyd. vol. i. ch. xv. p. 181.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction of *αὐτοῦ* with *ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας*, in the sense of "those ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily." This would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.

Nevertheless I think (differing from them) that *αὐτοῦ* is not a pronoun referring to *ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας*, but is used in contrast with those words, and really means "in or about Peloponnesus." It was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy (including the triremes already in Pelo-

ponnesus) equal to 500 sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily *alone* should amount to 500 sail, as Dr. Arnold (in my judgment, erroneously) imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: 500 sail for Sicily and Italy alone, would be incredible.

To construe the sentence as it stands now (putting aside the conjecture of *νῆσες* instead of *νῦν*, or *ἐπετάχθη* instead of *ἐπετάχθησαν*, which would make it run smoothly), we must admit the superposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes occurs in Thucydides. The sentence begins with one form of construction and concludes with another. We must suppose (with Göller) that *αἱ πόλεις* is understood as the nominative case to *ἐπετάχθησαν*. The dative cases (*Λακεδαιμονίους—ἐλομένοις*) are to be considered, I apprehend, as governed by *νῆσες ἐπετάχθησαν*: that is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which Thucydides has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if *νῆσες ἐπετάχθησαν* were intended to follow.

to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realised, we are not distinctly told; and we find Hermokratus the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy.¹ But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta; so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathised with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbours, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse—and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succour as allies² and Ionians—and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the

The Dorian
cities in
Sicily attack
the Ionian
cities in
Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34: compare iii. 86.

² Thucyd. vi. 86.

head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece,¹ though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Lachēs and Charœadēs,—with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests.

^{B.C. 427.} Taking station at Rhegium, Lachēs did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.² Throughout the ^{B.C. 426.} ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighbourhood of Rhegium and Mèssenê, his colleague Charœadēs being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messenê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.³ He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex:⁴ after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inessus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.⁵ Lachēs concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodorus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.⁶

¹ Thucyd. iii. 86; Diodor. xii. 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282. B. It is remarkable that Thucydides, though he is said (with much probability) to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus the pupil of Isokratus. Among the writers of the Isokratean school, the persons of distinguished rhetors, and their supposed

political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydides. Pausanias (vi. 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this celebrated legation.

² Thucyd. iii. 88; Diodor. xii. 54.

³ Thucyd. iii. 90; vi. 6.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 99.

⁵ Thucyd. iii. 103.

⁶ Thucyd. iii. 115.

That officer¹ had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under Eurymedon and Sophoklēs, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachēs insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforcements—at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.¹

Second ex-
pedition
under Py-
thodorus.

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklēs started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, ^{B.C. 425.} with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenēs on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylus, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war—the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.² But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.³

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodōrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachēs at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messenē; which had surrendered to Lachēs a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail,—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messenē to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land force of Lokri, together with a body of Reginé exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of

Indecisive
operations
near Mes-
senē and
Rhegium.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 115.

² See ch. LII.

³ Thucyd. iv. 48.

obtaining admission by means of a favourable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succour from Rhegium to Messenê. The latter town now served as a harbour for the fleet hostile to Athens,¹ which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes² together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory—in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at Cape Pelorus near Messenê, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium—each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.³ This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Reginæ territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under Cape Pelorus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Reginæ came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbour of Messenê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.³

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 115; iv. 1.

² Thucyd. iv. 24. καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχου ἀπέλευσαν, ὡς ἔκαστοι ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῷ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Πηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες, &c.

I concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage, yet conceiving that the words ὡς ἔκαστοι ἔτυχον designate the flight as disorderly, insomuch that *all* the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian station, nor *all* the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.

³ Thucyd. iv. 25. ἀποσμιωσάντων ἄκείνον καὶ προεμβαλόντων.

I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which is expressed by ἀποσμιωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says, "The Syracusans, on a sudden, threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants," &c. The open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their superior seamanship.

Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt : and the Messenian force thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbour the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinê near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels was seen descending the neighbouring hills to succour the Naxians : upon which, the latter, elate with the sight and mistaking the new-comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Messénê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomelê, while the Leontines and Naxines, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messénê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.¹

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war : nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus.² Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind,—the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in

Defeat of
the Mes-
senians by
the Naxians
and Sikels,
near Naxos.

Eurymedon
and Sopo-
kîles, with a
larger
Athenian
fleet, arrive
in Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 25.

² Thucyd. iv. 48.

which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island.¹ The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighbouring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.²

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratēs, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all pecuniary corruption, and clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country;³ but at the same time, of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydidēs places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratēs impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them,—but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be

¹ Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratēs, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse was on its way—respecting the increased disposi-

tion to union among the Sicilian cities, produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi. 33).

² Thucyd. iv. 58.

³ Thucyd. viii. 45.

exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance ; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the brunt of war,—was prepared to set the example ; without that foolish over-valuation of favourable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbours, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots ; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.¹

This harangue from Hermokratēs, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanour for the future. Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinē to Kamárina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money.² The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification ;

General
peace made
between
the Sicilian
cities.
Euryomedon
accedes to
the peace,
and with-
draws the
Athenian
fleet.

¹ See the speech of Hermokratēs, Thucyd. iv. 59–64. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Thucydidēs many years after its proper date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; though I doubt not that Thucydidēs collected the memoranda for it at the time.

Hermokratēs says, “The Athenians are now near us with a few ships, lying in wait for our blunders”—*οἱ δύναμις ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, ὁλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, &c. (iv. 60).

Now the fleet under the command of Euryomedon and his colleagues at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodōrus. It could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a small fleet : assuredly Hermokratēs would not thus allude to

it, since it was for the interest of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.

But Thucydidēs composing the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of Euryomedon as “a few ships,” when he tacitly compared the two. This is the only way that I know, of explaining such an expression.

The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted the words *ὅλιγαις ναυσὶ*: probably they noticed the contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage may certainly be construed without those words.

² Thucyd. iv. 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii. 22, 23, one of the Excerpta recently published by Mai in the Cod. Vatic.) that Timaeus had in his 21st book described the Congress at Gela at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratēs: which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.¹ They next acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. These generals had no choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities; with liberty of access reciprocally for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.²

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklēs and Pythodōrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated, we are not informed.³ This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained, in his conduct as recounted by Thucydidēs, is,—that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigour or success in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means entrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrol-

¹ Thucyd. v. 5.

² Thucyd. vi. 13–52.

³ Thucyd. iv. 65.

ment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town, upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.¹ While these exiles found shelter as they could in

¹ Thucyd. v. 4. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ἔμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλούς, καὶ δὴ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενέει ἀναδάσσονται. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθάμενοι Συρακούσους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, &c.

Upon this Dr. Arnold observes—“The principle on which this ἀναδασμὸς γῆς was re-demanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his portion, *κλῆρος*, of the land of the state, and that the admission of new citizens rendered a re-division of the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual *κλῆροι* (properties) of the old citizens were required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the Ager Publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary measure.”

I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed between Rome and Leontini. The Ager Publicus at Rome was the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may indeed have been originally a similar Ager Publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at any rate have been very small, and had probably been all absorbed and assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began.

We cannot suppose that the Leontines

had any Ager Publicus acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of men were the new immigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands to work with—or did they bring with them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of Leontini? (compare Thucyd. i. 27, and Plato de Legib. v. p. 744 A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and provided this were ensured, it might be a good bargain for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy.

We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words of Thucydides do not present this measure as revolutionary, or as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It was proposed on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the close neighbourhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syracuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure, without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford's representation can be noway justified from Thucydides—“Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the ex-

other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighbouring strong post called Brikinies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.¹

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent

pulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project for a fresh and equal partition; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens" (Mitford, H. G., ch. xviii. sect. ii. vol. iv. p. 23).

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has misrepresented the re-division of lands which took place after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty. That re-division had not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to say that the poor at Leontini now desired "a fresh and

equal partition." Thucydides says *not one word about equal partition*. He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens as the substantive and primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines—the re-division of the lands as a measure consequent and subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (*ἐπενδεῖ*). Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at variance with that of Thucydides.

¹ Justin (iv. 4) surrounds the Sicilian envoys at Athens with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the Athenian assembly—"Sordida veste, capillo barbaque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, concionem deiformes adeunt."

Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organise an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens; and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared; while on the other hand the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination, that the Kamarinæans, neighbours of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition, that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnes, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messenæ to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messenæ after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 4, 5.

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phœax to that island, came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiadēs carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mēlos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens pressing their entreaties for aid; which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighbouring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connexion. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.¹ Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachēs ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterwards she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even

¹ Thucyd. vi. 6; Diodor. xii. 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he mentions as having taken place some years before between Egesta and Lilybæum (xi. 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war between Egesta and Selinus.

at Carthage,¹ thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbours.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project ^{B.C. 416.} to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mēlos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear like the ^{Promises of the Egestæans: motives offered to Athens for intervention in Sicily.} Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all : as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.²

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandisement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favourable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,³ together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadēs, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous ; and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34.

&c.

² Thucyd. vi. 6; Diodor. xii. 83.

Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all

³ Thucyd. vi. 6. ὡν ἀκούοντες οἱ
Αθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε
Ἐγεσταλων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ
τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐψηφίσαντο,

these previous debates, when he im-
putes to the Athenians hurry and pa-
ssion in the ultimate decision (ch. xviii.
sect. ii. vol. iv. p. 30).

not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans:—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodité on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.¹

They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egesta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighbouring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive entertainment every Egestæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property—the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud.² To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestæan

¹ Thucyd. vi. 46. Ιδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιού-
μενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τὰ τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέσ-
της ἀκτώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἄργυρά ἔνδι-
λέζαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων πόλεων
καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἐλληνίδων αἰτησμέ-
νοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστίσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα
ἔκαστοι. Καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς

αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν
φαινομένων, μεγάλην τὴν ἐκπλήξιν τοῖς
ἐκ τῶν τριηρῶν Ἀθηναῖς παρέχον, &c.

Such loans of gold and silver plate
betoken a remarkable degree of intimacy
among the different cities.

² Thucyd. vi. 46; Diodor. xii. 83.

envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,¹ about three months after the capture of Mélos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents (one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes) as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers—Nikias, Alkibiadēs, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.² Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadēs and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias who had opposed it. He was probably

¹ To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the lost comedy *Τριφάλης* of Aristophanēs. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at this time by Alkibiadēs and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi. 90).

The word *Τριφάλης* was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied to Alkibiadēs, who was just now at the height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining of the *Τριφάλης*, in Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* vol. ii. p. 1162-1167.

² Thucyd. vi. 8; Diodor. xii. 83.

b.c. 415.
Return of
the com-
missioners
to Athens—
impression
produced by
their report.
Resolution
taken to send
an expedition
to Sicily.

more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith—and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he laboured under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favour. Accordingly his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance.¹ But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydidēs. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

“ Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honourable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may

¹ Thucyd. vi. 8. ‘Ο δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούοις μὲν γρηγέρως ἄρχειν, &c. The reading ἀκούστοις appears better sustained by MSS., and intrinsically more suitable than ἀκούοις, which latter word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech

which properly belonged to the first—and who explained this by supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavoured to supply one in the text.

clash with your habitual judgements. I tell you then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as cooperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandisement. But to me it seems, that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favour of Lacedæmon—but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonour: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkibiadēs: "If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own

selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of making good his extravagances—do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own—and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly—and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach: in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire—many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition—maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.¹ Nor be thou afraid, Prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly—seeing that breach of the law in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgement."

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this

¹ Thucyd. vi. 9–14. Καὶ σὺ, ὁ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κῆδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βουλεῖ γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγάθος, ἐπικῆφις, καὶ γράμματα προτίθει αὐθίς Ἀθηναῖοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὅρθωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λίνειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶν δὲ μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως κακῶς βουλευσαμένης λαρπὸς ἄν γενέσθαι, &c.

I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold either on this passage, or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian assembly on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the Mityleneans (see above, ch. L. and Thucyd. iii. 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the Prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and punishment. Probably he would have been accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it actually turned out—if they had reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small majority.

The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold

between what was *illegal* and what was merely *irregular*, was little marked at Athens: both were called *illegal*—τὸν νόμους λίνειν. The rules which the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and decisions, were just as much *laws* as those which it passed for the guidance of private citizens.

Both in this case, and in the Mitylenean debate, I think the Athenian Prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many Mitylenean lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident (the condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ) in which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.

memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression ; since it completely reopened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadēs rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nikias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus ; yet the hostile feelings till continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadēs started up forthwith—his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

“ Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander (for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin Reply of Alkibiadēs. here), and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Théory at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war ; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honour to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here ; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if ~~he~~ were their equal ; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us—in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous : or else let him give equal

dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society, with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely—and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honour. It is this glory which I desire; and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength."

"Thus did my youth, and my so called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long as I possess it in full vigour, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way."¹

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadēs went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens, than they were now: they were not more desperate enemies now, than they had been in former days:² they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy

¹ Thueyd. vi. 16, 17.

² Thueyd. vi. 17. Καὶ νῦν οὐτε ἀνέλ· | πιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς δηγεούντο, εἴτε καὶ πάντα ἔρθωνται, &c.

sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure *they* could bring no help to Attica in return:—but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinising such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that aspiring readiness of enterprise, which, having become engrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.¹

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadēs to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more however, decidedly, in favour of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also, those Athenians who had visited Egesta stood forward again to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and

The assembly
favourable
to the views of
Alkibiadēs
—adheres to
the resolu-
tion of sail-
ing to Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16-19.

insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free—well-prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxus and Katana, from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and ensuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing.¹ If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 22.

² Thucyd. vi. 23. ὅπερ ἔγώ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμάς δέοντας, βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλειων εὐτυχῆσαι (χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους θυτας), διτι ἐλάχιστα τῷ τόχῳ παραδοὺς ἔμαυτὸν

βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλῆς ἐκπλεῦσα. Ταῦτα γάρ τη τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιώτατα ἥγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια εἰ δέ τῷ Κλλως δοκεῖ, παρῆμι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardour and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve every thing which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralising the popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadēs, the Egestæans, and the Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realising more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiadēs had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety and favour with the gods—that his opposition to their favourite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.¹

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardour beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain; others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament.

Effect of this speech—increased eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—ardour and unanimity in reference to the plan.

Excitement in the city among all classes—great increase in the scale on which the expedition was planned.

¹ Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.

So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than 5000—Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle—fatally interrupted however by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct

B.C. 415.
April.

Large pre-
parations
made for the
expedition.

Review of
these prelim-
inary pro-
ceedings to
the Sicilian
expedition.

information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission from Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favour of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance^{to proceed in the enterprise without him,} that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his scepticism about the

Advice and
influence of
Nikias.

reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiadēs. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiadēs is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted ; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklēs had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus—we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadēs, and the destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must for ever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nikias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued ; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadēs draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending—is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before : her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint ; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadēs asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large

portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily; the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!¹—to notice the honour which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,² which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the maximum of her credit as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydidēs so replete with rash, misguiding, and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiadēs.

As a man of action, Alkibiadēs was always brave, vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands—a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Mélos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects: for we ought not to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was³ than the largest island in the *Ægean*. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.⁴ Moreover we shall see presently that even the armament which was despatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiadēs: though I cannot bring myself to believe that even

Athena believed herself entitled to be mistress of the islands as well as of the sea.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 1. οὐ πολλῷ τινι ἵπο-
δεέστερον πόλεμον, &c.: compare vii.
28.

² Compare Plutarch, Precept. Reipubl. Gerend. p. 804.

³ Thucyd. v. 99; vi. 1-6.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 6. ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ
ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς πάσης (Σικε-

λίας) ἄρξειν, βοηθεῖν δὲ Ἀμα ἐντρέπως
βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἔνγγεστι καὶ
τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμπόχοις.

Even in the speech of Alkibiadēs, the conquest of Sicily is only once alluded to—and that indirectly; rather as a favourable possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.

he (as he afterwards asserted) really looked beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. It was not merely ambition which he desired to gratify. He was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.¹

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiadēs as here described—we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen, before this volume is finished, that the vices of Alkibiadēs, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρα-
τηγήσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικε-
λίαν τε δί' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι,
καὶ τὰ Ίδια ἔμα εὐτυχῆσας χρήμασι τε
καὶ δόξῃ ὀφελήσειν. Ὡν γάρ ἐν ἀξιώ-
ματι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις
μείζοισιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν
ἐχρήγτο ἐς τὰς ἴστοροφίας καὶ τὰς
ἄλλας δαπάνας, &c.

Compare vi. 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadēs alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadēs made at Sparta after his banishment (Thucyd.

vi. 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here ascribing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain—as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thucydidēs.

In the *Oratio de Pace* of Andokidēs (sect. 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This statement is wholly untrue.

CHAPTER LVIII.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

FOR the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily (described in the last chapter), the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted (chiefly through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a counter-manoeuvre) with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favourable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result¹. All classes in the city, rich and poor—cultivators, traders, and seamen—old and young—all embraced the project with ardour; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandisement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadēs, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint or incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was adopted reluctantly with many dissentients, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land and sea-service. Among the trierarchs (or rich citizens who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war) the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honour to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state indeed fur-

B.C. 415.
April.
Preparations
for the expe-
dition against
Sicily—
general ent-
husiasm
and san-
guine hopes
at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. viii.-1.

nished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion, was different in every individual case according to temper and circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness were universal. Each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the Thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:¹ and it seems that the seamen were not appointed especially to one ship, but were at liberty to accept these offers and to serve in any ship they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known before—in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from the subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.²

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had now elapsed since the peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations,³ and the triremes increased

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31. ἐπιφορᾶς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θραυλταῖς τὰν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις, καὶ τέλλα σημειοῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, &c.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαι to mean the petty officers, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστής, &c. Gölter and Poppo construe it to mean "the servants of the sailors." Neither of the two explanations seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means "to the crews generally," the word ὑπηρεσίαι being a perfectly general word, comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before. To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning—"the crews generally, or the remaining crews, along with the Thranitæ"—is doubtless more or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

² Thucyd. vii. 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ εὐθάνατες, &c.

³ Thucyd. vi. 26. I do not trust the

statement given in Aeschines De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidēs, De Pace, sect. 8, that 7000 talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the peace of Nikias, and that 400 triremes, or 300 triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that the sum of 3000 talents at least must have been laid by, during the interval between the conclusion of the peace of Nikias and the Sicilian expedition, in the acropolis: that over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition to discharge, out of the current receipts, sums which it had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various temples: and that there was besides a surplus for docks and fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so paid in the Opisthodomus

ni number—the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Periklēs,—

Abundance
in the Ath-
enian treasury
—display of
wealth as
well as of
force in the
armament.

was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest, in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral ; in picked men, universal ardour, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat ; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city while the preparations were going forward : a mingled feeling of private sympathy and patriotism—a dash of uneasiness from reflection on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act—yet an elate confidence in Athenian force such as had never before been entertained.¹ We hear of Sokratēs the philosopher, and Meton the astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine anticipation : the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. It is not impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general predominance of the various favourable religious signs and prophecies, there were also some unfavourable. Usually, on all public matters of risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite ways : those which turned out right were treasured up ; the rest were at once forgotten, or never long remembered.²

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city.

or back-chamber of the Parthenon, for account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. part ii. Inscr. Att. No. 76. p. 117; also the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii. p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the years between 421-

415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 31; Diodor. xiii. 2, 3.

² Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately after the catastrophe at Syracuse the Athenians were very angry with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii. 1).

This was, the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

The Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermes, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well as of temples—near the most frequented porticos—at the intersection of cross ways—in the public agora. They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood,¹ so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermès, became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover the quadrangular fashion of these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermès, was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness of Pelasgian workmanship; and was popular in Arcadia, as well as peculiarly frequent in Athens.²

About the end of May 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidēs affirms (and I incline to believe him) that there was but *one* which escaped unharmed.³

¹ Cicero, Legg. ii. 11. “*Melius Graeci atque nostri; qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, incere voluerunt.*”

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sect. 15–46: compare Herodotus, v. 67—a striking story, as illustrated in this History, ch. ix.—also Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4–7; Livy, xxxviii. 43.

In an inscription in Boeckh's Corp. Insc. (part ii. No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis appears, at the

head of which list figures the name of Athénē Polias.

² Pausanias, i. 24, 3; iv. 33, 4; viii. 31, 4; viii. 48, 4; viii. 41, 4. Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller, Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl. Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum. Berlin, 1845.

³ Thucyd. vi. 27. οὐοι Ἐρμαῖ ήσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῷ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναῖσι . . . μιᾶς ρυκτῆς οἱ πλεῖστοι περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidēs (De Myst. sect. 63) ex-

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of different creed, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other,—is usually one of surprise Violent excitement and religious alarm produced by the act at Athens. that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement.¹ But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realise in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians²—noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods.³ If we

pressly states that only a single one was spared—*καλ διὰ ταῦτα δὲ Ερμῆς δύ
δράτε πάντες, δ παρὰ τὴν πατρόφαν οἰκλαρ
τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, μένος
τῶν 'Ερμῶν τῶν 'Αθηνῆσι.*

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13) copy Andokidēs: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thucydidēs—*οἱ πλεῖστοι.* This expression is noway at variance with Andokidēs, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andokidēs; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

Diodorus (xiii. 2) says that *all* the Hermæ were mutilated—not recognising a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all *thrown down* (dejicerentur).

¹ It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii. sect. 65. p. 191–196. While he denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language—you would suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking the smallest pains to show in

what way it profoundly wounded the religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetzerieen zu Athen. p. 65), though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

² Pausanias, i. 17, 1; i. 24, 3; Harpocrator v. 'Ερμαι. See Sluiter, Lectioines Andocideæ, cap. 2.

Especially the *ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι* (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets — a function performed by Apollo Agieus, as well as by Hermes.

³ Herodot. viii. 144; Aeschylus, Pers. 810; Aeschyl. Agam. 339; Isokratis, Or. iv. Panegyr. s. 182. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arkhinous: see the argument of the Ιάλου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, Sophoklēs, sect. 21. vol. i. p. 162. Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to the Egyptian statues and holy customs, upon any other supposition than that of stark madness—*ἐδυνη μεγάλως*—Herod. iii. 37–38.

Timaeus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320–290 B.C.) represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration

could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens—where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life—where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localised, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonoured and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general,—it would seem that the town had become as it were godless—that the streets, the market-place, the porticos, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments,—wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathising. It was on the protection of the gods that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others:¹ an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction,—not simply a form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues, without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences and determining practical measures. Accordingly they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted.²

of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syracusan Hermokratēs, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermes (*Timæi Fragn.* 103–104, ed. Didot; *Longinus, de Sublim.* iv. 3).

The etymological thread of connexion between the Hermæ and Hermokratēs, is strange enough: but what is of importance to remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly was

it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 97; Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 871 b, 881 d. ή τοῦ νόμου ἡρα, &c. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363. c. 24. p. 404. c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.

² Dr. Thirlwall observes in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ—

“We indeed see so little connexion between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together, as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition, it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.¹ It would doubtless have been so interpreted, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object,—just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of Adonis.² The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organised conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more, mutilation by wholesale—spread by one band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

The authors
of the act
unknown—
but it was
certainly
done by
design and
conspiracy.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other:—to ruin Alkibiadēs—to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,³ prompting them to intercept an expedition which was

reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadēs, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch. xxv. vol. iii. p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history, indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might however have been stated far more strongly, for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our disjunction of the two ideas, as we have

in comprehending his association of the two.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μείζων ἐλάμβανον τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰώνδς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δῆμου καταλύσεως γεγενήθαν.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine magna multorum consensione esse factum,” &c.

² Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratēs, Fr. Inc. 84, ed. Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 358, also p. 1164; Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

³ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 834, who

supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens—rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies of intestine politics. Various parties suspected —great probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians to abandon or postpone the expedition.

that the Athenians, under the intense impression of re-

ligious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going (a fact perfectly known to the enemy¹), would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of his character and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.²

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias—this calculation was not realised. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra;

professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch however asserts—what cannot be true—that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestean agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egesteans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, high-

ways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310–280 B.C.) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanes—who however is not very careful, since he tells us that Thucydides ascribed that act to Alkibiadēs and his friends; which is not true (Philochor. Fragm. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lyaistr. 1094).

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34.

² See Thucyd. v. 45; v. 50; viii. 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 4.

he Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in that which I have stated as the other part of their probable plan; to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadēs.

Few men in Athens either had, or deserved to have, a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiadēs; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seemed to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people—as it would have appeared to the Ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece—that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes.¹ Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unpeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large rewards were accordingly proclaimed to

The political enemies of Alkibiadēs take advantage of the reigning excitement to try and ruin him.

Anxiety of the Athenians to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for information.

¹ See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (*Orat. ii. Tetrilog. 1. 1. 10.*).

'Ασύμφορόν θ' ὅμιν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἐκαγονὸν ὕντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιανεῖν τὴν ἀγνελαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τε τὰς αὐτὰς πρατέjas λόντα συγκατακιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἱ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θαληταὶ πρᾶξις εἰς καθίστανται. Οἰκεῖαν οὖν χρῆ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὰ τόντου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ιδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, *De Cæde Herodis*,

sect. 83, and Sophoklēs, *Oedip. Tyrann.* 26, 96, 170—as to the miseries which befall a country, so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil, and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, *Hiero*, iv. 4, and Plato, *Legg. x. p. 885–910*, at the beginning and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (*ὕθρις*) outrage against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species of *ὕθρις*; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole population.

any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew, and more than he knew, about such incidents ; while to exercise any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic himself a suspected man—“metuunt dubitasse videri.” To rake out and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an earnest zeal for the honour of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance ;¹ but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally.²

While the Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action, Diognétus, Peisander, Chariklēs, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries ; and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.³ The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date ; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic—and above all to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses,⁴ by parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the

¹ Thucyd. vi. 27.

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 14, 15, 26; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18.

⁴ Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical goverment, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family (the Chevalier d'Étallonde and Chevalier de la Barre) were tried, convicted and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this offence they were charged with

having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful: nevertheless both were condemned to have their tongues cut out by the roots—to have their right hands cut off at the church gate — then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre (d'Étallonde having escaped) in July 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt—but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accom-

Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadēs.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the ~~trireme~~^{First accusation of Alkibiadēs, of having professed and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.} of Lamachus (who was doubtless more diligent about the military details than either of his two colleagues) was already moored in the outer harbour, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers,¹ who probably laid before their countrymen an imposing account of the force assembled—when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadēs. “Athenians” (said he), “you are going to despatch this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadēs is one of the profaners of the holy mysteries in a private house. Pass a vote of impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose, if my statement prove untrue.” While Alkibiadēs strenuously denied the allegation, the Prytanes (senators presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes) at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the as-

plices (Voltaire, *Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre*, Œuvres, vol. xlii. p. 361–379, ed. Bouchot : also Voltaire, *Le Cri du Sang Innocent*, vol. xii. p. 133).

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how (as in this mutilation of the Hermae at Athens) the occurrence of one act of sacrilege turns men's imagination, belief, and talk, to others, real or imaginary:—

“Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit secrètement cette trame, il arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont d'Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l'on soupçonna que des soldats ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

“Malheureusement l'évêque d'Amiens, étant aussi évêque d'Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une importance qu'elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires: il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; et on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année entière. On disoit qu'il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties, et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On

assuroit qu'ils avoient répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l'Europe. Vous connaissez, Monsieur, jusqu'à quel point la populace porte la crédulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

“La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de délations. Chacun disoit ce qu'il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu'il avoit entendu ou cru entendre.”

It will be recollect that the sentence on the Chevalier de la Barre was passed, not by the people nor by any popular judicature; but by a limited court of professional judges sitting at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris, the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

¹ Andokidēs (*D. Myster. s. 11*) marks this time minutely—*Ὕπε δὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νίκαια καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριηρήσ η στρατηγίσ ηδη ἔξωρει η λαμπρού ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ εἶπεν, &c.*

sembly, and went to fetch the slave (Andromachus by name) whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadēs, Nikiadēs, and Melētus went through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen—the test which Pythonikus had offered.¹

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadēs by his enemies. Pythonikus, the demagogue Androkłēs, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding (probably in substance true), enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. "All had been done (they said) with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors—a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanour." Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the mutilation of the Hermæ, (for whatever else Alkibiadēs may have done, of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,) they calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadēs—aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favourite projects in Sicily—found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantinea were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loath to be balked of this project. From all which circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.²

¹ Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.

² Thucyd. vi. 29. Isokratēs (Orat. Sicily, in a very inaccurate manner. xvi. De Bigis, sect. 7, 8) represents these

But Alkibiadēs saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty—accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted—and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself of being aspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadēs. These men affected a tone of candour—deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith—and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return.¹ Such was the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadēs probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which ensured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 29. Οἱ δὲ ἔχθροι, δεδιδτές τό τε στράτευμα, μὴ εἴνουν ἐχρ, θνήθη ἀγωνίσηται, δὲ δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται, θεραπεύων διτὶ δι' ἑκείνον οἱ τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἔννεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέστειδον, δλλοις δὲ τοῖς ἡτορας ἐνιέντες, οἱ ἑλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βαυλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, θνήμελλον δὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος πορείν, μετάτεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkip. c. 19.

² The account which Andokidēs gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadēs by Pythonikus, in the assembly prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially cor-

rect, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidēs. But when Andokidēs goes on to say, that “in consequence of this information Polystratūs was seized and put to death, while the rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death in their absence” (sect. 13)—this cannot be true. Alkibiadēs most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned—at that time. If Alkibiadēs was not then tried, neither could the other persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadēs before the sailing of the fleet, was dropped

He denies
the charge
and de-
mands im-
mediate
trial—his
demand is
eluded by
his enemies.

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement—while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll—and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, (Epibatae or marines) each with a panoply furnished by the state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships.¹ The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport.

But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle—the citizens accom-

entirely for that time, both against him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when the information of Andokidés himself had satisfied the Athenians on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadés, was founded, in part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when Alkibiadés was sent for and refused to come home. But we may well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidés is as to the consequences of

the information of Andromachus. He mentions Panatius as one of those who fled in consequence of that information and were condemned in their absence: but Panatius appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as not having fled at that time (sect. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v. Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias, that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermae. This is quite different from the statement of Andokidés, and would lead us to suppose that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidés himself informed.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 43; vii. 57.

panying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken ; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none of them accurately—and into ~~the~~ sea of undefined possibilities ; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions ; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board and the Keleustès was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained, by sound of trumpet, the crews in every ship, and the spectators on shore, followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the Epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file—displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.¹ Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods ; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details, given by Thucydidès, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise 134 triremes with two Rhodian pentekonters ; 5100 hoplites ; 480 bowmen, 80 of them Kretan ; 700 Rhodian slingers ; and 120 Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons and carpenters, &c., the number was not less than 500 ; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading ships, following

*Solemnities
of parting,
on ship-
board and
on the
water's edge.*

*Full muster
of the
armament
at Korkyra.*

¹ Thucyd. vi. 32; Diodor. xiii. 3.

voluntarily for purposes of profit.¹ Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance, to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Egesta that the succour solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadēs, and Lamachus—they crossed the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, Progress to they met with a very cold reception from the various Rhegium—cold reception by the Grecian cities. None would receive them within their Italian cities, walls or even sell them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavouring to induce them to aid the armament in re-establishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Reginæ would promise nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave to themselves open latitude of conduct for the future—not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies.²

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra (about July 415 B.C.) that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their

¹ Thucyd. vi. 44.

² Thucyd. vi. 44–46.

designs against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was however a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumour; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before.¹ No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.²

Hermokratēs, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as

Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching armament—disposition to undervalue its magnitude, and even to question its intended coming.

Strenuous exhortations of Hermokratēs, to be prepared.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes—"It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidēs makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii. sect. iii. vol. iv. p. 46). The democratical party

now bore the sway," &c.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidēs this conjecture is founded. Mr. Mitford had spoken of the government as a democracy before; he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain.

² Thucyd. vi. 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμετάλληθα ήδη, &c.

might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece; by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks—to the Sikels—and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable—and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratēs) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organised, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian¹ allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbour of Tarentum; from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows; the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case, Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.²

Though these opinions of Hermokratēs were espoused farther Temper and by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater parties in number of speakers held an opposite language, and the Syra- placed little faith in his warnings. We have already cusan as- sembly. noticed Hermokratēs nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34. "Ο δὲ μάλιστα ἐγίνετο νομίω ἐπίκαιον, διεῖσδε δὲ διὰ τὸ ξένηθες Ησυχον. Ήκιστορέων δὲ καὶ τοιούτοισθε, θυμός εἰρηνείας.

That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratēs here predicates of his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklēs and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i. 144; vi. 7).

Both of the governments however were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predictions about all democracies; for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted however whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratēs to his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his language implies.

² Thucyd. vi. 33–36.

to the existing democratical constitution ; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech.¹ Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratēs himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that, which he characterised as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganisation under those administrators and generals, characterised as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who in replying to Hermokratēs and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors—a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.²

“ Every one,³ (said he) except only cowards and bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians *would* be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you ; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not detected.⁴ You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports : you will rather judge from what able men such as the Athenians are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable : indeed I think they account themselves lucky that we with our powerful cities have never come across to attack them. And if they *should*

Reply of
Athenagoras,
the popular
orator.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἥσαν, &c.

² Thucyd. vi. 35. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, δι δῆμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐπὶ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ξέλεγε τοιάδε, &c.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἑκαίνου τὸν χρόνον δὲν καὶ τῷ τλήθει πιθανώτατος, &c. (iv. 21).

Neither δῆμον προστάτης, nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold)—at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office bearing such title:

but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words δῆμον προστάτης always imply an equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv. 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most influential men in the city. See also iii. 70—Peithias at Korkyra.

³ Thucyd. vi. 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydides, without binding myself to the words.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 36. τοὺς δ' ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιάτα καὶ περιφέρους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξιούσιας, εἰ μὴ οἰονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι.

come, as it is pretended—they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business; in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you and get themselves nominated to the chief posts.¹ One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city: they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you—by chastisement to these conspirators—and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me² that democracy is neither

¹ Thucyd. vi. 38. 'Αλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἔγώ, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες τὰ σφετέρα αὐτῶν, εἰδὲ οἴδε' ὅτι, σάχουσι, καὶ οὐθένδε ἄνδρες οὐτε ὄντα, οὐτε ἀντιγόνους. Οὐδὲ ἔγώ οὐ νῦν πρώτον, δλλ' ἀεὶ ἐπίστημαι, ητοι λόγοις γε τοιούστοις, καὶ ἔτι τούτων κακορυγτέροις, ή Ἅργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοῦς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικο μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσασιν, &c.

² Thucyd. vi. 39. φῆσει τις δημοκράτης οὐτε ξυνεργὸν οὖν ίσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. Ἔγώ δέ φημι, πώτα μὲν, δῆμοις ἔμπτων ἀνομάσθαι, διλγαρχίας δὲ μέρος: ἔπειτα, φύλακας μὲν ἀριστούς εἴναι τηρημάτων τοὺς πλανούσους, βουλεύειν δ' ἀντιγόνους τοὺς ξυνεργούς, κρίναι δ' ἀνδρόσαρτας ἄριστα τοὺς πολεούς· καὶ ταῦτα δημοτικά καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξυμβατά διδημοκρατίᾳ ἴσομοιρεῖν.

Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων—"having the care of the public purse"—as if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxa-

tion or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi. 9). This is the service which he renders, *quatenus rich man*, to the state: he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities: thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (ξυνεργὸς as well as πλούσιος), and then he may serve the state as *counsellor*—the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise command—which was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary—but not to expect command, unless they are personally competent.

intelligent nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community—intelligent men, the best counsellors—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolises the whole for itself.¹ This is just what you young and powerful men are aiming at, though you will never be able to keep it permanently in a city such as Syracuse. Be taught by me—or at least alter your views, and devote yourselves to the public advantage of our common city. Desist from practising, by reports such as these, upon the belief of men who know you too well to be duped. If even there be any truth in what you say—and if the Athenians *do* come—our city will repel them in a manner worthy of her reputation. She will not take you at your word, and choose *you* commanders, in order to put the yoke upon her own neck. She will look for herself—construe your communications for what they really mean—and instead of suffering you to talk her out of her free government, will take effective precautions for maintaining it against you."

Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the Stratēgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words:—"We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biassed by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm

Interposition
of the
Stratēgi to
moderate
the violence
of the debate.

speaking, that which he here affirms,² is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state, individually taken: moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really entitled to.

A passage in the financial oration of Demosthenes—περὶ Συμποριῶν (p. 185.

c. 8) will illustrate what has been here said—Δεῖ τοίνυν ὑμᾶς τάλλα παρατεκμάσσθαι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα νῦν μὲν ἔαν τοὺς κεκτημένους ἔχειν—οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἦν ἐν καλλιόνῳ σώζοντο τῇ πόλει· ἔαυ δὲ ποθ' ὁ καρδος οὗτος ἔλθῃ, τότε ἐκόντων εἰσφερόντων αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 39. 'Ολιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δὲ ὀφελίων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔμπατα ἀφελούσιν ἔχει· οἱ δὲ δια τοῦ οὐτε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι οἱ προθυμοῦνται, δύναται ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.

in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. We generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighbouring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have indeed already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn."

The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party-feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens—the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratēs and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratēs has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition—a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got the real power, and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families—often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon—the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms—whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal power, there are always abundant censors and critics—some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candour, wisdom, or rhetoric—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorised magistrate or general.

We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested

Relative
position of
Athenagoras
and other
parties at
Syracuse.

policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called Demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary war; a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens, that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the harangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war; a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendancy of Hermokratēs was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians—while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgement respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations *à priori* founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary—may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organize and train the select regiment of One Thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth: within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution.¹ Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select Thousand at Argos.

The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals

His general denuncia-
tions against the
oligarchical
youth were
well-founded.

¹ See above, chap. lvi.

had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratēs than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, and apprised by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, they pushed their preparations with the utmost activity; distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.¹

The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Reginæ, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded—it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, under severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money—for it appears that both Alkibiadēs and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful—the generals now discussed their plan of action.

Nikias—availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable—wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realised, he would only tarry long enough

¹ Thucyd. vi. 45.

to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises—all at the cost of Athens.¹

Against this scheme Alkibiadēs protested, as narrow, timid, and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been entrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks—especially Messenē, convenient both as harbour for their fleet and as base of their military operations—to prevail upon them to co-operate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to ensure supplies of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus; unless indeed the former should consent to re-establish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.²

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, dissented from both his colleagues. He advised, that they should proceed at once, without any delay, to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its walls. The Syracusans (he urged) were now in terror and only half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighbouring lands, not yet removed within the walls—and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army;³ while the deserted town and harbour of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum, immediately after its arrival. If advantage were taken of this first impression to take an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist: but the longer such attack

¹ Thucyd. vi. 47; Plutarch, Nikias, οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμβάίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Δεοντίγους ἔωσι καροκίζειν.
c. 14.

² Thucyd. vi. 48. Οὕτως ἡδη Συρα-
κούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ην μὴ ³ Compare iv. 104—describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas.

was delayed, the more this first impression of dismay would be effaced, giving place to a reactionary sentiment of indifference and even contempt, when the much-dreaded armament was seen to accomplish little or nothing. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.¹

Superior discern-
ment of Lamachus—
plan of Alkibiadēs
preferred. But Lamachus found no favour with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadēs and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former—which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious; at first sight indeed the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished: and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadēs insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive—a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. The advice of Lamachus, alike soldier-like and farsighted, would probably have been approved and executed either by Brasidas or by Demosthenēs; while the dilatory policy still advocated by Alkibiadēs, even after the suggestion of Lamachus had been started, tends to show that if he was superior in military energy to one of his colleagues, he was not less inferior to the other. Indeed, when we find him talking of besieging Syracuse, unless the Syracusans would consent to the re-establishment of Leontini—it seems probable that he had not yet made up his mind peremptorily to besiege the city at all; a fact completely at variance with those unbounded hopes of conquest which he is reported as having conceived even at Athens. It is possible that he may have thought it impolitic to contradict too abruptly the tendencies of Nikias, who, anxious as he was chiefly to find some pretext for carrying back his troops unharmed, might account the proposition of Lamachus too desperate even to be discussed.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 49.

Unfortunately, the latter, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, the wealth and family ascendency of either of his colleagues, the achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse, not as prisoners, but as conquerors.

Alkibiadēs, as soon as his plan had become adopted by means of the approval of Lamachus, sailed across the strait in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messenē. Though admitted personally into the city and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favourable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward, and take their night-station at the mouth of the river Terias. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself, while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbour, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald,—“The Leontines now in Syracuse are hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians.” After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.¹

Alkibiadēs
at Messenē
—Naxos
Join the
Athenians.
Empty dis-
play of the
armament.

We may remark that this proceeding was completely at variance with the judicious recommendation of Lamachus. It tended to familiarise the Syracusans with the sight of the armament piecemeal, without any instant action—and thus to abate in their minds the terror-striking impression of its first arrival.

At Katana, Alkibiadēs personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messenē. Accident alone enabled him to carry his

¹ Thucyd. vi. 50. .

point—for the general opinion was averse to his propositions.
 Alkibiadēs at Katana—
 the Athenians made of Katana—
 they establish their station there.
 Refusal of Kamarina.

While most of the citizens were in the assembly listening to his discourse, some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open, and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadēs.¹ The whole Athenian armament was now conducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as head-quarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly the whole armament proceeded thither, and took moorings off the shore, while a herald was sent up to the city. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty; which bound them to receive at any time one single ship—but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse both going and returning, they ascertained the falsehood of a report that the Syracusans were putting a naval force afloat; moreover they landed near the city and ravaged some of the neighbouring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships²—the first blood shed in this important struggle, and again at variance with the advice of Lamachus.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They Alkibiadēs is summoned home to take his trial. found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived from Athens—the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadēs to come home and stand his trial for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes. A few other citizens specified by name were commanded to come along with him under the same charge; but the trierarch of the Salaminian was especially directed to serve him only with the summons, without any guard or coercion, so that he might return home in his own trireme.³

This summons, pregnant with momentous results both to Athens

¹ Polyænus (i. 40, 4) treats this acquisition of Katana as the result, not of accident, but of a preconcerted plot. I follow the account as given by Thucydides.

² Thucyd. vi. 52.

³ Thucyd. vi. 53-61.

and to her enemies, arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ (described a few pages back) and the inquiries instituted into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The extensive and anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing citizens, combined with the solemnity of the scene itself, had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege. But it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, 1000 and even 10,000 drachms, were proclaimed to informers; of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus before mentioned. A metic named Teukrus had fled from Athens, shortly after the event, to Megara, from whence he sent intimation to the senate at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ—and that if impunity were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of the senate was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, in the mock-célébration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês—these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city—deposed farther that Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner in the house of Charmidês. And lastly Lydus, slave of a citizen named Phereklês, stated that the like scene had been enacted in the house of his master in the deme Thêmakus—giving the names of the parties present, one of whom (though asleep and unconscious of what was passing) he stated to be Leogoras, the father of Andokidês.¹

Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.² The informers

¹ Andokides de Mysteriis, sect. 14, 15, 35. In reference to the deposition of Agaristê, Andokidês again includes Alkibiadês among those who fled into banishment in consequence of it. Unless we are to suppose another Alkibiadês, not the general in Sicily—this statement cannot be true. There was another Alkibiadês, of the deme Phegus: but Andokidês in mentioning him afterwards (sect. 65), specifies his deme.

He was cousin of Alkibiadês, and was in exile at the same time with him (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 13).

² Andokidês (sect. 13–34) affirms that some of the persons, accused by Teukrus as mutilators of the Hermæ, were put to death upon his deposition. But I contest his accuracy on this point. For Thucydidês recognises no one as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidês himself in-

Feelings and
proceedings
at Athens
since the
departure
of the
armament.

received the promised rewards, after some debate as to the parties entitled to receive the reward; for Pythonikus, the citizen who had produced the slave Andromachus, pretended to the first claim, while Androkles, one of the senators, contended that the senate collectively ought to receive¹ the money—a strange pretension, which we do not know how he justified. At last however, at the time of the Panathenaic festival, Andromachus the slave received the first reward of 10,000 drachms—Teukrus the metic, the second reward of 1000 drachms.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into exile. But the alarm, the agony, and the suspicion, in the public mind, went on increasing rather than diminishing. The information hitherto received had been all partial, and with the exception of Agaristē, all the informants had been either slaves or metics, not citizens; while Teukrus, the only one among them who had stated anything respecting the mutilation of the Hermæ, did not profess to be a party concerned, or to know all those who were.² The people had heard only a succession of disclosures—all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods who protected their country and constitution—all indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasonable—yet none communicating any full or

formed (see vi. 27, 53, 61). He dwells particularly upon the number of persons, and persons of excellent character, imprisoned on suspicion; but he mentions none as having been put to death except those against whom Andokidēs gave testimony. He describes it as a great harshness, and as an extraordinary proof of the reigning excitement, that the Athenians should have detained so many persons upon suspicion on the evidence of informers not entitled to credence. But he would not have specified this detention as extraordinary harshness, if the Athenians had gone so far as to put individuals to death upon the same evidence. Besides, to put these men to death would have defeated their own object—the full and entire disclosure of the plot and the conspirators. The ignorance in which they were of their internal enemies, was among the most agonising of all their sentiments; and to put any prisoner to death until they arrived, or believed themselves to have arrived, at the knowledge

of the whole—would tend so far to bar their own chance of obtaining evidence — δὲ δῆμος δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύσμενος λαβάν, ὡς φέτο, τὸ σαφὲς, καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβούλευοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθε μὴ εἰσονται, &c.

Wachsmuth says (p. 194)—“The bloodthirsty dispositions of the people had been excited by the previous murders: the greater the number of victims to be slaughtered, the better were the people pleased,” &c. This is an inaccuracy quite in harmony with the general spirit of his narrative. It is contradicted, implicitly, by the very words of Thucydides which he transcribes in his note 108.

¹ Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 27–28. καὶ Ἀνδροκλῆς ὁ πὲρ τῆς βουλῆς.

² Andokid. de Myster. sect. 36. It seems that Diognetus, who had been commissioner of inquiry at the time when Pythonikus presented the first information of the slave Andromachus, was himself among the parties denounced by Teukrus (And. de Myst. sect. 14, 15).

satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him. Amidst the gloomy terrors, political blended with religious, which distracted their minds, all the ancient stories of the last and worst oppressions of the Peisistratid despots, ninety-five years before, became again revived. Some new despots, they knew not who, seemed on the point of occupying the acropolis. To detect the real conspirators, was the only way of procuring respite from this melancholy paroxysm: for which purpose the people were willing to welcome questionable witnesses, and to imprison on suspicion citizens of the best character, until the truth could be ascertained.¹

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklēs, who acted as commissioners of investigation; Peisander
and Chariklēs
the commis-
sioners of
inquiry. furious and unprincipled politicians,² at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy. They insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained. And the sentiment of the people, collectively taken, responded to this stimulus; though individually, every man was so afraid of becoming himself the next victim arrested, that when the herald convoked the senate for the purpose of receiving informations, the crowd in the market-place straightway dispersed.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidēs—who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation Informa-
tion of Dio-
kleidēs. of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number. He recounted that on the night on which that incident occurred, he started from Athens to go to the mines of Laureion; wherein he had a slave working on hire, on whose account he was to receive pay. It was full moon, and the night was so bright that he began his journey, mistaking it for day-break.³ On

¹ Thucyd. vi. 53–60. οὐδὲ δοκιμάζοντες δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγυκτον δια-
τὸς μηνύτας, ἀλλὰ πάντας ὑπόπτως ἀπο-
δεχόμενοι, διὰ τοντρῶν ἀνθρώπων τίστιν φυγεῖν. . . .
τῶν χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλαμβά-
νοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι . . .
εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν, ή . . .
διὰ μηνυτὸς πονηρίαν τιὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δεινὸν ποιούμενοι, εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβου-
λεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται . . .
² Andokid. de Myst. sect. 36.
³ Plutarch (Alkib. c. 20) and Dio-
dorus (xiii. 2) assert that this testimony

reaching the propylæum of the temple of Dionysus, he saw a body of men about 300 in number descending from the Odeon towards the public theatre. Being alarmed at such an unexpected sight, he concealed himself behind a pillar, from whence he had leisure to contemplate this body of men, who stood for some time conversing together, in groups of fifteen or twenty each, and then dispersed. The moon was so bright that he could discern the faces of most of them. As soon as they had dispersed, he pursued his walk to Laureion, from whence he returned next day and learnt to his surprise that during the night the Hermae had been mutilated; also that commissioners of inquiry had been named, and the reward of 10,000 drachms proclaimed for information. Impressed at once with the belief, that the nocturnal crowd whom he had seen were authors of the deed, and happening soon afterwards to see one of them, Euphēmus, sitting in the workshop of a brazier—he took him aside to the neighbouring temple of Hephaestus, where he mentioned in confidence that he had seen the party at work and could denounce them,—but that he preferred being paid for silence, instead of giving information and incurring private enmities. Euphēmus thanked him for the warning, desiring him to come next day to the house of Leogoras and his son Andokidēs, where he would see them as well as the other parties concerned. Andokidēs and the rest offered to him, under solemn covenant, the sum of two talents (or 12,000 drachms, thus overbidding the reward of 10,000 drachms proclaimed by the senate to any truth-telling informer) with admission to a partnership in the benefits of their conspiracy, supposing that it should succeed. Upon his reply

was glaringly false, since on the night in question it was *new moon*. I presume, at least, that the remark of Diodorus refers to the deposition of Diokleidēs, though he never mentions the name of the latter, and even describes the deposition referred to with many material variations as compared with Andokidēs. Plutarch's observation certainly refers to Diokleidēs, whose deposition (he says), affirming that he had seen and distinguished the persons in question by the light of the moon, on a night when it was *new moon*, shocked all sensible men, but produced no effect upon the blind fury of the people. Wachsmuth, *Hellenisch. Alterth.* vol. ii. ob. viii. p. 194 copies this remark from Plutarch.

I disbelieve altogether the assertion that it was *new moon* on that night. Andokidēs gives in great detail the de-

position of Diokleidēs, with a strong wish to show that it was false and perfidiously got up. But he nowhere mentions the fact that it was *new moon* on the night in question—though if we read his report and his comments upon the deposition of Diokleidēs, we shall see that he never could have omitted such a means of discrediting the whole tale, if the fact had been so (Andokidēs Myster. sect. 37-43). Besides, it requires very good positive evidence to make us believe, that a suborned informer, giving his deposition not long after one of the most memorable nights that ever passed at Athens, would be so clumsy as to make particular reference to the circumstance that it was *full moon* (*ελατήρια μηνός*), if it had really been *new moon*.

that he would consider the proposition, they desired him to meet them at the house of Kallias son of Tèleklês, brother-in-law of Andokidês: which meeting accordingly took place, and a solemn bargain was concluded in the ~~Acropolis~~. Andokidês and his friends engaged to pay the two talents to Diokleidês at the beginning of the ensuing month, as the price of his silence. But since this engagement was never performed, Diokleidês came with his information to the senate.¹

Such (according to the report of Andokidês) was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two senators actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidês and many of his nearest relatives—his father Leogoras, his first or second cousins and brother-in-law, Charmidês, Taureas, Nisæus, Kallias son of Alkmæon, Phrynickus, Eukratês (brother of Nikias the commander in Sicily) and Kritias. But as there were a still greater number of names (assuming the total of three hundred to be correct) which Diokleidês was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the Psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the senate at first received it with favour. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before the Dikastery, that this was at last granted.² No sooner had they provided their

More pri-
soners ar-
rested—
increased
terror in
the city—
Andokidês
among the
persons im-
prisoned.

¹ Andokid., de Myster. sect. 37–42.

² Considering the extreme alarm which then pervaded the Athenian mind, and their conviction that there were traitors among themselves whom yet they could not identify—it is to be noted as remarkable that they resisted the proposition of their commissioners for applying torture. We must recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions—for they applied it often to the testimony of slaves—sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their attachment to the es-

tablished law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great, special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognised, and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I could wish to induce the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the

sureties, than they broke their covenant, mounted their horses and deserted to the enemy; without any regard to their sureties, who were exposed by law to the same trial and the same penalties as would have overtaken the offenders themselves. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Boeotian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The senate at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the Strategi, all the citizens were put under arms—those who dwelt in the city, mustering in the market-place—those in and near the long walls, in the Theseum—those in Peiraeus, in the square called the market-place of Hippodamus. Even the horsemen of the city were convoked by sound of trumpet in the sacred precinct of the Anakeion. The senate itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the Prytanes (or fifty senators of the presiding tribe) who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner—prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidēs, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the Prytaneum.¹

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined. Moreover, worse, in every way, was still to be looked for—since the Athenians would

proceedings of the Athenians concerning the mutilation of the Hermæ, to peruse by way of comparison the *Storia della Colonna Infame* by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of 'I Promessi Sposi.' This little volume, including a republication of Verri's 'Osservazioni sulla Tortura,' is full both of interest and instruction. It lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain suspected persons called *Utori*; that is, men who were firmly believed by the whole population (with very few exceptions) to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. Manzoni recounts with simple, eloquent, and impressive detail the incredible barbarity with which the official lawyers at Milan, under the authority of the senate, ex-

torted, by force of torture, evidence against several persons, of having committed this imaginary and impossible crime. The persons thus convicted were executed under horrible torments: the house of one of them (a barber named Mora) was pulled down, and a pillar with an inscription erected upon the site, to commemorate the deed. This pillar, the *Colonna Infame*, remained standing in Milan until the close of the 18th century. The reader will understand, from Manzoni's narrative, the degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarise the course of justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure secretly—as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and multitudinous.

¹ Andokid. de Myst. sect. 41-46.

know neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female relatives and children of Andokidēs and his companions were by permission¹ along with them in the prison, aggravating by their tears and wailings the affliction of the scene—when Charmidēs, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidēs as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. “ *You know (he said) all that passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father and upon all of us ; while if you inform whether you have been an actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city.* ” Such instances on the part of Charmidēs,² aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidēs to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. “ *Euphilētus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present—but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently I broke my collar-bone and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed ; when Euphilētus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeis have dedicated. Accordingly they executed the project while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge : they presumed that I would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes—and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury. When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party, Euphilētus and Melētus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I observed silence : to which I replied that it was not I, but their own crime, which had brought them into danger.* ”

Having recounted this tale (in substance) to the senate, Andokidēs tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in

¹ Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 42. the person who thus addressed himself to, and persuaded, Andokidēs, was named Timaeus. From whom he got the latter

² Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that name, we do not know.

Andokidēs
is solicited
by his fel-
low-prison-
ers to stand
forward
and give
information
— he com-
plies.

order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves), and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidēs affirmed. Andokidēs designates the authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of his revelations.

He mentioned twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermæ. Eighteen of these names, including Euphilētus and Melētus, had already been specified in the information of Teukrus; the remaining four were, Panætius, Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredēmus—all of whom fled the instant that their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being arrested. As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidēs, they proceeded to question Diokleidēs over again; who confessed that he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadēs the Phegusian (a relative of the commander in Sicily) and Amiantus, as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately on this revelation; but Diokleidēs was detained, sent before the dikastery for trial, and put to death.¹

The foregoing is the story which Andokidēs, in the oration *De Mysteriis* delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did tell—certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief intimation of Thucydidēs, who tells us that Andokidēs impeached himself along with others as participant in the mutilation.² Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed that his own nearest relatives were included—though this latter statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokidēs really told was something very different from

¹ The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to be found in Andokidēs de *Myst.* sect. 48–66.

² Thucyd. vi. 60. *Kαὶ δὲ μὲν οὐ τόδες τέ καθ' ἔαυτοῦ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἐρυθρῶν, &c.*

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra Andocidem, Or.

vi. sect. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidēs himself, *De Mysteriis*, sect. 71; *De Reditu*, sect. 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit. X. Orator.* p. 834), Andokidēs had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken irregularity and damaging a statue.

what now stands in his oration. But what it really was, we cannot make out. Nor should we gain much, even if it could be made out—since even at the time neither Thucydidēs nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted Andokidēs the principal organiser.¹

That which is at once most important and most uncontested, is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokidēs, true or false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes—said to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus—and invested on a previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover he was making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his communications with implicit confidence. They were so delighted to have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery, that the public mind subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.² All the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokidēs informed, were forthwith released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a reward offered for their heads.³ And though discerning men were

*Belief of
the Athene-
nians in his
information
—its trans-
quillising
effects.*

¹ Thucyd. vi. 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, δισπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶγατι, ὥπτι τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς, εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηρύνσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὗ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα γάρ εἰκάζεται τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδέτες οὕτω τότε οὐτε βοτερού ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δραστών τὸ ἔργον.

If the statement of Andokidēs in the *Oratio de Mysteriis* is correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer, Phrynius ap. Plutarch. Alkib. c. 20).

Thucydidēs refuses even to mention the name of Andokidēs, and expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark transaction—as if he

were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokidēs. If the story of Didymus be true, that Thucydidēs after his return from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

² Thucyd. vi. 60. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος δ τῶν Αθηναίων κόσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς φέτο, τὸ σαφὲς, &c.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 67, 68.

³ Andokid. de Myster. sect. 66; Thucyd. vi. 60; Philochorus, Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal of divine protection.¹ Andokidēs himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude; so that his father Leogoras, who had been among the parties imprisoned, ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the Dikastery.² But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidēs was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding so well merited.³

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement; profanations the more sure to be pressed home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal, since the enemies of Alkibiadēs were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of Eleusis; originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtér herself, in her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian patriarchs, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in

¹ Tacyd. vi. 60. ή μέντοι ἀλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὀφέλητο: compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.

² See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ παρανόμων which Andokidēs alleges that his father Leogoras brought against the senator Speusippus, before a Dikastery of 6000 persons (a number very difficult to believe), out of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained 200 votes. But if this trial ever took place at all,

we cannot believe that it could have taken place until after the public mind was tranquillised by the disclosures of Andokidēs—especially as Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidēs immediately before those disclosures were given in.

³ See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances of Andokidēs, the three Orations—Andokidēs de Mysteriis—Andokidēs de Reditu Suo—and Lysias contra Andokidem.

their families.¹ Celebrated annually in the month of September under the special care of the Basileus or second Archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred, under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants. Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis (the Hierophant, the Daduch or Torch-bearer, and the Keryx or Herald)—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Dêmêter and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by the Hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgements which always overtook such impious men.²

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens, and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so tardily and recently healed, in reference to

¹ Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

² Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster. sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias against Kinësias (Fragm. xxxi. p. 490, Bekker; Atheneus, xii. p. 551)—where Kinësias and his friends are accused of numerous impieties; one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on unlucky and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our laws”—*ώς καταγέλωντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμέρων*. The lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinësias had all mi-

serably perished, while Kinësias himself was living in wretched health and in a condition worse than death—*τὸ δ' οὔτες ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀποθησκούτα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπερ οὖτος ἔξημαρτηκόσι.*

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinësias among their favourite subjects of derision and libel, and seem particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill-health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii. p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

the Hermæ.¹ It was about this same time² that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the Revival of the accusation against Alkibiadēs. mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state to the majesty of the Two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents.³ And the enemies of Alkibiadēs, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favourable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these holy Ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanour habitual with Alkibiadēs, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Boeotians—a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night in the sacred precinct of the Theseum. No enemy indeed appeared, either without or within: but the conspiracy had only been pre-

¹ Lysias cont. Audokid. sect. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib. c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklēs (Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Edip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries are very striking: also Cicero, Legg. ii. 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called *Agaophamus*; and in the Dissertation called *Eleusinia*, in K. O. Müller's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 242 seqq.

² Diodor. xiii. 6.

³ We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadēs from banishment (Thucyd. viii. 53).

vented from breaking out (so they imagined) by the recent inquiries and detection. Moreover the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadēs were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy ; which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages taken from that town a few months before,¹ in order that it might put those hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadēs in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper : Thessalus son of Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical polities—as well as Androkłēs, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the memorable impeachment which, fortunately for our information, is recorded verbatim.

“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the Deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached Alkibiadēs son of Kleinias, of the Deme Skambōnidæ, as guilty of crime in regard to the Two Goddesses Dêmèter and Persephonê—in mimicking the mysteries and exhibiting them to his companions in his own house—^{Indictment presented by Thessalus, son of Kimon, against Alkibiadēs.} wearing the costume of the Hierophant—applying to himself the name of Hierophant ; to Polytion that of Daduch ; to Theodôrus, that of Herald—and addressing his remaining companions as Mysts and Epopts : all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian priests.”²

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadēs, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable or anti-constitutional projects. Probably however these suspicions were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the com-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 53–61.

² Plutarch, Alib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιδῆς, Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσῆγειλε ἀδικεῖν περὶ τῷ θεῷ, τὴν Δῆμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομούσαν τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταῖροις ἐν τῇ οἰκλατῇ στοῦ, ἔχοντα στολὴν, ολαντερούς ιεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει

τὰ ιερὰ, καὶ διομήσοντα αὐτὸν μὲν ιεροφάνην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δαδύχοι, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον Φηγεέα· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἑταῖρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ' Εὔμολπιδῶν καὶ κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ιερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσίνος.

mand of the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was indispensable that a strong case should be made out : but the public was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of pre-judgement, or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme ; so as to avoid the hazard of offending the Argive and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself.¹

It was on the return of the Athenian army—from their unsuccessful attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana—that they found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadēs received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people ; so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused ; the Salaminian trireme being in company. But as soon as they arrived at Thurii in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadēs and the rest of the accused (one of whom² was his own cousin and namesake) were tried, condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated ; while the Eumolpi and the other Eleusinian sacred families pronounced him³ to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the mysteries³—and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens : at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him ; while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, could not be regarded as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadēs, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had

¹ Thucyd. vi. 61.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 13.

³ Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat. vi. cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadēs to raise a mutiny in

the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to believe that he would have taken this step, had it been practicable.

committed—at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek;—the divulgence and profanation of the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally accounted guilty in public estimation; as an offence at once against the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety, by offending the Two goddesses (Dêmêtêr and Persephonê), and driving them to withdraw their favour and protection. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history—if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the Sacrifice of the Mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadès at Athens—as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,¹

¹ To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the Mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence—*Jousse*, *Traité de la Justice Criminelle*, Paris 1771, part iv. tit. 27, vol. iii. p. 672:—

“Du Crime de Lèze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Lèze-Majesté Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu'on doit regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs manières.—1. En niant l'existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de ceux qui attendent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on profane ou qu'on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu'on frappe les Images de Dieu dans le dessin de l'insulter. C'est ce qu'on appelle *Crime de*

Lèze-Majesté Divine au premier Chef.”

Again in the same work, part iv. tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11. vol. iv. p. 97-99:—

“*La profanation des Sacrements et des Mystères de la Religion est un sacrilège des plus exécrables.* Tel est le crime de ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs et mauvais, en dérision des Mystères; ceux qui profanent la sainte Eucharistie, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière que ce soit; ceux qui, en mépris de la Religion, profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties, ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes; ceux qui, en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints, en mépris de la Religion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes sont des crimes de *Lèze-Majesté divine au premier chef*, parce qu'ils s'attaquent immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun desssein que de l'offenser.”

“... La peine du Sacrilège, par l'Antien Testament, étoit celle du feu, et

down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadès, we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he really deserved punishment—if any one deserved it. Even his enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely; though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin with the mutilation of the Hermæ: an act of new and unparalleled wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadès was one of the direct purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies, even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme, which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the absent general—has been already recounted. It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong

d'être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'accusé.—Dans le sacrilège au premier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte

Vierge, et les Saints, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des

usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parceque ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité."

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadēs: but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadēs owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermae, the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the deposition of Andokidēs—a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty; and whose death not only tranquillised comparatively the public mind, but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadēs, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial: a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means.¹

¹ The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermae. But there are many material differences, and all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants” (to adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons—see Dr. Lingard’s History of England, vol. xiii. ch. v. p. 88—words, the like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to the Hermokopids) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot: the Hermokopids were real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermae. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermae, a man like Oates had pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Alkibiadēs and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that

terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidēs. Those implicated in *that* deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidēs, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence: yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or Diokleidēs—much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot wonder that the people trusted him—and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and Diokleidēs in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the Hermae had been mutilated. I have endeavoured to show, that looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connexion between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put themselves on their guard, when a Lacedaemonian or a Boeotian armed force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadēs and others for profaning and divulging

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadēs afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed—"I shall show them that I am alive." He fully redeemed his word.¹

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadēs was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy's camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of

Mischief to
Athens from
the banish-
ment of Alki-
biadēs,
Languid
operations
of the Sicil-
lian arma-
ment under
Nikias.

the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These were true charges: at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons were convicted and punished for having done acts which they really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not—is another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Herinae, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but while the cause of it was graver and more real, nevertheless the active injustice which it produced was far less, than in England.

Mr. Fox observes, in reference to the Popish Plot—History of James II., ch. i. p. 33,—

"Although, upon a review of this truly shocking transaction, we may be fairly justified in adopting the milder alternative, and in imputing to the greater part of those concerned in it, rather an extraordinary degree of blind credulity, than the deliberate wickedness of planning and assisting in the perpetration of legal murder; yet the proceedings on the Popish Plot must always be considered as an indelible disgrace upon the English nation, in which king, parliament, judges, juries, witnesses, prosecutors, have all their respective, though certainly not equal, shares. Witnesses—of such a character

as not to deserve credit in the most trifling cause, upon the most immaterial facts—gave evidence so incredible, or, to speak more properly, so impossible to be true, that it ought not to have been believed even if it had come from the mouth of Cato: and upon such evidence, from such witnesses, were innocent men condemned to death and executed. Prosecutors, whether attorneys and solicitors-general, or managers of impeachment, acted with the fury which in such circumstances might be expected: juries partook naturally enough of the national ferment: and judges, whose duty it was to guard them against such impressions, were scandalously active in confirming them in their prejudices and inflaming their passions."

I have substituted the preceding quotation from Mr. Fox, in place of that from Dr. Lingard, which stood in my first edition. On such a point, it has been remarked that the latter might seem a partial witness, though in reality his judgement is noway more severe than that of Hume, or Mr. Fox, or Lord Macaulay.

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a legislative body, and in their judicial character when the Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (Lingard, Hist. Engl. ch. vi. p. 231–241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion—and the Milanese judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note—were more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning prejudice, than the purely popular Dikastery of Athens in the affair of the Herinae, and of the other profanations.

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.

the Sicilian armament—most of all probably the Argicians and Mantineians—and slackened their zeal in the cause.¹ And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralysing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence except in the field, or in the actual execution of that which his colleague had already resolved.

The armament now proceeded—as Nikias had first suggested—to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta. It was his purpose to investigate the quarrel between the two as well as the financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the celebrated courtesan Laïs, then a very young girl.² Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of 120 talents,³ and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing beyond the acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies, except the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great dis-

Increase of
confidence
and pre-
parations at
Syracuse,
arising from
the delays
of Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατού δέῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἔπολου, &c.

² The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad Philisti Fragment. V.

³ Diodor. xiii. 6; Thucyd. vi. 62. Καὶ τὸν δράχον ἀπέδοσε ἡ πέδος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔγενοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν ἑκοσι: καὶ ἐκατὸν τάλαντα. The word ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the

prisoners were handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydidēs said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible—and (in my judgement) more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

appointment. What is still worse in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished. The invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous,¹ and when he disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta—still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla—their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry—informing himself as to the ground near the city through some exiles serving along with him.²

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen in his heart attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers (so the message ran) were in the habit of passing the night within the walls apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans (they added) were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an

¹ Thucyd. vi. 63; vii. 42.

² Thucyd. vi. 63; Diodor. xiii. 6.

aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anapus, in the interior of the Great Harbour, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighbouring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anapus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles—houses, walls, trees, and standing water—besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing: so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighbouring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one.¹ Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith: but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road—probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division (in hollow square with the baggage in the middle) was held in reserve near the camp to lend aid where aid might be wanted: cavalry

Return of the
Syracusans
array from
Katana to
the Great
Harbour—
preparations
for fighting
Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 65, 66; Diodor. xiii. 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13.

To understand the position of Nikias, as well as it can be made out from the

description of Thucydides, the reader will consult the plan of Syracuse and its neighbourhood annexed to the present volume.

there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection ; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than 1200 in number ; together with 200 horsemen from Gela, 20 from Kamarina, about 50 bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training ; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families—others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.¹

Thucydidēs, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias.

Feelings of the ancient soldier.—Harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honour and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognised military pre-eminence of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians—as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority, (this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay,) but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline.² Moreover, he reminded them that they were far away from home—and that defeat would render them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity, serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens—since it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmish-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 67–69.

² Thucyd. vi. 68, 69. οὐλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεῖ τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὅπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἱ δὲ ερφόνοι οὖσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ τὴν ἐπί-

στήμην τῆς τόλμης ήσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb *πανδημεῖ*. Compare *πανδημεῖ*, *πανομίλει*, Aeschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

ing. But presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavourable augury—while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phænomenon of the season,¹ so that they still farther astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken, dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helorine road.²

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate detachment to guard the neighbouring temple and sacred precinct of the Olympian Zeus; wherein there was much deposited wealth which they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the field of battle, burnt his own dead; and stripped the arms from the dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost 250 men, the Athenians 50.³

¹ Thucyd. vi. 70. Τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅρᾳ ἔτους περινεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, τολν̄ μείζω ἐκπληξιν μή νικωμένους παρέχειν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be seen in the next chapter but one. At this moment, too, they were in high spirits and confidence; which greatly affected their interpretation of such sudden weather-phænomena: as will be seen also illustrated

by melancholy contrast, in that same chapter.

² Thucyd. vi. 70.

³ Thucyd. vi. 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct, though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii. 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x. 28. 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the treasures or the offerings, and left

Battle near
the Olym-
pieion—vic-
tory of the
Athenians.

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies for burial and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias re-embarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana—though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbour in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose numbers he

He determines to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends to Athens for reinforcements of horse. calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory—and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces

to Messenê, within which there was a favourable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messenê. Accordingly these latter,

His failure at Messenê through the betrayal by Alkibiadês. watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.¹

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbour of Syracuse and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other

Salutary lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of Nikias. them still under the care of the Syracusan priests, he returned to Katana. But the language of Thucydidês indicates that the

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his position before the Athenians returned on the day after the battle. ¹ Thucyd. vi, 71-74.

results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively mischievous—since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction which followed—and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the cause of very deplorable calamities to his army, his country, and himself. Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at present we have only to turn back to his own predictions and recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking the expedition—but the Athenians, though unfortunately not allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their reality, and authorised him to demand whatever force was necessary to overcome them.¹ He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well as to every man at Athens:² upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet—after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty—the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression of his armament—giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications—and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succour Sicily. It was the unhappy weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity became imminent: the consequence of which was (to use an expression of the Corinthian envoy, before the Pe-

¹ Thueyd. vi. 21-26.

² Thueyd. vi. 20.

ponnesian war, in censuring the dilatory policy of Sparta), that never acting, yet always seeming about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single, at the moment of actual conflict.¹

Great indeed must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted any thing serious—nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him.² And

Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their good temper—they send to him the reinforcements demanded.

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. ήσυχάζετε γάρ μόνοι Ελλήνων, δο Λακεδαιμονίοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὕτη σιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες.

² Αλογρόν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ηὔστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρώτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευναμένους—“It is disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our own fault in making bad calculations at first.” (Thucyd. vi. 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens, prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover, such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was anxious to put down his name to serve (vi. 26–31). Thucydidēs can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text—that the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by his own previous speeches at Athens—so it seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Arnold when he wrote his note on the remarkable passage, ii. 65, of Thucydidēs—ἐξ ἀλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχοντι, ημαρτήθη, καὶ δὲ Σικελίαν πλοῦς διὸ οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμφτημα. ἐν πρὸς οὐδὲ ἐπέσταν, δοὺς οἱ ἐπιπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις

ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ίδιας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δῆμου προστασίας, τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποιουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐπαράχθοσαν.—Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

“Thucydidēs here expresses the same opinion, which he repeats in two other places (vi. 31; vii. 42), namely, that the Athenian power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, had not the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently supplied by the government at home. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify ‘not voting afterwards the needful supplies to their absent armament’ for Nikias was prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.”—Göller and Poppe concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that these words do not signify “voting the needful supplies.”

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii. 2–15)—ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν πτλα, ιῆτας, ιπποις, χρήματα, &c., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive word for these particulars, meaning

this is the more to be noted, since the removal of Alkibiadēs afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily; though *their* disappointment must have been yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest

"supplies." The words really mean—*"taking farther resolutions (after the expedition was gone) unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament."* Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally—agreeing with *βουλεύματα* or some such word: indeed we find the phrase *τὰ πρόσφορα* used in the most general sense, for "what is suitable"—"what is advantageous or convenient"—γυμνάσω *τὰ πρόσφορα*—πρόσσεται *τὰ πρόσφορα*—*τὰ πρόσφορ' ηὔξατ'*—*τὰ πρόσφορα δρῆσης άν—τὰ ταῖσθε πρόσφορον.* Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148: Iphig. Aul. 160 B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydidēs appears to have in view the violent party contests which broke out in reference to the Hermē and the other irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament, especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadēs, which grew out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party-animosity was directed against Alkibiadēs exclusively—not against the expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold's note—that *one of the causes* of the failure of the Athenian expedition in Sicily, was, that it was "insufficiently supplied by Athens." Of the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidēs (vi. 31; vii. 42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting forth the prodigious amount of force sent—the second says nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the

autumn—the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless the supplies *were sent*, as soon as they could be, and as soon as Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say—"that the armament *was allowed* to be reduced to great distress and weakness before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it." The second expedition was sent, the moment that Nikias made known his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of Thucydidēs, than to charge the Athenians with having starved their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is—the having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire strength—perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidēs plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of Nikias and that of Demosthenes.

Thucydidēs is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias, whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that he conceived the mismanagement of the general as *the cause* of the failure of the armament—not as "*one of two causes*," as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course I recognise fully the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigour so unusual in a Spartan, of Gylippus—together with the effective influence which this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have set foot in Syracuse had he not been let in, first through the apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown by Nikias (vii. 42).

murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army.¹ The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. At the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratēs addressed them in a mingled tone of encouragement and admonition. While praising their bravery, he deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command—to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers—lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratēs himself, with Herakleidēs and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;² so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall of his army.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, enclosing an additional space and covering both their Inner and their Outer City to the westward, reaching from the Outer sea to the Great Harbour, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ—and stretching far enough westward to enclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls—he might nevertheless be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional

¹ Thucyd. v. 7. See chap. liv. of this History.

² Thucyd. vi. 72, 73.

extent of ground.¹ Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification, enclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege—by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance—to occupy and fortify the Euryalus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did not think of it until too late—as we shall presently see.

Nevertheless, it is important to remark, in reference to the general scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus—or if he had begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C.—he would have found none of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his winter's inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned the tents which they found standing—ravaging at the same time the neighbouring fields.²

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphémus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratès the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 75. Ετείχισον δὲ οἱ ἄρι σφάλλωνται, &c.

Συρακύσοις ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τα τῆ I reserve the general explanation of πόλει, τῷν Τεμενίην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, the topography of Syracuse for the next τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς Ἐπι- chapter (when the siege begins), and πολὰς δρῶν, δικασ μὴ δι' ἔλδο- the Appendix attached to it.

σονος εὐαποτείχιστοι δύσιν, ήν

² Thucyd. vi. 75.

Hermokratēs began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history of Athens. He did not (he said) fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of Kamarina. The Athenians after the recent battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyse all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily—that Leontini and Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward—and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was in truth nothing else but an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another—but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this honourable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbours of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish, from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse humbled: but this could not happen without endangering their own existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina—instead of lending merely nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily single-handed—was as unjust as it was dishonourable. If she came off victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so plain that he (Hermokratēs) could not pretend to enlighten them: but he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.¹

Euphēnus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in

¹ Thucyd. vi. 77-80.

reference to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratēs. Though addressing a Dorian assembly,^{Speech of Euphemus.} he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratēs, that Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling, Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbours in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the illegitimate ascendancy of Sparta. Her empire was justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies—to accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies, would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed in their own island. Hence her desire to re-establish the expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home she wanted nothing but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying—while in Sicily, she required independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which Hermokratēs reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt differently with her different allies according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

No—it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do, when the time came, against Kamarina and others.

It was under this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily : it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them ; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbour, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled the imputations which Hermokratès had cast upon Athens—but the Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against Syracuse ; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens.¹

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratès renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela—to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens ; who if she once got footing in Sicily would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician ; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities—especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphémus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing : but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering ? This Euphémus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realised—and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was—that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in

¹ Thucyd. vi. 83–87.

the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition—"Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies."¹ What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction—Euphēmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and reasonable.

The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokrates and Euphēmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians, yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove completely successful. The Kamarinæans maintain practical neutrality. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of very ancient date—and even now, their great fear was, of probable suffering if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, whichever way the ultimate success might turn.²

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December 415 B.C., no human being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect indeed in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed—if indeed they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse: so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies (Lamachus had contended) was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of

¹ Thucyd. vi. 86. ήμεῖς μέν γε θύτε : ἡπειρωτίδων, &c.

δημοσίου δυνατοῦ μὴ μεθ' ίμάν: εἰ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαμέθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκος τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς τόλεων αεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῆς

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians, vi. 11.

² Thucyd. vi. 88.

the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.¹

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. Winter proceedings of Nikias from his quarters at Katana. He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favour—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês—sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, re-establishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.²

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realised their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias also sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

Syracusan envoys sent to solicit aid from Corinth and Sparta. While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the battle near the Olympieion and the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements.

Here again, we are compelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects.³ After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks, in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succour. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

¹ Compare the remarks of Alkibiadès, Thucyd. vi. 91.

² Thucyd. vi. 88.

³ Thucyd. vi. 88; vii 42.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted—Alkibiadēs. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllēnē in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel,¹ and now appeared at Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantinea. He now appeared too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy goodwill of the Spartan Ephors into comparative decision and activity.² His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydidēs—who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiadēs at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the

¹ Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydidēs (vi. 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiadēs went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes.

Isokratēs (De Bigis, Orat. xvi. s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiadēs was compelled to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratēs is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadēs. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians ban-

ished him out of all Greece stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratēs.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadēs turned against his country, or went to Sparta, upon compulsion. The first act of his hostility to Athens (the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messenē) was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover Thucydidēs represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in fact waiting for a safe conduct and invitation from them. Thucydidēs mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi. 88).

² Thucyd. vi. 88.

Alkibiadēs
at Sparta—
his intense
hostility to
Athens.

prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connexion with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favour on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents—thus strengthening their hands, and dishonouring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid despots; and as all opposition, to a ruling One or Few, takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people.¹ Moreover our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey: though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning licence. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses—those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which I found already existing.² For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against it—if one could say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you

¹ Thucyd. vi. 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεὶ ποτὲ διδόπολοι ἦσαν, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἐγκριτούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ἀνδρασταῖ καὶ ἀπ’ ἑκείνους ἔμπταρέμενεν ἡ προστασία ημίν τοῦ πλήθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to τύμανοι or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadēs took the best means of excusing them before

a Lacedæmonian audience.

² Thucyd. vi. 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ἔμπαντος προστημενοι, δικαιοῦντες, ἐν φ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη ὅσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατο τις, τούτο ξυνδιασάσσειν ἐπει δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρογοῦντες τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἀν χειρὸν, δυσφ καὶ λαδορρήσαιμι ἀλλὰ περὶ διμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἀν καινὺν λέγοιστο: καὶ τὸ μεβιστόν ται αὐτὴν οὐκ εἴδοκεν ἄμιν, ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὅμην πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks—next, the Italian Greeks—afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If indeed the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot—beaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

"It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily—it is for the safety of Peloponnesus—that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I consider still more important than an army—a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:¹ that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines²

¹ The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corin-

thians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i. 122).

² The occupation of Dekeleia made it

as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

"None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies—I who once passed for a lover of my country.¹ Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country² while I was secure as a citizen—I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine: I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience—but he whose ardour makes him try every means to regain her.

"Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or suffering: the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force."³

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech—no less masterly Great effect in reference to the purpose and the audience, than of his speech on the Peloponnesians. If its contents became known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadēs would be supplied with a justification of their most violent political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious ceremonies of the state⁴—that he

necessary for the larger number of Athenians to be almost incessantly under arms. Instead of a city, Athens became a guard-post, says Thucydidēs (vii. 28). There was therefore seldom leisure for the convocation of that numerous body of citizens who formed a Dikastery.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτῷ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιστῶν, φιλόπολις ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν δυκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

² Thucyd. vi. 92. Τό τε φιλόπολις οὐκ ἐν φιλοκούμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν φιλοφάλῳ ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὖθ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὐσαν έτι ήγούμαι νῦν λέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὐσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος δρθῶς, οὐχ θι δι τὴν ξανθοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μη ἐπήρ, ἀλλ' θι δι τὸ παρός τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῆ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

³ Thucyd. vi. 89-92.

⁴ Thucyd. vi. 28.

detested the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the first safe opportunity of subverting it—appears here in his own language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; while the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadēs, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very selfish a* politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints, and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.¹ He takes credit in his speech for moderation as opposed to the standing licence of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such licence as that of Alkibiadēs himself had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest—combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained—which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit: As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres; and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices (as seems probable of some) in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadēs and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last preceding chapter but one of this history.

If then that portion of the speech of Alkibiadēs, wherein he

¹ See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii. 89—*βάσον τὰ ἀνοβαίνοντα, ὡς φέρει*—and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. lxii.

touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition.

Misrepresentations contained in the speech.

That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament (during the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium) recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadēs, opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known at Athens—conspire to prove that their minds were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that those, who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy conquest, were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. If Alkibiadēs had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be little doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus—or rather would have originated it himself. We find him indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out hopes, that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favourable possibility—is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification—and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. Alkibiadēs could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated—Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, &c., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.¹ Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian history, seems in truth little better than a gigantic romance, dressed up to alarm his audience.²

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to

¹ Thucyd. vi. 12-17.

² Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the peace of Nikias, and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly. For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the Ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed, that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending—brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadēs to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece—“*Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*”¹ He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedy as the case admitted.² We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, for taking Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.³ Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him, to Asinē in the Messenian Gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could furnish.

The Lacedæmonians
send Gy-
lippus to
Syracuse.

¹ Lucan, *Pharsal.* iv. 819.

² Thucyd. vi. 93; Plutarch, *Alkib.* c.

23; Diodor. xiii. 7.

³ Thucyd. vi. 104.

CHAPTER LIX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS—DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.

THE Athenian troops at Katana, probably tired of inaction, were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to the deserted walls of Megara, not far from Syracuse, which the Syracusans had recently garrisoned. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, and laid waste the neighbouring fields, they re-embarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens 250 horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily¹—30 horse-bowmen and 300 talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana, from which cities he also received some farther cavalry—so that he was presently able to muster 650 cavalry in all.²

Even before this cavalry could be mounted, Nikias made his first approach to Syracuse. For the Syracusan generals on their side, apprised of the arrival of the reinforcement from Athens, and aware that besieging operations were on the point of being commenced, now thought it necessary to take the precaution of occupying and guarding the roads of access to the high ground of Epipolæ which overhung their outer city.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and outer

¹ Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they even found their way into Attica and Central Greece—Sophoklēs, ΟΕδ. Kolon. 312— If the Scholiast is to be trusted, the Sicilian horses were of unusually great size.

γυναιχ' ὄρω
Στριχονοσαν ἡμῖν, δόσον, Αἰτναις ἐπί^{*}
Πῶλου βεβώσαν.

² Thucyd. vi. 95-98

city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, and within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing—and by a seawall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagia or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situated between it and the inner city or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed (and probably had been employed even from the first settlement in the island), partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies—partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

To the north-west of the outer city-wall in the direction of the port called Trogilus, stood an unfortified suburb which afterwards became enlarged into the distinct walled town of Tychê. West of the southern part of the same outer city-wall (nearly south-west of the outer city itself) stood another suburb—afterwards known and fortified as Neapolis, but deriving its name, in the year 415 b.c., from having within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês¹ (which stood a little way up on the ascent of the hill of Epipolæ), and stretching from thence down southward in the direction of the Great Harbour. Between these two suburbs lay a broad open space, the ground

Local con-
dition and
fortifica-
tions of
Syracuse, at
the time
when Ni-
kias arrived
—Inner and
Outer City.

¹ At the neighbouring city of Gela, also, a little without the walls, there stood a large brazen statue of Apollo—of so much sanctity, beauty, or notoriety, that the Carthaginians in their invasion of the island (seven years after the siege of Syracuse by Nikias) carried it away with them and transported it to Tyre (Diodor. xiii. 108).

rising in gradual acclivity from Achradina to the westward, and diminishing in breadth as it rose higher, until at length it ended in a small conical mound called in modern times the Belvedere. This acclivity formed the eastern ascent of the long ridge of high ground called Epipolæ. It was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual (excepting two or three special mounds or cliffs) towards the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope.¹

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take Possibilities of the siege when Nikias first arrived in Sicily—Increase of difficulties through his delay. Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land, and at the same time blockading it by sea. Now looking at the Inner and Outer city as above described, at the moment when he first reached Sicily, we see that (after defeating the Syracusans and driving them within their walls, which would be of course the first part of the process) he might have carried his blockading wall in a direction nearly southerly from the innermost point of the cleft of Santa Bonagia, between the city-wall and the Temenitês so as to reach the Great Harbour at a spot not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbour, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great Harbour, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached

¹ In reference to all these topographical details, the reader is requested to consult the two Plans of Syracuse annexed to the end of this volume, together with the explanatory Appendix. The very perspicuous description of Epipolæ, also, given by Mr. Stanley (as embodied in Dr. Arnold's Appendix to the third volume of his *Thucydides*), is especially commended to his attention.

In the Appendix to this volume, I have been unavoidably compelled to repeat a portion of the matter contained in my general narrative: for which repetition I hope to be pardoned.

In Plan I., the letters A, B, C, D represent the wall of the Outer City as it seems to have stood when Nikias first arrived in Sicily. The letters E, F represent the wall of the Inner City at the same moment.

Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city—stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbour to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia—and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade.¹ After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbour, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbour at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who (having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point where they were yet more vulnerable) did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of 600 hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted.² These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus

Increased
importance
of the upper
ground of
Epipolæ.
Intention
of the Syra-
cuscans to
occupy the
summit of
Epipolæ.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 75. Ἐτείχισον δὲ καὶ ὁ σιν, ἵν δρα σφάλλωνται, οἱ Συρακοῦσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός In Plan I., the letters G, H, I—re-
τε τῷ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησά-
μενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς present this additional or advanced for-
τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς δρῶν, δρῶν μὴ tification.
δι' ἐλασσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ² Thucyd. vi. 96.

obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

The summit summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians
is surprised by the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katanā, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the north-east, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryalus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryalus from the south-west, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length—they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryalus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.¹

This was a most important advantage—indeed seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well laid and well executed, grounded upon the omission of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which they did not at first perceive the importance—and which in fact only acquired its pre-eminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favourable accident which could not have been

¹ Thucyd. vi. 97.

reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favourable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipolæ. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult—if not completely frustrated.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled enclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbour. This circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork, the front of which measured one thousand feet.¹ Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction,² the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order—the

¹ Thucyd. vi. 97. ἐχάρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.

The probable position of this Athenian Κύκλος or Circle will be found on both the Plans in the Appendix, marked by the letter K.

² The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v. 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 18.

Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldierlike array, as compared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage; merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into conflict; though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his block-
First counter-wall of the
Syracusans. ading operations; first completing the Circle,¹ then beginning his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilus: for which purpose a portion of his forces were employed in bringing stones and wood, and depositing them in proper places along the intended line. So strongly did Hermokratēs feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall or cross-wall; traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued, so as to impede its farther progress. A tenable counter-wall, if they could get time to carry it sufficiently far to a defensible terminus, would completely defeat the intent of the besiegers: but even if Nikias should interrupt the work by his attacks, the Syracusans calculated on being able to provide a sufficient force to repel him, during the short time necessary for hastily constructing the palisade or front outwork. Such palisade would serve them as a temporary defence, while they finished the more elaborate cross-wall behind it; and would, even at the worst, compel Nikias to suspend all his proceedings and employ his whole force to dislodge them.²

¹ Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. vi. 98, says that the Circle is spoken of, in one passage of Thucydides, as if it had never been completed. I construe this one passage differently from him

(vii. 2, 4)—τῷ Ἑλλῷ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρόγιλον τεὶς τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν: where I think τῷ Ἑλλῷ τοῦ κύκλου is equivalent to ἑτέρῳ τοῦ κύκλου—as plainly appears from the accompanying mention of Trogilus and the northern sea. I am persuaded that the Circle

was finished—and Dr. Arnold himself indicates two passages in which it is distinctly spoken of as having been completed. See Appendix to this volume.

² Thucyd. vi. 99. ‘Τποτειχίζειν δὲ ἀμεινὸν ἔδοκε εἶναι (τοῖς Συρακοσίαις) ή ἐκεῖνοι (the Athenians) ἔμελλον δέειν τὸ τεῖχος· καὶ εἰ φθάσειν, ἀποκλήσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἄμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ φθάνειν ἢν τοῖς σταυ-

Accordingly they took their start from the postern gate near the grove of Opollo Temenitēs; a gate in the new wall erected four or five months before to enlarge the fortified space of the city. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian Circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. The nautical population from Ortygia could be employed in this enterprise, since the city was still completely undisturbed by sea and mistress of the Great Harbour—the Athenian fleet not having yet moved from Thapsus. Besides this active crowd of workmen, the sacred olive-trees in the Temenite grove were cut down to serve as materials; and by such efforts the work was presently finished to a sufficient distance for traversing and intercepting the blockading wall intended to come southward from the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank; while it was defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for discharge of missiles. One tribe of hoplites was left to defend it, while the crowd of Syracusans who had either been employed on the work or on guard, returned back into the city.

προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰς ἐφόδους ἑκείνους δὲ τὸν πανομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἀν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. —The probable course of this first counter-wall is marked on Plan I. by the letters N, O.

The Scholiast here explains *τὰς ἐφόδους* to mean *τὰς βάσιμα*—adding *ὅτι γὰρ δὲ τὰ ἐπιβαθῆναι δυνάμενα, διὰ τὸ τελματῶδες εἶναι τὸ χώριον.* Though he is here followed by the best commentators, I cannot think that his explanation is correct. He evidently supposes that this first counter-wall of the Syracusans was built (as we shall see presently) that the second counter-work was) across the marsh, or low ground between the southern cliff of Epipola and the Great Harbour. “The ground being generally marshy (*τελματῶδες*) there were only a few places where it could be crossed.” But I conceive this supposition to be erroneous. The first counter-wall of the Syracusans was carried, as it seems to me, up the slope of Epipolæ, between the Athenian Circle and the southern cliff: it commenced at the Syracusan newly-erected advanced wall, enclosing the Temenitēs. This

was all hard, firm ground, such as the Athenians could march across at any point: there might perhaps be some roughnesses here and there, but they would be mere exceptions to the general character of the ground.

It appears to me that *τὰς ἐφόδους* means simply “the attacks of the Athenians”—without intending to denote any special assaultable points:—*προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἐφόδους* means “to get beforehand with the attacks” (see Thucyd. i. 57. v. 30). This is in fact the more usual meaning of *ἐφόδος* (compare vii. 5; vii. 43; i. 6; v. 35; vi. 63), “attack, approach, visit,” &c. There are doubtless other passages in which it means “the way or road through which the attack was made:” in one of these however (vii. 51) all the best editors now read *ἐσόδου* instead of *ἐφόδου*.

It will be seen that arguments have been founded upon the inadmissible sense which the Scholiast here gives to the word *ἐφόδοι*: see Dr. Arnold, Memoir on the Map of Syracuse, Appendix to his ed. of Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 271.

Its direction,
south of the
Athenian
Circle—its
completion.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them.¹ Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from the Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay he was enabled to prosecute his own part of the circumvallation without hindrance, and to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts which supplied the city, partially at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers—and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: instead of occupying the wall, tents were erected behind it to shelter them from the midday sun; while some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites, with some light troops clothed in panoplies for the occasion, were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall; while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus; half towards the city walls to prevent any succour from coming out of the gates—half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counterwall, feebly defended by its guards; who, taken by surprise, abandoned their post and fled along behind their wall to enter the city by the Temenite postern-gate. Before all of them could get in, however, both the pursuing three hundred and the Athenian division which marched straight to that point, had partially come up with them: so that some of these assailants even forced their way along with them through the gate into the interior of the Temenite city-wall. Here however the Syracusan strength within was too much for them: these foremost Athenians and Argeians were thrust out again with loss. But the general movement of the Athenians had been completely triumphant.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 100.

They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counterwork had been carried to the brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank—Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of the same resource in future. Accordingly, without staying to finish his blockading wall regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ—he left the Circle under guard and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall.¹ Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbour, and across which the Athenian wall of circumvallation must necessarily be presently carried. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The intermediate space between

Nikias occupies the southern cliff—and prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 101. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχισον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔλους, διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταῦτη πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὅρῃ, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὄμβλου καὶ τοῦ ἔλους ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα.

I give in the text what I believe to be the meaning of this sentence, though the words ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου are not clear, and have been differently construed. Götler in his first edition had construed them as if it stood ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου: as if the fortification now begun on the cliff was continuous and in actual junction with the Circle. In his second edition he seems to relinquish this opinion, and to translate them in a manner similar to Dr. Arnold, who considers them as equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου δρώμενοι, but not at all implying that the fresh work performed was continuous with the Circle—which he believes not to have been the fact.

If thus construed, the words would imply “starting from the Circle as a base of operations.” Agreeing with Dr. Arnold in his conception of the event signified, I incline, in construing the words, to proceed upon the analogy of two or three passages in Thucyd. i. 7; i. 46; i. 99; vi. 64—Ἄι δὲ παλαιὰ πόλεις διὰ τὴν λροτεῖαν ἐπιπολὴν ἀντισχύσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον φέκισθησαν . . . Ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιαδιβε τῆς Θεοπρότιδος, Ἐφύρη. In these passages ἀπὸ is used in the same sense as we find ἀποθεῖναι, iv. 125, signifying “apart from, at some distance from;” but not implying any accompanying idea of motion, or proceeding from, either literal or metaphorical.

“The Athenians began to fortify, at some distance from their Circle, the cliff above the marsh,” &c

the Circle and the fortified point of the cliff, was for the time left with an unfinished wall, with the intention of coming back to it (as was in fact afterwards done, and this portion of wall was in the end completed). The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour; being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh—an

Second counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh, south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.

seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, beginning from the lower portion of their own city-walls, and stretching in a south-westerly direction across the low ground as far as the river Anapus; so that by the time the new Athenian fortification of the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also,¹ and stockade with a ditch seemed to shut out the besiegers from reaching the Great Harbour.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort on the cliff at Epipolæ into the low ground beneath—and providing his troops with planks and broad gates to bridge over the marsh where it was scarcely passable—he contrived to reach and surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. But before the fleet could arrive, the palisade and ditch had been carried, and its defenders driven off. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to sustain them, and retake it; bringing on a general action in the low ground between the Cliff of Epipolæ and the Harbour, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the

¹ The course and extent (as I conceive it) of this second counter-work, palisade, and ditch, will be found marked on Plan I., by the letters P, Q.

Athenians proved successful : the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge.Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of 300 hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into such disorder, that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, put them to flight, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardour carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch, with very few followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here attacked and slain,¹ in single combat with a horseman named Kallikratēs : but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up, and had only just time to snatch and carry off his dead body, with which they crossed the bridge and retreated behind the Anapus. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing ; a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.²

Meanwhile the visible disorder and temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They again came forth to renew the contest ; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the north-western gates of the city to attack the Athenian Circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself, probably stript of part of its garrison to reinforce the combatants in the lower ground, was only saved by the presence of mind and resource of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants to set fire to a quantity of

Danger of
the Ath-
enian Circle
and of Ni-
kias -- vic-
tory of the
Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 102; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18. Diodorus erroneously places the battle, in which Lamachus was

slain, after the arrival of Gylippus (xiii. 8).

² Thucyd. vi. 102.

wood which lay, together with the battering engines of the army in front of the Circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and forced them to retreat. The flames also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immedately sent reinforcements to the entrance of relief of their general; while at the same time the the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour. This last event, threatening the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbour. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city. Their combatants from the field, and their detachment from the Circle, were each brought back within the walls.¹

Had the recent attempt on the Circle succeeded, carrying with it the death or capture of Nikias, and combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that same day—it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorised commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour, wherein it was hence-forward permanently established, in coöperation with the army, in a station near the left bank of the Anapus.

Both army and fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbour. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals—inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence of the whole Athenian army.² The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a

¹ Thucyd. vi. 102. M. In the first Plan, it appears as intended and unfinished; in the second Plan, it appears as completed.
² The southern part of the Athenian line of circumvallation is marked both on Plans I. and II. by the letters K, L,

general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbour.—It was now, for the first time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations of a siege.¹ Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbour, had been open and unimpeded ; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both,² so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and fleet ; and a portion of the fleet seems still to have been left at Thapsus. Nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbour and the Hélôrine road : moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryalus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy, but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this, and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans constructed their

The Syracusans offer no further obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing closeness of the siege.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 103. οἵα δὲ εἰκός ἀνθράπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκούμενων, &c.

² Diodorus however is wrong in stating (xiii. 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the Po-

lichnē or hamlet surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii. 4, 37).

Order of the besieging operations successively undertaken by the Athenians.

two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, with a view to its coöperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbour, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason—that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open—at least the greater part of it —by Gylippus.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever; promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through the neighbouring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation —a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratēs and his colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals,—to which Herakleidēs, Euklēs, and Tellias were appointed. But this change did not inspire the Syracusans with confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms.¹ Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο | πόλιν.
 πρὸς τε ἔκεινον καὶ πλειόν τι κατὰ τὴν | ² Thucyd. vii. 55.

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse;¹ who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished (a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C.), the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigour as well as unremitting perseverance; while the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy. The wall across the low ground near the harbour might have been expected to proceed more rapidly, because the Athenian position generally was much stronger—the chance of opposition from the Syracusans was much lessened—and the fleet had been brought into the Great Harbour to coöperate. Yet in fact it seems to have proceeded more slowly: Nikias builds it at first as a double wall, though it would have been practicable to complete the whole line of blockade with a single wall before the arrival of Gylippus, and afterwards, if necessary, to have doubled it either wholly or partially; instead of employing so much time in completing this one portion, that Gylippus arrived before it was finished, scarcely less than two months after the death of Lamachus. Both the besiegers and their commander now seem to consider success as certain, without any chance of effective interruption from within—still less from without; so that they may take their time over the work, without caring whether the ultimate consummation comes a month sooner or later.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops,

Conduct of
Nikias—his
correspond-
ents in the
interior of
Syracuse.

Confidence
of Nikias—
comparative
languor of
his opera-
tions.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 49-86.

Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part, of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint. If he wasted in indolence the first six months after his arrival in Sicily, and turned to inadequate account the present two months of triumphant position before Syracuse—both these mistakes arose from the same cause; from reluctance to act except under the pressure and stimulus of some obvious necessity. Accordingly he was always behindhand with events: but when necessity became terrible, so as to subdue the energies of other men—then did he come forward and display unwonted vigour, as we shall see in the following chapter. But now, relieved from all urgency of apparent danger, and misled by the delusive hopes held out through his correspondence in the town, combined with the atmosphere of success which exhilarated his own armament—Nikias fancied the surrender of Syracuse inevitable, and became, for one brief moment preceding his calamitous end, not merely sanguine, but even careless and presumptuous in the extreme. Nothing short of this presumption could have let in his destroying enemy Gylippus.¹

That officer—named by the Lacedæmonians commander in Sicily, at the winter meeting which Alkibiadēs had addressed at Sparta—had employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily against the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet, now acting there, was a service not tempting to any one, and demanding both personal daring and devotion. Moreover every vessel from Sicily, between March and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus—thus rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Great as those consequences were, they were still farther exaggerated by report. It was confidently affirmed, by messenger after messenger, that the wall of circumvallation had been completed, and that Syracuse was now invested on all sides.¹ Both Gylippus and the Corinthians were so far misled as to believe this to be the fact, and despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little squadron of four sail—two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians—and the Corinthian captain Pythēn; leaving the Corinthian main squadron to follow as soon as it was ready. Intending then to act only in Italy, Gylippus did not fear falling in with the Athenian fleet. He first sailed to Tarentum, friendly and warm in his cause. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came opposite to the Terinæan Gulf, near the south-eastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land overtook him, exposed his vessels to the greatest danger, and drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum.² But such was the damage which his

¹ Thucyd. vi. 104. ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγέλαι εἰράτων δεῖναὶ καὶ πάσαι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄντε θέψευμέναι, ὡς ἡδὴ παντελῶς ἀποτείχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαι εἰσὶ, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμέλαι εἶχεν δύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἱταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποῆσαι, &c. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 18.

It will be seen from Thucydides, that Gylippus heard this news while he was yet at Leukas.

² Thucyd. vi. 104. Ἀπας (Γύλιππος) παρέπλει τὴν Ἱταλίαν καὶ ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκκνεῖ ταρτύρ μέγας, κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηκὼν ἀποφερεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεῖς ἐς τὰ μάλα ταῦ Τάραντι προσπλογεῖ.

Though all the commentators here construe the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηκὼν

Progress of
Gylippus, in
spite of dis-
couraging
reports.

as if they agreed with ὃς or ἀνεμος, I cannot but think that these words really agree with Γύλιππος. Gylippus is overtaken by this violent off-shore wind while he is sailing southward along the eastern shore of what is now called Calabria Ultra: “setting his ship towards the north or *standing to the north* (to use the English nautical phrase), he is carried out to sea, from whence after great difficulties he again gets into Tarentum.” If Gylippus was carried out to sea when in this position, and trying to get to Tarentum, he would naturally lay his course northward. What is meant by the words κατὰ Βορέαν ἐστηκὼν, as applied to the wind, I confess I do not understand; nor do the critics throw much light upon it. Whenever a point of the com-

ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.¹

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit, as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse; treating with contempt the idea of four triremes coming to attack the powerful Athenian fleet. In the present sanguine phase of his character, Nikias sympathised with the flattering tenor of the message and overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of sending four ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learnt, to his great satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded, but that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, entering it by the Euryalus and the heights of Epipolæ. Having deliberated whether he should take the chance of running his ships into the harbour of Syracuse, despite the watch of the Athenian fleet—or whether he should sail through the strait of Messina to Himera at the north of Sicily, and from thence levy an army to cross the island and relieve Syracuse by land—he resolved on the latter course, and passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching ~~bath~~ at Rhegium and at Messenê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force; though Nikias had indeed sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been apprised that Gylippus had reached Lokri—rather from excess of precaution, than because he thought it necessary. But this Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late: Gylippus had already passed the

pass is mentioned in conjunction with any wind, it always seems to mean the point *from whence* the wind blows. Now, that *κατὰ βορέαν ξερῆκως* means "a wind which blows steadily from the north," as the commentators affirm—I cannot believe without better authority than they produce. Moreover Gylippus could never have laid his course for Tarentum if there had been a strong wind in this direction; while such a wind would have forwarded him to Lokri, the very place whither he

wanted to go. The mention of the Terinian Gulf is certainly embarrassing. If the words are right (which perhaps may be doubted), the explanation of Dr. Arnold in his note seems the best which can be offered. Perhaps indeed—for though improbable, this is not wholly impossible—Thucydides may himself have committed a geographical inadvertence, in supposing the Terinian Gulf to be on the east side of Calabria. See Appendix to this volume.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 104.

strait, and fortune, smiting his enemy with blindness, landed him unopposed on the fatal soil of Sicily.

The blindness of Nikias would indeed appear unaccountable, were it not that we shall have worse yet to recount. To appreciate his misjudgment fully—and to be sensible that we are not making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen—we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkibiadēs at Sparta :—“Send forthwith an army to Sicily (he exhorted the Lacedæmonians)—but *send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army—a Spartan to take the supreme command.*” It was in fulfilment of such recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta with full assurance of Spartan intervention to come, not to mention his great personal ability—would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island—disdains even this most easy precaution, and neglects him as a freebooter of no significance. Such neglect too is the more surprising, since the well-known philo-Laconian tendencies of Nikias would have led us to expect, that he would overvalue, rather than undervalue, the imposing ascendancy of the Spartan name.

Gylippus, on arriving at Himera as commander named by Sparta and announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himeræans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favourable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidēs—a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid, and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse, at the head of 700 hoplites from his own vessels, seamen and epibatae taken together—1000 hoplites and light troops, with 100 horse, from Himera—some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela—and 1000

Blindness
of Nikias—
egregious
mistake of
letting in
Gylippus.

Gylippus
levies an
army and
marches
across Sicily
from Hi-
mera to
Syracuse.

Sikels.¹ With these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryalus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse—assaulting and capturing the Sikel fort of Ietæ in his way, but without experiencing any other opposition.

The arrival was all but too late—and might have been actually too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Gongylus got to Syracuse a little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, under Erasinidēs—having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, but as soon as it was ready —was now on its way to Syracuse. But Gongylus had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest; probably striking a straighter course across the sea, and favoured by weather. He got safely into the harbour of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian guardships; whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence of the besieging operations.²

The arrival of Gongylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable moment—and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard of any relief approaching, or of any active intervention in their favour, from Peloponnesus. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation.³ It was at this critical juncture that Gongylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. He was the first to announce that both the Corinthian fleet, and a Spartan commander, were now actually on their voyage, and might be expected immediately —intelligence which filled the Syracusans with enthusiasm and with renewed courage. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had reached Himera (which Gongylus at his arrival could not know) and was raising an army to march across for their relief. After the interval necessary for his preparations and for his march (probably not less than between a fortnight and three weeks), they learnt that he was approaching Syracuse by the way of Euryalus and Epipolæ. He

Gylippus
with his
new-levied
force enters
Syracuse
unopposed.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 1.
² Thucyd. vii. 2-7.

³ Thucyd. vi. 103; vii. 2. Plutarch,
Nikias, c. 19.

was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryalus; the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.¹

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After this instant the besiegers pass from incontestable superiority in the field, and apparent certainty of prospective capture of the city—to a state of inferiority, not only excluding all hope of capture, but even sinking step by step into absolute ruin. Yet Nikias had remained with his eyes shut and his hands tied; not making the least effort to obstruct so fatal a consummation. After having despised Gylippus in his voyage along the coast of Italy as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been,² the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well-known to him beforehand. He must have learnt from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well-aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms—that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela,—as well as to sound the Sikel towns, not all of them friendly;—lastly, that he had to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory—it is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight, or three weeks, between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias must have learnt, through his intelligence in the interior of Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan opinion through the arrival of Gongylus, even before the landing of Gylippus in Sicily was known. He was apprised, from that

¹ Thucyd. vii. 2.

² Thucyd. vii. 3. Οι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, | αἱ φυιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίπτου καὶ τῶν Συρακουσῶν σφίσιν ἐπιόντων, &c.

moment, that he had to take measures, not only against renewed obstinate hostility within the town, but against a fresh invading enemy without. Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated ;¹ and could then approach Syracuse only by one road ; over the high ground of Euryalus in the Athenian rear—through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended ; he takes not a single new precaution ; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a broad and free plain.

If we are amazed at the insolent carelessness, with which Nikias disdained the commonest precautions for repelling the foreknown approach, by sea, of an enemy formidable even single-handed—what are we to say of that unaccountable blindness which led him to neglect the same enemy when coming at the head of a relieving army, and to omit the most obvious means of defence in a crisis upon which his future fate turned ? Homer would have designated such neglect as a temporary delirium inflicted by the fearful inspiration of Até : the historian has no such explanatory name to give—and can only note it as a sad and suitable prelude to the calamities too nearly at hand.

At the moment when the fortunate Spartan auxiliary was thus allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, eight stadia long, was all but completed : a few yards only of the end close to the harbour were wanting. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew (what Nikias unhappily never felt and never lived to learn) the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression, and full tide of confidence, which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to the lines of the Athenians. Amazed as they were, and struck dumb by his unexpected arrival, they too formed in battle order, and awaited his approach. His first proceeding marked

¹ Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thucyd. vii. 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel tribes to raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry—Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications.¹ This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field. It was a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse—a tacit admission that the Athenians could hope for nothing better in the end, than the humiliating offer which the herald had just made to them. So it seems to have been felt by both parties; for from this time forward, the Syracusans become and continue aggressors, the Athenians remaining always on the defensive, except for one brief instant after the arrival of Demosthenes.

After drawing off his troops and keeping them encamped for that night on the Temenite cliff (seemingly within the added fortified enclosure of Syracuse), Gylippus brought them out again the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise the fort of Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The enterprise was completely successful. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword; while the Syracusans gained another unexpected advantage during the day, by the capture of one of the Athenian triremes which was watching their harbour. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city-wall in a north-westerly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ; so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible.² He availed himself, for this purpose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall (between the

Gylippus
surprises and
captures the
Athenian
fort of
Labdalum.

He begins
the con-
struction
of a third
counter-
wall, on the
north side
of the Athe-
nian Circle.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 3.

² Thucyd. vii. 4. The probable direction of this third Syracusan counter-

wall will be seen in Plan II., marked by the letters S, T, U.

southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour)—which was now just finished, so as to leave their troops disposable for action on the higher ground. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire. This part of the wall was now heightened, and the Athenians took charge of it themselves, distributing their allies along the remainder.¹

These attacks however appear to have been chiefly intended as *Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium* diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field—unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And indeed he seems actually to have relinquished such hope, even thus early after he had seemed certain master of the city. For he now undertook a measure altogether new; highly important in itself, but indicating an altered scheme of policy. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium—the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbour, immediately south of the point of Ortygia—and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto stationed in close neighbourhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour. From such a station in the interior of the harbour, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them—of watching the two ports of Syracuse (one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the mainland) so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without—and of ensuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.²

Three forts, one of considerable size and two subsidiary, were erected on the sea-board of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burthen. Though the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 4.

² Thucyd. vii. 4.

situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages ; being destitute of any spring of water, such as the memorable fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Ortygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves, and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy, became disposed to ~~steal~~ away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbour of Peiræus.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, while by withdrawing the Athenian forces it left Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, planting them near the Athenian lines ; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he thought a favourable opportunity to make the attack himself ; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls—the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Gongylus being among the slain.¹ On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was a consequence of his own mistake, (he publicly confessed) in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their inbred superiority as Dorians and

Inconveniences of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischiefs which ensues to the Athenian naval strength.

Operations of Gylippus in the field—his defeat.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

Peloponnesians, by chasing these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the combat, but His decisive victory—
the Athenians are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of blockade.
marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation—so that it was essential for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action, between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigour, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.¹

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes under Erasinidēs, which Nikias had vainly endeavoured to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers were fortunate enough to escape them.

Erasinidēs and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryalus; a step which Hermokratēs had

¹ Thucyd. vii. 5, 6.

not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort¹ on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ—at the other extremity, upon the city-wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended along its whole length by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second by Sicilian Greeks; a third by other allies. Such was the improved and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present moment:² a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenes.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to equip their ships in

¹ This new upper fort is marked on Plan II. by the letter V. The three fortified encampments are marked XXX.

² Thucyd. vii. 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἱ τέ τῶν Κορινθίων νῆσες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκάδων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δόδεκα (ἥρη δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐρασνίδες Κορύθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς Συρακουσίους μέχρι τοῦ ἔγκαρσιον τείχους. The new wall of junction thus constructed is marked on Plan II. by the letters V, W, T.

These words of Thucydides are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways.

Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining the higher part of Epipolæ with the city-wall.

The explanation which I here give does not (so far as I know) coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thuc. vol. iii. p. 273), and the notes of Poppe and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him, that he thinks some words must have dropped out. The reader will find a defence of my views in the Appendix annexed to the Plan of Syracuse in this volume.

the harbour, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athens—envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding additional troops—even in merchant-vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.¹ Should no reinforcements reach the Athenian camp, the Syracusans well knew that its efficiency must diminish by every month's delay, while their own strength, in spite of heavy cost and effort, was growing with their increased prospects of success.

If such double conviction was present to sustain the ardour of the Syracusans, it was not less painfully felt amidst the Athenian camp, now blocked up like a besieged city, and enjoying no free movement except through their ships and their command of the sea. Nikias saw that if Gylippus should return with any considerable additional force, even the attack upon him by land would become too powerful to resist—besides the increasing disorganization of his fleet. He became fully convinced that to remain as they were was absolute ruin. As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that his position in the harbour had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenes would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias—who was afraid moreover of the blame which it would bring down upon him at home, if not from his own army. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now indeed the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not hope even for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements (if such were to be sent) until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval—precautions which, as

Nikias
sends home
a despatch
to Athens,
soliciting
reinforce-
ments.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 7.

the result will show, were within a hair's breadth of proving insufficient. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position—he resolved to transmit a written despatch; not trusting to the oral statement of a messenger, who might be wanting either in courage, in presence of mind, or in competent expression, to impress the full and sad truth upon a reluctant audience.¹ Accordingly he sent home a despatch, which seems to have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the secretary of the city. Preserved by Thucydidēs verbatim, it stands as one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and well deserves a literal translation.

“Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, Athenians, in many other despatches;² but the present crisis is such as to require your deliberation more than ever, when you shall have heard the situation in which we stand. After we had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy—there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive: indeed we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can no

Despatch of
Nikias to
the Athenian
people.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 8.

² Thucyd. vii. 9. *ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς.* The word *despatches*, which I use to translate *ἐπιστολαῖς*, is not inapplicable to oral, as well as to written messages, and thus retains the ambiguity involved in the original; for *ἐπιστολαῖς*, though usually implying, does not necessarily imply, *written* communications.

The words of Thucydidēs (vii. 8) may certainly be construed to imply that Nikias had never on any previous occasion sent a written communication to Athens; and so Dr. Thirlwall understands them, though not without hesitation (*Hist. Gr.* ch. xxvi. vol. iii. p.

418). At the same time I think them reconcileable with the supposition, that Nikias may previously have sent written despatches, though much shorter than the present—leaving details and particulars to be supplied by the officer who carried them.

Mr. Mitford states the direct reverse of that which Dr. Thirlwall understands—“Nicias had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing, with an exact account of every transaction” (ch. xviii. sect. v. vol. iv. p. 100).

Certainly the statement of Thucydidēs does not imply this.

longer continue the latter to completion, unless we had force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged—by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities; trying to stir up to action such of them as are now neutral, and to get, from the rest, additional naval and military supplies. For it is their determination (as I understand) not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea with their ships.

“Be not shocked when I tell you, that they intend to become aggressors even at sea. They know well, that our fleet was at first in high condition, with dry ships¹ and excellent crews: but now the ships have rotted, from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit: since the enemy’s fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can; for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others; while to us, who are obliged to retain all our fleet on guard, nothing less than prodigious superiority of number could ensure the like facility. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

“Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away, from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves, desert, now that our superiority is gone and that we have come to equal chances with our enemy; while the foreigners whom we pressed into our service, make off straight to some of the neighbouring cities. And those who came, tempted by high pay, under the idea of enriching themselves by traffic rather than of fighting, now that they find the enemy in full competence to cope with us by sea as well as by land, either go over to him as professed deserters, or get away as they can amidst the wide area of Sicily.² Nay,

¹ It seems that in Greek ship-building, moist and unseasoned wood was preferred, from the facility of bending it into the proper shape (Theophrastus, Hist. Plaut. v. 7, 4).

² Thucyd. vii. 13. *Kai oἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν*

there are even some who while trafficking here on their own account, bribe the trierarchs to accept Hykkarian slaves as substitutes, and thus destroy the strict discipline of our marine. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

"Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern—nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxus and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength.

ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσθάντες, εἰδὸς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὅπερ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸν πρώτον ἐπαρθέντες, καὶ οἱδμενοὶ χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον η̄ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γυνώμην ναύτικον τε δῆ καὶ τάλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα δρόσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσεις ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἔκαστοι δύνανται πολλὴ δ' η̄ Σικελία.

All the commentators bestow long notes in explanation of this phrase *ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσεις ἀπέρχονται*: but I cannot think that any of them are successful. There are even some who despair of success so much, as to wish to change *αὐτομολίας* by conjecture: see the citations in Poppo's long note.

But surely the literal sense of the words is here both defensible and instructive—"Some of them depart under pretence (or profession) of being deserters to the enemy." All the commentators reject this meaning, because they say, it is absurd to talk of a man's announcing before hand that he intended to desert to the enemy, and giving that as an excuse for quitting the camp. Such is not (in my judgement) the meaning of the word *προφάσεις* here. It does not denote what a man said before he quitted the Athenian camp (he would of course say nothing of his intention to any one), but the colour which he would put upon his conduct after he got within the Syracusan lines. He would present himself to them as a deserter to their cause: he would profess anxiety to take part in the defence: he would pretend to be tired of the oppressive Athenian dominion—for it is to be recollect, that all or most of these de-

serters were men belonging to the subject-allies of Athens. Those who passed over to the Syracusan lines would naturally recommend themselves by making profession of such dispositions, even though they did not really feel any such: for their real reason was, that the Athenian service had now become irksome, unprofitable, and dangerous—while the easiest manner of getting away from it was, to pass over as a deserter to Syracuse.

Nikias distinguishes these men from others, "who got away, as they could find opportunity, to some part or other of Sicily." These latter also would of course keep their intention of departing secret, until they got safe away into some Sicilian town; but when once there, they would make no profession of any feeling which they did not entertain. If they said anything, they would tell the plain truth, that they were making their escape from a position which now gave them more trouble than profit.

It appears to me that the words *ἐπ' αὐτομολίας προφάσει* will bear this sense perfectly well, and that it is the real meaning of Nikias.

Even before the Peloponnesian war was begun, the Corinthian envoy at Sparta affirms that the Athenians cannot depend upon their seamen standing true to them, since their navy was manned with hired foreign seamen rather than with natives—*ἄνητη γὰρ η̄ Αθηναῖων δύναμις μᾶλλον η̄ οἰκεῖα* (Thucyd. i. 121). The statement of Nikias proves that this remark was to a certain extent well-founded.

And if our enemy gain but one farther point—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us, under the impression of our present bad condition, with no reinforcement arriving from you—we shall be starved out, and he will bring the war to triumphant close, even without a battle.

"Pleasanter news than these I could easily have found to send you; but assuredly nothing so useful, seeing that the full knowledge of the state of affairs here is essential to your deliberations. Moreover I thought it even the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise; understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favourable assurances, yet are angry in the end, if they turn to unfavourable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You must either send for us home—or you must send us a second army, land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here; together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your hands: for while my health lasted, I did you much good service in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succours which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here—and those which are to come from Peloponnesus, though they will be longer in arriving, yet if you do not keep watch, will either elude or forestall you as they have already once done."¹

Such was the memorable despatch of Nikias which was read to the public assembly of Athens about the end of November or beginning of December 414 B.C.—brought by officers who strengthened its effect by their own oral communications, and answered all such inquiries as were put to them.² We have much reason to regret that Thucydides gives no account of the debate which so gloomy a revelation called forth. He tells us merely the result. The Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 11-15.

² Thucyd. vii. 10.

Resolution
of the Atheneans
to send De-
mosthenes
with a
second
armament.

home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament both of land and naval force, in prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him in command ; passing a vote however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenēs and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring. Demosthenēs was directed to employ himself actively in getting such larger force ready.¹

This letter of Nikias—so authentic—so full of matter—and so characteristic of the manners of the time—suggests Remarks upon the despatch of Nikias. several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious, that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time—what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse ? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin—the inquiry naturally suggests itself, whether he had done his best to anticipate, and what precautions he had himself taken to prevent, the coming of the Spartan general. To which the answer must be, that so far from anticipating the arrival of new enemies as a possible danger, he had almost invited them from abroad by his delay—and that

¹ Thucyd. vii. 16. • There is here a doubt as to the reading; between 120 talents—or 20 talents.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and other commentators in thinking that the money taken out by Eurymedon was far more probably the larger sum of the two, than the smaller. The former reading seems to deserve the preference. Besides, Diodorus states that Euryme-

don took out with him 140 talents: his authority indeed does not count for much—but it counts for something—in coincidence with a certain force of intrinsic probability (Diodor. xiii. 8).

On an occasion such as this, to send a very small sum such as 20 talents, would produce a discouraging effect upon the armament.

he had taken no precautions at all against them, though forewarned and having sufficient means at his disposal. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force, doubtless but too real, was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery, numbered among his difficulties. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army not to recognise that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because their general directed it; and next, did their duty most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

If even with our imperfect knowledge of the case, the ruin Former
despatches
of Nikias. complained of by Nikias be distinctly traceable to his own remissness and oversight, much more must this ~~connection~~ have been felt by intelligent Athenians, both in the camp and in the city, as we shall see by the conduct of Demosthenes¹ hereafter to be related. Let us conceive the series of despatches, to which Nikias himself alludes as having been transmitted home, from their commencement. We must recollect that the expedition was originally sent from Athens with hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned indeed by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition is complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close—in spite of a Spartan adventurer named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smooth the transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate communication above translated.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42.

When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents—the natural effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians would be, a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people; that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful and irritable, by standing habit—as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements—we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticised him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias,—on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this,—betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon: instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought to have

Effect of his
despatch
upon the
Athenians.

Treatment
of Nikias
by the
Athenians.

rendered, but has not : instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation : instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general however meritorious,—we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to pre-established personal esteem ;—and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue ; an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and position, who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was *his* hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias—his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of Alkibiadēs, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent construction put upon all his shortcomings, and spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible command.

The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy—and as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a Demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command ! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias—to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine—to prove how much

mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued.¹ Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgement; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover there was at that time a confusion,—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realised through the siege of Syracuse,—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself—perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenes was not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite quality; from inability to get clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their minds—ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias.

¹ Plutarch (*Nikias*, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them; but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious (*φθόνως*) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias.

No judgement can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this—facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.

Capital
mistake
committed
by the
Athenians.

A little more of this alleged fickleness—or easy escape from past associations and impressibility to actual circumstances—
Hostilities
from Sparta
certain and
impending. would have been at the present juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favourably to the recommendation of Alkibiadēs¹ that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still subsisted in name—and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria.² Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodōrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiae and committed devastations: which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylus, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.³

Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse—envoys from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Syracusans on the other—each urgently calling for farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claim at Sparta; Alkibiadēs also renewed his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of such impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse.

¹ Thueyd. vi. 93.

² Thucyd. vii. 18.

³ Thucyd. vi. 105; vii. 18.

and prosecute the siege with vigour. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created ~~an~~ imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much ~~more~~ vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring¹ to Syracuse; and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.¹

¹ Thucyd. vii. 18.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY.

THIS Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as the winter of 414–413 b.c., the months immediately preceding that which Thucydidēs terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the Dekeleian war.¹ While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse even in midwinter, Demosthenēs exerted himself all the winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus—to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian Gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites.² In Corinth, Sikyon, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse—at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, embarked a force of 600 Lacedæmonian hoplites
B.C. 413. (Helots and Neodamodes) under the Spartan Ekkritus—and 300 Bœotian hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrénê in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of 700 hoplites under Alexarchus—partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful

¹ Diodor. xiii. 8.

² Thucyd. vii. 17.

neighbours¹—departed from the north-west of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf of Sicily—the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the re-invasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis, son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighbourhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnēs, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens—near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia; while the road from Athens to Orōpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.²

We read with amazement, and the contemporary world saw with yet greater amazement, that while this important work was actually going on, and while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens—at that very moment,³ the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Chariklēs to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenēs, to push offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of 60 Athenian and 5 Chian triremes; of 1200 Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen

Invasion of
Attica by
Agis and
the Peloponnesian
force—for-
tification of
Dekeleia

¹ Thucyd. vii. 19–58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγ- καστολ σπαρεβόντες.

² Thucyd. vii. 19–28, with Dr. Arnold's note.

³ Thucyd. vii. 20. ἄμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ, &c. Compare Isokratis, Orat. viii. De Pace, s. 102. p. 236 Bekk.

muster-roll ; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged on hire 1500 peltasts from Thrace, of the tribe called Dii ; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenēs set sail without them.¹ Chariklēs having gone forward to take aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythēra to encourage desertion among the Helots. From hence Chariklēs returned with the Argeians, while Demosthenēs conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra.² On the Eleian coast, he destroyed a transport carrying hoplites to Syracuse, though the men escaped ashore : next he proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional hoplites—and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to act as colleague of Demosthenēs in the command.³ The news brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konōn at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyraeans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites—while Demosthenēs was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.⁴

Eurymedon not only brought back word of the distressed condition of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, but had also

¹ Thucyd. vii. 20-27.

² Thucyd. vii. 26.

³ Thucyd. vii. 31. "Οὐτὶ δὲ ἀβρῷ (Demosthenēs) περὶ ταῦτα (Anaktoriūm) Εὐρυμέδων ἀπαντᾷ, διὸ τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἔγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεσήμοθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει, &c."

The meaning of this passage appears quite unambiguous, that Eurymedon had been sent to Sicily in the winter to carry the sum of 120 talents to Nikias, and was now on his return (see Thucyd. vii. 11). Nevertheless we read in Mr. Mitford—"At Anactorium Demosthenes found Eurymedon collecting provisions for Sicily," &c. Mr. Mitford farther says in a note (quoting the Scholiast)—

"Ἔτοι τὰ πρὸς τροφὴν χρήματα, καὶ τὰ

λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς, Schol.)—“This is not the only occasion on which Thucydides uses the term *χρήματα* for necessities in general. Smith has translated accordingly: but the Latin has *pecuniam*, which does not express the sense intended here” (ch. xviii. sect. vi. vol. iv. p. 118).

There cannot be the least doubt that the Latin is here right. The definite article makes the point quite certain, even if were true (which I doubt) that Thucydides sometimes used the word *χρήματα* to mean “necessaries in general.” I doubt still more whether he ever uses *ἄγων* in the sense of “collecting.”

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 31.

learnt, during his way back, their heavy additional loss by the capture of the fort at Plemmyrium. Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenes quitted Peiraeus. He returned with fresh reinforcements from the interior, and with redoubled ardour for decisive operations against Nikias before aid could arrive from Athens. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratēs, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on ship-board. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendancy of the two leaders: “The Athenians (said Hermokratēs to his countrymen) have not been always eminent at sea as they now are: they were once landsmen like you, and more than you—they were only forced on shipboard by the Persian invasion. The only way to deal with bold men like them, is to show a front bolder still. *They* have often by their audacity daunted enemies of greater real force than themselves, and they must now be taught that others can play the same game with them. Go right at them before they expect it—and you will gain more by thus surprising and intimidating them, than you will suffer by their superior science.” Such lessons, addressed to men already in the tide of success, were presently efficacious, and a naval attack was resolved.¹

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port (as it was called afterwards, the Portus Lakkium) lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the Isthmus of Ortygia, within the Great Harbour. Both of them (it appears) were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated within it; the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the

Operations
of Gylippus
at Syracuse.
He deter-
mines to
attack the
Athenians
at sea.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 21. Among the topics of encouragement dwelt upon by Hermokratēs, it is remarkable that he makes no mention of that which the sequel proved to be the most important of all—the confined space of the harbour, which rendered Athenian ships and tactics unavailing.

Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the Anapus, to the neighbourhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out, at one and the same signal, from both the ports; 45 triremes out of the lesser port, 35 out of the other. Both squadrons tried to round the southern point of Ortygia, so as to unite and to attack the enemy at Plemmyrium in concert. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, hastened to man 60 ships; with 25 of which they met the 35 Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbour —while with the other 35 they encountered the 45 from the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbour. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbour, and joined their comrades. But being little accustomed to naval warfare, they presently fell into complete confusion, partly in consequence of their unexpected success; so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, attacked them anew, and completely defeated them; sinking or disabling eleven ships, of three of which the crews were made prisoners, the rest being mostly slain.¹ Three Athenian triremes were destroyed also.

But this victory, itself not easily won, was more than counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded, and little suspecting the presence of their enemy on the land side. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at day-break, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller. The garrison sought safety as they could, on board the transports and vessels of burden at the station, and rowed across the Great Harbour to the land-camp of Nikias on the other side. Those who fled from the greater fort, which was the first taken, ran some risk from the Syracusan triremes, which were at that moment victorious at sea. But by the time that the two lesser forts were taken,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 23; Diodor. xiii. 9; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20.

the Athenian fleet had regained its superiority, so that there was no danger of similar pursuit in the crossing of the Great Harbour.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault—but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort; partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security. The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.¹

Important consequences of the capture.

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians at a time when their situation could ill bear it—the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious, besides the alarm and discouragement which it spread among the army. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbour on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment—the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbour, between the city-wall and the river Anapus; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position both by sea and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent battle proved every way encouraging; not merely from the valuable acquisition of Plemmyrium, but even from the sea-fight itself; which had indeed turned out to be a defeat, but which promised at first to be a victory, had they not thrown away the chance by their own disorder. It removed all superstitious fear of Athenian nautical superiority; while their position was so much improved by having acquired the command of the mouth of the harbour, that they began even to assume the aggressive at sea. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant-vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these

Increased spirits and confidence of the Syracusans, even for sea fight.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 23, 24.

vessels seem to have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. In touching at Lokri on their return, they took aboard a company of Thespian hoplites who had made their way thither in a transport. They were also fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Megara—with the loss of one ship however, including her crew.¹

Efforts of
the Syra-
cuscans to
procure
farther rein-
forcements
from the
Sicilian
towns. One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favourable news of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went from Syracuse—not merely Syracusans, but also Corinthians and Lacedæmonians—to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They made known everywhere the prodigious improvement in Syracusan affairs arising from the gain of Plemmyrium, as well as the insignificant character of the recent naval defeat. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay; since there were now good hopes of being able to crush the Athenians in the harbour completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.²

Conflicts
between the
Athenians
and Syra-
cuscans in
the Great
Harbour. While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbour was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. Since the loss of Plemmyrium, the Athenian naval station was in the north-west interior corner of that harbour, adjoining the fortified lines occupied by their land-army. It was enclosed and protected by a row of posts or stakes stuck in the bottom and standing out of the water.³ The Syracusans on their side had also planted a stockade in front of the interior port of Ortygia, to defend their ships, their ship-houses, and their docks within. As the two stations were not far apart, each party watched for opportunities of occasional attack or annoyance by missile weapons to the other; and daily skirmishes of this sort took place, in which on the whole the Athenians seem to have had the advantage. They even formed the plan of breaking through the outworks of the Syracusan dockyard and burning the ships within. They brought up a ship of the largest size, with wooden towers and side defences,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 25.

² Thucyd. vii. 25.

³ Thucyd. vii. 38.

against the line of posts fronting the dockyard, and tried to force the entrance, either by means of divers who sawed them through at the bottom, or by boat-crews who fastened ropes round them and thus unfixed or plucked them out. All this was done under cover of the great vessel with its towers manned by light-armed, who exchanged showers of missiles with the Syracusan bowmen on the top of the ship-houses, and prevented the latter from coming near enough to interrupt the operation. The Athenians contrived thus to remove many of the posts planted—even the most dangerous among them, those which did not reach to the surface of the water, and which therefore a ship approaching could not see. But they gained little by it, since the Syracusans were able to plant others in their room. On the whole, no serious damage was done either to the dockyard or to the ships within. And the state of affairs in the Great Harbour stood substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour—probably three weeks or a month.¹

These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came 500 hoplites, 400 darters, and 300 bowmen; from Gela, 5 triremes, 400 darters, and 200 horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of 800 men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force (about 1500 in number) to Syracuse.²

This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenes with his armament were at Korkyra on the way

Defeat of a
Sicilian re-
inforcement
marching
to aid
Syracuse.

to Syracuse—so greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving.¹ The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

It was not until Demosthenes was approaching Rhegium, within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without further delay. Preparation in every way had been made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it—then by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction, and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him—or backed their ship stern foremost—until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his—against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oar-blades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room—which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbour of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies; so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process, which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able

Renewed
attack by
Gylippus
on the
Athenians.

Disadvan-
tages of the
Athenian
fleet in the
harbour.
Their naval
tactics im-
possible in
the narrow
space.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 33.

Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as good nautical manœuvring.¹ Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and sharp, advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less damage—they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid—and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the epôtids—"ear-caps" or nozzles projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick and sustained by under-beams let into the hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forwards very prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are called Catheads in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended: but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less and the epôtids more—so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three nozzles.² The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable.

Having completed these arrangements, their land-force was marched out under Gylippus to threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry and the garrison of the Olympieion marched up to the other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their

Improvements in
Syracusan
ships suited
to the narrow
space.

The Syra-
cusan
threaten
attack upon
the Athe-
nian naval
station.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμάθῃ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίφωτον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ' ἢν αὐτοὶ χρησασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, &c.

Diodor. xiii. 10.

² Compare Thucyd. vii. 34–36; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppe, and Didot, on the passages of Thucydides.

It appears as if the ἀντηρίδες or sustaining beams were something new, now provided for the first time—in order to strengthen the epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words which Thucydides employs

to describe the position of these ἀντηρίδες, are to me not fully intelligible, nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily.

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water—which Thucydides does not mention.

A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being deprived of her beak (Athenaeus, xii. p. 535). Lysander reserved the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Egos-potami to grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8).

walls from what seemed to be a land-attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, 80 triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, 75 triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off however in desultory and indecisive skirmish; with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action.¹

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action (at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbour) by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenes was now at hand, prudence counselled such reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been out-voted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus; who, anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenes, took their stand upon Athenian maritime honour, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered.²

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Additional preparations of Nikias—battle renewed. Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained; and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about 200 feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins—or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering:³ any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening where no enemy could follow, and choose her own time for sailing out again. Before night, such arrangements were completed. At the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans re-appeared, with the same demonstrations both of land-force and naval force as before. The

¹ Thucyd. vii. 37, 38.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii. 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

³ Thucyd. vii. 41. *αἱ κεραῖαι δελφινοφόροι:* compare Pollux, i. 85, and Fragment vi. of the comedy of the poet Pherekrates, entitled *Αύριος—Meineke*, Fragn. Comic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 258, and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759.

Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city—again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing such retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight,¹ and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to get their dinners at leisure—having tasted no food that day.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manoeuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, after a short, but sufficient interval, allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder.² On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some time—until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to ensure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realise this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, &c. νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν | ² Thucyd. vii. 40.

and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board—one of them being captured with all her crew. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.¹

Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and contemplated nothing less than the complete destruction of their enemies in the harbour. Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of Demosthenes with the second armament. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbour, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenes and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbour; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.² So important were the consequences which turned upon that postponement of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to Athens, if Demosthenes had not arrived in time; if the ruin of the first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the second!

Demosthenes, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Chœrades on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of 150 Messapian darters, through the friendly

¹ Thucyd. viii. 41.

² Thucyd. vii. 42.

aid of the native prince *Areas*, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther¹ to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendancy, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents.² They not only took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of 700 hoplites and 300 darters to accompany Demosthenes, who remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify the completeness of each division. After having held this review on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory: upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy—touching at the various towns, all except the hostile *Lokri*.³

His entry into the harbour of Syracuse³—accomplished in the most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments—was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force, than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together—he conducted 73 triremes, 5000 hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description; archers, slingers, darters, &c., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder.⁴ That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified—was a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably, the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenes was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 33–57.

² Thucyd. vii. 35.

³ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 42.

Imposing
effect of his
entry into
the Great
Harbour.

They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea ;
 Revived courage of the Athenians.
 Judicious and decisive resolutions of Demosthenes.
 and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus ; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenes was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.¹

He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the first terror-striking impression of his splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenes to act without a moment's delay, while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired—and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.²

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the Position and southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolae. But all plans of Demosthenes along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans ; beginning at the city-wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a north-westerly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryalus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans as defenders were on the north side of this counter-wall ; he and the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, and he could not stir a step without making himself master of it ; towards which end there were only two possible

¹ Thucyd. vii. 47-50.

² Thucyd. vii. 42.

means—either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryalus. He began by trying the first method. But the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed.¹ There remained only the second method—to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryalus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.

But the march necessary for this purpose—first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryalus by a narrow and winding path—was so difficult, that even Demosthenes, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines)²—conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post—lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favoured him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance—then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryalus or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground—assailed it completely by surprise—and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 43.

² Thucyd. vii. 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenes took with him 10,000 hoplites, and 10,000 light troops—numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii. 11).

Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Ni-

kias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipolæ: Thucydides notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable.

The course taken by Demosthenes in his night-march will be found marked on Plan II. annexed to this volume.

Nocturnal
march of
Demosthenes to
surprise
Epipolæ,
and turn the
Syracusan
line of
defence.

greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall,¹ on the declivity of Epipolæ—as well as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratēs,² who formed a night-watch or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenēs and the Athenian vanguard, charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus, and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenēs had been successful
Partial
success at
first—com-
plete and
ruinous de-
feat finally. beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counter-wall which rested upon that fort: the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it—so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall; an

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42, 43. Καὶ (Demosthenēs) δρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακούσων, φέκάλυπτας περιτείχισας σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναῖους, ἀπλούν τε δν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσει τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβδόσεως, καὶ αὗτις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, βρδῶς ἀν αὐτῷ ληφθὲν (οὐδὲ γὰρ δυοπεῖναι ἀν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἡπελγεῖτο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ.

vii. 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἔδοκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ ἀναβάντας, &c.

Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of Thucydidēs (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxvi. p. 432-434).

This appears to me a mistake. What conceivable motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff—Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care

that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the παρατείχισμα. The moment when the Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (*τὰ ἄνω τείχη*) is specially marked by Thucydidēs afterwards—vii. 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the Great Harbour. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgement, evading the direct sense of it.

The words of Thucydidēs, vii. 42—εἰ ἐπικρατήσει τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβδόσεως καὶ αὗτις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου—are more correctly conceived by M. Firmin Didot in the note to his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The στρατόπεδον here indicated does not mean the Athenian Circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Labdalam, and of which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus, who had now converted it into a camp or στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans.

² Diodor. xiii. 11.

operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenēs a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried—if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther—and if he could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. Whether it would have been possible for him to maintain himself without farther advance, until day broke, and thus avoid the unknown perils of a night-battle, we cannot say. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately however their ardour of pursuit (as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites) disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Boëtian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Boëtians charged them, and after a short resistance, broke them completely, forcing them to take flight. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind—still under the impression of success—ignorant of what had passed in front—and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamour and confusion, wherein there was neither command nor obedience, nor could any one discern what was passing. The light of the moon rendered objects and figures generally visible, without being sufficient to discriminate friend from foe. The beaten Athenians, thrown back upon their comrades, were in many cases mistaken for enemies and slain. The Syracusans and Boëtians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. That test also soon failed, since each party got acquainted with the watchword of the other—especially that of the Athenians, among whom the confusion was the greatest, became well-known to the Syracusans, who kept together in larger parties. Above all, the effect of the pæan or war-shout, on both sides, was remarkable. The Dorians in the Athenian army (from Argos, Korkyra, and other places) raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans: accordingly

Disorder of
the Ath-
enians—great
loss in the
flight.

their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended : but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many (especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenēs) lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines. Their loss of arms was even greater than that of men, from the throwing away of shields by those soldiers who leaped the cliff.¹

Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive plans, of the Syracusans. The overjoyed Syracusans erected two trophies, one upon the road to Epipolæ, the other upon the exact and critical spot where the Boeotians had first withheld and first repelled the enemy. By a victory, so unexpected and overwhelming, their feelings were restored to the same pitch of confidence which had animated them before the arrival of Demosthenēs. Again now masters of the field, they again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament ; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily—while Sikanus with fifteen triremes was despatched to Agrigentum, then understood to be wavering, and in a political crisis.²

Deliberation and different opinions of the Athenian generals. During the absence of Gylippus, the Athenian generals were left to mourn their recent reverse, and to discuss the exigencies of their untoward position. The whole armament was now full of discouragement and weariness ; impatient to escape from a scene where fever daily thinned their numbers, and where they seemed destined to nothing but dishonour. Such painful evidences of increasing disorganization only made Demosthenēs more strenuous in enforcing the resolution which he had taken before the attack on Epipolæ. He had done his best to strike one decisive blow : the chances of war had turned

¹ Thucyd. vii. 44, 45.

² Thucyd. vii. 46. Plutarch (*Nikias*, c. 21) states that the number of slain was 2000. Diodorus gives it at 2500 (xiii. 11). Thucydides does not state it

at all.

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thucydides; perhaps Philitus.

out against him, and inflicted a humiliating defeat; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favourable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), while the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle (he added) to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue; especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.¹

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, though he admitted the full reality of both, ought not nevertheless to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy²—as such a resolution ought to be. But furthermore, he (Nikias) took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognisant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving—though now loud in cries of suffering, and impatient to get home—would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly; and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Speaking his own personal feelings, he knew too well the tempers of his countrymen to expose himself to the danger of thus perishing under a charge alike unmerited and disgraceful. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy.³ It must be re-

¹ Thucyd. vii. 47.

² Thucyd. vii. 48. Ο δὲ Νικίας ἐνθυμήσε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρὰ σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἀβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδὲ ἐμφανώς σφᾶς ψυχοβούλουν μετὰ πολλά ὡν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτον τίγνεσθαι· οὐδεὶν γάρ διν, διότε βούλοντο, τοῦτο ποιῶντες πολλῷ ἤττον.

³ It seems probable that some of the taxarchs and trierarchs were present at

this deliberation, as we find in another case afterwards, c. 60. Possibly Demosthenes might even desire that they should be present, as witnesses respecting the feeling of the army; and also as supporters, if the matter came afterwards to be debated in the public assembly at Athens. It is to this fact that the words ἐμφανώς μετὰ πολλῶν seem to allude.

³ Thucyd. vii. 48. Οὐκούν βούλεσθαι αὐτὸς γε, ἐπιστρέψεος τὰς Ἀθηναῖς φε-

collected too (he added) that if *their* affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts—so that they had already spent 2000 talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war (to which Demosthenēs had alluded as a reason for returning home) could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege;¹ the more so as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

Both Demosthenēs and Euryomedon protested in the strongest language against the proposition of Nikias. Especially Demosthenes insists at least on removing out of the Great Harbour. they treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbour as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting (for argument) the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbour to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians; escaping from that narrow basin which condemned them to inferiority even on their own proper element. At all events to remove, and remove forthwith, out of the Great Harbour—such was the pressing requisition of Demosthenēs and Euryomedon.²

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He

σεις, ἐπὶ αἰσχρῷ γε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ' Ἀθηναῖον ἀπολέσθαι, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν, ιδίᾳ.

The situation of the last word *ιδίᾳ* in this sentence is perplexing, because it can hardly be construed except either with *ἀπολέσθαι* or with *αὐτός γε*: for Nikias could not run any risk of perishing *separately* by the hands of the enemy — unless we are to ascribe to him an absurd rhodomontade quite foreign to

his character. Compare Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 22.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 48. *τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆγει προσκαθημένους, &c.*

² Thucyd. vii. 49. 'Ο δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι· οὐδὲ διώσασθαι ἐνεδέχετο· τὸ δὲ ἐνίκαντα επεῖν, οὐδεγεν τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρεσκεῖν ἐγ τῷ αὐτῷ έτι μένειν, ἀλλ' θτι τάχιστα ήδη καὶ μὴ μέλλειν ἔχαντασθαι. Καὶ δ Ευρυμέδων αὐτῷ τοῦτο ξυνηγρέειν.

insisted on remaining as they were ;—and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus¹ (colleagues named by the assembly at home before the departure of the second armament) must have voted under the influence of his authority ; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenes and Eurymedon to submit—on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the Harbour, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements. Throughout the army, hope of success appears to have vanished, while anxiety for return had become general. The opinions of Demosthenes and Eurymedon were doubtless well-known, and orders for retreat were expected, but never came. Nikias obstinately refused to give them, during the whole of this fatal interval ; which plunged the army into the abyss of ruin, instead of mere failure in their aggressive enterprise.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even Thucydides thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse, with whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence, (seemingly apart from his colleagues,) and who still urged him, by special messages, not to go away : assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on longer. Without fully trusting these intimations, he could not bring himself to act against them. He therefore hung back from day to day, refusing to pronounce the decisive word.²

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that it involved all the brave men

Infatuation
of Nikias.

¹ Thueyd. vii. 69; Diodor. xiii. 12.

² Thueyd. vii. 48. "Α ἐπιστάμενος, τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ' ἀμφότεραις ἔχων καὶ δισκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δὲ μφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἐφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν,

The insignificance of the party in Syracuse which corresponded with Nikias may be reasonably inferred from Thucyd. vii. 55. It consisted in part of those Leontines who had been incorporated into the Syracusan citizenship (Diodor. xiii. 18).

Polyænus (i. 47, 1) has a tale respecting a revolt of the slaves or villeins (*oiketai*) at Syracuse during the Athenian siege, under a leader named Sosikrates—a revolt suppressed by the stratagem of Heinokratès. That various attempts of this sort took place at Syracuse during these two trying years, is by no means improbable. In fact, it is difficult to understand how the numerous pedial slaves were kept in order during the great pressure and danger, prior to the coming of Gylippus.

around him in one common ruin with himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war? Childish as such credulity seems, we are nevertheless compelled to admit it as real, to such an extent as to counterbalance all the pressing motives for departure; motives, enforced by discerning colleagues as well as by the complaints of the army, and brought home to his own observation by the experience of the late naval defeat. At any rate, it served as an excuse for that fatal weakness of his character which made him incapable of taking resolutions founded on prospective calculations, and chained him to his actual position until he was driven to act by imminent necessity.

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. The other generals think with satisfaction of going back to their country, and rescuing the force which yet remained, even under circumstances of disappointment and failure. Not so Nikias: he knows too well the reception which he had deserved, and which might possibly be in store for him. Avowedly indeed, he anticipates reproach from the Athenians against the generals, but only unmerited reproach, on the special ground of bringing away the army without orders from home;—adding some harsh criticisms upon the injustice of the popular judgment and the perfidy of his own soldiers. But in the first place, we may remark that Demosthenes and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice; or if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. The mistakes of the people in regard to him had always been those of indulgence, over-esteem, and over-constancy. But Nikias foresaw too well that he would have more to answer for at Athens than the simple fact of sanctioning retreat under existing circumstances. He could not but remember the pride and sanguine hopes under which he had originally conducted the expedition out of Peiraeus, contrasted with the miserable sequel and ignominious close,—even if the account had been now closed, without worse. He could not but be conscious, more or less, how much of all this was owing to his own misjudgment; and under such impressions, the idea of meeting the free criticisms and scrutiny of his fellow citizens (even putting aside the chance of

judicial trial) must have been insupportably humiliating. To Nikias,—a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable disease,—life at Athens had neither charm nor honour left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure; clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up—and yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.¹

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ,² Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. The latter had been unsuccessful at Agrigentum, where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent into banishment before his arrival; but Gylippus brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Taenarus in the early spring, and who had made their way from Kyrônê first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive, both by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenes first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and Demosthenes now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition—though even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction.³ He however insisted with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion—but that the order should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away—with orders to forward no farther supplies.⁴

¹ Thucyd. vii. 49. • Ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ὅκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἀμά όπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἶδὼς δ Νικίας ἴσχυρίζεται.

The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and discriminating—“Nicias, seu pudore male acte rei, seu metu destitutus spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit” (Justin. iv. 5).

² This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. vii. 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.

³ Thucyd. vii. 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ δ Νικίας έπι δ μοίως ἡ ναντιοῦτο, &c. Diodor. xiii. 12. ‘Ο Νικίας ἡ ναντιοῦθη συγχωρῆσαι, &c.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 60.

This plan was proceeding successfully : the ships were made ready—much of the property of the army had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy—the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning—and within a few hours, this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbour, with comparatively small loss¹—when the Gods themselves (I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp) interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before (the 27th August, 413 b.c.)—which was full moon—the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues ; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over.² And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus made his own, was a sentence of death to the Athenian army : yet it went along with the general feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenes, though if he had commanded alone, he might have tried to overrule it—found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus (himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events), it was a decision decidedly wrong ; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape or any other operation requiring silence

¹ Diodor. xiii. 12. Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐπέλθεντο, &c. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23.

² The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 b.c., from 27 minutes past 9 to 34 minutes past 10 P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Graecor. sect. xciv. p. 184)—speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thucydides states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry thrice nine days (vii. 50). Diodorus says three days. Plutarch intimates that Ni-

kias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on three days, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thucydides: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix. 19).

and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was (he affirmed) an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbour. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidēs, the ablest prophet in his service; and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability.¹ His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived.²

The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended consequence, of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army.

What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and ^{victorious,}
put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbour, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days: he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, 76 triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, 86 triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans

Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbour.

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 22; Diodor. xiii. 12; Thucyd. vii. 50. Stilbidēs was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. *Pac.* 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia.

Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, c. 31).

² Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 24.

first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbour which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner—neared the land too much—and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. ^{Partial success ashore against Gylippus.} Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen in hauling off the ships as prizes. His march however was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, beat the foremost of them, and drove them away from the shore into the marsh called Lysimcleia. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle ensued in which the latter were victorious. Though they did not inflict much loss upon the enemy, yet they saved most of their own triremes which had been driven ashore, together with the crews—and carried them into the naval station. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. This was probably the division of Eurymedon, which having been driven ashore in the recess of Daskon, was too far off from the Athenian station to receive any land assistance. As the Athenian were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favourable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames.¹

Here was a complete victory gained over Athens on her own element—gained with inferior numbers—gained even over the fresh, and yet formidable fleet recently brought by Demosthenes. It told but too plainly on which side the superiority now lay—how well the Syracusans had organized their naval strength for the specialties of their own harbour—how ruinous had been the folly of Nikias.

<sup>The Syracusans deter-
mine to block up the mouth
of the harbour, and
destroy or capture the
whole Athenian arm-
ament.</sup>

¹ Thucyd. vii. 52, 53; Diodor. xiii. 13.

in retaining his excellent seamen imprisoned within that petty and unwholesome lake, where land and water alike did the work of their enemies. It not only disheartened the Athenians, but belied all their past experience, and utterly confounded them. Sickness of the whole enterprise, and repentance for having undertaken it, now became uppermost in their minds: yet it is remarkable that we hear of no complaints against Nikias separately.¹ But repentance came too late. The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, sailed round the harbour in triumph as again their own,² and already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit.

Nor were they insensible how vastly the scope of the contest was now widened, and the value of the stake before them enhanced. It was not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence; for Athens could never be expected to survive so terrific a loss as that of the entire double armament before Syracuse.³ The Syracusans exulted^{*} in the thought that this great achievement would be theirs; that their city was the field, and their navy the chief instrument, of victory; a lasting source of glory to them, not merely in the eyes of contemporaries, but even in those of posterity. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryalus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many, and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks continental and insular—Ionic, Doric, and Æolic—autonomous and dependent—volunteers and mercenaries—from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west—were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacedæmonians, Corin-

Large views
of the Syra-
cuscans
against the
power of
Athens—
new hazards
now opened
to endanger
that power.

Vast num-
bers, and
miscel-
laneous origin,
of the com-
batants now
engaged in
fighting for
or against
Syracuse.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 55. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι
ἐν ταὐτὶ δὴ ἀθυίας ἦσαν, καὶ δὲ παράδο-
γος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι
τῆς στρατείας δὲ μεγάλος.

² Thucyd. vii. 56. Οἱ δὲ Συρακουσίοις
τὸν τε λιμένα εὑθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς, &c.

³ Thucyd. vii. 56.

thians, and Bœotians, were fighting on the side of Syracuse—the Argeians and Mantineians, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her. The jumble of kinship among the combatants on both sides, as well as the cross action of different local antipathies, is put in lively antithesis by Thucydidēs.¹ But amidst so vast an assembled number, of which they were the chiefs, the paymasters, and the centre of combination—the Syracusans might well feel a sense of personal aggrandisement, and a consciousness of the great blow which they were about to strike, sufficient to exalt them for the time above the level even of their great Dorian chiefs in Peloponnesus.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was nearly one mile broad, with vessels of every description—triremes, traders, boats, &c.—anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together.² They at the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate struggle which they knew to be coming. They then awaited the efforts of the Athenians, who watched their proceedings with sadness and anxiety.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make

a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbour. Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp leaned to the former scheme.³ But the generals resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff; confining themselves to a limited fortified space close to the shore, just adequate for their sick, their wounded, and their stores; in order to spare the necessity for a large garrison to defend them, and thus leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every trireme in the station, which could be rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country. The triremes were

¹ Thucyd. vii. 57, 58.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24.

³ Thucyd. vii. 59; Diodor. xiii. 14.

manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters—the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids. The best consultation was held with the steersmen as to arrangement and manœuvres of every trireme, and no precaution omitted which the scanty means at hand allowed. In the well-known impossibility of obtaining new provisions, every man was anxious to hurry on the struggle.¹ But Nikias, as he mustered them on the shore immediately before going aboard, saw but too plainly that it was the mere stress of desperation which impelled them; that the elasticity, the disciplined confidence, the maritime pride, habitual to the Athenians on shipboard—was extinct, or dimly and faintly burning.

He did his best to revive them, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. “Recollect (he said) that you too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. Yield not to despair like raw recruits after a first defeat: you, Athenians and allies, familiar with the unexpected revolutions of war, will hope now for the fair turn of fortune, and fight with a spirit worthy of the great force which you see here around you. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages—the narrow circuit of the harbour, and the thickness of the enemy's prows.² Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy—a land battle on shipboard.³ It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage, in spite of this sad failure in our means,

¹ Thucyd. vii. 60.

² Thucyd. vii. 62. “Α δὲ ἀρωγὴ ἐνεδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λίμενος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα δχλον τῶν νεάν ξεσθαι, &c.

³ Thucyd. vii. 62. ‘Ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ θῆ ἡναγκόσμεθα, ὅπε τε ομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεάν, καὶ τὸ μῆτε αὐτούς διακρούεσθαι, μῆτε ἑκείνους ἐξ, ὠφέλιμον φάγεται.

and subversion of our tactics. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens. Though not really citizens, you have been reputed and treated as such: you have acquired our dialect, you have copied our habits, and have thus enjoyed the admiration, the imposing station, and the security, arising from our great empire.¹ Partaking as you do freely in the benefits of that empire, do not now betray it to these Sicilians and Corinthians whom you have so often beaten. For such of you as are Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now going aboard here are the *all* of Athens—her hoplites, her ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name.² Bear up then and conquer, every man with his best mettle, in this one last struggle—for Athens as well as yourselves, and on an occasion which will never return.”

If, in translating the despatch written home ten months before Agony of Nikias—his efforts to encourage the officers. by Nikias to the people of Athens, we were compelled to remark, that the greater part of it was the bitterest condemnation of his own previous policy as commander—so we are here carried back, when we find him striving to palliate the ruinous effects of that confined space of water which paralysed the Athenian seamen, to his own obstinate improvidence in forbidding

¹ Thucyd. vii. 63. *Tois δὲ ναυταις παραινῶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι, μὴ ἐκπελῆχθει τι ταῖς ἔμφοραις ἄγαν . . . ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὃς ἀξίᾳ ἔστι διασώσασθαι, οἱ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ δύντες ὑμῶν, τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει, θαυμάζεοθε κατὰ τὴν Ἐλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμέτερας οὐδὲ κλασσὸν κατὰ τὸ ὀφελεῖσθαι, ἐς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλείον, μετελέχετε, διστρεπτοί μόνοι ἀλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες, δικαλώς αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταχροδίσσοτε, &c.*

Dr. Arnold (together with Göller and Poppo), following the Scholiast, explain these words as having particular reference to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct.

All persons in that service—who were freemen, but yet not citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent allies—the *ξένοι ναυβάται* alluded to by the Corinthians and by Periklēs at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 121–143) as the *ἀντηὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεῖα* of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were not so.

² Thucyd. vii. 64. “Οτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσθμενοι, καὶ πέζοι τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες, καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις, καὶ τὸ μέγα ὕδωμα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν . . .

the egress of the fleet when insisted on by Demosthenes. His hearers probably were too much absorbed with the terrible present, to revert to irremediable mistakes of the past. Immediately on the conclusion of his touching address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off—the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death struggle, and the serious, but inevitable shortcomings of the armament in its present condition—he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs,—all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. They were all familiarly known to him, and he addressed himself to every man separately by his own name, his father's name, and his tribe—adjuring him by the deepest and most solemn motives which could touch the human feelings. Some he reminded of their own previous glories, others of the achievements of illustrious ancestors, imploring them not to dishonour or betray these precious titles: to all alike he recalled the charm of their beloved country, with its full political freedom and its unconstrained licence of individual agency to every man: to all alike he appealed in the names of their wives, their children, and their paternal gods. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the common-places of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the in-bred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that he ought to say more—and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, where they might render as much service and as much encouragement as possible to the combatants on shipboard.¹

Very different was the spirit prevalent, and very opposite the burning words uttered, on the sea-board of the Syracusan station, as the leaders were mustering their men immediately before embarkation. They had been apprised of the grappling irons now about to be employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching hides along their bows, so that the “iron-hand” might slip off

Bold and
animated
language of
Gylippus to
the Syra-
cusan fleet.

¹ See the striking chapter of Thucyd. vii. 89. Even the tame style of Dio- | dorus (xiii. 15) becomes animated in describing this scene.

without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible.¹ He reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, seeking nothing but escape, undertaken without confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans.² He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.³

The Syracusan fleet—76 triremes strong, as in the last battle—
 Syracusan arrangement of the Great Harbour—sympathising population surrounding it. was the first to put off from shore ; Pythen with the Corinthians in the centre, Sikanus and Agatharchus on the wings. A certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbour, in order to guard the barrier ; while the rest were distributed around the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover the surface of the harbour swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans, in many of which embarked youthful volunteers, sons of the best families in the city ;⁴ boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships, as well as annoying the fighting Athenian triremes. The day was one sacred to Héraklēs at Syracuse ; and the prophets announced that the god would ensure victory to the Syracusans, provided they stood on the defensive, and did not begin the attack.⁵ Moreover the entire

¹ Thucyd. vii. 65.

² Thucyd. vii. 66, 67.

³ Thucyd. vii. 68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίων τε τοιαύτην . . . δργῇ προσμίξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἄμα μὲν νομιώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναπέσι, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσθέντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γυάμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἄμα δὲ ἔχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐγγεγόσθμενον ἡμῖν, καὶ (τὸ λεγόμενόν που) ήδιστορ εἶναι.

This plain and undisguised invocation of the angry and revengeful passions should be noticed, as a mark of character and manners.

⁴ Diodorus, xiii. 14. Plutarch has a similar statement, in reference to the previous battle: but I think he must

have confused one battle with the other—for his account can hardly be made to harmonise with Thucydides (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24).

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read the description of the battles in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thucydides; since he was probably at this time in Syracuse, and was perhaps actually engaged.

⁵ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24, 25. Timæus reckoned the aid of Héraklēs as having been one of the great causes of Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He gave

shore round the harbour, except the Athenian station and its immediate neighbourhood, was crowded with Syracusan soldiers and spectators; while the walls of Ortigia, immediately over-hanging the water, were lined with the feebler population of the city, the old men, women, and children. From the Athenian station presently came forth 110 triremes, under Demosthenēs, Menander, and Euthydēmus—with the customary pæan, its tone probably partaking of the general sadness of the camp. They steered across direct to the mouth of the harbour, beholding on all sides the armed enemies ranged along the shore, as well as the unarmed multitudes who were imprecating the vengeance of the gods upon their heads; while for them there was no sympathy, except among the fellow-sufferers within their own lines. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, 194 ships of war, each manned with more than 200 men, were about to join battle—in the presence of countless masses around, all with palpitating hearts, and near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle (if we could abstract our minds from its terrible interest) probably in history, without smoke or other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily—a serious and magnified realization of those Naumachiae which the Roman emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the recreation of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier where a narrow opening (perhaps closed by a moveable chain) had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the harbour. On both sides a fierce and desperate courage was displayed, even greater than had been shown on any of the former occasions. At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous, well-seconded by zeal on the part of the rowers and by their ready obedience to the voice of the Keleustēs. As the vessels neared, the bowmen, slingers and throwers on the deck hurled clouds of missiles against the enemy—next was heard the loud crash of the two impinging metallic fronts, resounding all along the shore.¹ When the vessels were

Attempt of
the Athenian
fleet to
break out—
battle in the
Great Har-
bour.

several reasons why the god was provoked against the Athenians: see Ti- | maeus, Fragm. 104, ed. Didot.

¹ The destructive impact of these me-

thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy's deck. It was not always however that each trireme had its own single and special enemy: sometimes one ship had two or three enemies to contend with at once—sometimes she fell aboard of one unsought, and became entangled. After a certain time, the fight still obstinately continuing, all sort of battle order became lost; the skill of the steersman was of little avail, and the voice of the Kéleustès was drowned amidst the universal din and mingled cries from victors as well as vanquished. On both sides emulous exhortations were poured forth, together with reproach and sarcasm addressed to any ship which appeared flinching from the contest; though factitious stimulus of this sort was indeed but little needed.

Such was the heroic courage on both sides, that for a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbour was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Long-continued and
desperate struggle—
intense emotion—
total defeat of the Athenians. Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. At one and the same time, every variety of human emotion might be witnessed; according as attention was turned towards a victorious or a defeated ship. It was among the spectators in the Athenian station, above all, whose entire life and liberty were staked in the combat, that this emotion might be seen exaggerated into agony, and over-passing the excitement even of the combatants themselves.¹ Those among them who looked towards a portion of the harbour where their friends seemed winning, were full of joy and thanksgiving to the gods: such of their neighbours as contemplated an Athenian ship in difficulty, gave vent to their feelings in shrieks and

tallic masses at the heads of the ships of war, as well as the periplus practised by a lighter ship to avoid direct collision against a heavier—is strikingly illustrated by a passage in Plutarch's Life of Lucullus, where a naval engagement between the Roman general, and Neoptolemus the admiral of Mithridates, is described. "Lucullus was on board a Rhodian quinquereme, commanded by Damagoras, a skilful Rhodian pilot; while Neoptolemus was approaching with a ship much heavier, and driving forward to a direct collision: upon which

Damagoras evaded the blow, rowed rapidly round, and struck the enemy in the stern." . . . δέσας δὲ Δαμαγόρας τὸ βάρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, καὶ τὴν τραχεῖην τοῦ χρυσοκόματος, οὐκ ἔτολμητο συμπεσεῖν πετρώρωρος, ἀλλ' ὅδεώς ἐκ περιαγωγῆς ἀποστρέψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ πρύμναν ὕσσοσθαι· καὶ πιεσθείσης ἵνταῦθα τῆς νέως ἐδέξατο τὴν πληγὴν ἀβλαβῆ γεγομένην, ἄτε δὴ τοῖς θαλαττεύοντι τῆς νέως μέρεσι προσπεσοῦσαν.—Plutarch, Lucull. c. 3.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 71.

lamentation ; while a third group, with their eyes fixed on some portion of the combat still disputed, were plunged in all the agitations of doubt, manifested even in the tremulous swing of their bodies, as hope or fear alternately predominated. During all the time that the combat remained undecided, the Athenians on shore were distracted by all these manifold varieties of intense sympathy. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favour of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their efforts as well as their shouts, and pushed them back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes, abandoning farther resistance, were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near their own station ; a few being even captured before they could arrive there. The diverse manifestations of sympathy among the Athenians in the station itself were now exchanged for one unanimous shriek of agony and despair. The boldest of them rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land : many were even paralysed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin. Their souls were doubtless still farther subdued by the wild and enthusiastic joy which burst forth in maddening shouts from the hostile crowds around the harbour, in response to their own victorious comrades on shipboard.

Such was the close of this awful, heart-stirring, and decisive combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thucydides. We find in his description of battles generally, and of this battle beyond all others, a depth and abundance of human emotion which has now passed out of military proceedings. The Greeks who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long professional training—but citizens with all their passions, instincts, sympathies, joys, and sorrows, of domestic as well as political life. Moreover the non-military population in ancient times had an interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle ; which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at least of the extremity of happiness and misery. Hence the strong light and shade, the Homeric exhibition of undisguised impulse, the tragic detail of personal motive and suffering, which pervades this and other military descriptions of Thucydides. When we read the few but most vehement words which he employs to depict the

Military operations of ancient times—strong emotions which accompanied them.

Athenian camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full of impressibility—sensitive and demonstrative Greeks, and indeed the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was not considered, in ancient times, essential to the dignity of the human character.

Causes of
the defeat
of the
Athenians. Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as 110 to 76 triremes—that they fought with courage not less heroic—and that the action was on their own element; we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe—1. The number of 110 triremes was formed by including some hardly seaworthy.¹ 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles.² 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favourable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbour would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage—without the means of twisting and turning her triremes so as to strike only at a vulnerable point of the enemy—compared with the thick, heavy, straightforward butting of the Syracusans; like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle.³ For the mere land-fight on ship-board, Athenians had not only no advantage, but had on the contrary the odds against them. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great advantage from having nearly the whole harbour lined round with their soldiers and friends; not simply from the force of encouraging

¹ Thucyd. vii. 60. τὰς ναῦς ἀπάσας δοται ήσαν καὶ δυναται καὶ ἀπλούωτερα.

² Thucyd. vii. 60. πάντα τίνα ἐσβάθυντος πληρώσαται—ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαθυνεῖν θότις καὶ διπλωσῶν ἐδόκει ήλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. Compare also the speech of Gylippus, c. 67.

³ The language of Theokritus, in describing the pugilistic contest between Pollux and the Bebrykian Amykus, is

not inapplicable to the position of the Athenian ships and men when crammed up in this harbour (Idyll. xxii. 91):—

· · · · · ἐκ δ' ἑτέρωθιν
· Ήρωες κρατερὸν Πολυθένκεα θαρσίνεσκον,
Δειδώτες μή πάς μιν ἐπιβρίσας
δαμάσσετεν,
Χώρῳ ἐν τεινῷ Τεινῷ ἐναλίγιος ἀνήρ.

Compare Virgil's picture of Entellus and Darès, Aeneid, v. 430.

sympathy, no mean auxiliary—but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure; while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding—though Thucydidēs does not again mention them. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters—the pressure of necessity was less potent, as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence and elation, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be reversed.

About 60 Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had also suffered severely; only 50 triremes remaining out of 76. The triumph with which, nevertheless, on returning to the city, they erected their trophy, and the exultation which reigned among the vast crowds encircling the harbour, was beyond all measure or precedent. Its clamorous manifestations were doubtless but too well heard in the neighbouring camp of the Athenians, and increased, if anything could increase, the soul-subduing extremity of distress which paralysed the vanquished. So utterly did the pressure of suffering, anticipated as well as actual, benumb their minds and extinguish their most sacred associations, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead. This obligation, usually so serious and imperative upon the survivors after a battle, now passed unheeded amidst the sorrow, terror, and despair, of the living man himself.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals; to their honour be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenēs proposed to Nikias that at day-break the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbour. To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on ship-board: they would hear of nothing but attempting to escape by land.¹ Pre-

*Resolution
of Demo-
stenēs and
Nikias to
make a
second
attempt—
the arma-
ment are
too much
discouraged
to obey.*

¹ Thueyd. vii. 72.

parations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved.¹ But there occurred one more mistake—one farther postponement—which cut off the last hopes of this gallant and fated remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratēs, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus and the military authorities to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, in consequence of the recent victory, still farther magnified by the circumstance that the day was sacred to Héraklēs—so wild the jollity, the feasting, the intoxication, the congratulations, amidst men rewarding themselves after their recent effort and triumph, and amidst the necessary care for the wounded—that an order to arm and march out would have been as little heeded as the order to go on ship-board was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratēs resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him (they affirmed) not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.²

This fraud (the same as the Athenians had themselves practised two years before,³ in order to tempt the Syracusans to march out against Katana) was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenēs been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less

¹ Diodor. xiii. 18.

² Thucyd. vii. 73; Diodor. xiii. 18.
³ Thucyd. vi. 64.

obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. An excuse for inaction was always congenial to his character; and the present recommendation, moreover, fell in but too happily with the temper of the army—now benumbed with depression and terror, like those unfortunate soldiers, in the Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were yielding to the lethargy of extreme cold on the snows of Armenia, and whom Xenophon vainly tried to arouse.¹ Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day,—in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible—sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions.² Gylippus and Hermokratēs had thus ample time, on the following day, to send out forces and occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded³—seemingly even those within the station itself.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenēs put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle, the number of wounded men and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand miserable men (so prodigious was the total, including all ranks and functions) now set forth to quit it, on a march of which few could hope to see the end; like the pouring forth of the population of a large city starved out by blockade. Many had little or no provisions to carry—so low had the stock become reduced; but of those who had, every man carried his own—even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left without slaves by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted. But neither such melancholy equality of suffering, nor the number of sufferers, counted for much in the way of alleviation. A downcast stupor and sense of abasement possessed every man; the more intolerable, when they recollect the

Retreat of
the Ath-
enians—
miserable
condition of
the army.

¹ Xenophon. *Anab.* iv. 5, 15, 19; v. 8, 15. | ² Thucyd. vii. 77.

³ Thucyd. vii. 74.

exit of the armament from Peiraeus two years before, with prayers, and solemn pæans, and all the splendid dreams of conquest—set against the humiliation of the closing scene now before them, without a single trireme left out of two prodigious fleets.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that

Wretchedness arising from abandoning the sick and wounded. the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed, which no one probably spoke out beforehand, of leaving

behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded. The scenes of woe, which marked this hour, passed endurance or description. The departing soldier sorrowed and shuddered, with the sentiment of an unperformed duty, as he turned from the unburied bodies of the slain ; but far more terrible was the trial, when he had to tear himself from the living sufferers, who implored their comrades, with wailings of agony and distraction, not to abandon them. Appealing to all the claims of pious friendship, they clung round their knees, and even crawled along the line of march until their strength failed. The silent dejection of the previous day was now exchanged for universal tears and groans, and clamorous outbursts of sorrow, amidst which the army could not without the utmost difficulty be disengaged and put in motion.

Attempt of the generals to maintain some order — energy of Nikias. After such heart-rending scenes, it might seem that their cup of bitterness was exhausted ; but worse was yet in store—and the terrors of the future dictated a struggle against all the miseries of past and present. The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage ; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks, marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing them with a voice louder, more strenuous, and more commanding than was his wont.

Exhortations of Nikias to the suffering army. “Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now : others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. Be not too much humiliated, either with your defeats or with your present unmerited hardships. I too, having no advantage over any of you in strength (nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease), and accustomed even to superior splendour and good fortune in private as well as public life—I too am plunged in the same peril with

the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods, as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine, at the same time that our actual misfortunes do not appal me in proportion to their intrinsic magnitude.¹ Per-

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν
εἰς θεούς νόμιμα δεδίηται, πολλὰ δὲ εἰς
ζυνθράποις δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. Αὐτὸς
ζεῖ δὲ μὲν ἐλπὶς δύως θρασεῖα
τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ἔνυμφοροι
ἐν κατ' ἀξίᾳν δὴ φοβοῦσι. Τάχα
δέ τινας καὶ λαθρῆσειν ἵκανα γάρ τοις τε
πολεμοῖς εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῷ θεῶν ἐπί-
φθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀρκούντως ήδη τε-
τιμωρήμεθα.

I have translated the words *οὐ κατ' ἀξίᾳν*, and the sentence of which they form a part, differently from what has been hitherto sanctioned by the commentators, who construe *κατ'* ἀξίᾳν as meaning "according to our desert"—understand the words *αἱ ένυμφοροι οὐ κατ' ἀξίᾳν* as bearing the same sense with the words *παρὰ τὴν ἀξίᾳν κακοπραγίαις* some lines before—and likewise construe *οὐ*, not with *φοβοῦσι*, but with *κατ' ἀξίᾳν*, assigning to *φοβοῦσι* an affirmative sense. They translate—"Quare, quamvis nostra fortuna pro rurso affecta videretur (these words have no parallel in the original), rerum tamen futurarum spes est audax: sed clades, quas nullo nostro merito accepimus, nos iam terrent. At fortasse cessabunt," &c. M. Didot translates—"Aussi j'ai un ferme espoir dans l'avenir malgré l'effroi que des malheurs non mérités nous causent." Dr. Arnold passes the sentence over without notice.

This manner of translating appears to me not less unsuitable in reference to the spirit and thread of the harangue, than awkward as regards the individual words. Looking to the spirit of the harangue, the object of encouraging the dejected soldiers would hardly be much answered by repeating (what in fact had been glanced at in a manner sufficient and becoming, before) that "the unmerited reverses terrified either Nikias, or the soldiers." Then as to the words—the expressions *διθ' οὐ, δύως, μὲν* and *δὲ*, seem to me to denote, not only that the two halves of the sentence apply both of them to Nikias—but that the first half of the sentence is in harmony, not in opposition, with the second. Mattheis (in my judgement, erroneously) refers (Gr. Gr. § 623) δύως to some words which have preceded; I think

that δύως contributes to hold together the first and the second affirmation of the sentence. Now the Latin translation refers the first half of the sentence to Nikias, and the last half to the soldiers whom he addresses; while the translation of M. Didot, by means of the word *malgré*, for which there is nothing corresponding in the Greek, puts the second half in antithesis to the first.

I cannot but think that *οὐ* ought to be construed with *φοβοῦσι*, and that the words *κατ' ἀξίᾳν* do not bear the meaning assigned to them by the translators. *Ἀξίᾳν* not only means, "desert, merit, the title to that which a man has earned by his conduct"—as in the previous phrase *παρὰ τὴν ἀξίᾳν*—but it also means "price, value, title to be cared for, capacity of exciting more or less desire or aversion"—in which last sense it is predicated as an attribute, not only of moral beings, but of other objects besides. Thus Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikom. iii. 11)—δὲ γὰρ ὡτιώς ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ήδονας τῆς ἀξίᾳς δὲ δὲ πάρφρων οὐ τοιούτος, &c. Again, ibid. iii. 5. •Ο μὲν οὖν δὲ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεικα, ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, διοῖος δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀδρεῖος· καὶ ἀξίᾳν γάρ, καὶ ὡς τὸν δὲ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει δὲ ἀνδρεῖος. Again, ibid. iv. 2. Διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τοῦ μεγαλουπρεποῦς, ἐν φέντε ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλουπρεπῶς ποιεῖν τὸ γάρ τοιούτον οὐχ εὐτέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίᾳν τοῦ δαπανήματος. Again, ibid. viii. 14. Ἀχειρός γάρ δύτα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ίστον ἔχειν λειτουργίαν τε γάρ γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ φίλαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίᾳν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλας. Compare also ib. viii. 13.

Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 4, 32. τὸ γάρ πολλὰ δοκοῦντα ἔχειν μὴ κατ' ἀξίᾳν τῆς οὐσίας φάνεσθαι ὀφελοῦντα τοὺς φίλους, ἀνελευθεραν ἐμοὶγε δικεῖ περιάπτειν. Compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 5, 2. ὕσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὗτα καὶ τῶν φίλων, εἰσίν ἀξίαι; also ibid. i. 6, 11. and Isocrat. cont. Lochit. Or. xx. s. 8; Plato, Legg. ix. p. 876 E.

The words *κατ' ἀξίᾳν* in Thueydides

haps indeed they may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune, and if at the moment of our starting we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. Other people before us have invaded foreign lands, and by thus acting under common human impulse, have incurred sufferings within the limit of human endurance. We too may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly—for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy.¹ Look moreover at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; there is no city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. Be careful

appear to me to bear the same meaning as in these passages of Xenophon and Aristotle—"in proportion to their value," or to their real magnitude. If we so construe them, the words *ἀνθ' ἀντί, διως μὲν, καὶ δὲ*, all fall into their proper order: the whole sentence after *ἀνθ' ἀντί* applies to Nikias personally, is a corollary from what he had asserted before, and forms a suitable point in an harangue for encouraging his dispirited soldiers—"Look how I bear up, who have as much cause for mourning as any of you. I have behaved well both towards gods and towards men: in return for which, I am comparatively comfortable both as to the future and as to the present: as to the future, I have strong hopes—at the same time that as to the present I am not overwhelmed by the present misfortunes in proportion to their prodigious intensity."

This is the precise thing for a man of resolution to say upon so terrible an occasion.

The particle *δὴ* has its appropriate meaning—"αι δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσι"—"and the present distresses, though they do appal me, do not appal me *assuredly* in proportion to their actual magnitude." Lastly, the particle *καὶ* (in the succeeding phrase *τάχα δ' ἀν καὶ λαφῆσειν*) does not fit on to the preceding passage as usually construed: accordingly the Latin translator, as well as M. Didot, leave it out and translate—"At fortasse cessabunt." "Mais peut-être vont-ils cesser." It ought to be translated—"And perhaps

they may even abate," which implies that what had been asserted in the preceding sentence is here intended not to be contradicted, but to be carried forward and strengthened: see Kuhnner, Griech. Gramm. sect. 725-728. Such would not be the case as the sentence is usually construed.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. Ικανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις εὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῷ ἐπίθυμοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἡδὸν τετιμωρήσεα: ἥλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινες ἡδὸν ἐφ' ἔτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. Καὶ ήμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα ἔξειν: οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἡδὸν ἔσμεν η φθόνον.

This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was pre-eminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Peiraeus, now believed that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily. He comforts his soldiers by saying that the enemy is now at the same dangerous pinnacle of exaltation, whilst *they* have exhausted the sad effects of the divine jealousy.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykrates in Herodotus (iii. 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Aemilius by Plutarch (Vit. Paul. Emil. c. 36).

yourselves to keep your march firm and orderly, every man of you with this conviction—that whatever spot he may be forced to fight in, that spot is his country and his fortress, and must be kept by victorious effort. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. We have sent forward to apprise them, and entreat them to meet us with supplies. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you—and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as are Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city—not walls, nor ships without men.*¹

The efforts of both commanders were in full harmony with these strenuous words. The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenes. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage however without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles, under the delay arising from the harassing of the enemy's cavalry and light troops. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. They were in hopes of finding some provisions in the houses, and were even under the necessity of carrying along with them some water from this spot; there being none to be found farther on. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akraean cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of over-

Commencement of the retreat - harassed and impeded by the Syracusans.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 77. Ἀνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη, οὐδὲ νῆσος ἀνθρῶν κεναι·

whelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.¹

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akræan cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous and obstinate efforts to force this inexpugnable position, but all their struggles were vain, while they suffered miserably from the missiles of the troops above. Amidst all the discouragement of this repulse, they were yet farther disheartened by storms of thunder and lightning, which occurred during the time, and which they construed as portents significant of their impending ruin.²

This fact strikingly illustrates both the change which the last violent storm—^{change of feeling in the last two years.} two years had wrought in the contending parties—and the degree to which such religious interpretations of phenomena depended for their efficacy on predisposing temper, gloomy or cheerful. In the first battle between Nikias and the Syracusans, near the Great Harbour, some months before the siege was begun, a similar thunder-storm had taken place: on that occasion, the Athenian soldiers had continued the battle unmoved, treating it as a natural event belonging to the season,—and such indifference on their part had still farther imposed upon the alarmed Syracusans.³ Now, both the self-confidence and the religious impression had changed sides.⁴

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This however they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day, attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akræan cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and

¹ Thucyd. vii. 78.

² Thucyd. vii. 79. ἀφ' ὃν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἥθεμον, καὶ ἐνδιήζοντες επὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὁλέθρῳ καὶ

ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι.

³ Thucyd. vi. 70.

⁴ See above, c. lviii.

the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Externated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third miserable night in the same fatal plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenes took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable; and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the south-eastern coast of Sicily—or a river still farther on called the Erineus—they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the south-eastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse and fell into the track of the Helörine road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straight forward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side.¹

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day unobstructed by the enemy. He thought it wiser to push his troops as fast as possible in order to arrive at some place both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the rear division under Demosthenes. That division, the larger half of the army, started both later and in greater disorder. Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss

Night march
of the Athene-
nians in an
altered direc-
tion, towards
the southern
sea.

Separation
of the two
divisions
under Nikias
and Demo-
sthenes. The
first division
under Nikias
gets across
the river
Erineus.

¹ Thueyd. vii. 80-82.

their way, so that Demosthenēs, with all his efforts to keep them together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kakyparis,¹—and at a moment when the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus,

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenēs had been tardy before, and his division disorganised; but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him, and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission; employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves enclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably once the property, of Polyzēlus, brother of the despot Gelon.² Entangled and huddled up in this enclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now

¹ Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 280, copied by Görler ad vii. 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenēs reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii. 80, 81 do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of Demosthenēs from the beginning, and gained upon it principally during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenēs was the most inconvenient: see c. 81—*ἀς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ἐνεραπέθησαν, &c.* When Thucydidēs therefore says that “at daybreak they arrived at the sea” (*ἴμα δὲ τῇ ἐφ ἀφικούνται ἐς τὴν θάλατταν*, c. 80), this cannot be true both of Nikias and Demosthenēs. If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same

point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand with Demosthenēs when he reached the sea—and considerably *more* beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague—that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division.

It appears to me that the words *ἀφικούνται, &c.* (c. 80) are not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenēs, but that they refer back to the word *ἀβρῶις*, two or three lines behind: “the Athenians (*taken generally*) reached the sea”—no attention being at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear divisions. The *Athenians* might be said, not improperly, to reach the sea—at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

The rear
division
under De-
mosthenēs
is pursued,
overtaken,
and forced to
surrender.

overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides.¹ Though unable to get at the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many—a fact much to their honour—availed themselves of this offer, and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse—6000 in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields.² Discarding either to surrender or to

¹ Thucyd. vii. 81. Καὶ τότε γνός
(sc. Demosthenēs) τὸν Συρακοσίους διώ-
κοντας οὐ προύχωρε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐσ μάχην
ξυνέποστο, ἔως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦται
τε ἦν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν τολφθορύβῳ αὐτὸς
τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἤσαν ἀνε-
ληθέντες γὰρ ἔστι τι χώριον, φ κύκλῳ μὲν
τειχίον περιῆν, δ δὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε
καὶ ἐνθεν, ἐλασσὸν δὲ οὐκ δλγας εἶχεν,
ἐβαλλοντο περισταδόν.

I translate δδὸς δὲ ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν differently from Dr. Arnold, from Miford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words *might* have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii. 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay ex-

actly in the road, the word ἀνειλη-
θέντες becomes perfectly explicable, on
which I do not think that Dr. Arnold's
comment is satisfactory. The pressure
of the troops from the rear into the
hither opening, while those in the front
could not get out by the farther opening,
would naturally cause this crowd
and *huddling* inside. A road which
passed right through the walled ground,
entering at one side and coming out at
the other, might well be called δδὸς
ἐνθεν τε καὶ ἐνθεν. Compare Dr. Ar-
nold's Remarks on the Map of Syracuse,
vol. iii. p. 281; as well as his note on
vii. 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here
named, not for either of the two rea-
sons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but
because they hindered the Athenians
from seeing beforehand distinctly the
nature of the enclosure into which
they were hastening, and therefore
prevented any precautions from being
taken—such as that of forbidding too
many troops from entering at once, &c.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd.
vii. 82.

make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenēs was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded ; but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner, by the Syracusans.¹

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprised him of the capitulation of Demosthenēs, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman, for the purpose of verifying the statement ; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus—that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made ; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected ; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenēs. Accordingly the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the pæan or war-shout ; thus showing that they were on the look-out, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of 300 Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.²

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary. His sick and feeble frame was made to bear up, and even to hearten up stronger men, against the extremity of hardship, exhausting the last fragment of hope or even possibility. It was now the sixth day of the retreat—six days³ of constant privation, suffering, and endurance of attack—yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply im-

¹ This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan Philistus : see Pausanias, i. 29, 9; Philist. Fragn. 46, ed. Didot.

² Thucyd. vii. 83.

³ Plutarch (*Nikias*, c. 27) says eight days, inaccurately.

bedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry ; who even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the unhappy fugitives at length gave way : when they reached the river, their strength, their patience, their spirit, and their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Many thus perished from being pushed down upon the points of the spears ; or lost their footing among the scattered articles of baggage, and were thus borne down under water.¹ Meanwhile the Syracusans from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers. So violent nevertheless was the thirst of the Athenians, that all other suffering was endured in order to taste relief by drinking. And even when dead and wounded were heaped in the river—when the water was tainted and turbid with blood, as well as thick with the mud trodden up—still the new-comers pushed their way in and swallowed it with voracity.²

Wretched, helpless, and demoralised as the army now was, Nikias could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered himself to Gyliippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that general and of the Lacedæmonians ;³ earnestly imploring that the slaughter of the defenceless soldiers might be arrested. Accordingly Gyliippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the rest should be secured as captives. Many were slain before this order was understood ; but of those who remained, almost all were made captive, very few escaping. Nay, even the detachment of 300, who had broken out in the night, having seemingly not known whither to go, were captured and brought in by troops sent forth for the purpose.⁴ The triumph of the Syracusans was in every way complete : they hung the trees on the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 85 ; see Dr. Arnold's note.

² Thucyd. vii. 84. . . . οὐαλλον
κνωθει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους, καὶ ἐν
κοίλῃ όντι τῷ ποτάμῳ ἐν σφίσιν αύτοῖς

ταρασσομένους.

³ Thucyd. vii. 85, 86 ; Philistus, Fragm. 46, ed. Didot ; Pausanias, i. 29, 9.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 85 ; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

banks of the Asinarus with Athenian panoplies as trophy, and carried back their prisoners in joyous procession to the city.

The number of prisoners thus made is not positively specified by Thucydidēs, as in the case of the division of Demosthenēs, which had capitulated and laid down their arms in a mass within the walls of the olive-ground. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than 1000.¹ The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Not less than 40,000 persons in the aggregate had started from Total num- the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days bers cap- tured. before. Of these probably many, either wounded or otherwise incompetent even when the march began, soon found themselves unable to keep up, and were left behind to perish. Each of the six days was a day of hard fighting and annoyance from an indefatigable crowd of light troops, with little, and at last seemingly nothing, to eat. The number was thus successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling; so that the 6000 taken with Demosthenēs, and perhaps 3000 or 4000 captured with Nikias, formed the melancholy remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana—where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge.² These fugitive Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana.³

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive Hard treat- again within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons ment and sufferings whom she had drafted forth in two such splendid divisions of the Ath- to Sicily. For of those who were carried as prisoners to Syracusa. Syracusa,⁴ fewer yet could ever have got home. They were placed, for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracusa—of which there were several, partly

¹ Thucydidēs states, roughly and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse under public supervision, was not less than 7000—*δέηθησαν δὲ οἱ σύμπλετοι, ἀκριβεῖα μὲν χαλεπὸν ἔστειν, δῆμος δὲ οὐκ ἀλόσους ἐπτακισχιλίων* (vii. 87). As the number taken with Demosthenēs was 6000 (vii. 82), this leaves 1000 as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

² Thucyd. vii. 85. πολλοὶ δὲ δῆμοι καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παρατίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ θαδδεόσκοντες βοτερον. The word *παρατίκα* means, during the retreat.

³ Lysias pro Polystrato, Orat. xx. sect. 26–28. c. 6. p. 686 R.

on the southern descent of the outer city towards the Nekropolis, or from the higher level to the lower level of Achradina—partly in the suburb afterwards called Neapolis, under the southern cliff of Epipolæ. Into these quarries—deep hollows, of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the miserable prisoners were plunged, lying huddled one upon another, without the smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread (half the daily ration of a slave) with no more than half a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. Moreover the heat of the midday sun, alternating with the chill of the autumn nights, was alike afflicting and destructive; while the wants of life having all to be performed where they were, without relief—the filth and stench presently became insupportable. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily died; and happiest was he who died the first, leaving an unconscious corpse, which the Syracusans would not take the trouble to remove, to distress and infect the survivors. Under this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days; probably serving as a spectacle for the triumphant Syracusan population, with their wives and children, to come and look down upon, and to congratulate themselves on their own narrow escape from sufferings similar in kind at least, if not in degree. After that time, the novelty of the spectacle had worn off; while the place must have become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves.¹ The dead bodies were probably at the same time taken away, and the prison rendered somewhat less loathsome. What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told. It may be presumed that those who could survive so great an extremity of suffering might after a certain time be allowed to get back to Athens on ransom. Perhaps some of them may have

¹ Thucyd. vii. 87. Diodorus (xiii. 20-32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chaniikes* of barley-meal—instead of two *kotylæ*; the *cheinix* being four times as much as the *kotylē* (Diodor. xiii. 19).

obtained their release—as was the case (we are told) with several of those who had been sold to private masters—by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanour. The dramas of Euripidēs were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidēs, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens.¹ I cannot refrain from mentioning this story, though I fear its trustworthiness as matter of fact is much inferior to its pathos and interest.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenēs, not merely the Treatment of Nikias and Demosthenēs—difference of opinion among the conquerors. Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermokratēs.² But Gylippus, then in full ascendency and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta. To achieve this would have earned for him signal honour in the eyes of his countrymen; for while Demosthenēs, from his success at Pylus, was their hated enemy—Nikias had always shown himself their friend, as far as an Athenian could do so. It was to him that they owed the release of their prisoners taken at Sphakteria; and he had calculated upon this obligation when he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus, and not to the Syracusans.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of Gylippus—both the generals are slain. this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies always procure for him the means of escaping from imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury—they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way; being apprehensive that, if

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 29; Diodor. xiii. 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian pri-

Diodor. xiii. 111. ² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28; Diodor. xiii. 19.

tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, so that Nikias, as well as Demosthenēs, was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratēs vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed ; and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens;¹ while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the Asinaria, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month Karneius.²

Such was the close of the expedition, or rather of the two expeditions, undertaken by Athens against Syracuse. Never in Grecian history had a force so large, so costly, so efficient, and full of promise and confidence, been sent forth ; never in Grecian history had ruin so complete and sweeping, or victory so glorious and unexpected, been witnessed.³ Its consequences were felt from one end of the Grecian world to the other, as will appear in the coming chapters.

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken : after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenēs was engraved, on the funeral pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military

Disgrace of
Nikias after
his death, at
Athens—
continued
respect for
the memory
of Demo-
sthenes.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 86; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timaeus respecting the intervention of Hermokrates, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thucydidēs. The word *κελευσθέντας* seems decidedly preferable to *καταλευσθέντας*, in the text of Plutarch.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 28. Though Plutarch says that the month Karneius is "that which the Athenians call Metageitnion," yet it is not safe to affirm that the day of the slaughter of the Asinarus was the 16th of the Attic month Metageitnion. We know that the civil months of different cities seldom or never exactly coincided. See the remarks of Franz on this point in his comment on the valuable In-

scriptions of Tauromenium, Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 5640, part xxxii. sect. 3. p. 640.

The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse (which occurred on the 27th of August)—that is about Sept. 21. Mr. Fynes Clinton (F. H. ad ann. 413 B.C.) seems to me to compress too much the interval between the eclipse and the retreat; considering that the interval included two great battles, with a certain space of time, before, between, and after.

The μετόπωροι noticed by Thucyd. vii. 79 suits with Sept. 21: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22.

³ Thucyd. vii. 87.

man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenēs had disdained.¹

The opinion of Thucydidēs deserves special notice, in the face of this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenēs, beyond the fact of his being put to death, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. “Such, or nearly such, (he says) were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though he assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of established duties to the divinity.”²

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his personal conduct in one scale, against his personal suffering on

¹ Pausan. i. 29, 9; Philist. Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.

Justin erroneously says that Demosthenēs actually did kill himself, rather than submit to surrender—before the surrender of Nikias; who (he says) did not choose to follow the example:—

“Demosthenēs, amissō exercitu, a captivitate gladio et voluntariā morte se vindicat: Nicias autem, ne Demosthenis quidem exemplo, ut sibi consuleret, admonitus, cladem suorum auxit dedecore captivitatis” (Justin, iv. 5).

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thucydidēs, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life—Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding, and condemns it as disgraceful (see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end). Demosthenēs could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistus, though Thucydidēs does not notice it.

² Thucyd. vii. 86. Καὶ δὲ μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ διά ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθήκει, ἦκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ἐν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἔμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι, διὰ τὴν νενομισμένην ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτῆδευσιν.

So stood the text of Thucydidēs, until various recent editors changed the last words, on the authority of

some MSS., to διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτῆδευσιν.

Though Dr. Arnold and some of the best critics prefer and adopt the latter reading, I confess it seems to me that the former is more suitable to the Greek vein of thought, as well as more conformable to truth about Nikias.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his virtue (see passages in Isokratis de Permutation. Orat. xv. sect. 301; Lysias, cont. Nikomach. c. 5. p. 854)—though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. Men might differ about the virtue of Nikias; but his piety was an incontestable fact; and his “good fortune” also (in times prior to the Sicilian expedition) was recognised by men like Alkibiadēs, who most probably had no very lofty opinion of his virtue (Thucyd. vi. 17). The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life—was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the historian to note. Whereas if we read, in the passage, πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν—the panegyric upon Nikias becomes both less special and more disproportionate—beyond what even Thucydidēs (as far as we can infer from other expressions, see v. 16) would be inclined to bestow upon him—more in fact than he says in commendation even of Periklēs.

the other, the remark of Thucydidēs would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? We are compelled to say, that if his personal suffering could possibly be regarded in the light of an atonement, or set in an equation against the mischief brought by himself both on his army and his country—it would not be greater than his deserts. I shall not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily—it is not the less incontestable, that first, the failure of the enterprise—next, the destruction of the armament—is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. Sometimes petty trifling—sometimes apathy and inaction—sometimes presumptuous neglect—sometimes obstinate blindness even to urgent and obvious necessities—one or other of these his sad mental defects, will be found operative at every step whereby this fated armament sinks down from exuberant efficiency into the last depth of aggregate ruin and individual misery. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings. The man whose flagrant incompetency could bring such wholesale ruin upon two fine armaments entrusted to his command, upon the Athenian maritime empire, and ultimately upon Athens herself—must appear on the tablets of history under the severest condemnation, even though his personal virtues had been loftier than those of Nikias.

And yet our great historian—after devoting two immortal books to this expedition—after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the *OEdipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs—when he comes to recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for Demosthenēs (far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no fault of his own), but reserves his flowers to

strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—“What a pity! Such a respectable and religious man!”

Thucydidēs is here the more instructive, because he exactly

Opinion of
the Athenians about
Nikias—
their steady
over-con-
fidence and
over-esteem
for him,
arising from
his respect-
able and
religious
character.

represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn, to mistrust, to dismiss, or to do without, so respectable and religious a citizen. The private qualities of Nikias were not only held to entitle him to the most indulgent construction of all his public short-comings, but also ensured to him credit for political and military competence altogether disproportionate to his deserts.

When we find Thucydidēs, after narrating so much improvidence and mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the main feature of his character—we can understand how the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity. Never in the political history of Athens did the people make so fatal a mistake in placing their confidence.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and the demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, and decorating their rulers—whatever renders them more difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause. Clever criminative speakers often passed themselves off for something above their real worth: though useful and indispensable as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into

Over-con-
fidence in
Nikias was
the greatest
personal
mistake
which the
Athenian
public ever
committed.

measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction—still it is only one among others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, as the anti-demagogic Nikias. The man who, over and above his shabby manœuvre about the expedition against Sphakteria, and his improvident sacrifice of Athenian interests in the alliance with Sparta, ended by bringing ruin on the greatest armament ever sent forth by Athens, as well as upon her maritime

empire—was not a leather-seller of impudent and abusive eloquence, but a man of ancient family and hereditary wealth—munificent and affable, having credit not merely for the largesses which he bestowed, but also for all the insolences, which as a rich man he might have committed, but did not commit—free from all pecuniary corruption—a brave man, and above all, an ultra-religious man, believed therefore to stand high in the favour of the gods, and to be fortunate. Such was the esteem which the Athenians felt for this union of good qualities purely personal and negative, with eminent station, that they presumed the higher aptitudes of command,¹ and presumed them unhappily after proof that they did not exist—after proof that what they had supposed to be caution was only apathy and mental weakness. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias. Now it was against the overweening ascendancy of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and short-comings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided—even at Athens, where everyone denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess—the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

*
¹ A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (Hist. i. 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias—much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter:—

“Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed

claritas natalium, et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut quod segnitia fuit, sapientia vocaretur. Dum vigebat aetas, militari laude apud Germanias floruit: proconsul, Africam moderate; jam senior, citeriore Hispaniam, pari justitia continuit. Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.” *

CHAPTER LXI.

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

IN the preceding chapter, we followed to its melancholy close the united armament of Nikias and Demosthenēs, first in the harbour and lastly in the neighbourhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September 413 b.c.

The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned—chiefly for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished, partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects of the catastrophe throughout Greece were yet more momentous than those within the island in which it occurred.

I have already mentioned, that even at the moment when Demosthenēs with his powerful armament left Peiraeus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished, and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.

And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—and recently enforced, with full comprehension of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile Alkibiadēs.¹ The earlier invasions of Attica had been all

¹ Thucyd. i. 122–142; vi. 90.

temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty, as from the extraordinary vigour which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves or artisans, began to desert to Dekelia in great numbers: more than 20,000 of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Orôpus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekelia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers.¹ In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekelia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.² Moreover the rich citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the garrison of Dekelia: their efficiency was however soon impaired by the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.³

Athens becomes a military post—
heavy duty in arms imposed upon
the citizens.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 4. * About the extensive ruin caused by the Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or. vii. De Oleâ Sacrâ, sect. 6, 7.

An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh's Corp. Inscr. (Part ii. No. 93. p. 132) gives some hint how landlords and tenants met this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The

Deme *Æxoneis* lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a fixed rent of 140 drachmæ; but if an invading enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the Deme is to receive one half of the year's produce, in place of the year's rent.

² Thucyd. vii. 28, 29.

³ Thucyd. vii. 27.

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigences
Financial pressure. pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state.

Already the immense expense incurred, in fitting out the two large armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury during the interval since the peace of Nikias; so that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the same time abridging the means of paying, brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been assessed. Instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of 5 per cent. on all imports and exports by sea.¹ How this new principle of assessment worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty, and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers—when we come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual year.²

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body
Athens dismisses her Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been
Thracian mercenaries very useful against the enemy at Dekeleia. These
—massacred at Mykálessus. Thracian peltasts, 1300 in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenes to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephe, to conduct them back to their native country—with

¹ Thucyd. vii. 28.

² Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—

"Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden itself was comparatively a nothing."

This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression ruinous to the subject-allies.

I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this was "the heaviest tax then known in the world;" and that "it caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths." The latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it be true that the tax ever came into operation: but we are not entitled to affirm it.

Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire. And the fact that Thucydides does not notice it as an additional cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such doubts.

instructions to do damage to the Boeotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly Diitrephe^s, putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Boeotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighbourhood of the Boeotian town Mykalēssus. He arrived here unseen—lay in wait near a temple of Hermès about two miles distant—and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians—dwelling in the centre of Boeotia, not far from Thebes and at a considerable distance from the sea—such an assault was not less unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble—in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephe^s, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses, and even the temples, plundered—but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst of blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, &c. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian communities, though Mykalēssus was in itself a town of second-rate or third-rate magnitude.¹

The succour brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, not to save, the inhabitants. The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could carry away, when the Boeotarch Skirphondas overtook them both with cavalry and hoplites; after having put to death some greedy plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore;

The Thracians driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 29, 30, 31. I conceive that *οὗτοι οὐ μεγάλη* is the right reading—and not *οὗτοι μεγάλη*—in reference to Mykalēssus. The words *ὡς ἔπι μεγίθει* in c. 31 refer to the size of the city.

The reading is however disputed among critics. It is evident from the language of Thucydides that the catastrophe at Mykalēssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.

not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than 250 Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;¹ and the Athenian commander Diitrephe's was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

Meanwhile the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. It will be recollectcd that this was the scene of the memorable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year of the Peloponnesian war,² wherein the nautical superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. In that respect, matters had now considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,³ at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian. But the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenes and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others—out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare—on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite of 25 sail was about to assume the offensive against him.⁴

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon with some fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes 33. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these

¹ Thucyd. vii. 30; Pausanias, i. 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad Aristophanis Frag. ² See above, ch. xl ix. of this History.

³ See the preceding chapter. ⁴ Thucyd. vii. 31. Compare the lament. "Hæres," vol. ii. p. 1069. language of Phormion, ii. 88, 89.

promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack ; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks—while it was favourable to the solid bows, and thick epôtids or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side—yet not advancing far enough out to sea, to admit of the manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore : on the Athenian side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to renew the fight : moreover both the wind and the current set towards the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself entitled to erect a trophy ; but the real feeling of victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution ; and such assuredly would have been the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness the conflict.¹

This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenes at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when

Last news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army there not officially made known to them.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 34.

they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenēs in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, when Demosthenēs was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid farther supplies of provisions:—but this was the last practicable opportunity—for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbour. The mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly. But the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes—partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about it as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in every one's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumours for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.¹ How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenēs in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence—*Αθηναῖος δέ φασι, &c.*

these fugitives, how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments, without even a feeble remnant left to console them.¹

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction, dismay and terror. Over and above the extent of private mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread nearly the whole city—there prevailed utter despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months (October, November, 413 B.C.) the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies—an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.²

Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had promised them Energetic resolutions adopted by the Athenians—probabilis the divine blessing upon it.³ After this first burst both of grief

¹ Thucyd. viii. 1.

² Thucyd. viii. 1. Πάντα δὲ παντάχοθεν αὐτοῖς ἐλύπει, &c.

³ Thucyd. viii. 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν θῶν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμησίοις τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, δοσπέρ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισμένοι, &c.

From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydides considered the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness,

and practicability; and he very properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns out to present results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition not merely moral, but even legal, responsibility; a regulation of doubtful property under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.

It must be admitted however to have been hard upon the advisers of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in the

and anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of despair revived in their bosoms: they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money—to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa—and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure,¹ to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require. The propositions of these Probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly—springing out of that pressure and alarm of the moment which silenced all criticism.¹ Among other economies, the Athenians abridged the costly splendour of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast. They at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.²

execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the Oration of Lysias —περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii. sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the advisers of the expedition—a manifest injustice.

Demosthenes (in the Oration de Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts for himself as a political speaker and advisor—responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the premonitory signs, of coming events, and giving his countrymen warning beforehand: *ἰδεῖν τὰ πρόγυμata ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθένθαι καὶ προεπεῖν τοῖς ἔλλοις.* This is the just view of the subject; and applying the measure proposed by Demosthenes, the Athenians had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.

¹ Thueyd. viii. 1. *τάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδέεις, διπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἐτοῖμοι θῶσαν εὐτακτεῖν:* compare Xenoph. Mem. iii. 5, 5.

² Thueyd. viii. 1-4. About the func-

tions of this Board of Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in Thucydides—*τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐντελεῖαν σωφροῖσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτερών ἀνδρῶν ἐλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἐν καιρῷ γέ προβολεύονται. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδέεις, διπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἐτοῖμοι θῶσαν εὐτακτεῖν.*

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks—“That is, no measure was to be submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by this Council of Elders.” And such is the general view of the commentators.

No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in the word Πρόβουλοι. It is indeed conceivable that persons so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will the passages in Aristotle's Politics, wherein the Πρόβουλοι occurs, authorise any inference with respect to this Board in the special case of Athens (Aristot. Politic. iv. 11, 9; iv. 12, 8; vi. 5, 10-13). The

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and aggressive scheming against her. So grave an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity; it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of 100 triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; 50 of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Boeotians—15 on Corinth—15 on the Phocians and Lokrians—10 on the Arcadians, with Pellénê and Sikyon—10 on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Ilermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March.¹ The same large hopes,

The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens, being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling, there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It was rather of importance to encourage the suggestion of new measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.

The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not reconstituted after their deposition.

I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the functions of this

Prodigious effect of the catastrophe upon all Greeks
—enemies and allies of Athens as well as neutrals—
and even on the Persians.

Board of Probæli now constituted, from the proceedings of the Probælus in Aristophanic Lysistrata, as is done by Wachsmuth (*Hellenische Alterthums-kunde*, i. 2. p. 198), and by Wattenbach (*De Quadrigenitorum Athenis Factio*, p. 17-21, Berlin 1842).

Schoman (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v. xii. p. 181) says of these Πρόβοντοι—“Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.” I do not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four Hundred, which would be about a year and a half from its first institution.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 2, 3. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔκαπον γεῶν

which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the Peloponnesians;¹ the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.²

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac Gulf, and levied large contributions on the neighbouring Cœtæans, in reprisal for the plunder which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.³

It was during the march of Agis through Boeotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa (probably of Chalkis and Eretria) applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenès at the head of 300 Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the island as Harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Boeotians (their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others—that he was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct Alkamenès as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,⁴ without at all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of Chios—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and

τῆς ναυτηγίας ἐποιοῦντο, &c.: compare ii. 7. πολέμου: compare ii. 7.
The Chians, with the same view, make application to Sparta. παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν ναυτηγίαν, &c.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 5. οὐτων οὐδὲν ἄλλο
ἢ ὅσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ

² Thucyd. viii. 2: compare ii. 7; iii. 86.

³ Thucyd. viii. 3.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 5.

caution in avoiding risks—considering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking measures for achieving independence.¹

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected—the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernès and Pharnabazus. No sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only way to realise this tribute, for which the satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break up her empire;² for which purpose Tissaphernès sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ships' crews.³ He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgès, the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnès, who was established, in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgès should either be brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras—two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character

¹ Thucyd. viii. 7-24.

² Thucyd. viii. 5. "Τπδ βασιλέως γάρ νεμετη ἀτύχασθε πεπραγμένος (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πολέων οὐ δυνάμενος πρόστεσθαι ἐπωφείησε. Τοὺς τούς φόρους μᾶλλον ἔθρεμμε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, &c."

I have already discussed this important passage at some length, in its bear-

ing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years before this time between Athens and Persia. See note to chap. xlvi. of this History.

³ Thucyd. viii. 29. Καὶ μηδὲ μὲν τροφὴν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐκάστη τῷ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριάβολον διδόναι,

from that satrap, whose government¹ comprehended Phrygia and the coast lands north of *Aeolis*, from the Propontis to the north-east corner of the Elæatic Gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realise the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernès as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose between them—one striving to attract the projected expedition to Chios, the other to the Hellespont:² for which latter purpose, Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a first payment in part.

From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens in the hour of her distress, so that the Lacedæmonians had only to choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much guided by the exile Alkibiadès. It so happened that his family friend Endius was at this moment one of the Board of Ephors; while his personal enemy King Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on an intrigue,³ was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadès strenuously exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to that island. A Perioökus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the Lacedæmonian ports (probably at Gythium), were directed immediately to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have been now midwinter—but Alkibiadès, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as a mark of divine displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede Melanchridas; while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so as

¹ The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii. 108).

² Thucyd. viii. 6.

³ Thucyd. viii. 6–12; Plutarch, Alki- biad. c. 23, 24; Cornelius Nepos, Alki- biad. c. 3.

to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger fleet from Corinth.¹

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent to Corinth (in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian envoys) to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the same time, to Chios—even those which Agis had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined any concern with Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios under Chalkideus—next, to Lesbos under Alkamenès—lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic Gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its movements.²

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh obstacle arose to delay their departure. The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching. They would not consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratès, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratès to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were compelled thus to act. But being aware that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, they did not feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Pelopon-

Synod of the Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—measures resolved.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 6.

² Thucyd. viii. 8.

Isthmian festival—scruples of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of Athens.

nesus, which had been so much delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to open revolt. Nevertheless, during the Isthmian festival, to which they were invited along with other Greeks—they discovered farther evidences of the plot which was going on, and resolved to keep strict watch on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in Chios.¹

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenès ; but an equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. Alkamenès however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best to return back ; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus, mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of 37 triremes, they pursued Alkamenès (who had again begun his voyage along the shore southward) and attacked him near the uninhabited harbour called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenès himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient

¹ Thucyd. viii. 10. 'Εν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ισθμία ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγ-γέλθησαν γάρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῷ Χίῳ ἐφάνη.

The language of Thucydidēs in this passage deserves notice. The Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks, that they should be present with their Theōry or solemn sacrifice at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidēs, when he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the explanation — *ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ* — “for they had been invited” — “for the festival truce had been formally signified to them.” That the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it to a state in hostility with Corinth, was some-

thing unusual, and meriting special notice: otherwise, Thucydidēs would never have thought it worth while to mention the proclamation—it being the uniform practice.

We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival which had taken place since the resumption of the war between Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out Athens from the Corinthian herald’s proclamation had not yet been renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was in its origin half Athenian—said to have been established, or revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian Theōry enjoyed a *προεδρία* or privileged place at the games (Plutarch, Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad. Pindar. Isthm. Schol.).

numbers to defend them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart. It was not without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the instances of King Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighbouring islet.¹

The Spartan Ephors had directed Alkamenēs, at the moment of his departure from Kenchreæ, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadēs might leave Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the defeat and death of Alkamenēs at Peiraeum. Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the Ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadēs, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat at Peiraeum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadēs) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connexion with the leading men—who would repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To these arguments, Alkibiadēs added an appeal to the personal vanity of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise to King Agis.²

By these arguments,—assisted doubtless by his personal influence, since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful—Alkibiadēs obtained the consent of the Spartan Ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendancy could have extorted, from men both dull and backward, a determination apparently so rash, yet in spite of such appearance, admirably conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet now

Small squadron starts from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadēs, to go to Chios.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 11.

² Thucyd. viii. 12.

Energetic advice of Alkibiadēs — his great usefulness to Sparta.

blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadēs was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the dangerous wounds upon his country!

There was indeed little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidēs was detached with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkideus and

Alkibiadēs as soon as their departure was known, he was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly they reached the town of Chios (on the eastern coast of the island, immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent) to the astonishment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the Council was found just assembling, so that Alkibiadēs was admitted without delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching—and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land, incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under these impressions, and while the population were yet under their first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical Council took the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town (called Polichnē) was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and Erythreans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.¹

Arrival of
Alkibiadēs
at Chios—
revolt of the
island from
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 14.

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens—Lesbos, ~~Akanthus~~, Torôné, Mendê, Amphipolis, &c. Contrary to what is commonly ^{General population of Chios was disinclined to revolt from Athens.} intimated by historians, we may observe, first, that

Athens did not systematically interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her allies—next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in^{*} her superior force,^{*} was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable, to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population—a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadēs and Chalkideus, partly by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force approaching.¹ Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was ruined, and her power to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.² The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt therefore whether this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies (as I have before observed) was more negative than positive. It was favourable rather than otherwise, in the

¹ Thucyd. viii. 9. Αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν ψῶν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τὰς τάχιν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δ' θλίγοις ἔμειδότες, τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοι πιστολέμιον ἔχειν, πρύντι καὶ συχυρὸν λάθιστο, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ήξειν, διέτετριθον.

² Also viii. 14. 'Ο δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ δικαιότερος . . . προενηγεόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τοῖς, καὶ κελευθύντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προεικόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικούνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. Καὶ

οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύμασι δσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει τοῖς δὲ δλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὅστε βουλὴν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγούμενην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἄπο τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆσοι πολλαὶ προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραιῷ νεῶν οὐ δηλώσαντων, ἀφίστανται Χίοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖον, Ἀθηναῖον.

² See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii. 24, about the calculations of the Chian government.

minds of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading men—since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of that reserve of 1000 talents, which Periklēs had set aside in the first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiraeus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal enactment (or standing order) against proposing any other mode of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.¹

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbour, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiraeum; out of which Strombichidēs with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia—followed, after a short interval, by Thrasylkēs with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardour to get ready thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first lamentably in-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 15.

adequate. Strombichidēs, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos (on the continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ is on the northern) in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidēs was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap; who moreover came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.¹

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadēs now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milētus. He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all the continental allies of Athens—by his own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order that the glory of the exploit might be ensured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had been re-manned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidēs had just been reinforced by Thrasylkēs with the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milētus, where he possessed established connexions among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt—Alkibiadēs prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidēs and Thrasylkēs, who came in pursuit the moment they learnt his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were

Activity of
the Chians in
promoting
revolt among
the other
Athenian
allies—Al-
kibiadēs
determines
Milētus to
revolt.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 16.

forced to take up a station on the neighbouring island of Ladê. So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadê in this enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, (opposite to Samos) in order to hear the result and to tender aid if required. A message from Chalkideus apprised them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgê (the Persian ally of Athens, at Iasus) was on his way at the head of an army: upon which they returned to Chios—but were unexpectedly seen in the way (off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon) and pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this check, however, the Chians had come again with fresh ships and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to Samos—and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from Athens.¹

It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and the Great King—and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernês concluded by was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighbouring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonourable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—

"The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions. The king shall possess whatever territory and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The King, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king."²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 17-19.

² Thucyd. viii. 18.

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milētus was handed over to Tissaphernēs, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it.^{1*} If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the *Ægean*, but also of all Thessaly and Boeotia and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxes.² Besides this monstrous stipulation, the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of their armament—which was their great motive for courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up—the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta realised her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian state.

The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia and the Asiatic side of the *Ægean* sea. The enemies of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and Milētus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, ensuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the *Geōmori* (the proprietors of land)—as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon. It cannot be doubted that these *Geōmori* were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt

Dishonourable and disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.

Energetic efforts of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 84-109.

² Thucyd. viii. 44.

from Athens; while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves conspired¹ with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle; two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured (and probably nothing less than a democratical revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic affairs) the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately recognised the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such of the Geomori as were slain or banished:¹ the survivors were deprived of all political privileges, and the other citizens (the Demus) were forbidden to intermarry with them.² We may fairly suspect that

¹ Thucyd. viii. 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου τοῦ δυνατοῦ, μετὰ Ἀθηναλῶν, οἱ ἔτυχον ἐν τρίσιν ναυὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμιῶν ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τὸν πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγὴ Σημιδαστές, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκλας νειψάμενοι, Ἀθηναλῶν τε σφίσιν αὐτονόματα μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαλοῖς ήδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διφούν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμέτραις μετεδίσασαν οὐτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὐτε ἐκδούνται οὐδὲ ἄγαγοσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδὲ ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἔξην.

* Thucyd. viii. 21. The dispositions and plans of the "higher people" at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford; and implied by Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.

Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix. sect. iii. vol. iv. p. 191)—"Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were

proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending their condition. The lower people, having intelligence of their design, rose upon them, and with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them," &c. &c. &c.

"The massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their island; which since the last rebellion had been kept under the immediate control of the Athenian government."

To call this a massacre is perversion of language. It was an insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the "higher people" were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by their conspiracy (which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact) to introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that the "lower people" were bound to sit still and see this done? And what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection? which inevitably became bloody, because the "higher people" were a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with

this latter prohibition was only the retaliation of a similar exclusion, which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to maintain

great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell on the followers of the Geōmori. Thucydides specifies only the number of the Geōmori themselves, who were persons of individual importance.

I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control from Athens—and that it kept the "higher people" in a state of severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.

But if he means by the expression "*under the immediate control of the Athenian government*," that there was any Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here given by Thucydides distinctly refutes him. The conflict was between two intestine parties, "the higher people and the lower people." The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews of three triremes, and even they were thereto by accident (*of έτυχον παρότρες*), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi. 85). After this resolution, the Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally—which Mr. Mitford is pleased to call "rewarding massacre and robbery;" in the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samos, immediately before this intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language of Thucydides carries to my mind a full conviction that it was oligarchical—under an exclusive aristocracy called the Geōmori. Dr. Thirlwall however (whose candid and equitable narrative of this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford) is of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the government continued democratical during the first years of the Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by

the hostility of the Samian exiles at Anaea, whom he looks upon as oligarchical refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford's view of the peculiarly depressed condition of the "higher people" at Samos at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not actually in possession of the government.

"Still (he says) as the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to regain a part of the substance of power under different forms, and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient pretensions on the first opportunity. *That it had not yet advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt from Athens;* and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost irreparable" (Hist. Gr. ch. xxvii. vol. iii. p. 477, 2nd edit.). Manso (Sparta, book iv. vol. ii. p. 260) is of the same opinion.

Surely the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate promises. Admitting that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadēs, after securing Chios, considered Miletus to be next in order of importance, and had moreover peculiar connexions with the leading men there (viii. 17); so that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Miletus, being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication with Tissaphernēs, for which reason he might naturally deem it of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover, not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidēs, having come across the Aegean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of central station (viii. 15). These circumstances, combined with the known

the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.

reluctance of the Samian Demos or com-monalty, are surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr. Thirlwall's inference, that the government was *not* oligarchical.

We have no information how or when the oligarchical government at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anax, so actively hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a democratical government at Samos (iv. 75), is not in itself improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the passages of Thucydides, viii. 21, 63, 73, it is impossible without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now in the hands of the oligarchy or Geōmori, and that the Demos rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The natural sense of the words *ἐπανάστασις*, *ἐπανίσταμαι*, is that of *insurrection against an established government*; it does not mean "a violent attack by one party upon another"—still less does it mean, "an attack made by a party in possession of the government"; which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i. 115 (after Thucydides has stated that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary force)—*καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δῆμῳ ἐπανίστησαν, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, &c.* Again, v. 23—about the apprehended insurrection of the Helots against the Spartans—*ἥν δὲ η δούλεια ἐπανίστησατ*: compare Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv. 18, p. 444; Herodot. iii. 39-120. So also *δυνατός* is among the words which Thu-

cydides uses for an oligarchical party, either in government or in what may be called *opposition* (i. 24; v. 4). But it is not conceivable to me that Thucydides would have employed the words *ἡ ἐπανάστασις δῦτο τοῦ δῆμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς*—if the Demos had at that time been actually in the government.

Again, viii. 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party under Peisander *ἀντῶν τῶν Σαμίων προύτραψαν τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὅπε τε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν δλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίτερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ίνα μὴ δλιγαρχῶνται*. Here the motive of the previous *ἐπανάστασις* is clearly noted—it was in order that they might *not be under an oligarchical government*: for I agree with Kriger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense prevents our construing it, "in order that their democratical government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon them"—which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall's view were just.

Lastly, viii. 78, we have *οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ δυτες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις — ἔγενοντο τέ ἐς τριακοσίους ἔννωμάται, καὶ ξελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δῆμῳ δύτῃ ἐπιθήσεσθαι*. Surely these words—*οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ δυτες δῆμος*—"those who having risen in arms against the wealthy and powerful, were now a Demos or a democracy"—must imply that the persons against whom a rising had taken place had been a governing oligarchy. Surely also, the words *μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις*, can mean nothing else except to point out the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical government, and constituted a democratical government. On the second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on the first occasion, the established government was already democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely persons making use of

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.¹ The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral in chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.²

Peloponnesian fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral to Ionia.

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen triremes under a Lacedæmonian Periækus named Deiniadas, to procure the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land-force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city-governments—Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylène towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical, we do not know; but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylène after its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared.³ The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and pro-

Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.

the powers of a democratical government to do violence to rich citizens—all this antithesis completely vanishes.

On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos⁴ at the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical like that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the oligarchy became established there. So long as the island performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely to interfere, during the seven years of peace intervening between

the years 421–414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to have been much exaggerated.

The Samian oligarchy or Geomori, dispossessed of the government on this occasion, were restored by Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war—Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 6—where they are called *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται*.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 13.

² Thucyd. viii. 20–23.

³ See the earlier part of this History, ch. 1.

cured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylēnē, and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.¹

Their proceedings however were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he had moreover failed in an attack upon Eræ.² But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylēnē (the largest town in that island) very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbour when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and some hoplites on board. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learnt the recapture of Mitylēnē by the Athenians. He was here also joined by three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither from Mitylēnē. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place—whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast. But in spite of all his endeavours, Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his force to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.³

¹ Thueyd. viii. 22.

² Thueyd. viii. 20.

³ Thueyd. viii. 23. ἀπεκομισθη δὲ
ἡδίν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ἐτὸ τὸν νεῶν

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomeneæ, which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore—the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself. The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went farther up the country to Daphnūs. Animated by such additional success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were blockading Milētus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well-equipped with Epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were Thêtes armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.¹ They occupied the little islets called Cenussæ, near Chios on the north-east—as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island at Kardamylē and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighbourhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt, inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been seen in the island, since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, and the organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years before. The territory of

τεξδ, ος ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐλασσοτόνον ἐμέλλησεν λέγειν.

Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative. The land-force marched along by land towards Klazomeneæ and Kymè (διεκόπει δῆμα Πελοποννήσου τε τῶν παρόποτων καὶ τῶν

ἀντόθεν ξυμάχων παρήσει ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydides does not say that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymè prepared to march forward, after that island should have been conquered, to the Hellespont.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 24, with Dr. Arnold's note.

Chios was highly cultivated,¹ its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidēs expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government, in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into extravagance. "Except Sparta (he says),² Chios is the only state that I know, which maintained its sober judgement throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power." He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end—and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidēs doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandisement; a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party from Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milētus.³ in the island began to declare in favour of re-union with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition; by seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other precautions. While the Chiāns were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklēs, and Skironidēs conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes,

¹ Aristotel. *Politic.* iv. 4, 1; *Athenaeus*, vi. p. 265.

² Thucyd. viii. 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι οὐκέτι ἐπεκβέσαν, οἱ δὲ μὲν Χῖοι οὐδὲ οὐκέτι ἐπεκβέσαν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀκαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γάρ μόνοι

μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὃν ἔγειραν ισθόμηροι, εὐδαιμονήσαντες δῆμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν,

καὶ θηρίου ἀπεβίδον τὸ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ μεῖζον, τόσῳ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἔχυρώτερον, &c.

viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι . . . πλονοιάτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, &c.

some of them employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there were aboard 1000 Athenians, and 1500 Argeians. Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms, were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milétus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladé. The Milesians marched forth to give them battle; mustering 800 of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap Tissaphernés. Alkibiadès also was present and engaged. The Argeians were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milétus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of 300 men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.¹

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milétus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprised, on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, 55 triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these 55, 22 were Sicilian (20 from Syracuse and two from Selinus) sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratès and under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at Athens—so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C. The remaining 33 triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenès until he could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenès, halting first at the island of Lerus (off the coast towards the southward of Milétus), was there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so that he thought it prudent to take station for the

Fresh Peloponnesian forces arrive — the Athenians retire, pursuant to the strong recommendation of Phrynicus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 25, 26.

night in the neighbouring Gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadēs, who came on horseback in all haste from Milētus, to the Milesian town of Teichiussa on that Gulf. Alkibiadēs strenuously urged him to lend immediate aid to the Milesians, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly he prepared to sail thither the next morning; but during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milētus and return to Samos with their wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenēs with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders, indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting that the maritime honour of Athens would be tarnished by retiring before the enemy. But the third, Phrynicus, opposed with so much emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his colleagues to retire. The fleet (he said) had not come prepared for fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations against Milētus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidēs bestows much praise on Phrynicus for the wisdom of this advice, which was forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from which place the Argive hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.¹

Capture of
Iasus by the
Peloponnesians—
Under—
Amorgēs
made pri-
soner.

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the Gulf of Iasus to Milētus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and leaving their masts, sails, and rigging (as was usual when going into action) at Teichiussa. Finding Milētus already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day in order to reinforce themselves with the 25 triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladē—and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgēs, Tissaphernēs persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be Athenians and friends, so that the place was

¹ Thucyd. viii. 26, 27.

entered and taken by surprise;¹ though strong in situation and fortifications, and defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of signal advantage from the abundant plunder which it distributed among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnēs, father of Amorgēs. It was handed over to Tissaphernēs, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ—and along with Amorgēs himself, who had been taken alive and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa. The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ, in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.²

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milétus, Tissaphernēs paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future (partly at the instigation of Alkibiadēs, of which more hereafter) that he could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa; and that until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenēs, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid (a miserable jealousy which marks the low character of many of these Spartan officers): but the Syracusan Hermokratēs remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernēs the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued.³ For the present,

Tissapher-
nēs begins to
furnish pay
to the Pe-
loponnesian
fleet. He re-
duces the rate
of pay for the
future.

¹ Phrynicus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced by the Athenians—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical conspirators—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed Amorgēs on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus (Thucyd. viii. 54).

Phrynicus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave omission in not

sending notice to Amorgēs of the sudden retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milétus; the ignorance of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgēs mistook the Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.

² Thucyd. viii. 28.

³ Thucyd. viii. 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter which the words of Thucydides

however, the seamen were in good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay, but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;¹ while Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival of so large a fleet. Nevertheless the Athenians on their side were also reinforced by 35 fresh triremes, which reached Samos under Strombichidēs, Charmīnūs, and Euktēmon. The Athenian fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment—we read with amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than 104 triremes in full condition of the navy of Athens.² and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been 128.³ So energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklēs.

The Athenians resolved to employ 30 triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn among the generals, Strombichidēs with two others were assigned to the command. The other 74 triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milētus, trying in vain to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbour. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command—being engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes—ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleūs, the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed to

do not enable us to make out. None of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some alteration or omission of words: nor does any of the explanations given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to consider the conjecture and explanation

given by Paulmier and Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or of Poppe and Hermann.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 36.

² Thucyd. viii. 30: compare Dr. Arnold's note.

Klazomenæ, recently re-transferred from the continent to the neighbouring islet. He here (in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian general of the district) enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified; and was presently driven off by a severe storm, from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days, destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.¹

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus (at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of 500 of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the sea with Chalkideus and since served as hoplites), had reached Erythræ, and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians—a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose—an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedaemonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in the Erythraean territory), on the north side; but while there, he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræa by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead of pursuing his voyage

Pedaritus, Lacedaemonian governor at Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 31, 32.

to Milētus, he therefore returned on the next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their liberation.¹

The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet under Strombichidēs—30 triremes accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milētus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm became so violent that even these Chiāns had great difficulty in making their own harbour, while the three foremost Athenian ships were wrecked on the neighbouring shore, all the crews either perishing or becoming prisoners.² The rest of the Athenian fleet found shelter in the harbour of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland—under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.

As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos, from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbour on each side, not far from the city of Chios.³ They bestowed great labour and time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea side, during which process they were scarcely interrupted at all either by the Chiāns, or by Pedaritus and his garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still his remaining partisans were so

¹ Thucyd. viii. 32, 33.

² Thucyd. viii. 33, 34.

³ Thucyd. viii. 34–38. Δελφίνιον . . . ον—λαμπτήρας έχον, &c.

That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the base of their operations, and as the immediate scene

of last preparations, against Chios—was only repeating what they had once done before (c. 479), and what they again did afterwards (c. 100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of Chios.

numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever—and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milētus, entreating succour and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed—Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy, was immense.¹ The distress of the island increased every day, and could only be relieved by succour from without, which Astyochus still withheld.

That officer, on reaching Milētus, found the Peloponnesian force on the Asiatic side of the *Ægean* just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laonian party; the chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.² Dorieus and his squadron, crossing the *Ægean* in its southern latitude, had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by Tissaphernēs from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.³ Orders were sent from Milētus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian Cape to intercept the trading-vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron

Dorieus arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii, to join Astyochus — maritimo contests near Knidus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 38–40. About the slaves in Chios, see the extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodōrus in Athenaeus, vi. p. 265.

That from Nymphodōrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local legend, connected with the Chapel of the *Kind-hearted Hero* (*"Ηρως εὐμένεος"*) at Chios.

Even in antiquity, though the insti-

tution of slavery was universal and nowhere disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.

² See the Life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionyaius of Halikarnassus, o. i. p. 453 Reisk, and in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 835.

³ Thucyd. viii. 35–100.

from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed; but additional defences had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured near Triopium had come into help; so that the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the 74 Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milētus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milesians were zealous in the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernēs continued to be supplied with tolerable regularity, yet at the reduced rate mentioned a little above.¹

Though the Peloponnesians had hitherto no ground of complaint (such as they soon came to have) against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still the powerful fleet now at Milētus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadēs, when first landing at Milētus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milētus, and even before the departure of Theramenēs (whose functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet), insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernēs, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—

“ Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, between the Lacedæmonians with their allies—and King Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernēs. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king—or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies—let each meet as much as may be the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐπίδοτο ἀρκούντως, &c.

The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king's territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if any one within the king's territory, or within the territory subject to him,¹ shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them and lend his best defensive aid."

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenès was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects; nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, undiminished extent of the king's dominion, the same as at the maximum under his predecessors—the like undefined rights of the King to meddle with Grecian affairs—the like unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by Theramenès, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage home, in a small boat—no one knew how.²

Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and in spite of his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to them—when a new incident happened which gave him at least a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of 27 triremes under the command of Antisthenès, having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured

Comparison
of the second
treaty with
the first.

Arrival of a
fresh Pelop-
ponnesian
squadron
under An-
tisthenes at
Kaunus—
Lichas
comes out
as Spartan
commis-
sioner.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 37. Καὶ ἦν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ χάρη, ἡ δοῦλος βασιλέως ἀρχεῖ, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγ. ἡ τῶν ἔνυμάχων, βασιλεὺς καλλέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

The distinction here drawn between the king's territory, and the territory over which the king holds empire deserves notice. By the former phrase is understood (I presume) the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon,

together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and peculiar (Herodot. i. 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the plenitude of their power.

² Thucyd. viii. 38. ἀποκλέων δὲ κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.

three of them—then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenēs was instructed first to get to Milētus and put himself in concert with the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or another squadron of equal force, under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenēs, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at Milētus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus—but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and to appoint Antisthenēs in his place.¹

No sooner had Astyochus learnt at Milētus the arrival of Antisthenēs at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure his junction with the 27 new triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of 20 triremes under Charminus; which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenēs. Charminus, having his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charminus, seeing at first only a few ships apart

Astyochus goes with the fleet from Milētus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats the Athenian squadron under Charminus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 39. Καὶ ἐρῆτο αὐτοῖς, | λων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι, ὃ μέλλει ἐς Μίλητου ἀφικομένους τῶν τε κλ- | κριστα ἔξειν, &c.

from the rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of newcomers. Attacking the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage—disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the island called Teatlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including the 27 triremes newly arrived, was now united.¹ The Athenians in Samos (whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which will be explained in the ensuing chapter) had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprised of the defeat of Charmînus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet (probably including the remnant of the squadron of Charmînus) to Samos.²

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of 94 triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap (now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which also more in the coming chapter) had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same time full of promises, paralysing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus

Peloponnesian fleet at Knidus—double-dealing of Tissaphernês—breach between him and Lichas.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 42.

² Thucyd. viii. 43. This defeat of Charminus is made the subject of a jest by Aristophanes — Thesmophor. 810, with the note of Paulmier.

and by Theramenēs, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms—a proposition, which Tissaphernēs rejected with so much indignation, as to depart without settling anything.¹

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors.

Peloponnesian fleet masters Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three separate city-governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a force of 94 triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the mountains.² All the three Rhodian

¹ Thucyd. viii. 43.

² Thucyd. viii. 44. Οι δ' ἐς τὴν Ρόδον, ἐπικηρυκεομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, &c.

. . . Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ρόδου πρώτῳ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἑννετήκοντα, ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρᾶσσα ενεγκαὶ, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτελίστους οἴσθης τῆς πόλεως, &c.

We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among the dependent allies of Athens—that the general population of the allied city mani-

fests no previous discontent, nor any spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the island (those who, if the government was democratical, formed the oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself, if oligarchical) conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force, unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with little attachment on the one hand—yet no hatred, or sense of practical suffering, on the other.

towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian* fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of 32 talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their desire to be more out of his reach.¹ But what we cannot so easily explain, is—that they remained on the island without any movement or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet of 94 triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle—their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:² moreover the promise of sending to co-operate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained unperformed.³ We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes—paralysed their energies by assurances that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them—and ensured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus the general-in-chief took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.⁴ Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the tardiness of Nikias in Sicily—but

Long inaction
of the
fleet at
Rhodes—
paralysing
intrigues
of Tissa-
phernês—
corruption
of the La-
cadiemian
officers.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44: compare c. 57.

² Thucyd. viii. 40–55.

³ Thucyd. viii. 39.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 45. Suggestions of Alkiabiadès to Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριπ-
άρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων
διδιδασκεν ἀστε ὅπντα χρήματα

ἀντὸν πεῖσαι, ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι
ταῦτα ἔαντφ, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων
τούτων δὲ, Ἐρμοκράτης ἡναντιούστο μό-
γος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔνταντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.

About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.

proceeded from the dishonesty and personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.

I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private—and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue—are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. Of course it is not meant that this was true of all of them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be disguised even from themselves—far less would they be above the vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride, power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, &c. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual—but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being

tried and punished ; though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil—they will be found imperfect indeed both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled-for nor over-severe.

CHAPTER LXII.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.—OLIGARCHY OF
FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

Rally of Athens, during the year after the defeat at Syracuse, B.C. 412. ABOUT a year elapsed between the catastrophe of the Athenians near Syracuse and the victory which they gained over the Milesians, on landing near Milētus (from September 413 B.C., to September 412 B.C.). After the first of those two events, the complete ruin of Athens had appeared both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. But so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic, had been her rally, that at the time of the second, she was found again carrying on a tolerable struggle, though with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system, against enemies both bolder and more numerous than ever. There is no reason to doubt that her foreign affairs might have gone on thus improving, had they not been endangered at this critical moment by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens—bringing her again to the brink of ruin, from which she was only rescued by the incompetence of her enemies.

Commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred at Athens—Alkibiadēs. That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiadēs. I have already recounted how this man, alike unprincipled and energetic, had thrown himself with his characteristic ardour into the service of Sparta, and had indicated to her the best means of aiding Syracuse, of inflicting positive injury upon Athens, and lastly, of provoking revolt among the Ionic allies of the latter. It was by his boldness and personal connexions in Ionia that the revolt of Chios and Milētus had been determined.

In the course of a few months, however, he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted: Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted, was defeated and slain near Milētus: the Ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other Ephors¹ just about the

¹ See Thucyd. v. 36.

end of September, or beginning of October, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Milētus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; lastly, King Agis, the personal enemy of Alkibiadēs, still remained to persecute him. Moreover, there was in the character of this remarkable man something so essentially selfish, vain, and treacherous, that no one could ever rely upon his faithful coöperation. Accordingly, as soon as any reverse occurred, that very energy and ability, which seldom failed him, made those with whom he acted the more ready to explain the mischance by supposing that he had betrayed them.

* It was thus that, after the defeat of Milētus, King Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadēs as a traitor to Sparta; Order from Sparta to kill Alkibiadēs. upon which the new Ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death.¹ Alkibiadēs had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent,—with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him; yet the utmost which they could obtain was, that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the Dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination and without any idea of judicial trial, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadēs however got intimation of the order in time to retire to Tissaphernēs. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milēsians, nor foreseeing the full mischief which his desertion would bring upon Sparta. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadēs soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan, nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic: a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernēs himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King (Alkibiadēs urged) to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other: he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid

He escapes, retires to Tissaphernēs, and becomes adviser of the Persians.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45. Καὶ δέπ' αὐτῶν τῷ Ἀγιδὶ ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἀπι-
ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστυόχου ἐκ στοὺς ἐφαίνετο), &c.
Λακεδαιμονος διστ' ἀποκτεῖναι (ἢ γὰρ καὶ

of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both: first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves—which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.¹

Thus far Alkibiadēs gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernēs from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian—it would nevertheless be found easier to arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens, than with those of Lacedæmon. Athens (he argued) neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King; while Sparta, forsaking all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same privilege. This view appeared to be countenanced by the objection which Theramenēs and many of the Peloponnesian officers had taken to the first convention concluded by Chalkideus and Alkibiadēs with Tissaphernēs; objections afterwards renewed by Lichas even against the second modified convention of Theramenēs, and accompanied with an indignant protest against the idea of surrendering to the Great King all the territory which had been ever possessed by his predecessors.²

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadēs professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45, 46.

² Thucyd. viii. 46-52.

He advises
the satrap
to assist
neither of
the Grecian
parties
heartily—but
his advice
leans towards
Athens,
with a view
to his own
restoration.

either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia—while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernēs at all lend himself to any such positive impression; though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadēs—that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without ensuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success: or rather, this duplicity was so congenial to his Oriental mind, that there was no need of Alkibiadēs to recommend it. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money. Established along with Tissaphernēs at Magnesia—the same place which had been occupied about fifty years before by another Athenian exile, equally unprincipled and yet abler, Themistoklēs—Alkibiadēs served as interpreter of his views in all his conversations with the Greeks, and appeared to be thoroughly in his confidence: an appearance of which he took advantage to pass himself off falsely upon the Athenians at Samos as having the power of turning Persian wealth to the aid of Athens.

The first payment made by Tissaphernēs, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgēs, to the Peloponnesians at Milētus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half; a reduction for which Alkibiadēs undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians (he urged) gave no more than half a drachma; not because they could not afford more, but because, from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would bring back the men when called for.¹ As he probably never expected that such

Alkibiadēs acts as negotiator for Tissaphernēs at Magnesia.

Diminution of the rate of pay furnished by Tissaphernēs to the Peloponnesians.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολεῖσθαι, ὑπολικότερες ἐς δύνηται δύ τροσοφειλέμενον μισθών.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation.

Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

subterfuges (employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head) would carry conviction to any one—so he induced Tissaphernēs to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs ; a mode of argument which was found effectual in silencing the complaints of all, with the single exception of the Syracusan Hermokratēs. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadēs spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens (he said), and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burthens in their own defence. Nor was it anything less (he added) than sheer impudence in the Chians, the richest people in Greece—if they required a foreign military force for their protection, to require at the same time that others should furnish the means of paying it.¹ At the same time, however, he intimated—by way of keeping up hopes for the future—that Tissaphernēs was at present carrying on the war at his own cost ; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed, with the addition of aid to the Grecian cities in any other way which could be reasonably asked. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless : an assurance not merely deceitful, but mischievous, since it was employed to dissuade them from all immediate action, and to paralyse their navy during its moments of fullest vigour and efficiency. Even the reduced rate of pay was furnished so irregularly, and the Peloponnesian force kept so starved, that the duplicity of the satrap became obvious to every one, and was only carried through by his bribery to the officers.²

While Alkibiadēs, as the confidential agent and interpreter of Tissaphernēs, was carrying on this anti-Peloponnesian policy through the autumn and winter of 412–411 B.C.—partly during the stay of the Peloponnesian fleet at Milētus, partly after it had moved to

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις δεορένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀνασχυντο εἰεν, πλουσιώτατοι ἦντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ δύως σωζόμενοι καὶ διοῦσσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

κακῶς ἔπειρισε τοῖς Πελοποννησοῖς καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴσα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας νέος φόσκων ἤξειν καὶ ἐκ περιύποτος ἀγωγείσθαι ἐφειρε ἵνα πρόγυμνα καὶ τὴν ἀκρὺν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πάνι ισχυράν, τὰ τε Βλλα, καταφανέστερον ἢ ὅπε λαυδίσειν, οὐ προύμως ξυνεπαλέμει.

² Thucyd. viii. 46. Τὴν τε τροφὴν

Knidus and Rhodes—he was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernēs, were facts well-known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was, to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendancy over the mind of the satrap. His hostility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution; which, moreover, was not less gratifying to his sentiment of vengeance for the past, than to his ambition for the future. Accordingly he sent over a private message to the officers and trierarchs at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the “best men” in the armament¹—such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other—and intimating his anxious wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernēs as their ally. But he would come only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government; nor would he ever again set foot amidst the odious democracy to whom he owed his banishment.²

Such was the first originating germ of that temporary calamity, which so near brought Athens to absolute ruin, called the Oligarchy of Four Hundred: a suggestion from the same exile who had already so deeply wounded his country by sending Gylippus to Syracuse, and the Lacedæmonian garrison to Dekeleia. As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. To subvert the democracy for their own profit, and to be rewarded for doing so with the treasures of Persia as a means of carrying on the war against the Peloponnesians—was an extent of good fortune greater than they could possibly have hoped. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors—

Conspiracy arranged between the Athenian officer and Alkibiades.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκι- δῆται, καὶ οὐ πονηρά οὐδὲ βίδους προπέμψαντος λόγους ἐσ τοὺς δημοκρατίας τῇ έαυτῷ ἐκβαλούσῃ, κατ-

δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν (Αθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ελθόν, &c. ² Thucyd. viii. 47.

ὅτε μησθῆται τερπαὶ αὐτοῦ ἐσ τοὺς βελτίστατους τῶν ἀνθράκων, δητι ἐπ'

upon whom the cost of military operations fell; from which burthen they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. Elate with so tempting a promise, a deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadēs, who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernēs, but the Great King himself, into active alliance and coöperation with Athens provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.¹ He doubtless did not omit to set forth the other side of the alternative; that if the proposition were refused, Persian aid would be thrown heartily into the scale of the Peloponnesians; in which case, there was no longer any hope of safety for Athens.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical Athenians—the heteries or political clubs. Peisander is sent to push forward the conspiracy at Athens. The oligarchical men in Samos came together, both in greater number and with redoubled ardour, to take their measures for subverting the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion; but who were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them on condition, and only on condition, that they would relinquish their democracy. Such was at this time the indispensable need of foreign money for the purposes of the war—such was the certainty of ruin, if the Persian treasure went to the aid of the enemy—that the most democratical Athenian might well hesitate when the alternative was thus laid before him. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that they had the feeling of the armament altogether against them—that the best which they could expect from it was a reluctant acquiescence—and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands and management. They formed themselves into a political confederacy (or *Hetaia*) for the purpose of discussing the best measures towards their end. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander² at the head, to make known the new prospects and to

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48.

² It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (Orat. xxv. Δῆμον Καταλύσεως Ἀπολογία, c. 3. p. 766 Reisk.) that Phrynicus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance such an asser-

tion, and the narrative of Thucydides gives quite a different colour to their behaviour.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover his forwardness and energy (presently to be described) in taking the formidable initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient

put the standing oligarchical clubs (Hētæries) into active co-operation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy; and farther, to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance—when once she should be relieved from her democracy and placed under the rule of her “best and most virtuous citizens.”

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been—subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadēs, on one hand—against hearty co-operation, and a free supply of gold, from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realised—or that when the first part should have been brought to pass, the second would follow? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadēs: very little to be trusted, even when promising what was in his own power to perform, as we may recollect from his memorable dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens—and on the present occasion, vouching for something in itself extravagant and preposterous. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadēs—or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadēs coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves—a purpose, towards which the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into a sincere persuasion. Without adverting to this fact,

evidence that the taunts of the writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the Symposium repeats this taunt (ii. 14), which also appears in Aristophanes, Eupolis, Plato Comicus, and others: see the passages collected in Meineke, Histor.

Critic. Comicorum, vol. i. p. 178, &c.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person libelled.

we should be at a loss to understand how the word of such a man as Alkibiadēs, on such a matter, could be so implicitly accepted as to set in motion a whole train of novel and momentous events.

There was one man, and one man alone so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynicus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milētūs; a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadēs, and thoroughly seeing through his character and projects. Though Phrynicus was afterwards one of the chief organizers of the oligarchical movement, when it became detached from and hostile to Alkibiadēs—yet under the actual circumstances he discountenanced it altogether.¹ Alkibiadēs (he said) had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp—the greatest misfortune that could at present happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence—while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover the dependencies of Athens—upon whom it was now proposed to confer, simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government—would receive that boon with indifference. Those who had already revolted, would not come back; those who yet remained faithful, would not be the more inclined to remain so longer. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. Assuredly they would not expect better treatment from an oligarchical government at Athens, than from a democratical; for they knew that those self-styled “good and virtuous” men, who would form the oligarchy, were, as ministers of democracy, the chief advisers and instigators of the people to iniquitous deeds; most commonly for nothing but their own individual profit. From an Athenian

¹ Phrynicus is affirmed in an Oration of Lysias to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica; then to have resided in the city, and practised what was called

sycophancy, or false and vexatious accusation before the Dikastery and the public assembly (Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674 Reisk.).

oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and^{*} the popular Dikasteries. Such (Phrynicus affirmed on his own personal knowledge) was the genuine feeling among the dependencies of Athens.¹ Having thus shown the calculations of the conspirators—as to Alkibiadēs, as to Persia, and as to the allied dependencies—to be all illusory, Phrynicus concluded by entering his decided protest against adopting the propositions of Alkibiadēs.

But in this protest (borne out afterwards by the result) he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspirators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadēs; and at the same time to propose to the people their new intended ally Tissaphernēs.

Phrynicus knew well what would be the consequence to himself—if this consummation were brought about, as he foresaw that it probably would be—from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadēs against his recent opposition. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiadēs beforehand, even by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milētus; to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynicus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the

Maneuvres
and counter-
manoeuvres
of Phryni-
chus and
Alkibiadēs.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τάς τε ξυμαχίας πόλεις, αἱς διεσχήσθαι δὴ σφᾶς διλγαρχίαν, δτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ δημοκράτησσονται, εἰδέναι ἐφ' δτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσι οὖθ' αἱ ἀφεστηκαῖ προσχωρήσονται, οὐθ' αἱ περάχουσαι βεβαιώτεραι θεωρῶνται οἱ γὰρ δύνατονται αὐτοὺς μερ' διλγαρχίας η δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον, η μεθ' δποτέρου δν τύπωσι ταῦτων ἀλενθέρους εἶναι. Τούς τε καὶ λέκανάς καγαθοὺς δν ομαζούντους δύνατονται αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πρόγυμνα παρέκειν τοῦ δῆμου, ποριστὰς δυτας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δῆμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ τλεῖα αὐτοὺς ὥφελεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὲν

ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτος δν καὶ βιαιωτέρον ἀποδιησκειν, τούς τε δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, δτι οὐτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernès and Alkibiadès. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians—but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernès, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynicus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadès forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos of the step taken by Phrynicus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynicus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, complaining of the violation of confidence in regard to the former, but at the same time intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to come and attack the place, which was as yet unfortified—explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted ; and he concluded by saying that this, as well as every other means of defence, must be pardoned to one whose life was in danger from a personal enemy. Foreseeing that Astyochus would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynicus waited a proper time, and then revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. He insisted on the necessity of immediate precautions; and himself as general superintended the work of fortification, which was soon completed. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadès, communicating to the army that Phrynicus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynicus himself had been already completed, was construed into a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadès himself, through his acquaintance with the intentions of the Peloponnesians, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made by his second letter effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynicus by the first, insomuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.¹

But Phrynicus, though thus successful in extricating himself,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 50, 51.

failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence and life of Alkibiadēs; in whose favour the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects which had been conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadēs and renounce their democratical constitution; in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians.¹ Violent was the storm which these propositions raised in the public assembly. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy; few, if any, distinctly against it. The opponents of Alkibiadēs indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him, in violation of the laws, and in reversal of a judicial sentence; while the Eumolpidæ and Kerykes, the sacred families connected with the Eleusinian mysteries which Alkibiadēs had profaned, entered their solemn protest on religious grounds to the same effect. Against all these vehement opponents, whose impassioned invectives obtained the full sympathy of the assembly, Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question—"What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities—and when the king as well as Tissaphernēs are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side?" The answer was a melancholy negative—or perhaps not less melancholy silence. "Well then (rejoined Peisander)—that object cannot possibly be attained, unless we conduct our political affairs for the future in a more moderate way, and put the powers of government more into the hands of a few—and unless we recall Alkibiadēs, the only man now living who is competent to do the business. Under present circumstances, we surely shall not lay greater stress upon our political constitution than upon the salvation of the city;

¹ In the speech made by Theramenēs (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterward, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the Lacedæmonians would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect—a speci-

Proceedings
of Peisander
at Athens—
strong op-
position
among the
people both
to the con-
spiracy and
to the re-
storation of
Alkibiadēs.

men of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramenēs said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the Lacedæmonians would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramenēs transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

the rather as what we now enact may be hereafter modified, if it be found not to answer."

Against the proposed oligarchical change the repugnance of the assembly was alike angry and unanimous. But they were silenced by the imperious necessity of the case, as the armament at Samos had been before; and admitting the alternative laid down by Peisander (as I have observed already), the most democratical citizen might be embarrassed as to his vote. Whether any speaker, like Phrynicus at Samos, arraigned the fallacy of the alternative, and called upon Peisander for some guarantee, better than mere asseveration, of the benefits to come—we are not informed. But the general vote of the assembly, reluctant and only passed in the hope of future change, sanctioned his recommendation.¹ He and ten other envoys, invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadēs and Tissaphernēs, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynicus from his command; under the accusation of having traitorously caused the loss of Iasus and the capture of Amorgēs, after the battle of Milētūs—but from the real certainty that he would prove an insuperable bar to all negotiations with Alkibiadēs. Phrynicus, with his colleague Skironidēs, being thus displaced, Leon and Diomedon were sent to Samos as commanders in their stead; an appointment, of which, as will be presently seen, Peisander was far from anticipating the consequences.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote—a result of fear inspired by the war, representing a sentiment utterly at variance with that of the assembly, and only procured as the price of Persian aid against a foreign enemy—would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was indeed indispensable as a first step; partly as an authority to himself, partly also as

¹ Thucyd. viii. 54. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος τὸ περιυπάρχας σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὅπερ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἰναι ἀλληγρωτήριαν, δεῖσας, καὶ ἀμα ἐλπίζων ως καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐγέδωκε.

"Atheniensibus, imminentे periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitatis cura fuit. Itaque, permittente populo, im-

perium ad Senatum transfertur" (Justin, v. 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes; but he takes no notice of the change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated without the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and by simple terrorism.

a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed; that of calling these forces into energetic action—organising an amount of violence sufficient to extort from the people actual submission in addition to verbal acquiescence—and thus as it were tying down the patient while the process of emasculation was being consummated. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, conspiracies, or Hetæries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, &c. Among these clubs were distributed most of “the best citizens, the good and honourable men, the elegant men, the men of note, the temperate, the honest and moderate men,”¹ &c., to employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. And though there were doubtless individuals among them who deserved these appellations in their best sense, yet the general character of the clubs was not the less exclusive and oligarchical. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in coöperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force; generally either in abeyance, or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes—but capable, at a special crisis, of being evoked, organised, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy, at a moment when it was already intimidated and might be finally overthrown.²

¹ Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλοκάγαθοι, οἱ χαριέντες, οἱ γυνώμοι, οἱ σάφρονες, &c.: le parti honnête et modér., &c.

² About these *ψυχεμόσαις δὲ δίκαιοι* political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor—Aristotel. Polit. ii. 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii. 46; xxxiv. 61:

rieen zu Athen, pp. 75, 79, Leipzig, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor—Aristotel. Polit. ii. 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii. 46; xxxiv. 61:

Pisander leaves Athens for Samos—Antiphon takes the management of the oligarchical conspiracy—Theramenes and Phrynicbus. Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Pisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his negotiation with Tissaphernēs. But the coöperation and aggressive movement of the clubs which he had originated, was prosecuted with increased ardour during his absence, and even fell into hands more organising and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon, of the deme Rhamnus, took it in hand

compare Kluge, ad Aristotel. de Polit. Carthag. p. 46–127, Wratisl. 1824.

The like political associations were both of long duration among the nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success—"coitiones (compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 54, s. 148) honorum adipiscendorum causa factæ—factiones—sodalitates." The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The Senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the Dictator Macrius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in coöperation (as was equally the fact under Pisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. "Nec diutius, ut fit, quam dum recens erat, *questio per clara nomina reorum viguit: inde labi coepit ad viliora capita, donec coitionibus factionibusque, aduersus quas comparuta erat, oppressu est.*" (Livy, ix. 26.) Compare Dio. Cass. xxxvii. 57, about the ἑταῖρικὰ of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (de Petition. Consulat. c. 5) says to his brother the orator—"Quod si sati grati homines essent, haec omnia (i. e. all the *subsidia* necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut parata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor sodalitates civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti Horum in causis ad te deferrundis quidnam eorum sodales tibi receperint et confirmarint, scio; nam interfui."

See Th. Mommsen, De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum, Kiel 1843, ch. iii. sect. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the Onomasticon Tullianum of Orelli and Baiter, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, p. 200–210, ad Ind. Legum; *Lex Lici-nia de Sodalitiis.*

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in ξυσ-

μόσιαι, ἐπὶ Εἰκαῖς (not including ἀρχαῖς, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called *Εἰκαδεῖς* made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth's Athens and Attica, p. 223; next in Ross, Die Demen von Attica, Preface, p. v. These *Eikadeῖς* are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythical hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (*ἐνάριον τῷ ἄρῃ ἦν Εἰκαδέψ ἐπηρδατό*)—they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecuniary process against the *κοινόν*: compare analogous obligations among the Roman *Sodales*, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Pollyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness: and the general body of the *Eikadeῖς* pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, choosing three of their members to assist him in the cause before the Dikastery (*οἱ τρεῖς συναγωγοῦνται τῷ ἐπεσκημένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι*): compare the *ἑταῖραι* alluded to in Demosthenēs (cont. Theokrin. c. 11. p. 1335) as assisting Theokrinēs before the Dikastery and intimidating the witnesses.

The Guilds in the European cities during the middle ages, usually sworn to by every member and called *Conjuraciones Amicitiae*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these ξυσμόσιαι; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance however was quite equal. (See Wilda, Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters, Abschn. ii. p. 167, &c.)

"*Omnis autem ad Amicitiam pertinente villa per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto*" (ib. p. 148).

especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life and not open to pecuniary corruption: in other respects, of pre-eminent ability, in contrivance, judgement, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluded him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the *dikastery*: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker (to repeat a remark already once made), was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage, as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Himself thus debarred from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice, calculation, scheming, and rhetorical composition,¹ to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

Thus efficient was the man to whom Peisander in departing chiefly confided the task of organising the anti-popular clubs, for the consummation of the revolution already in immediate prospect. His chief auxiliary was Theramenēs, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father (either natural or by adoption), Agnon, was one of the *Probūli*, and had formerly been founder of Amphipolis. Even Phrynicus—whose sagacity we have already had occasion to appreciate, and who from hatred towards Alkibiadēs had pronounced himself decidedly against the oligarchical movement at Samos—became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenēs a contriving

¹ The person described by Krito in the *Euthydēmus* of Plato (c. 31, p. 305 C.) as having censured Sokrātēs for conversing with Euthydēmus and Diogenesdōrus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydidēs—*ἴκιστα νὴ τὸν δίκαιον πέπειρος οὐδὲ οἷμα πάποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαιοτήριον ἀγαθεύηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπατείνατο τὸν φασὶ περὶ τὸν πρόγυματος, νὴ τὸν Δία, καὶ τεινόν εἶναι καὶ δεινόν λόγους ἔντεινεται.*

Heindorf thinks that Isokratēs is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of

Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasyphorus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

Oι συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a law-suit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the *Dikastery* effectively in support of his case (Xenoph. *Memorab.* i. 2, 51).

head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior. Under such skilful leaders, the anti-popular force of Athens was organised with a deep skill, and directed with a dexterous wickedness, never before witnessed in Greece.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia (seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February 411 B.C.), the Peloponnesian fleet had already quitted Milētus and gone to Knidus and Rhodes, on which latter island Leon and Diomedon made some hasty descents, from the neighbouring island of Chalkē. At the same time, the Athenian armament at Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighbouring fort at Delphinium. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived; and he therefore resolved to attempt a general sally and attack upon the Athenians, with his whole force foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death, with great slaughter of the Chian troops, and with the loss of many whose shields were captured in the pursuit.¹ The Chians, now reduced to greater straits than before, and beginning to suffer severely from famine, were only enabled to hold out by a partial reinforcement soon afterwards obtained from the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Milētus. A Spartan named Leon, who had come out in the vessel of Antisthenes as one of the Epibatæ or Marines, conducted this reinforcing squadron of 12 triremes (chiefly Thurian and Syracusan) succeeding Pedaritus in the general command of the island.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 55, 56.

² Thucyd. viii. 61. έτυχον δὲ έτι ἐν Ρόδῳ δύτος οἰστρύδου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντα τε ἄνδρα Σπαριδάτην, δε 'Αυτισθένει εἰ πιβάτης ξυνέπει, τοῦτον κεκομισμένον μετὰ τῶν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον θρονοῦται, &c.

I do not see why the word *έπιβάτης* should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of *miles classiarius*. The commentators (see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppe, and Göller) start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common *miles classiarius* or marine (being a Spartan citizen) should be appointed commander

at Chios, when (a few chapters afterwards) we find Thrasybulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (*Hellenic* i. 3, 17), about Hegesandridas — *έπιβάτης ἀντὶ Μινδρού*, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (Schneider's note in the *Addenda* to his edition of 1791, p. 97). The participle *ἀντί* in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for *γεγενημένος*, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas had been among the epibatae of Mindarus, and was now in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace.

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athēns—and while the superior Peloponnesian fleet was paralysed at Rhodes by Persian intrigues and bribes—that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadēs and Tissaphernēs. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange—Persian alliance and aid to Athens against the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadēs knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform. The satrap had appeared to follow his advice—or had rather followed his own inclination, employing Alkibiadēs as an instrument and auxiliary—in the endeavour to wear out both parties, and to keep them nearly on an equality until each should ruin the other. But he was no way disposed to identify himself with the cause of Athens, nor to break decidedly with the Peloponnesians—especially at a moment when their fleet was both the greater of the two, and in occupation of an island close to his own satrapy. Accordingly Alkibiadēs, when summoned by the Athenian envoys to perform his engagement, found himself in a dilemma from which he could only escape by one of his characteristic manœuvres.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernēs, and speaking on behalf of the latter, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians would never concede; in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighbouring islands, with some other items besides.¹ Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C. before the Ionic revolt—Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadēs was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last he bethought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in

Negotiations
of Peisander
with Alki-
biadēs.

Tricks of
Alkibiadēs
— he exag-
gerates his
demands
with a view
of breaking
off the nego-
tiation—in-
dignation of
the oligarchs
against him.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 56. 'Ιωνίαν τε γὰρ πάσαν ἡγεμονίαν δίδοσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς νῆσους τε ἐπικειμένας καὶ οἰλλα, οἷς οὐκ εὐα-
τιουμένων τὰς Ἀθηναῖς, &c.

What these et cetera comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without them.

unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory. After the immense concessions already made, the envoys not only rejected this fresh demand at once, but resented it as an insult which exposed the real drift and purpose of Alkibiadēs. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty (called the peace of Kallias) concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, and limiting the Persian ships of war to the sea eastward of Phasēlis—but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. To see Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, &c. in possession of Persia, was sufficiently painful; but if there came to be powerful Persian fleets on these islands, it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxes. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate, returned to Samos;—indignant at the discovery, which they now made for the first time, that Alkibiadēs had juggled them from the outset, and was imposing conditions which he knew to be inadmissible.¹ They still appear however to have thought that Alkibiadēs acted thus, not because he *could* not, but because he *would* not, bring about the alliance under discussion.² They suspected him of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and of projecting the accomplishment of his own restoration, coupled with the alliance of Tissaphernēs, into the bosom of the democracy which he had begun by denouncing. Such was the light in which they presented his conduct; venting their disappointment in invectives against his duplicity, and in asseverations that he was, after all, unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations, when circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected failure in realising the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an

¹ Thucyd. viii. 56. ναῦς ἡξίον ἔαν
βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν
ἴαυτοῦ γῆν, δηη ἀν καὶ δοτος ἀν
βούληγαται.

In my judgement ἔαυτοῦ is decidedly the proper reading here, not ἔαυτῶν. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Bekker, and Göller.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing (in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others) that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes mis-called by the name of Kimon—was a

real fact and not a boastful fiction: see ch. xlv.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and resenting this third demand.

² Thucyd. viii. 63. Καὶ ἐν σφίσι
αὐτοῖς ἄμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο, Ἐλκιβιδήτη
μὲν, ἐπειδὴ τερ οὐ βούλεται, ταῦ
(καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀντίθειον αὐτὸν εἶναι εἰ
διληγαρχίαν ἔλθειν), δικα.

impression that Alkibiadēs was really favourable to the democracy ; at the same time leaving unabated the prestige of his unbounded ascendancy over Tissaphernēs and the Great King. We shall presently see the effects resulting from this belief.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations, however, the satrap took a step well-calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party, and of merely prolonging the war so as to enfeeble both—he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians, who had now been two months inactive at Rhodes, with their large fleet hauled ashore. He had no treaty with them actually in force, since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions ; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. His bribes to the officers had hitherto kept the armament quiet ; yet we do not distinctly see how so large a body of men found subsistence.¹ He was now however apprised that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians, under desperate circumstances. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to put himself again in communication with them, to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention—the proposition, of which he had refused to entertain at Knidus. He therefore went to Kaunus, invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Milētus, and concluded with them near that town a treaty to the following effect :—

Reconcilia-
tion between
Tissaphernēs
and the Pe-
lonnesians.

“ In this 13th year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernēs and Hieramenēs and the sons of Pharnakēs, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king’s territory with any mischievous purpose—nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44-57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labour. But this was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 1; vi. 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king's territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if any one from the king's territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernês shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present, at the rate already stipulated, until the king's fleet shall arrive; after that it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet if they think fit—or if they prefer, Tissaphernês shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king's fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernês and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent.”¹

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia; which is ensured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim—though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder.² Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus (the son of Pharnakês) with his satrapy of Daskylium; and Hieramenês, with his district, the extent and position of which we do not know; while in the former treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. We must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet included those 27 triremes, which had been brought across by Kalligeitus expressly for the aid of Pharnabazus; and therefore that the latter now naturally became a party to the general operations. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians. This was a promise which the satrap now set forth more plainly than before, to amuse them, and to abate the mistrust which they had begun to conceive of his sincerity. It served the temporary purpose of restraining them from any immediate act of despair hostile to his interests, which was all that he looked for. While he renewed his payments,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 58.

² Thucyd. viii. 58. χάραν τὴν βασιλείαν, δέοντα τῆς Ασίας ἔστι, βα-

σιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χάρας τῆς
ἐπιτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βο-

therefore, for the moment, he affected to busy himself in orders and preparations for the fleet from Phenicia.¹

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came <sup>Loss of
Orôpus by
Athens.</sup> thither from Eretria and from Orôpus; which latter place (a dependency on the north-eastern frontier of Attica), though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Boeotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second the island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But they had scarcely passed the Triopian cape, when they saw the Athenian squadron from Chalkê dogging their motions. Though there was no wish on either side for a general battle, yet they saw evidently that the Athenians would not permit them to pass by Samos, and get to the relief of Chios, without a battle. Renouncing therefore the project of relieving Chios, they again concentrated their force at Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos.² It was about the end of March 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the stations which they had occupied four months previously.

After the breach with Alkibiadès, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernês with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. They would not have begun the movement at first, had they not been instigated by Alkibiadès, and furnished by him with the treacherous delusion of Persian alliance to cheat and paralyse the people. They had indeed motives enough, from their own personal ambition, to originate it of themselves, apart from Alkibiadès; but without the hopes—equally useful for their purpose whether false or true—connected with his name, they would have had no chance of achieving the first step. Now, however, that first step had been achieved, before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarised with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had

Peisander •
and his col-
leagues per-
sist in the
oligarchical
conspiracy,
without
Alkibiadès.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 59.

² Thucyd. viii. 60.

thus consented to sell.¹ Moreover the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. They had set in motion their partisans at Athens, where the system of murderous intimidation (though the news had not as yet reached Samos) was already in full swing: so that they felt constrained to persevere as the only chance of preservation to themselves. At the same time, all that faint pretence of public benefit, in the shape of Persian alliance, which had been originally attached to it and which might have been conceived to enlist in the scheme some timid patriots—was now entirely withdrawn. Nothing remained except a naked, selfish, and unscrupulous scheme of ambition, not only ruining the freedom of Athens at home, but crippling and imperilling her before the foreign enemy at a moment when her entire strength was scarcely adequate to the contest. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were content (Thucydidēs observes) to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.²

¹ They attempted to subvert the democracy at Samos—as assassination of Hyperbolus and others. ² They lost no time in proceeding to execution, immediately after returning to Samos from the abortive conference with Alkibiadēs. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there—and the remaining five to oligarchise the dependent allies—they organised all their partisan force in the armament, and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. That democracy had been the product of a forcible revolution, effected about ten months before by the aid of three Athenian triremes. It had since preserved Samos from revolting, like Chios: it was now the means of preserving the democracy at Athens itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of

¹ See Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit, and afterwards consummated by force—οἷον ἐτί τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἔξηγάπτησαν, φάσκουστες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· ψευσμένοι δὲ, κατέχειν ἐπειρώντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

² Thucyd. viii. 63. Άντοις δὲ ἐπισφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔδη καὶ κινδυνεύεοντας, δράγιοι τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθέσται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου δῆμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοῖς προβλημάτων χρήματα καὶ ἦν τι ἄλλο δέρ, οὐκέτι ἀλλοιοί ή σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the pre-existing oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs, to put down the Samian democracy, and got possession of the government for themselves. The new alliance was attested and cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by a murder without judicial trial, or an assassination—for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracised some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiadēs, together with their respective partisans—ostracised (as Thucydidēs tells us) not from any fear of his power and over-transcendent influence, but from his bad character and from his being a disgrace to the city—and thus ostracised by an abuse of the institution—was now resident at Samos. He represented the demagogic and accusatory eloquence of the democracy, the check upon official delinquency; so that he served as a common object of antipathy to Athenian and Samian oligarchs. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charminūs, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized Hyperbolus and put him to death; seemingly with some other victims at the same time.¹

But though these joint assassinations served as a pledge to each section of the conspirators for the fidelity of the other in respect to farther operations, they at the same time gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two generals most recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phryniclus and Skironidēs—men sincerely devoted to the democracy, and adverse to all oligarchical change—as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus (son of Lykus) then serving as an hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal, not simply in behalf of their own personal

The democracy at Samos is sustained by the Athenian armament.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ Τπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθετον, ὑστραχισμένον οὐδὲ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φέβοι, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίας καὶ αἰσχύνης τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι: μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἐνδε τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τινῶν τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδοὺς ἀδρούς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ' αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλεόντοι δρυπητῷ ἐπιτίθεσσιν.

² I presume that the words ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that

other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii. vol. iv. p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase μετὰ Χαρμίνου, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

safety and of their own democracy, now threatened by conspirators of whom a portion were Athenians—but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchised, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end. At this moment the most recent events which had occurred at Athens (presently to be told) were not known, and the democracy was considered as still subsisting there.¹

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favour, but most of all, among the Parali, or crew of the consecrated public trireme called the Paralus. These men were the picked seamen of the state; each of them not merely a freeman, but a full Athenian citizen; receiving higher pay than the ordinary seamen, and known as devoted to the democratical constitution, with an active repugnance to oligarchy itself as well as to everything which scented of it.² The vigilance of Leon and Diomedon on the defensive side counteracted the machinations of their colleague Charminus, along with the conspirators; and provided, for the Samian democracy, faithful auxiliaries constantly ready for action. Presently the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment and opportunity, they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle, especially through the energetic aid of the Parali. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of the three hundred conspirators—granted a general amnesty—and did their best to re-establish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 73, 74. οὐκ ἡξίουν περιβεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας, καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, &c. . . . οὐ γὰρ φίεσδύ πα τούς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 73. καὶ οὐδὲ θυμότα τοὺς Παράλους, ἀνδρας Ἀθηναῖον τε καὶ δευθέρους πάστος . . . αἱ ἐν τῷ νητελέοντας, καὶ ἀεὶ βήποτε δλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους.

Peitholaus called the Paralus *ῥόταλον* τοῦ δήμου—"the club, staff, or mace of the people." (Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii. 3.)

³ Thucyd. viii. 73. Καὶ τρίδκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτεινα τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐγκλωπαν· τοῖς δὲ ἀλλοῖς οὐ μητικακαῦτες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ἔζησαν λίτενοι.

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the Paralus itself to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found a state of things not less odious than surprising. *The democracy of Athens had been subverted: instead of the Senate of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the Senate House. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the Paralus had entered Peiræus, was to imprison two or three of the crew, and to remove all the rest from their own privileged trireme aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forthwith and to cruise near Eubœa. The commander Chæreas found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.¹

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when Peisander quitted Athens,—after having obtained the vote of the public assembly authorising him to treat with Alkibiadēs and Tissaphernēs,—and after having set on foot a joint organisation and conspiracy of all the anti-popular clubs, which fell under the management especially of Antiphon and Theramenēs, afterwards aided by Phrynicus. All the members of that board of Elders called Probūli, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily—with Agnon, father of Theramenēs, at their head²—together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the conspiracy; while the oligarchical and the neutral rich came into it with ardour; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. Antiphon did not attempt to bring them together, or to make any public demonstration, armed or unarmed, for the purpose of overawing the actual authorities. He permitted the senate and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as usual; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon

The Paralus
is sent to
Athens with
the news.

Progress of
the oli-
garchical
conspiracy
at Athens—
dexterous &
management
of Antiphon.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 74.

² Thucyd. viii. 1. About the countenance which *all* these Probūli lent to the conspiracy, see Aristotle, Rhetoric. iii. 18. 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the Probūli, in the same cause, see Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosthen. c. 11. p. 426 Reisk. sect. 66.

which they descended, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, when tribute from the allies could no longer be reckoned upon—the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the Senators, the Dikasts, the Ekklesiasts or citizens who attended the public assembly, &c. The state could now afford to pay none but those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought any one else to touch the public money. It was essential (they insisted) to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse.

The extensive disfranchisement involved in this last proposition was quite sufficiently shocking to the ears of an Athenian assembly. But in reality the proposition was itself a juggle, never intended to become reality, and representing something far short of what Antiphon and his partisans intended. Their design was to appropriate the powers of government to themselves simply, without control or partnership; leaving this body of Five Thousand not merely unconvened, but non-existent, as a mere empty name to impose upon the citizens generally. Of such real intention, however, not a word was as yet spoken. The projected body of Five Thousand was the theme preached upon by all the party orators; yet without submitting any substantive motion for the change, which could not be yet done without illegality.

Language of the conspirators—juggle about naming Five Thousand citizens to exercise the political franchise exclusively.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the paid civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call forth abundant opponents. For such opponents Antiphon was fully prepared. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition, either all, or at least all the most prominent, were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who thus perished was Androkłēs, distinguished as a demagogue or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of Alkibiadēs before his exile. For at this time, the breach of Peisander with Tissaphernēs and Alkibiadēs had not yet become known at Athens, so that the latter was still supposed to be on the point of returning home as a member of the contemplated oligarchical government. After Androkłēs, many other speakers of similar sentiments perished in the same way, by unknown hands.

Assassination of the popular speakers by Antiphon and the oligarchical party.

A band of Grecian youths, strangers got together from different cities,¹ was organised for the business : the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations—sure, special, secret, and systematic, emanating from an unknown Directory like a Vehmic tribunal—had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became intense and universal. No justice could be had, no inquiry could be instituted, even for the death of the nearest and dearest relative. At last, no man dared to demand or even to mention inquiry, looking upon himself as fortunate that he had escaped the same fate in his own person. So finished an organisation, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats,² so at last dismay and mistrust became universally prevalent. No one dared even to express indignation at the murders going on, much less to talk about redress or revenge, for fear that he might be communicating with one of the unknown conspirators. In the midst of this terrorism; all opposition ceased in the senate and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69. Οἱ ἔκοσι· καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ' αὐτῶν (that is, along with the Four Hundred) ΕἼλληνες νεανίσκοι, οἱ ἔχρωτο εἴ τι που δέοι χειρουργεῖν.

Dr. Arnold explains the words "Εἴλληνες νεανίσκοι" to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydides would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens : neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

² Even Peisander himself had possessed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots—four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidæ de Myster. c. 9, 10. sect. 36–43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratæs (de Bigis, sect. 4–7. p. 347), the second of the

two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot, which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavoured to enlist Alkibiadæs. The latter refused (so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contends) in consequence of his attachment to the democracy ; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, got up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach's De Quadrinorum Athenis Factions, p. 7, 8, Berlin 1842) place confidence to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts—I consider it to be nothing better than complete perversion ; irreconcileable with Thucydides, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time, and introducing unreal causes—for the purpose of making out (what was certainly not true) that Alkibiadæs was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

³ Thucyd. viii. 68.

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens, by Antiphon and the oligarchical conspirators acting under his direction, at the time when Peisander and the five envoys arrived thither returning from Samos. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from Samos news of the rupture with Alkibiadēs, and of the necessity of prosecuting the conspiracy without farther view either to him or to the Persian alliance. Such news would probably be acceptable both to Antiphon and Phrynicus, both of them personal enemies of Alkibiadēs; especially Phrynicus, who had pronounced him to be incapable of fraternising with an oligarchical revolution.¹ At any rate, the plans of Antiphon had been independent of all view to Persian aid, and had been directed to carry the revolution by means of naked, exorbitant, and well-directed fear, without any intermixture of hope or any prospect of public benefit. Peisander found the reign of terror fully matured. He had not come direct from Samos to Athens, but had halted in his voyage at various allied dependencies—while the other five envoys, as well as a partisan named Diotrepēs, had been sent to Thasos and elsewhere;² all for the same purpose, of putting down democracies in those allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. Peisander made this change at Tēnos, Andros, Karystus, Ægina, and elsewhere; collecting from these several places a regiment of 300 hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new oligarchy.³ He could not know, until he reached Peiræus, the full success of the terrorism organised by Antiphon and the rest; so that he probably came prepared to surmount a greater resistance than he actually found. As the facts stood, so completely had the public opinion and spirit been subdued, that he was enabled to put the finishing stroke at once. His arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution; first, by an extorted suspension of the temporary constitutional sanction—next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

First, he convoked a public assembly, in which he proposed a

¹ Thucyd. viii. 68. νομίσων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν (Alkibiadēs) κατὰ τὸ εἰδός ὅτι διληπχεῖται κατελθεῖν, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 64.

³ Thucyd. viii. 65. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὴν Πεισανδρὸν παραπλέοντες ταῦτα, περιπέπτοντο, τοὺς δῆμους οἱ ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυνον, καὶ μὰ τούτης ἡ φῶν χωρίων καὶ στλίτας ἔγοντες

σφίσιν εἴτε διμιμάχους ἢ λθον οἱ τὰς θήθησαν. Μαζικαλαμβάνοντο τὰ πλεόντα τοὺς τριπετούς προειργασμένα.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them by very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

decree, naming ten commissioners with full powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable—and to be ready by a given day.¹ According to the usual practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the Senate of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, so that the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place (called the Pnyx) within the city walls, but at a place called Kolonus, ten stadia (rather more than a mile) without the walls,² north of the city. Kolonus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was enclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held,³ since there could be little motive to attend when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls; selecting a narrow area for the meeting—in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance—of an assembly which they fully designed should be the last in the history of Athens. They were thus also more

Consummation of the revolution at Athens—last public assembly at Kolonus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ἐνλέγαντες εἶπον γνῶμην, δέκα ἄνδρας ἀλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνῶμην ἔσενεγκεῖν ἐτὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ἥπτην, καθ' ὅτι ἀριστα η πόλις οἰκήσεται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats-Alterthümer, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, De Quadrinquentor. Factione, p. 38), I cannot think that there was any connexion between these τέκνη γραφεῖς, and the Board of πρόθυοντοι mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii. 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these γραφεῖς. The mention of Thirty persons, by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that either they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred, with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The σίνεδροι or συγγραφεῖς mentioned by Isocrate (Areopagit. Or. vii. sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or to that of the Thirty.

² Thucyd. viii. 67. Τείχη, ἀνάστη.

ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, ξυνέκληγσαν τὴν ἀκαληπταν ἐτὸν Κόλωνον ἔστη δέ λεπροὶ Ποσειδῶνος ἦσαν τόλεως, ἀτέχον σταδίου μάλιστα δέκα, &c.

The very remarkable word ξυνέκληγσαν, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not, as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolonus was one of the Attic Demes: indeed there seems reason to imagine that two distinct Demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the Commentary appended to his translation of the Antigonē of Sophoklēs, p. 190, 191; and Ross, Die Demen von Attika, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenides, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklēs has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the Oedipus Coloneus.

³ Compare the statement in Lysias (Orat. xi. cont. Eratosth. s. 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under colour of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed Decemvirs (probably ^{Abolition of the Graphē Paranomōn} Peisander, Antiphon, and other partisans themselves) was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition of the celebrated Graphē Paranomōn; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose—and that every other citizen should be interdicted, under heavy penalties, from prosecuting him by Graphē Paranomōn (indictment on the score of informality, illegality, or unconstitutionality), or from doing him any other mischief. This proposition was adopted without a single dissentient. It was thought more formal by the directing chiefs to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners; since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorisation by the senate—Peisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:—

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future.
 2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried.
 3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred (that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves). Each individual, out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons.
 4. A body of Four Hundred was then constituted, who were to take their seat in the Senate-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion.
 5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit.¹
- All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combi-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 68 Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς περιστούς τερπασθέους ὅντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτή-κισχιδίους δὲ ἐντάγειν, ὅποτε αὐτοῖς, ἔρχειν ὅπῃ ἀνέβιστα γηγενέστεσσιν, τοὺς δοκῆ.

nations of Antiphon.¹ No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution, just adopted, purported—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others—but that the Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred now installed formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state.² But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced (especially to the armament at Samos) as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens—all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal section.³ Next, it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the

Fictitious
and nomi-
nal aggre-
gate called
the Five
Thousand.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 66. οὐ δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπές πρὸς τοὺς πλεῖους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν σῆπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

² Thucyd. viii. 72. Πέμπουσι δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας. . . . διδάχοντας — πεντακισχίλιοι δὲ δύτι εἰναι, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πρόσοντες.

³ viii. 86. Οἱ δὲ ἀπήγγελλον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ διαφορῷ τῆς πόλεως ή μεταστασίς γένοντο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ. . . . τῶν δὲ πεντακισχίλιων δύτες εὖ τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, &c.

viii. 89. ἀλλὰ τὸς πεντακισχίλιαυς ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ δύναται χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὴν πολίτειαν λαστέραν καθιστάναι.

⁴ viii. 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of

being put down)—οὐ δὲ πρὸς τὸν δχλον η παράκλησις ὡς χρῆ, δύτις τὸν πεντακισχίλιους βούλεται δρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, έναντὶ τὸν δργον. Ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ δύως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχίλιων τῷ δύναμι, μὴ ἕντικρυς δῆμον δύτις βούλεται δρχειν δυομάζειν—φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ δύτι δργειν, πρὸς τίνα εἰπάν τις τι διεγόντας σφαλή. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ θέλον τὸν πεντακισχίλιους οὕτε εἶναι, οὕτε μὴ δύτας δῆλοις εἶναι τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἕντικρυς δν δῆμον δημόνειν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸ φόβον ἐσ ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

viii. 93. λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχίλιους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ή ἀν τοὺς πεντακισχίλιους δοκῇ, τὸν τετρακοσίους δεσδαι, τέτως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν, &c.

Compare also c. 97.

impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust—since every man, suspecting that his neighbour might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.¹ In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolōnus had with such seeming unanimity accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the Senate-house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence (at least the presence of the Prytanes, or Senators of the presiding tribe) was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. It was even possible that they might organise armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms.² Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home (probably to their morning meal), leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour according to the usual practice, the hoplites (Andrian, Tenian and others) in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred were directed by private order to hold themselves prepared and in arms at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance

¹ Compare the striking passage (*Thucyd.* viii. 92) cited in my previous note.

² See the jests of Aristophanés, about the citizens all in armour buying their provisions in the market place and car-

rying them home—in the *Lysistrata* 560; a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C., three months earlier than the events here narrated.

being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the Senate-house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of 120 young men from various Grecian cities—the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the Senate-house, where the senators were assembled—and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year (seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of Hekatombæon, the month of new nominations) during which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were noway prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality, with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That they should yield obedience to superior force under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept from the hands of the conspirators this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonoured the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now found themselves triumphantly installed in the Senate-hous~~e~~. There was not the least resistance, either within its walls, or even without, by any portion of the citizens.¹

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens; after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenes. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Athens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it—that even their enemy and neighbour Agis at Dekeleia could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished. We shall see presently that it did not stand—nor would it probably have stood, had circumstances even been more favourable—but the accomplishment of it at all, is an incident too extraordinary to be passed over without some words in explanation.

We must remark that the tremendous catastrophe and loss of blood in Sicily had abated the energy of the Athenian character generally—but especially, had made them despair of their foreign

¹ Thucyd. viii. 69, 70.

relations ; of the possibility that they could make head against enemies, increased in number by revolts among their own allies, and farther sustained by Persian gold. Upon this sentiment of despair is brought to bear the treacherous delusion of Alkibiadēs, offering them the Persian aid ; that is, means of defence and success against foreign enemies, at the price of their democracy. Reluctantly the people are brought, but they *are* brought, to entertain the proposition : and thus the conspirators gain their first capital point—of familiarising the people with the idea of such a change of constitution. The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skilful, of Antiphon, wielding and organising the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens ; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other—restrained by the ascendent democratical institutions—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny : he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality—respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims. But he knows well that the value of these meetings, as political securities, depends upon entire freedom of speech ; and that if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity—or rather an instrument of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side ; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority however are bound by their own constitutional forms : and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt,

than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.¹ Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution : the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyse individual patriotism.

It was this cheat which rendered the Athenians indisposed to stand forward with arms in defence of that democracy to which they were attached. Accustomed as they were to unlimited pacific contention within the bounds of their constitution, they were in the highest degree averse to anything like armed intestine contention. This is the natural effect of an established free and equal polity—to substitute the contests of the tongue for those of the sword, and sometimes, even to create so extreme a disinclination to the latter, that if liberty be energetically assailed, the counter-energy necessary for its defence may probably be found wanting. So difficult is it for the same people to have both the qualities requisite for making a free constitution work well in ordinary times, together with those very different qualities requisite for upholding it against exceptional dangers and under trying emergencies. None but an Athenian of extraordinary ability like Antiphon would have understood the art of thus making the constitutional feeling of his countrymen subservient to the success of his conspiracy—and of maintaining the forms of legal dealing towards assembled and constitutional bodies, while he violated them in secret and successive stabs directed against individuals. Political assassination had been unknown at Athens (as far as our information reaches), since the time when it was employed about fifty years before by the oligarchical party against Ephialtēs, the coadjutor of Periklēs.² But this had been an individual case, and it was reserved for Antiphon and Phrynicus to organise a band of assassins working systematically, and taking off a series of leading victims one after the other. As the Macedonian kings in after-times required the surrender of the popular orators in a body, so the authors of this conspiracy found the same enemies to deal with, and adopted another way of getting rid of them ; thus reducing the assembly into a tame and lifeless mass, capable of being intimidated into giving its collective sanction to measures which its large majority detested.

¹ This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (*Hist. Gr. ch.* xix. sect. v. vol. iv. p. 235).
² See Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10; *Diodor.* xi. 77; and chap. xlvi. of this History.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation, of the democratical states, were brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androkles, &c. stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason.

Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows that the political enemies—against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions—were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities, and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system; taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public-spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy—it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. I here employ the term demagogues because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them, popular speakers or opposition speakers. But by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and

melancholy working under the organising hands of Antiphon and Phrynicus.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed in the Senate-house, they divided themselves by lot into separate Prytanies (probably ten in number, consisting of forty members each, like the former Senate of Five Hundred, in order that the distribution of the year^{*} to which the people were accustomed might not be disturbed), and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs; carrying everything with a strictness and rigour unknown under the old constitution.¹ It seems to have been proposed among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority,² in order that Alkibiadēs might not be among the number; nor did they think it expedient, notwithstanding, to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace; which (they affirmed) he ought to be ready to grant to them, now that "the faithless Demos" was put down. Agis however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded, should a foreign army appear. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even a sally was made, in which some advantage was gained over him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.³

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, and placed matters on a footing which seemed to promise stability, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the

¹ Thucyd. viii. 70. I imagine that —τὰ δὲ ἄλλα θεμον καὶ κράτος τὴν
this must be the meaning of the words πόλιν. ² Thucyd. viii. 71.

danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had moreover just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the Paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Had this event occurred a little earlier, it might perhaps have deterred even some of their own number from proceeding with the revolution at Athens—which was rendered thereby almost sure of failure, from the first. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand; a number greater (they added) than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates,¹ in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

What satisfaction might have been given, by this allusion to the fictitious Five Thousand, or by the fallacious reference to the numbers, real or pretended, of the past democratical assemblies—had these envoys carried to Samos the first tidings of the Athenian revolution—we cannot say. They were forestalled by Chæreas the officer of the Paralus; who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the fearful and unexpected change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the treacherous extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynicus,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydides; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That no assembly had ever been attended by so many as 5000 (*ενδεκάωροι*) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that 5000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend. Dr. Arnold, in his

note, opposes the allegation, in part, by remarking that “the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least 6000 citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly.” It seems to me however quite possible, that in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the Ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting—the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than 6000 citizens must have voted altogether—it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

the armament first learnt it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth—and even more than the truth. He recounted with indignation that every Athenian, who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge—that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged—that there was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. The simple narrative, of what had really occurred, would have been quite sufficient to provoke in the armament a sentiment of detestation against the Four Hundred. But these additional details of Chæreas, partly untrue, filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos, as well as against those who had taken part in the recent oligarchical conspiracy in the island. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

But though violence and aggressive insult were thus seasonably checked, the sentiment of the armament was too ardent and unanimous to be satisfied without some solemn, emphatic, and decisive declaration against the oligarchs at Athens. A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions—To maintain their democracy—To keep up friendship and harmony with each other—To carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy—To be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony.¹ What lent

Ardent democratical manifestation, and emphatic oath, taken both by the Athenian armament at Samos and by the Samians.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 75. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, λαμπτρῶς ἡδη ἐσ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θρασυλλος, ὥρκωσαν πάντας τὸν στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους δρόκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μήδη δημοκρατήσεσθαι καὶ διμονοθέσιν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμῳ τε ξεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Εὐνόμυνος δὲ καὶ Σαμιών πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν δρόκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πρόγυμνα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβηθόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ἔνυκοινάσαντο οἱ στρατιώται τοῖς Σαμοῖσι, νομίζοντες οὗτε ἑκίνους ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὗτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακοσίοι στρατησώσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

double force to this touching scene, was, that the entire Samian population, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament. Both pledged themselves to mutual fidelity and common suffering or triumph, whatever might be the issue of the contest. Both felt that the Peloponnesians at Milētus, and the Four Hundred at Athens, were alike their enemies, and that the success of either would be their common ruin.

Pursuant to this resolution—of upholding their democracy and
 The Athenian democracy is re-constituted by the armament—public assembly of the soldiers—new generals chosen.
 at the same time sustaining the war against the Peloponnesians, at all cost or peril to themselves—the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, with whom Charmīnus and others among their own leaders were implicated, they constituted themselves into

a sort of community apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust; others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The assembly was not held for election alone. It was a scene of effusive sympathy, animating eloquence, and patriotism generous as well as resolute. The united armament felt that *they* were the real Athens; the guardians of her constitution—the upholders of her remaining empire and glory—the protectors of her citizens at home against those conspirators who had intruded themselves wrongfully into the Senate-house—the sole barrier, even for those conspirators themselves, against the hostile Peloponnesian fleet. “*The city has revolted from us*” (exclaimed Thrasybulus and others in pregnant words which embodied a whole train of feeling¹). “But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force—we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can ensure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that

¹ Thucyd. viii. 76. Καὶ παραιτέοις | γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλευ-
 ἥλλας τε ἐποιῶντα ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς | νων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριωτέρων μεθε-
 ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι: | στάσαι.
 ἡ τόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκε ταῦς

they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. What indeed does the city do now for us to second our efforts against the enemy? Little or nothing. We have lost nothing by their separation. They send us no pay—they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves—they are now out of condition for sending us even good counsel, which is the great superiority of a city over a camp.¹ As counsellors, we here are better than they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country—while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadēs, if we ensure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and even if the worst comes to the worst—if all other hopes fail us—our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants.”*

Such was the encouraging language of Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus, which found full sympathy in the armament, and raised among them a spirit of energetic patriotism and resolution, not unworthy of their forefathers when refugees at Salamis under the invasion of Xerxes. To regain their democracy and to sustain the war against the Peloponnesians, were impulses alike ardent and blended in the same tide of generous enthusiasm; a tide so vehement as to sweep before it the reluctance of that minority who had before been inclined to the oligarchical movement. But besides these two impulses, there was also a third, tending towards the recall of Alkibiadēs; a coadjutor, if in many ways useful, yet bringing with him a spirit of selfishness and duplicity uncongenial to the exalted sentiment now all-powerful at Samos.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδεύς ἄξιον, φέρος τὸ περιγύγεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολαλεκέναι, οὐ γε μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμψειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιώται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν, οὐπερ ἔνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τούς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τούς πατρίους νόμους καταλησσάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. “Πότε οὐδὲ τούτους, οὔπερ ἂν βουλεύοιεν τι χρηστόν, παρά σφι τοιχίους εἶναι.

² The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadēs, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterises an incident in some re-

spects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavoured to carry them over to the latter: his army however refused to follow him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favourable terms. “Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliuntur; catenas Cæcineam (nam etiam tum vinctus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adsistat: aspernante tu-

This exile had been the first to originate the oligarchical conspiracy, whereby Athens, already scarcely adequate to the exigences of her foreign war, was now paralysed in courage and torn by civil discord—preserved from absolute ruin only by that counter-enthusiasm which a fortunate turn of circumstances had raised up at Samos.

Having at first duped the conspirators themselves and enabled them to dupe the sincere democrats, by promising Persian aid, and thus floating the plot over its first and greatest difficulties—Alkibiadēs had found himself constrained to break with them as soon as the time came for realising his promises. But he had broken off with so much address as still to keep up the illusion that he *could* realise them if he chose. His return by means of the oligarchy being now impossible, he naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed (as Phrynicus had truly said about him)¹ to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders,² renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility, not to be neglected, of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war. Such possibility would at least infuse spirit into the soldiers; while the restoration was now proposed without the terrible condition which had before accompanied it, of renouncing the democratical constitution.

It was not without difficulty, however, nor until after more than one assembly and discussion,³ that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadēs. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal

mentemque lacrymis fatigant. *Extremum malorum, tot fortissimi viri, proditoris open invocantes*" (Tacitus, Histor. iii. 31).¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48.

² Thucydidēs does not expressly mention this communication—but it is implied in the words 'Αλκιβιάδην—&c με-

νον παρέξειν, &c. (viii. 76).

³ Thucyd. viii. 81. Θρασύβουλος, ἀεὶ τε τῆς αὐτῆς γυναικὸς ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, δύοτε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ τέλος ἐπ' ἔκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, &c.

of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with suspicion of treason. They were however induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadēs to the island, and introduced him to the assembled armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploreding the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny.¹ He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realise the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernēs. The satrap had promised him (so the speech went on) never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them; not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust them, except that Alkibiadēs should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phenician fleet, which was already at Aspendus—instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

In the communications of Alkibiadēs with Peisander and his coadjutors, Alkibiadēs had pretended that the Great King could have no confidence in the Athenians unless they not only restored him, but abnegated their democracy. On this occasion, the latter condition was withdrawn, and the confidence of the Great King was said to be more easily accorded. But though Alkibiadēs thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. It answered all the various purposes which he contemplated—partly of intimidating and disuniting the oligarchical conspirators at

Confidence placed by the armament in his language and promises—they choose him one of their generals.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκ-
κλησίας τὴν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν
τῇ φυγῆς ἐπρηίσατο καὶ ἀγω-
λοφύρατο δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης, &c.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadēs, vi. 92; viii. 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i.

home—partly of exalting his own grandeur in the eyes of the armament—partly of sowing mistrust between the Spartans and Tissaphernēs. It was in such full harmony with both the reigning feelings of the armament—eagerness to put down the Four Hundred, as well as to get the better of their Peloponnesian enemies in Ionia—that the hearers were not disposed to scrutinise narrowly the grounds upon which his assurances rested. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest; conceiving redoubled hopes of victory over their enemies both at Athens and at Milētus. So completely indeed were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favour of sailing to Peiraeus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadēs, knowing well (what the armament did not know) that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies in Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernēs to realise his recent engagements.

Relieved, substantially though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadēs was thus launched in a new career. After having first played the game of Athens against Sparta, next that of Sparta against Athens, thirdly that of Tissaphernēs against both—he now professed to take up again the promotion of Athenian interests. In reality, however, he was, and had always been, playing his own game, or obeying his own self-interest, ambition, or antipathy. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernēs, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos; to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced; and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernēs to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful; especially in regard to the latter purpose. For though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernēs to assist the Athenians, he

New position
of
Alkibiadēs
—present
turn of his
ambition.

did nevertheless contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.¹

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernēs than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadēs returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys had been long in their voyage; having made a considerable* stay at Delos, under alarm from intelligence of the previous visit of Chæreas, and the furious indignation which his narrative had provoked.² At length they reached Samos, and were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing—so strong was the antipathy against them—so loud were the cries that the subverters of the democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers:³ that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls: that the citizens, now possessing the political franchise, were, not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred:⁴ that the recitals of

The envoys
of the Four
Hundred
reach Samos
—are indi-
nantly sent
back by the
armament.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 82, 83, 87.

² Thucyd. viii. 77–86.

³ Thucyd. viii. 86. Εἰ δὲ ἐστέλειαν τις ξυντέμηται, δοτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔχειν τροφὴν, πάνυ ἀπαινεῖν.

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadēs to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged,

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 86. τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσι, &c. I dissent from Dr. Arnold's construction of this passage, which is followed both by Poppe and by Götler. He says in his note—"The sense must clearly be, 'that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn,' however strange the expression may seem, μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the govern-

ment in *their turn* —for they *all* partook of it as being the sovereign assembly—yet μετέχειν in this sense would require τῶν πραγμάτων after it, and would be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων."

Upon this I remark—1. *Mετέχειν* may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed, but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thucyd. ii. 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Mattheis (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold's note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for μετέχειν by implication out of previous phraseology: for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—τῆς πόλεως,

Chæreas, affirming ill-usage to have been offered to the relatives of the soldiers at Athens, were utterly false and calumnious.

Such were the topics on which the envoys insisted, in an ~~Eagerness of the armament to Peiræus is discountenanced by Alkibiadès—his answer to the envoys.~~ apologetic strain, at considerable length, but without any effect in conciliating the soldiers who heard them. The general resentment against the Four Hundred was expressed by several persons present in public speech, by others in private manifestation of feeling against the envoys: and so passionately was this sentiment aggravated—consisting not only of wrath for what the oligarchy had done, but of fear for what they might do—that the proposition of sailing immediately to the Peiræus was revived with greater ardour than before. Alkibiadès, who had already once disconcerted this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless all ~~the~~ the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasybulus,¹ was required to avert it. But for him it would have been executed. While he reproved and silenced those who were most clamorous against the envoys, he took upon himself to give to the latter a public answer in the name of the collective armament. “We make no objection (he said) to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the Senate of Five Hundred as it was before. We are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual

idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped—οἱ δὲ ἀπῆγγελλον, ὃς οὐτε ἐπὶ διαφθορῇ τὴν πόλεμον ἡ μετσοτασία γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὐθὲ ίνα τοῖς πολεμοῖς παραδοθῆ (i. e. ἡ πόλις) . . . τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων δτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν (i. e. τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression; nor is there any absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii. 93—λέγοντες τοὺς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, γὰρ τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῆ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἴστεσθαι, &c.

Dr. Arnold's designation of these Five Thousand as “the sovereign assembly” is not very accurate. They

were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together: in reality, they were but a fiction and a name—but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as an assembly to be convoked—πεντακισχιλοί—οἱ πρόσσωντες (viii. 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges (in rotation) with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadès, c. 26.

differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with.”¹

With this reply he dismissed the envoys; the armament reluctantly abandoning their wish of sailing to Athens.

Thucydidēs insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadēs then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favour of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Even apart from ambition, this was their best chance, if not their only chance, of safety for themselves: and we shall presently see that they tried to do it—being prevented from succeeding, partly indeed by the mutiny which arose against them at Athens, but still more by the stupidity of the Lacedæmonians themselves. Alkibiadēs could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of Athens, who could calculate what they would do—after having received this declaration of hostility from Samos—not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, and almost unnerving them as to the hearty prosecution of the war abroad in their utter uncertainty with regard to matters at home—or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy—we shall be disposed to conclude that the impulse of the armament was not merely natural, but even founded on a more prudent estimate of the actual chances, and that Alkibiadēs was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadēs represented, and as the armament conceived

Dissuasive
advice of
Alkibiadēs
—how far it
is to be com-
mended as
sagacious.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 88. Καὶ τὰλλα ἐκέ- | εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῖναι, εἰ δὲ ἀπαξ τὸ ἔτερον
λενεὶς ἀπτέχειν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς | σφαλήσεται ή τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ή ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδὲ
πολεμοῖς· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς | διφρούριον διαλλαγήσεται τις ἔτι ξεσθαι.
σωματένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἀπίδια

them upon his authority—viz. that the Phenician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia—we shall sympathise yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadēs had an advantage over every one else, simply by knowing his own ~~neigh~~hoods.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, ^{Envoy sent from Argos to the "Athenian Demos at Samos."} bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos. They came in an Athenian trireme, navigated by the Parali who had brought home Chæreas in the Paralus from Samos to Athens, and had been then transferred into a common ship of war, and sent to cruise about Eubœa. Since that time, however, they had been directed to convey Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melēsias,¹ as ambassadors from the Four Hundred to Sparta. But when crossing the Argolic Gulf, probably under orders to land at Prasiæ, they declared against the oligarchy, sailed to Argos, and there deposited as prisoners the three ambassadors, who had all been active in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred. Being then about to depart for Samos, they were requested by the Argeians to carry thither their envoys, who were dismissed by Alkibiadēs with an expression of gratitude, and with a hope that their aid would be ready when called for.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also—Eratosthenēs, Iatrocélēs and others, who had tried to turn their squadron to

^{Return of the envoys of the Four Hundred from Samos to Athens—bad prospects of the oligarchy.} the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled and driven off by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen.² If at Athens, the calculations of these conspirators had succeeded more triumphantly than could have been expected beforehand—everywhere else they had completely miscarried; not merely at Samos and in the fleet, but also with the allied dependencies. At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens to consum-

¹ Thueyd. viii. 86. It is very probable that the Melēsias here mentioned was the son of that Thueydides who was the leading political opponent of Periklēs. Melēsias appears as one of the *dramatic personæ* in Plato's dialogue called *Lachēs*.

² Lysias cont. Eratosthen. sect. 43. c. 9. p. 411 Reisk. οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρότοι

(Eratosthenēs) τῷ διετέρῳ πλήθει τὰ ἐνάντια ἔπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διγαρχῶν καθιστᾶς ἔφευγεν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου τριπράχος καταλιπὼν τὴν γαῖην, μετὰ Ἰατροκέλευς καὶ ἑτέρων. . . . ἀφικόμενος δὲ δύορο τάναγτια τοῖς βουλομένοις δημοκρατίαις εἶναι ἔπειρε.

mate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadēs, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation (as Phrynicus had predicted) was nowhere realised. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.¹ Instead of strengthening their hold on the maritime empire, the Four Hundred thus found that they had actually weakened it; while the pronounced hostility of the armament at Samos not only put an end to all their hopes abroad, but rendered their situation at home altogether precarious.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learnt, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos—discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members; together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. Antiphon and Phrynicus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace (these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the Parali and sent prisoners to Argos, as above stated). They farther commenced the erection of a special fort at Ectioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus. Against their proceedings, however, there began to arise, even in the bosom of the Four Hundred, an opposition minority affecting popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenēs and Aristokratēs.²

Though these two men had stood forward prominently as contrivers and actors throughout the whole progress of the conspiracy, they had found themselves bitterly disappointed by the result. Individually, their ascendancy with their colleagues was inferior to that of Peisander, Kallæschrus, Phrynicus, and others; while, collectively, the ill-gotten power of the Four Hundred was dimi-

Mistrust
and discord
among the
Four Hun-
dred them-
selves. An
opposition
party formed
under
Theramenēs.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 64.

² Thucyd. viii. 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenēs, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Eratosthenem (Orat.

xii. sect. 66, 67, 79; Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydidēs (viii. 89); compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 27-30.

nished in value, as much as it was aggravated in peril, by the loss of the foreign empire and the alienation of their Samian armament. Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself—each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy (observes Thucydidēs) contentions for power and pre-eminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors less of fierce antipathy and sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavourable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation—every one thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 89. οὐκ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ' ιδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν φπερ καὶ μάλιστα δηλιγαρχίᾳ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ γενομένῃ ἀπόλυται. Πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ίσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρώτων αὐτῶν ἔκαστος εἶναι: ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἰρέσσως γιγνομένης, ἢσον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐν ἀπὸ τῶν δμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει.

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure: see long notes of the commentators, especially Dr. Arnold and Poppe. Dr. Arnold considers *τῶν δμοίων* as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows:—"Whereas under an old established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. *'Απὸ τῶν δμοίων ἐλασσούμενος*, is, being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair."

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of these words, or of the ge-

neral sense of the passage. He thinks that Thucydidēs means to affirm what applies generally "to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy—whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one." It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is only applicable to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold assumes that "to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair," causes to the loser the *maximum* of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact; or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favour, jealousy, or antipathy, is *more* hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified: but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified; he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the mor-

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition, mingled with despondency, which sprung up among a minority of the Four

tification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydides has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words *τῶν δομῶν* are masculine, and that they have reference (like *τάντες* and *ταῦτα* in the preceding line) to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word *οἱ δομοι* acquired a sort of technical sense to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolised in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellenn. iii. 3, 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x. 7; xiii. 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 88). Now these *δομοι* or peers, here indicated by Thucydides as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied (though not literally designated or connote) by the word *δομοι* or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydides is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (Rhetoric. ii. 8; ii. 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards *τοὺς δομούς*, considers them as *ἀντερδότας* and *ἀνταγωνίστας*.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers—equals, rivals, and personally known among one another—who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theramendus, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to pre-eminence, but finds that he is shut out from it; the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot—to selfish ambition on the part of each—to ill-will—to jealousy—to wrongful partiality: so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a nar-

row, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large, miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens—he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified; but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomachides—whom Sokratis (see Xenophon, Memor. iii. 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general—would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgement, is the comparison which Thucydides wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and miscellaneous body of citizens—compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor* among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense—less connected with the sentiment of injury—and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of *δομοι* or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great immediately after that monarch's death (Justin, xii. 2):—

“Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut lati, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solitior et favor incertus erat. Inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum cæteros excedente, ut ei aliquis se submitteret.”

Compare Plutarch, Lysander, c. 23.
Haack and Poppe think that *δομῶν* cannot be masculine, because ἀπὸ τῶν

Hundred, immediately after the news of the proclamation of the democracy at Samos among the armament. Theramenès, demands that the leader of this minority—a man of keen ambition, clever Thousand shall be made a reality. but unsteady and treacherous, not less ready to desert his party than to betray his country, though less prepared for extreme atrocities than many of his oligarchical comrades—began to look out for a good pretence to disconnect himself from a precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that since the dangers that beset the newly-formed authority were so much more formidable than had been anticipated, it was necessary to popularise the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body!

Such an opposition, formidable from the very outset, became still bolder and more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadès directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the same time approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half-way; and there were hopes that at that price a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadès had himself spoken as practicable.² In addition to the formal answer,

δμοίων ἐλασσούμενος would not then be correct, but ought to be. *ν π δ τῶν δμοίων ἐλασσούμενος*. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism; for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of *ἀπ* here (see Thucyd. i. 17; iii. 82; iv. 115; vi. 28, &c.). But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive *τῶν δμοίων* depends rather upon *τὰ ἀποβαλοντά* which precedes, than upon *ἐλασσούμενος* which follows; and the preposition *ἀπ* is what we should naturally expect. To mark this I have put a comma after *ἀποβαλοντά* as well as after *δμοίων*.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford *certain* evidence that Thucydidès may not have advanced it; for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary; which in this case they do not.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86, 2. Of this sentence from *φοβούμενοι* down to *καθιστάται*, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

² Thucyd. viii. 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidès (in an Oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens—*De Reditu suo*, sect. 10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars—only obtained by the special favour of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to

the envoys doubtless brought back intimation of the enraged feelings manifested by the armament, and of their eagerness, uncontrollable by every one except Alkibiadēs, to sail home forthwith and rescue Athens from the Four Hundred. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last; and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramenēs, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.¹

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynicus exerted themselves with demagogic assiduity to caress and keep together the majority of the Four Hundred, as well as to uphold their power without abridgement. They were noway disposed to comply with this requisition that the fiction of the Five Thousand should be converted into a reality. They knew well that the enrolment of so many partners² would be tantamount to a democracy, and would be in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to

Measures of
Antiphon and
the Four
Hundred—
their solicita-
tions to
Sparta—con-
struction of
the fort of Fe-
tioneia, for
the admis-
sion of a
Spartan
garrison.

the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims which Andokidēs prefers to the favour of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 89. *σαφέστατα δὲ αὐτὸς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ισχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ διτὶ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔδοκει μηνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι. ἡγωνίζετο οὖν εἰς ἕκαστος προστάτης τοῦ δῆμου έσεσθαι.*

This is a remarkable passage as indicating what is really meant by *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*—"the leader of a popular opposition." Theramenēs and the other persons here spoken of did not even mention the name of the democracy—they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand—yet they are still called *πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου*, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thucyd. iii. 70; iv. 66; vi. 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is fre-

quently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thucydides does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramenēs: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii. 36; iv. 21)—ἀνὴρ δημαγογὸς κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν χρόνον ἀν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, &c. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklēs—ἄν γάρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ γνωτὴν πολιτείαν (i. 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as *σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν* (v. 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi. 35; and Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterth. i. 2. Beylage 1. p. 435-438.

² Thucyd. viii. 92. *τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι περίθους τοσούτους, ἔντικρυς ἀν δῆμον ἥγεμενοι, &c.*

Aristotle (Polit. v. 5, 4) calls Phrynicus the *demagogue* of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously ~~proved~~ their interests and struggled for their favour.

them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynicus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time the construction of the fortress at Eetioncia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, if the threat of their coming should be executed—but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. For this latter object every facility was provided. The north-western corner of the fortification of Peiræus, to the north of the harbour and its mouth, was cut off by a cross wall reaching southward so as to join the harbour: from the southern end of this cross wall, and forming an angle with it, a new wall was built, fronting the harbour and running to the extremity of the mole which narrowed the mouth of the harbour on the northern side, at which mole it met the termination of the northern wall of Peiræus. A separate citadel was thus enclosed, defensible against any attack from Peiræus—furnished besides with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy within it.¹ The new cross wall was carried so as to traverse a vast portico or open market-house, the largest in Peiræus: the larger half of this portico thus became enclosed within the new citadel, and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia,—the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbour; either to admit the Spartans or exclude the armament from Samos.²

¹ Thucyd. viii. 90-92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο,

καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον, καὶ ἑσθόν, καὶ ἐπεισ-

αγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, &c.

269, 270, Germ. transl.

² Thucyd. viii. 90. διφροδύμησαν δὲ

καὶ στοάν, &c.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side—that is to say, from the north-western corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake's Topographie Athénas, p.

I agree with the note in M. Didot's translation, that this portico, or *halle* open on three sides, must be considered as pre-existing; not as having been first built now, which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

Though Theramenēs, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced, in conjunction with his supporters, the treasonable purpose of this new citadel—Unaccountable backwardness of the Lacedæmonians. yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, so that the building made rapid progress under the superintendence of the general Alexiklēs, one of the most strenuous of the oligarchical faction.¹ Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted—and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand, unknown auxiliaries supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred—that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and Phrynicus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything,—not merely their naval force, but their city itself—and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus.² Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty, and that they manifested nothing but backwardness in seizing this golden opportunity. Had Alkibiadēs been now playing their game, as he had been doing a year earlier, immediately before the revolt of Chios—had they been under any energetic leaders to impel them into hearty coöperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, who combined at this moment both the will and the power to place Athens in their hands, if seconded by an adequate force—they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Considering that Athens was saved from capture only by the slackness and stupidity of the Spartans, we may see that the armament at Samos had reasonable excuse for their eagerness previously manifested to come home; and that Alkibiadēs, in combating that intention, braved an extreme danger which nothing but incredible good fortune averted. Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render

¹ Thucyd. viii. 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, οὐδὲν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ διπλοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεωρατηγύνει. ὅντα ἐκ τῆς διλγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταῖρους τετραμένου, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀσαγαγόμενοι ἔμεν τειχῶν καὶ πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχόρησαν τοὺς κάσι ξυμβατικούς, &c.

no account: possibly the caution of the Ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynicus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of 42 triremes (partly from Tarentum and Lokri)—now about to start from Las in the Laconian Gulf, and to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island—should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus, ready to take advantage of any opportunity for attack laid open by the Four Hundred.¹

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Assassination of Phrynicus Theramenès obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred —Lacedæmonian fleet for the occupation of Eetioneia. Meanwhile Athens hovering near Peiræus, became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder, after the abortive embassy and return from Sparta of Antiphon and Phrynicus. The coercive ascendancy of the Four Hundred was silently disappearing, while the hatred which their usurpation had inspired, together with the fear of their traitorous concert with the public enemy, became more and more loudly manifested in men's private conversations, as well as in gatherings secretly got together within numerous houses; especially the house of the peripolarch (the captain of the peripoli, or youthful hoplites who formed the chief police of the country). Such hatred was not long in passing from vehement passion into act. Phrynicus, as he left the Senate-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred: ² he was however a stranger, from Argos, and either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramenès, the pronounced leader of the opposition—as we shall find Kritias doing six years afterwards, under the rule of the Thirty. The assassins of Phrynicus

¹ Thucyd. viii. 91. οὐ δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἔχοντων, καὶ οὐ τάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου.

The reluctant language in which Thucydides admits the treasonable concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the

Lacedæmonians, deserves notice—also c. 94, τάχα μὲν τι καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (Alkibiadès, c. 25).

remaining undiscovered and unpunished, Theramenēs and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa—lent double force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Eetioneia.

Amidst this exaggerated alarm and discord, the general body of hoplites became penetrated with aversion,¹ every day increasing, against the new citadel. At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratēs (the warmest partisan of Theramenēs) was taxiarch, being on duty and engaged in the prosecution of the building, broke out into absolute mutiny against it, seized the person of Alexiklēs, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighbouring house; while the peripoli, or youthful military police, stationed at Munychia, under Hermon, abetted them in the proceeding.² News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the Senate-house, Theramenēs himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt; a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus, accompanied by one of the generals his colleague, who was of the same political sentiment as himself. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mistrust, together with some of the younger Knights (Horsemen or richest class in the state) identified with the cause of the Four Hundred. The oligarchical partisans ran to marshal themselves in arms—alarming exaggerations being rumoured, that Alexiklēs had been put to death, and that Peiræus was under armed occupation; while at Peiræus the insurgents imagined that the hoplites from the city were in full march to attack them. For a time all was confusion and angry sentiment, which the slightest untoward accident might have inflamed into sanguinary civil carnage. Nor was it appeased except by earnest entreaty and remonstrance from the elder citizens (aided by Thucydidēs of Pharsalus, proxenus or public guest

Rising at
Athens
against the
Four Hun-
dred—de-
molition of
the new fort
at Eetioneia.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 92. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, | Hermon as one of the assassins of Phry-
τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τὸ στίφος ταῦτα ἔβούλετο. | nichus.

² Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents

of Athens in his native town) on the ruinous madness of such discord when a foreign enemy was almost at their gates.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number, to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Eetioneia; though they were reinforced, only eight days before their fall, by at least one supplementary member, probably in substitution for some predecessor who had accidentally died.¹ Theramenès, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus and his oligarchical companions spoke in the harshest language, and threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenès himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity; under the general shout—"Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work." The idea of the old democracy was in every one's mind, but no man uttered the word; the fear of the imaginary Five Thousand still continuing. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklès from arrest, without doing him any injury.²

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklès was vehemently

¹ See Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5. p. 672, 674, 679 Reisk.), and has all the air of truth.

² Thucyd. viii. 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenes (or Deinarchus) against Theokrinès (c. 17. p. 1343) the speaker Epicharēs makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Eetioneia by Aristokratēs, uncle of his grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from the erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile—betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenēs, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy—and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible—stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendancy of the Four Hundred. Yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the Senate-house; and they appear, now when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand.¹ Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiraeus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by (in Peiraeus, but on the verge of Munychia) and there holding a formal assembly; probably under the convocation of the general Theramenēs, pursuant to the forms of the antecedent democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, (or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri,) in the city itself and close under the acropolis; whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they, who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiraeus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city and close by their own Senate-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The Five Thousand*, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such

¹ Lysias, *Orat. xx. pro Polystrato*, c. 4. p. 675 Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing 9000 names instead of 5000.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that

Decline of
the Four
Hundred—
concessions
made by
them—re-
newal of
the public
Assembly.

Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord—*Ἡπλ ὀμονοίας*. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (*Vit. Sophistar. c. xv. p. 500. ed. Olear.*) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann, *Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit*, Beilage ii. p. 276.

order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this, and that internal peace might be maintained, without which there was no hope of defence against the enemy without. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The position of the Four Hundred being no longer such as to inspire fear, the tongues of speakers were now again loosed, and the ears of the multitude again opened—for the first time since the arrival of Peisander from Samos, with the plan of the oligarchical conspiracy. Such renewal of free and fearless public speech, the peculiar life-principle of the democracy, was not less wholesome in tranquillizing intestine discord, than in heightening the sentiment of common patriotism against the foreign enemy.¹ The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the re-establishment of harmony, in the theatre of Dionysus.²

On the day, and at the hour, when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having recently quitted the harbour of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, while causing universal consternation throughout the city, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenēs as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished, and every one rejoiced that the demolition had been accomplished just in time. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbour—others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbour—others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus; but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium in a southerly direction. Having doubled the cape of Sunium, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica north-

¹ Thucyd. viii. 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὀπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἡπιότερον ήν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παυτὸς πολιτικοῦ.

² Thucyd. viii. 93. ἔνυχάρησαν δὲ ὥστ' ἐποίησαν βῆτην ἐκκλησαν

ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the day following the morrow: at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

ward, halted for a little while between Thorikus and Prasiæ, and presently took station at Orôpus.¹

Though relieved when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa; which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus; since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbour. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos—the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Polystratus, one of the members of the Four Hundred, perhaps others of them also, were aboard; men who had an interest in defeat rather than victory.² Thymocharès the admiral conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to 36 sail.

He had scarcely reached the harbour and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment—he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus, and was already approaching the harbour. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria, who took care, on the arrival of Thymocharès, that no provisions should be found in the market-place, so that his men were compelled to disperse and obtain them from houses at the extremity of the town; while at the same time a signal was hoisted, visible at Orôpus on the opposite side of the strait (less than seven miles broad), indicating to Agesandridas the precise moment for bringing his fleet across to the attack, with their crews fresh after the morning meal. Thymocharès, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time—so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbour, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated,

¹ Thucyd. viii. 94.

² Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 4. p. 676 Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet—possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharès, according to a common Athenian practice

(c. 5. p. 679). His son who defends him affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii. 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these ships under Thymocharès; almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

Naval battle
near Eretria
—Athenians
defeated—
Eubœa
revolts.

and his fleet driven back upon the shore. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves not far from Eretria : yet not less than 22 triremes, out of the whole 36, fell into the hands of Agesandridas, and a large proportion of the crews were slain or made prisoners. Of those seamen who escaped, too, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa (except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian Kleruchs) declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before—and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Boeotians.¹

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed ; her nearest and most precious island torn from her side ; an island which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbour.² The previous revolt of Eubœa, occurring thirty-four years before during the maximum of Athenian power, had been even then a terrible blow to Athens, and formed one of the main circumstances which forced upon her the humiliation of the Thirty years' truce. But this second revolt took place when she had not only no means of reconquering the island, but no means even of defending Peiræus against the blockade by the enemy's fleet.

The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded ; even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. There was no second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable—alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls ; wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth

¹ Thucyd. viii. 5; viii. 95.

² Thucyd. viii. 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Eubœa, De Corona, c. 71—*ἄπλους δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὄμηρος θάλασσα ἦν τῶν εἰς τὴν Εὐβοίαν μένων ληστῶν γέγονε*, &c.

of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas (more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures) off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis at Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy, for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendancy, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the city.¹ And though the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Samos would have prevented this extremity, yet it could not have arrived in time, except on the supposition of a prolonged blockade. Moreover the mere transfer of the fleet from Samos to Athens would have left Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Lacedæmonians and Persians, and would have caused the loss of all the Athenian empire. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigour, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest. As on the former occasion, when Antiphon and Phrynicus went to Sparta prepared to make any sacrifice for the purpose of obtaining Lacedæmonian aid and accommodation—so now, in a still greater degree, Athens owed her salvation only to the fact that the enemies actually before her were indolent and dull Spartans—not enterprising Syracusans under the conduct of Gylippus.² And this is the second occasion (we may add) on which Athens was on the brink of ruin in consequence of the policy of Alkibiadēs in retaining the armament at Samos.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel.³ Accordingly the Athenians were allowed to enjoy an interval of repose which enabled them to recover partially both from consternation and from intestine discord. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly, and that too in the Pnyx itself; the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies, well-calculated to re-inspire that patriotism which had now been dumb and smoul-

The Four
Hundred are
put down—
the demo-
cracy in sub-
stance re-
stored.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 96. Μάλιστα δ' αὐτούς καὶ δι' ἐγγυάτου ἀθωρύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιά ἔρημον δύτα γεῶν πλεῖν καὶ δους οὐκ ἥδη ἐνδιμίζον αὐτούς παρεῖναι. Ὁπερ ἂν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἡσαν, βραδίως ἀν ἐποίη-

σαν καὶ ή διέστησαν ἀν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες, ή εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ' Ιωνίας ναῦς ἤνδυκασαν ἀν βοηθῆσαν, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 96; vii. 21-55.

³ Thucyd. viii. 97.

dering for the four last months. In this assembly the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred.¹ Even those, who (like the Board of Elders entitled Probûli) had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed—1. To depose the Four Hundred—2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*—3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply either for himself, or for any one else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The Five Thousand*—4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated.² Such were the points

¹ It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dialogue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklēs, one of the Athenian Probûli, mentioned in Aristot. Rhetoric. iii. 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklēs the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

² Thucyd. viii. 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρώτον ἐς τὴν Πινύκα καλούμενην, σύπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰλθεσαν, ἐν ἥπερ καὶ τὸν τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδούναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, δύοσι καὶ δύλα παρέχονται· καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν, μηδεμίᾳ ὀφρῆν, εἰ δὲ μη, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι θυτερον πικναῖ ἐκκλήσια, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τάλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing 5000 names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of ἔνγραφεῖς (o. 67), “persons to model the constitution, corresponding to the ἔνγραφεῖς appointed by the aristocratical party a little before”—to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv. p. 51. 2nd ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground

of my opinion, when he says—“Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must have much exceeded 5000: and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (*Lysias*, p. 675 Reisk.), that he drew up a list of 9000. But we must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible into the number of the 5000, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii. 93).”

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydidēs—εἴραι δὲ αὐτῶν, δύοσι καὶ δύλα παρέχονται. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished heavy arms should be of the Five Thousand; should belong of right to that body: which is something different from being eligible into the number of Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydidēs, when he describes (in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93) the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different—καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τὸν τετρακοσίους ἑσθαῖς, &c. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, b. ii. ch. 21. p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized—coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydidēs, as well as with every-

determined by the first assembly held in the Pnyx. The Archons, the Senate of Five Hundred, &c., were renewed: after which many other assemblies were also held, in which Nomothetae, Dikasts, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theramenēs,¹ to restore Alkibiadēs and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, doubtless confirming the recent nomination of generals, apprising them of what had recently occurred at Athens,

thing which he had before said about them.

I will here add that *δποσις δπλα παρέχονται* means persons furnishing arms either for themselves alone, or, for others also (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 15).

As to the second point, the signification of *νομοθέτας*, I stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political language: see the explanation earlier in this History, ch. xlvi. It is for the commentators to produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it—"persons to model the constitution—commissioners who drew up the new constitution," as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that *νομοθέται* is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy: for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination—whereas the *ξυγγράφεις* or "commissioners to draw up a constitution," were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover the words *καὶ τὰλλα* would hardly be used in immediate sequence to *νομοθέτας* if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose:—"Commissioners for framing a constitution and the other things towards the constitution." Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution (if we are so to call it) have already been distinctly specified as settled by

public vote, before these *νομοθέται* are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called *νομοθέται*, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to *ξυγγράφεις*—*"Εδοξε τῷ δῆμῳ, τριάκοντα ἀνδρας ἐλέκτοι, οἱ τούς πατρόλους νόμους ξυγράψουσι, καθ' οὓς πολιτεύσονται."*—*Αἰρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ' ϕ τε ξυγγράψαι νόμους καθ' οὐστίνας πολιτεύσοντο, τούτους μὲν δεῖ ξμελλον ξυγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, &c.* (Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 3, 2-11.) Xenophon calls Kritias and Chariklēs the Nomothetae of the Thirty (Memor. i. 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of *νομοθέτης* (applied most generally to Solon, sometimes to others either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt) or *νομοθέται*, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn—see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 3, 33, 37; Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 81-85, c. 14. p. 38—where the Nomothetae are a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising conjointly with the senate the function of accepting or rejecting the laws proposed to them.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 5, and Dion. xiii. 38-42) mentions Theramenēs as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadēs from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the pro-position.

as well as bespeaking their full concurrence and unabated efforts against the common enemy.

Moderation of political antipathies, and patriotic spirit, now prevalent. Thucydidēs bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens, and which directed the political proceedings of the people.¹ But he does not countenance the belief (as he has been sometimes understood), nor is it true in point of fact—that they now introduced a new constitution. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy, seemingly with only two modifications—first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage—next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the Senate and the Dikastery, exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the Senate, the Dikasts, the Nomothetae, the Ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the assembly), the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals or defended any law when it was impugned—must have worked for the time without pay.*

The Five Thousand number never exactly realised. Moreover the two modifications above-mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realised, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit; a nominal total, yet no longer a mere blank as the Four Hundred had originally produced it, but containing indeed a number of individual names greater than the total, and without any assignable line of demarcation. The mere fact, that every one who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand—and not they alone, but others besides²—shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech composed by Lysias,³ the Four Hundred had themselves (after the demolition of their intended fortress at Eetioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands) appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The*

¹ Thucyd. viii. 97. Καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα Dr. Arnold (see ch. xlv.).

δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες μετρίᾳ γάρ ή τε ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔνγκρασίᾳ ἔγένετο, καὶ ἐπὶ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένῳ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former volumes, and on the explanation given of it by

Dr. Arnold (see ch. xlv.).
The words of Thucydidēs (viii. 97) —εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ δηλαπαρέχονται—show that this body was not composed exclusively of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the Hippes or Knights.

³ Lysias. Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 4. p. 675 Reisk.

Five Thousand : and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand. As this list of Polystratus (if indeed it ever existed) was never either published or adopted, I merely notice the description given of it to illustrate my position, that the number Five Thousand was now understood on all sides as an indefinite expression for a suffrage extensive, but not universal. The number had been first invented by Antiphon and the leaders of the Four Hundred, to cloak their own usurpation and intimidate the democracy : next, it served the purpose of Theramenēs and the minority of the Four Hundred, as a basis on which to raise a sort of dynastic opposition (to use modern phraseology) within the limits of the oligarchy—that is, without appearing to overstep principles acknowledged by the oligarchy themselves : lastly, it was employed by the democratical party generally as a convenient middle term to slide back into the old system, with as little dispute as possible ; for Alkibiadēs and the armament had sent word home that they adhered to the Fiye Thousand, and to the abolition of salaried civil functions.¹

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, especially with the expansive numerical construction now adopted, was of little value either to themselves or to the state,² while it was an insulting shock to the feelings of the excluded multitude, especially to brave and active seamen like the Larali. Though prudent as a step of momentary transition, it could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence—amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, and where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

The Five
Thousand
—were soon
enlarged into
universal
citizenship.

Even as to the gratuitous functions, the members of the Five Thousand themselves would soon become tired, not less than the poorer freemen, of serving without pay, as senators or in other ways : so that nothing but absolute financial deficit would prevent the re-establishment, entire or partial, of the pay. And that deficit was never so complete as to stop the disbursement of the Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each citizen on occasion of various religious festivals. Such distribution continued without interruption ; though perhaps the number of occasions on which it was made may have been lessened.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86.

δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆ-³ See the valuable financial inscrip-
σαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρυς ἀν tions in M. Boeckh's *Corpus Inscript.*

How far, or under what restriction, any re-establishment of civil
 Restoration of the complete democracy, all except pay. pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event—at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June or July 410 B.C.) when the Senate of Five Hundred, the Dikasts and other civil functionaries were renewed for the coming year, pursuant to the ancient democratical practice—exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. It seems to have been thought that this first renewal of archons and other functionaries, under the revived democracy, ought to be stamped by some emphatic proclamation of sentiment, analogous to the solemn and heart-stirring oath taken in the preceding year at Samos. Accordingly Demophantus proposed and carried a (psephism or) decree,¹ prescribing the form of an oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution.

The terms of his psephism and oath are striking. “If any man subvert the democracy at Athens, or hold any magistracy Demophantus—democratical oath prescribed. after the democracy has been subverted, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians. Let him be put to death with impunity, and let his property be confiscated to the public, with the reservation of a tithe to Athénè. Let the man who has killed him, and the accomplice privy to the act, be accounted holy and of good religious odour. Let all Athenians swear an oath under the sacrifice of full-grown victims, in their respective tribes and demes, to kill him.² Let the oath be as follows:—‘I will kill with my own

tionum, part i. nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disbursements for the Diobely in 410–409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Chorégi at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi. of Lysias—*'Απολογία Δωρόδοκες*—c. 1, 2. p. 698–700 Reiske.

¹ About the date of this psephism or decree, see Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii. p. 168 (in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Sir G. Lewis);

also Meier, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, sect. ii. p. 6–10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty—see Hellen. Alterth. ii. ix. p. 267.

² *Andokidēs de Mysteriis*, sect. 95–99. (c. 16, p. 48 R.)—‘Ο δ' ἀποκτένεις τὸν τάῦτα ποιήσαται, καὶ δὲ συμβουλεύεται, δύοις ξέσται καὶ εὐαγγήσ. Ὁμοσαι δὲ Αθηναῖοις ἀπαντας καθ' ιερῶν τελείων, κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δῆμους, ἀποκτένειν τὸν τάῦτα ποιήσαται.

The comment of Sievers (*Commentationes De Xenophonitis Hellenicis*, Berlin, 1833, p. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

hand, if I am able, any man who shall subvert the democracy at Athens, or who shall hold any office in future after the democracy has been subverted, or shall rise in arms for the purpose of making himself a despot, or shall help the despot to establish himself. And if any one else shall kill him, I will account the slayer to be holy as respects both gods and demons, as having slain an enemy of the Athenians. And I engage, by word, by deed and by vote, to sell his property and make over one-half of the proceeds to the slayer, without withholding anything. If any man shall perish in slaying or in trying to slay the despot, I will be kind both to him and to his children, as to Harmodius and Aristogeiton and their descendants. And I hereby dissolve and release all oaths which have been sworn hostile to the Athenian people, either at Athens, or at the camp (at Samos) or elsewhere.¹ Let all Athenians swear this as the regular oath immediately before the festival of the Dionysia, with sacrifice and full-grown victims;² invoking upon him who keeps it, good things in abundance,—but upon him who breaks it, destruction for himself as well as for his family."

Such was the remarkable decree which the Athenians not only passed in senate and public assembly, less than a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, but also caused to be engraved on a column close to the door of the Senate-house. It plainly indicates, not merely that the democracy had returned, but an unusual intensity of democratical feeling along with it. The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights—not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest.³ This decree

¹ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 95-99. (c. 16. p. 48 R.) "Οποσοι δ' ὄρκοι δμόσιον-ται Ἀθηναῖσι ή ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ή κλλοθί που ἐνδυτοι τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, λύει καὶ ἀφίγμει.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (Thucyd. viii. 75), is intended to be sworn by every one, including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or *κυρωμάσιαι* among themselves, insofar as it

pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii. 54-81).

² Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 95-99. (c. 16. p. 48 R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοσάντων Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες καθ' ἕρῶν τελεῖν, τὸν νόμιμον ὄρκον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, &c.

³ Those who think that a new constitution was established (after the deposition of the Four Hundred) are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadēs returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats Alterthümer, s. 167. not. 13.

became invalid after the expulsion of the Thirty, by the general resolution then passed not to act upon any laws passed before the archonship of Eukleidēs, unless specially re-enacted. But the column, on which it stood engraved, still remained, and the words were read upon it at least down to the time of the orator Lykurgus, eighty years afterwards.¹

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred, however, and the transfer of political power to the Five Thousand, which took place in the first public assembly held after the defeat off Eretria—was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders of the Four Hundred forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklēs, and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia;² Aristarchus alone made his flight the means of inflicting a new wound upon his country. Being among the number of the generals, he availed himself of this authority to march—with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city—to Cēnoē on the Boeotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Boeotians united. Aristarchus, in concert with the besiegers, presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Cēnoē should be surrendered to the Boeotians. He therefore, as general, ordered them to evacuate the place, under the benefit of a truce to return home. The garrison, having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Boeotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position—a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.³

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated, after an interruption of about four months by the successful con-

¹ Lykurgus, adv. Leokrat. sect. 131. c. 31. p. 225: compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 138. c. 34. p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of Solon by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidēs. He calls this pseudism of Demophantus a *law of Solon* (sect. 96); see above in this History, ch. xi.

² Thucyd. viii. 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Egospotami, when the Athenian people again became sub-

ject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Ilysias cont. Agorat. sect. 80. c. 18. p. 495).

Whether Aristotelēs' and Chariklēs were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De Quadrirgent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

³ Thucyd. viii. 89–90. Ἀρισταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλειστου ἐμπρίστος τῷ θημῷ, &c.

spiracy of the Four Hundred. It was only by a sort of miracle—or rather by the incredible backwardness and stupidity of her foreign enemies—that Athens escaped alive from this nefarious aggression of her own ablest and wealthiest citizens. That the victorious democracy should animadver^t upon and punish the principal actors concerned in it—who had satiated their own selfish ambition at the cost of so much suffering, anxiety, and peril, to their country—was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves—Theramenēs, Aristokratēs, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probūli—all of whom had been, at the outset, either principals or accomplices in that system of terrorism and assassination, whereby the democracy had been overthrown and the oligarchical rulers established in the Senate-house. The earlier operations of the conspiracy, therefore, though among its worst features, could not be exposed to inquiry and trial, without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenēs evaded the difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed, and on which therefore he had no interests adverse either to justice or to the popular feeling. He stood forward to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta—sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price—and connected with the construction of the fort at Eetion^a for the reception of an enemy's garrison. This act of manifest treason, in which Antiphon, Phrynicus, and ten other known envoys were concerned, was chosen as the special matter for public trial and punishment, not less on public grounds than with a view to his own favour in the renewed democracy. But the fact that it was Theramenēs who thus denounced his old friends and fellow-conspirators, after having lent hand and heart to their earlier and not less guilty deeds—was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after-days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself.¹

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except

¹ Lysias cont. Eratosthen. c. 11. p. 427. sect. 66-68. Βούλόμενος δὲ (Theramenēs) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντίφωντα καὶ Ἀρχεπόλεμουν, φιλτάτους δυτας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἥλθεν,

Θεραμένης stands forward to accuse the remaining leaders of the Four Hundred, especially in reference to the forty at Eetionela, and the embassy to Sparta.

δοτε δια μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ἴμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hell. ii. 3, 30-33.

Phrynicus, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklēs, seem to have already escaped to Dekelia or elsewhere. Phrynicus (as I have mentioned a few pages above) had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored Senate of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground; and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who claimed to have assassinated him.¹ The other three, Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklēs,² were presented in name to the Senate by the generals (of whom probably Theramenēs was one) as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens, partly on board an enemy's ship, partly through the Spartan garrison at Dekelia. Upon this presentation, doubtless a document of some length and going into particulars, a senator named Andron moved,—That the generals, aided by any ten senators whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial:—That the Thesmothetae do send to each of the three a formal summons, to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the Dikastery, on the charge of high treason—and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten senators chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and

¹ That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phrynicus, preceded the trial of Antiphon—we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 384 B.: compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynicus which are not in harmony with Thucydides. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynicus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship—Thrasybulus of Kalydon—Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18. p. 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29. p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynicus was assassinated by night “near the fountain hard by the willow-trees:” which is quite contradictory to Thucydides, who states that the deed was done in

daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, aged , whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead body of Phrynicus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklēs were put to death for undertaking its defence—is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Oenōe, Alexiklēs at Dekelia.

² Onomaklēs had been one of the colleagues of Phrynicus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii. 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydides (p. xxii, in Dr. Arnold's edition) it is stated that Onomaklēs was executed along with the other two: but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

if condemned, was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors, or persons guilty of treason.¹

Though all the three persons thus indicated were in Athens, or at least were supposed to be there, on the day when this resolution was passed by the Senate,—yet before ~~they~~ was executed, Onomaklēs had fled; so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklēs. So acute a man as he, at no time very popular, must have known that now at least he had drawn the sword against his fellow-citizens in a manner which could never be forgiven. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial, on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration; as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thucydidēs describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge, which had ever come before him;² and the poet Agathon, doubtless a hearer, warmly complimented Antiphon on his eloquence; to which the latter replied, that the approval of one such discerning judge was in his eyes an ample compensation for the unfriendly verdict of the multitude. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the Dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason. They were handed over to the magistrates called the Eleven (the chiefs of executive justice at Athens) to be put to death by the customary draught of hemlock. Their properties were confiscated: their houses were directed to be razed, and the vacant site to be marked by columns, with the inscription—“The

¹ Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 834: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. i. 7, 22.

Apolēkis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration, v. Στρασιώτης.

² Thucyd. viii. 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii. 5. Καὶ αὐτὸς τε ('Αντίφων)—δριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθεῖς—θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος—“And he too for himself,” &c. Thucydidēs had just before stated that Antiphon rendered the most valuable service as an adviser to other litigants, but that he seldom spoke

before the people or the Dikastery himself. The words καὶ αὐτὸς τε, following immediately, set forth his great efficiency when he did for once plead his own cause.

Rühnken seems quite right (*Dissertat. De Antiphont.* p. 818 Reisk.) in considering the oration περὶ μεταστρέψεως to be Antiphon's defence of himself—though Westermann (*Geschichte der Griechisch. Beredsamkeit*, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

residence of Antiphon the traitor—of Archeptolemus the traitor.” They were not permitted to be buried either in Attica or in any territory subject to Athenian dominion.¹ Their children, both legitimate and illegitimate, were deprived of the citizenship; and the citizen, who should adopt any descendant of either of them, was to be himself in like manner disfranchised.

Such was the sentence passed by the Dikastery, pursuant to the Athenian law of treason. It was directed to be engraved on the same brazen column as the decree of honour to the slayers of Phrynicus. From that column it was transcribed, and has thus passed into history.²

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus—perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Oenoë to the Bœotians. The latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned:³ though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after

¹ So, Themistoklēs, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i. 138; Cornel. Nepos. Vit. Themistocl. ii. 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

² It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered to be spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (*ἐπειδικάστατο*). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred—perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (*τοῦ ἐπειδικάστου*), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron (who made the motion in the Senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial) had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Theranenés (Harp. v. “Ανδρων”).

The note of Dr. Arnold, upon that passage (viii. 68) wherein Thucydides calls Antiphon *ἀπειθί οὐδεὶς θυτερός*—

“inferior to no man in virtue”—well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydidēs. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that while the exaggerations of opposition speakers or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred—exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows at the same time his high candour in the narration of facts; for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

³ Xenoph. Hellenic. i. 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it *may* also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekelia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekelia and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Niciae Fratris, Or. xviii. ch. 4. p. 604; Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx. c. 7. p. 688; Andokidēs de Mysteriis, c. 17. p. 50.

having once effected his escape, we are not informed. The property of Peisander (he himself having escaped) was confiscated, and granted either wholly or in part as a recompence to Apollo-dorus, one of the assassins of Phrynicus:¹ probably the property of the other conspicuous fugitive oligarchs was confiscated also. Polystratus, another of the Four Hundred, who had only become a member of that body a few days before its fall, was tried during absence (which absence his defenders afterwards accounted for by saying that he had been wounded in the naval battle off Eretria) and heavily fined. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability (according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office). Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors. But most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted, partly, we are told, by bribes to the Logistæ or auditing officers—though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred.²

¹ Lysias, De Oleâ Sacra, Or. vii. ch. 2. p. 263 Reisk.

² “Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; immo qui cum Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem rationes reddente fuerunt; qui solum vertissent, proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita” (Wattenbach, De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65).

From the psephism of Patrokleidēs (passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Aegospotamōs) we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial, were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities—Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 75-78 — Καὶ δοτα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὸς ἔγγραφαται, ή ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὀλυμπίᾳ πραχθέντων ἔστι που γεγραμμένου, πλὴν δύο σα ἐν στήλαις ἔγγραφται τῶν μη ἐνθαδε μεινάντων, &c. (these last names, as the most criminal, were excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidēs).

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred:—1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which

they could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned *par contumaciam*.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans—ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὀλυμπίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75—οἱ στρατιῶται, οἱ δτι ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἀπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ Βουλεῦσαι—where the preposition *ἐπὶ* seems to signify not simply contemporaneity, but a sort of intimate connexion, like the phrase *ἐπὶ προστάτου οἰκείου* (see Matthiae, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kuhner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow demot, of Phrynicus (sect. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance by saying that he had been wounded at the battle

Favourable judgement of Thucydidēs on the conduct of the Athenians. Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know from Thucydidēs that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behaviour at this juncture, is indeed doubly remarkable:¹ first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality, and likely to degenerate, by almost natural tendency, into excess of reactionary vengeance and persecution. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenēs—and fifty years old, even dating from the final reforms of Ephialtēs and Periklēs; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man's bosom—heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad.² At a moment when, from unparalleled previous disasters, she is barely able to keep up the struggle against her foreign enemies, a small knot of her own wealthiest citizens, taking advantage of her weakness, contrive by a tissue of fraud and force not less flagitious than skilfully combined, to concentrate in their own hands the powers of the state, and to tear from their countrymen the security against bad government, the

of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sect. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sect. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge: accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine; and they therefore still remained citizens and in the full exercise of their rights, though he was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the Dikastery that the sentence passed against his father may be miti-

gated—partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence—partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynosēma, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly (I think) long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (*Vit. Lysiae*, p. 55) that *all* the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

¹ This testimony of Thucydidēs is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv. of Lysias (*Δῆμου Καταλυσ. Ἀπολ.* sec. 34, 35) about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Mitford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (*History of Greece*, ch. xx. s. 1. vol. iv. p. 327).

² Thucyd. viii. 68.

sentiment of equal citizenship, and the long-established freedom of speech. Nor is this all: these conspirators not only plant an oligarchical sovereignty in the Senate-house, but also sustain that sovereignty by inviting a foreign garrison from without, and by betraying Athens to her Peloponnesian enemies. Two more deadly injuries it is impossible to imagine; and from neither of them would Athens have escaped, if her foreign enemy had manifested reasonable alacrity. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left notwithstanding her escape—we might well have expected in the people a violence of reactionary hostility such as every calm observer, while making allowance for the provocation, must nevertheless have condemned; and perhaps somewhat analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra.¹ And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thucydides (an observer rather less than impartial) selects to eulogise their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learnt to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

There are few contrasts in Grecian history more memorable or more instructive, than that between this oligarchical conspiracy,—conducted by some of the ablest hands at Athens—and the democratical movement going on at the same time in Samos, among the Athenian armament and the Samian citizens. In the former we have nothing but selfishness and personal ambition from the beginning: first, a partnership to seize for their own advantage the powers of government—next, after this object has been accomplished, a breach among the partners, arising out of disappointment alike selfish. We find appeal made to nothing but the worst tendencies; either tricks to practise upon the credulity of the people, or extra-judicial murders to work upon their fear. In the latter, on the contrary, the senti-

Oligarchy
at Athens,
democracy
at Samos—
contrast.

¹ See, about the events in Korkyra, vol. iv. ch. l. p. 387.

ment invoked is that of common patriotism, and equal, public-minded sympathy. That which we read in Thucydidēs—when the soldiers of the armament and the Samian citizens pledged themselves to each other by solemn oaths to uphold their democracy, to maintain harmony and good feeling with each other, to prosecute energetically the war against the Peloponnesians, and to remain at enmity with the oligarchical conspirators at Athens—is a scene among the most dramatic and inspiriting which occurs in his history.¹ Moreover we recognise at Samos the same absence of reactionary vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is indeed true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and every-day movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level, and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. Even their moments of transitory predominance leave a luminous tract behind, and render the men who have passed through them more apt to conceive again the same generous impulse, though in fainter degree. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion; sometimes, and on rare occasions, like the scene at Samos, with overwhelming intensity, so as to impassion an unanimous multitude; more frequently, in feebler tide, yet such as gave some chance to an honest and eloquent orator of making successful appeal to public feeling against corruption or selfishness. If we follow the movements of Antiphon and his fellow-conspirators at Athens, contemporaneous with the democratical manifestations at Samos, we shall see that not only was no such generous impulse

¹ Thucyd. viii. 75.

included in it, but the success of their scheme depended upon their being able to strike all common and active patriotism out of the Athenian bosom.* Under the “cold shade” of their oligarchy—even if we suppose the absence of cruelty and rapacity, which would probably soon have become rife had their dominion lasted, as we shall presently learn from the history of the second oligarchy of Thirty—no sentiment would have been left to the Athenian multitude except fear, servility, or at best a tame and dumb sequacity to leaders whom they neither chose nor controlled. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire, in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR.

THE oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens (installed in the Senate-house about February or March 411 b.c., and deposed about July of the same year), after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political dissensions at Athens, above described.

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of 94 triremes,¹ having remained not less than 80 days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milétus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidès had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions of Tissaphernê, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phenician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighbouring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milétus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighbouring town of Lampsakus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 44, 45.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidēs, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. The Chians, driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to 36 triremes against the Athenian 32, by the arrival of 12 ships under Leon (obtained from Milētus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes), had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage.¹ Nevertheless Strombichidēs felt compelled immediately to carry away 24 triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea, to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milētus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.²

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion—
Discontent in
the Pelopon-
nesian fleet
at Milētus.
 Charmīnus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprised of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favourable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbour of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbour. He accordingly returned to Milētus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation (real or pretended) of the arrival of the Phenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernēs in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamours, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favour of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milētus with his whole fleet of 112 triremes round to the promontory of Mykalē immediately opposite Samos—

¹ Thucyd. viii. 61, 62. οὐκ ἔλασσον | very decisive.

~~τύχην~~ means a certain success, not | ² Thucyd. viii. 63.

ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only 82 sail, in the absence of Strombichidēs, was then moored near Glaukē on the mainland of Mykalē: but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.¹

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament—coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy; and Strombichidēs had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milētus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos.² Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was Strombichi-
dēs returns
from Chios to Samos. increased to 108 sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mykalē the next morning. It consisted of 112 ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learnt both the arrival of Strombichidēs, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milētus, to the mouth of which harbour the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.³

Such confession of inferiority was well-calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at the Hellespont—revolt Simonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alkibiadēs to Athens, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them, in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta for the express purpose of going to

¹ Thucyd. viii. 78, 79.

² Thucyd. viii. 62.

³ Thucyd. viii. 79.

aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milētus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos by first stretching out westward into the *Æ*gean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of his squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Milētus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichidēs seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to capture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milētus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium,¹ and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile the discontents of the fleet at Milētus broke out, into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernēs. Unpaid and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratēs of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their

Discontent
and meet-
ing against
Astyochus
at Milētus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 80-99.

cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles : he took refuge, however, on a neighbouring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.¹

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernès had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathised in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely ; intimating to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernès within all reasonable limits—and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them ; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently,² and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot (probably some place of honour) which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokratès and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernès ; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites (a Karian brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages) both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges of Hermokratès, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alkibiadès and the Athenians—and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort.³ At the same time, he thought it

¹ Thucyd. viii. 83, 84.

² Thucyd. viii. 84. Ο μέντοι Λίχας οὗτος αὐτοῖς, ἐφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρειν καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια, | καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἡνὸς ἀν τὸν πόλεμον εἰδῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὑργίζοντε τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἄλλα τοιούτωντοι, &c.

³ Thucyd. viii. 85.

necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milétus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.¹

Mindarus, a new commander without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernès, was imposed upon by his plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so powerful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Tropian Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernès was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phenician ships were 147 in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernès affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of 300 sail to be fitted out for the service.² He waited for some time in pretended expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadès, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of the approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernès at Aspendus; so as to determine him, if possible, to employ the fleet in

Phenician
fleet at
Aspendus
— Duplicity
of Tissa-
phernès.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 87.

² Thucyd. viii. 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernès pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at 300 sail. Thucydidès does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii. 38, 42, 46).

Alkibiadès at
Aspendus —
his double
game be-
tween Tis-
saphernès
and the
Athenians.

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended to be augmented to a total of 300 sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

aid of Athens—but at the very least, *not to employ it in aid of Sparta*. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernēs had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting such a formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Phenicians sent back from Aspendus without action—motives of Tissaphernēs.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernēs and Alki-biadēs—partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretence that the fleet was insufficient in number—at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprised Mindarus—not

without indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernēs, indeed, in bringing up the Phenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one's eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydidēs supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behaviour during the last year—to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay.¹ The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Mindarus leaves Miletus with his fleet—goes to Chios—Thrasylus and the Athenian fleet at Lesbos.

Having at length lost his hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernēs—the more so as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever—and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into co-operation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet² (73 triremes strong, after deducting 13 which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes) having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that

¹ Thucyd. viii. 87, 88, 99.

² Diodor. xiii. 38.

no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with 55 triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet.¹ Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of 300 assailants from Kymê under the Theban Anaxander—partly Methymnæan exiles with some political sympathisers, partly mercenary foreigners—who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of 67 triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning in case the enemy's fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the north-eastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont—though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three tesserakosts (a Chian coin of unknown value) for

Mindarus
eludes Thra-
sillus, and
reaches the
Hellespont.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 100. Αἰσθέμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῷ Χίῳ εἴη, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτὸν, σκοπούς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντίπερας ἡπειρῷ, εἰ δρά τοι κινοῦντο αἱ νῆσοι, θώσ μὴ λάδουσεν, &c.

I construe τῷ ἀντίκερας ἡπειρῷ as

meaning the mainland opposite *Chios*, not opposite *Lesbos*. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτὸν appear so immediately before: and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of *Chios*.

each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or sea side. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left-hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbour called Karterii in the Phœcean territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the Gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginusæ (close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylénê), where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs (on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna) by the next day's morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lekatum, sailed along the Troad and past Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighbouring places.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydidēs; from whom I dissent with the less reluttance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative *οὐ* *on pure conjecture*, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done; yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidēs; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader by enclosing the word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, “*This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shews the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.*”

The words of Thucydidēs, without this correction and as they stood universally before Haack's edition (even in Bekker's edition of 1821), are—

“Ο δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπιστρέμεναι δύσιν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαράκοστας ἔκστις Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ίνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ

Ἐρέσφ ναυσὶν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβου ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἥπειρον. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρπερίοις λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιῶνται ἐν Ἀργεντούσαις τῆς ἥπειρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μιτυλήνης, &c.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert *οὐ* before *πελάγιαι*; so that the sentence stands in their editions ἀπαρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγιαι. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios *northward*, and going out at the *northern strait*. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word *πελάγιος*, when applied to ships departing from Chios—though it may perhaps mean that they round the north-eastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as *departing by the outer sea*, or sailing *on the seaside* (round the southern and western coast) *of the island*. Accept this meaning, and

By this well-laid course, and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral

the old words construe perfectly well. Ἀκαρπεύς ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii. 80) the squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed (which those who read οὐ πελάγιαι must suppose) that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokaea, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas by taking the circuitous route round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other; and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course with Lesbos on his left hand, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος (Xen. Hellēn. ii. 1. 17) means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the south-east or the north-east corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head three Chian tessarakosta. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydides, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellēn. i. 6, 12; ii. 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and

this Chian coin (which probably had no circulation out of the island) served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard more provisions in kind at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days—the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly."

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydides will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural οὐ. But I can show more: for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαλρουσιν οὐ πελάγιαι, ἀλλὰ—ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb ἀπαλρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such correlative participle, how are we to construe ἐπλεον; In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as—οὐκ ἀπηραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβου ἔχοντες ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κηφισον. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. The fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left-hand, it sailed straight to the continent."

I hope that I am not too late to make good my γραφήν ξενίας, or protest against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word οὐ in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or if these editors maintain their views, they ought at least to enclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydides, published at Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

was barely apprised of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Ἰαρματᾶς, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Μεθύμνα, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: 18 Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe—16 Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former, it was destruction to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Ελαῖς at the southern extremity of that peninsula, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Μιλήτος, that if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special look-out for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Ελαῖς.¹

¹ Thucyd. viii. 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, οὐ δικέν τῇ Σηστῷ, . . . ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσῆμαινον, καὶ γοθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἔξαφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῷ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν δὲ τὸ σπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταῦτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους, ὑποκίαντες τῇ Χερσονῆσῳ, παρέκλεον ἐπ' Ἐλαιούντος, Βουλδηνοὶ ἐκπλέουσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμιών ναῦς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβτίδῳ ἐκκαΐδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, δικαὶα αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, οὐ δικτέλεσσι—Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I venture to translate (as it stands in my text) differently from all of them. The words—*προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ*, δικαὶα αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, οὐ δικτέλεσσι—are explained by the Scholiast to mean—"Although watch had been enjoined to them (i. e. to the

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were ~~scared~~ by the fleet of Mindarus.

Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out."

Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppe, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says, "This again is most strangely intended to mean, προειρημένου ἀτροῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολεμίους."

To construe $\tauῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ$ as equivalent to $ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων$, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word *κατότοι*—although—from his own imagination. There is no indication of *although*, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydides; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification—not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an *although*; if this latter be intended, then the word *although* is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydides has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos—when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle such as *although* or *notwithstanding*, "The Athenians escaped, although the Peloponnesians had received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up." As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle *although* is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words— $προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ, διὰς αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔχουσιν, ην ἐκπλέωσι$ —do assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; viz. that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Eleusis. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon his approaching squadron; hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words $τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ$ are equivalent to $τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ$, and the pronoun *αὐτῶν*, which immediately follows, refers to *φίλων* (*the approaching fleet of Mindarus*), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of *αὐτῶν* seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That $τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ$ must be construed as equivalent to $τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ$ is certain: but it is not equivalent to $ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλέοντων φίλων$ —nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them—"orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends;" whereby we should turn $\delta \dot{\epsilon}πίπλους$ into an acting and commanding personality. The "approach of their friends" is an event—which may properly be said "to have produced an effect"—but which cannot be said "to have given previous orders." It appears to me that $τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ$ is the dative case governed by *φυλακῆς*—"a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians" having been enjoined (upon these guard-ships at Abydos)—"They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends." The English preposition *for* expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative—that is, the object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to.

The words immediately succeeding— $διὰς αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔχουσιν, ην ἐκπλέωσι$ —are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from—*φυλακῆς τῷ φίλῳ ἐπίπλῳ*. "They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote

which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Thrasyllus Sigeum and Rhœtœm. The latter immediately gave chase: but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros—not without the loss

special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start." For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i. 24; viii. 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ἀνακῶς, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς—the notes of Arnold and Göller here; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. sec. 333. ἀνακῶς ἔχειν *tivis* for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the opposite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words *ἵνε ἐκπλέωσι* refer to *Mindarus and his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject—not to the Athenians at Sestos.*

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydides and express the meaning in common Greek—*Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Αἴδηῳ ἐκκαθεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) Κλαθον· προειρητὸ γάρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναῦσιν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν φίλων, θπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι.* The verb φυλάσσειν here (and of course the abstract substantive φυλακή which represents it) signifies to watch for or wait for, like Thucyd. ii. 3. φυλάσσετε ἔτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περιόρθον; also viii. 41. ἐφύλασσε.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios (perhaps even from Milētus, before he quitted that place) to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and perhaps

block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad (which would indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios). Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus—whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. "Let your first thought be to ensure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded." Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios—nor was it indeed absolutely certain that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, conditional upon his being able to get off (*ἵνε ἐκπλέωσι*). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders—when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

however of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilus at Elæüs : the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force (86 triremes strong) was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæüs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He awaited at Elæüs the return of the fugitive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, 76 in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestus up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossêma, or the Dog's Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba : it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes (ten more than Thrasyllus in total number), extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore ; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatae or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manœuvring : nevertheless the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war ; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them ; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of

Battle of
Kynossêma
—victory of
the Athenian
fleet.

the projecting headland of Kynossēma. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellēne and Leukas, one each—fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who however on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected a trophy on the headland of Kynossēma, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.¹

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis with the revolt of Eubœa—their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossēma, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favour, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokratēs and Epiklēs to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now

¹ Thucyd. viii. 105, 106; Diodor. xiii. 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcileable with Thucydides. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots, and the Peloponnesian

epibatae. He states "that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favour: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards."

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossēma.

acting at Eubœa.¹ This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still farther enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of the fleet, which in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only under Hippokratès survived to join Mindarus.²

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Eubœa, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Boëtians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Eubœa of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Eubœan strait, where Chalkis was divided from Boëtia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenès, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of the undertaking. The Eubœans and Boëtians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Eubœa, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to re-establish her maritime power.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 107; Diodor. xiii. 41.

² Diodor. xiii. 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Boöotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athénæ at Köroneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratès himself survived, and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 23).

Respecting the danger of sailing round the promontory of Athos, the reader is

referred to a former chapter of this work, wherein the ship-canal, cut across the Isthmus by order of Xerxes, is described; together with an instructive citation from Colonel Leake's Travels. See ch. xxxviii. of this History.

³ Diodor. xiii. 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; not. p. 66).

See Colonel Leake's Travels in Northern Greece, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii. ch. xiv. p. 259-265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reach-

* The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences, except that of encouragement to the Athenians.
Revolt of Kyzikus. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæüs, and recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited; except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elæüs, set them on fire.¹

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernês, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to assist them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who laboured hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him labouring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first through the hands of Pharnabazus, next through those of the younger Cyrus—the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well-paid, out of the Persian treasury—the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of

ing 200 feet (x. p. 400). But there must have been material alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x. p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have

been more than 20 feet broad; for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all their masts. I cannot but think Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read in Diodorus xiii. 47—*οὐ* in place of *ότι*.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 107.

success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedaemonian Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner;¹ and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the ~~near~~ constant paymaster now introduced gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the Tissaphernès again courts the Peloponnesians. more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernès. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison. Arsakes had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramytium: he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighbouring Antandrians, who invited from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, a body of Peloponnesian hoplites; by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.²

In Milètus as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernès had already experienced the like humiliation:³ Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, and he was not without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milètus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt;⁴ while he himself quitted

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 17. Compare a like explanation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 7; Plutarch, Ly- sander, c. 8.

² Thucyd. viii. 108; Diodor. xiii. 42.

³ Thucyd. viii. 109.

⁴ Diodor. xiii. 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough; though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernès, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernès with the name of Pharnabazus.

Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some guarantee against repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus.¹ Having quitted Aspendus (as far as we can make out) about the beginning of August (411 b.c.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.²

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadēs returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasēlis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernēs, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own. He took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the goodwill of the satrap more strongly than ever in the cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phenician fleet.³

¹ Thucyd. viii. 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydidēs, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off (as we possess it) in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydidēs to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydidēs, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no pre-existing models before him from which to derive them. And the eight books of his work (in spite of the unfinished condition of the last) are not unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his

thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thucydidēs; most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold's edition is in most frequent use among English readers of Thucydidēs—partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgement, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Göller in the second edition of his Thucydidēs, and to a great degree also by Poppe. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its pre-eminence among English students of Thucydidēs, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 9.

³ Thucyd. viii. 108. Diodorus (xiii.

At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus (before his departure from Milētūs) in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadēs going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. Having erected fortifications at the town of Kos, he planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison. From Halikarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.¹

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossēma by the squadron from Eubœa; at ^{Farther com-}
^{bats at the}
^{Hellespont.} ^{B.C. 411.} least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm ^{c.} Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Eubœa enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhœteum; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessels ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athénê on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of 84 triremes; Pharnabazus coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the

38) talks of this influence of Alkibiadēs over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον.

Haack and Sievers (see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in the year.

two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue : at length, towards the evening, 20 fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadēs sailing from Samos : having probably heard of the re-junction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counterbalancing reinforcement.¹ As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavoured to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat ; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved : yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.²

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during
B.C. 411-410. the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among
 Theramenēs sent out with reinforcements : in the mean time, he
 engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land
 against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet
 united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos ; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenēs ; who first endeavoured without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenēs deposed and fined the men who had exercised it—establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the

¹ Diodorus (xiii. 46) and Plutarch [which is certainly very improbable.] (Alkib. c. 27) speak of his coming to the [* Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 7.] Hellespont by accident —κατὰ τύχην—

temporary pay, of Archelaus king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna ; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenēs was summoned away, before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace : Archelaus however took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the sea-board to a distance more than two miles inland.¹ We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra, less stained however with savage Renewed
troubles at
Korkyra. enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprised of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came with a detachment of 600 Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles.² We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed ; for we hear nothing about Korkyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest per-

¹ Diodor. xiii. 47, 49.

² Diodor. xiii. 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65. not. 58) contests the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv. 48 — *ὅτα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε*. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich

(Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, p. 95-99) has properly explained this phrase of Thucydides, as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Plataea and the peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra here alluded to by Diodorus.

fection of cultivation and prosperity.¹ Doubtless the emancipation of slaves, and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernê, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos—seemingly about November 411 B.C. He was anxious to retain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King's express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians.² Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great (partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former—partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay) that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia on the western side of the isthmus of that Peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês; who had found means to escape from Sardis, (along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner,) first to Klazomenæ, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenê came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 25.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 9, Plutarch,

| Alkibiadês, c. 27.

the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elæüs at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnèsus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Abydos.¹

Resting at Prokonnèsus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadēs warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. "We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King." Neither zeal in the men, nor contrivance in the commanders, was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadēs, Theramenēs, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbour; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighbouring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on ship-board, partly ashore—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain; and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The number of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at 60, the highest at 80.²

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadēs and his two colleagues (about April 410, b.c.),

¹ Diodor. xiii. 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 14–20; Diodor.

xiii. 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, *Commentat. in Xenoph. Hellen. not. 62*, pp. 65, 66 seq.

Battle of
Kyzikus—
victory of
the Athe-
nians—
Mindarus is
slain, and the
whole Pelop-
ponnesian
fleet taken.

changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milètus ; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratès (secretary of the late admiral Mindarus) to the Ephors at Sparta :—“All honour and advantage are gone from us : Mindarus is slain : the men are starving : we are in straits what to do.”¹ The Ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness ; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace ; or rather perhaps Endius (ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadès, who had already been at Athens as envoy before) was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy : and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event—which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompos, and is noway improbable in itself—nevertheless leads me to doubt whether the Ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered, that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms :—That each party should stand just as they were : That the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn : That prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischîef which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war : but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great King as a paymaster : she was robbed of the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 23. Ἐρρει τὰ δρες ἀπορέομεν τῇ χρὴ δρᾶν.
καλέ· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούσα· πεινῶντι τόν· | Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed : all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her pre-eminence.¹

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendour of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them ; insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.²

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition (even assuming it to have been formal and authorised) as well as the time at which it was made—we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character.³ They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Kleophon during the last years of the war—since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political peculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined ; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides, even if Kleophon were ever so much a gainer by the continuance of war, yet assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The

¹ Diodor. xiii. 52.

² Diodor. xiii. 53.

See a former volume, chap. liv.

Refused by
Athens—
opposition of
Kleophon.

Grounds of
the oppo-
sition of
Kleophon.

question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokratēs to the Ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens.¹ We cannot doubt that Alkibiadēs and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position—to withdraw garrisons—to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylus—she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia: such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war—doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklēs would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory at Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice calculated to paralyse Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet.² Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates: indeed past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burthen of war; but would merely have blunted the ardour and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly—and by the generals,

¹ Diodor. xiii. 52.

² Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant — Δακεδαιμονιῶν

πρεσβευταρένων περὶ εἰρήνης ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο: compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 722—Philocori Fragment. 117-118. ed. Didot.

Alkibiadēs, Theramenēs, and Thrasybulus—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated ; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favourable to her enemies should have arrived.

If therefore, passing from the vague accusation, that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject—we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made : yet a statesman like Periklēs would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont ; although the ardour and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus ; near to which (at a place called Aspaneus) the Idæan wood was chiefly exported.¹

n.c. 410, May, June, &c.

Strenuous aid of Pharnabazus to the Peloponnesians—Alkibiadēs and the Athenian fleet at the Bosphorus.

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkēdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory had been to sail to Perinthus

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 1, 24–26; Strabo, *xiii.* p. 606.

and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens: the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadēs then conducted them to Chalkēdon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens: first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn-ships from the Euxine for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through—not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkēdon in the Bosphorus (about June 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence; and her supplies obtained during the last few months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C. had been comparatively restricted.

Though Chalkēdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadēs now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine.¹ The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now re-established under the auspices of Alkibiadēs. In so

¹ See Demosthen. de Coronā, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 22. *καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσόπολει), καὶ τὴν δεκάδην ἔξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων:* compare iv. 8, 27; and v. 1, 28: also Diodor. xiii. 64.

The expression *τὴν δεκάδην* implies that this tithe was something known and pre-established.

Polybius (iv. 44) gives credit to Alki-

biadēs for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before—even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi. 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii. cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenēs were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus especially,¹ the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollect that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretence that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynicus had predicted from the first. The Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles,² under whose auspices the Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernēs; an accusation, which seems improbable, but which the Lacedæmonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.³

The tone at Athens, since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedæmonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia the abundant influx into the Peiræus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C., since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alkibiadēs. For the safe reception of these vessels,

The Lacedæmonians are expelled from Thasus.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 1, 32; *Demonthen. cont. Leptin.* s. 48. c. 14, p. 474. | ² Thucyd. viii. 64. | ³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 1, 32.

Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (B.C. 410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.¹

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded 50 triremes, 1000 of the regular hoplites, 100 horsemen, and 5000 seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes.² Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernê had summoned, under proclamation "to go and succour the goddess Artemis;" as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived.³ From these enemies Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost 300 men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On the way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to Sestos, and afterwards to Byzantium. But Sestos was the Athenian station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for Abydos, the Peloponnesian station.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 34; i. 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii. 64) confounds Thrasyllus with Thrasyllos.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τὰν ποτέρων

εἴκοσι νεῦαι—and then αἱ ἔπερι τίνει, αἱ νεωτὶ ἡκουονται. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia, since the battle of Kyzicus—though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Miletus, in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Peiræus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse: they contrived however during the ensuing winter to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alkibiadēs the Athenian (cousin and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name), whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.¹

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined Alkibiadēs at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their head-quarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions throughout the neighbouring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alkibiadēs was proceeding to marshal the army altogether (the hoplites, pursuant to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes), his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternise with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus, presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honour of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be re-established, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty.² Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylus, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenēs in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked both by sea and by land; and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 8-15.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

Thrasyllus
and Alki-
biadēs at the
Hellespont.

B.C. 409.
Pylus is re-
taken by the
Lacedemo-
nians—dis-
grace of the
Athenian
Anytus for
not relieving
it.

Athenians sent to its relief 30 triremes under Anytus, who however came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavourable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylus was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation.¹ But Anytus on his return encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfill, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the Dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption.² Whether he could really have reached Pylus, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisaea, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to retake it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.³

Thrasyllos, during the summer of B.C. 409—and even the joint force of Thrasyllos and Alkibiadēs during the autumn b.c. 408. Capture of Chalkēdon by Alkibiadēs and the Athenians. of the same year—seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force: indeed it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedæmonian Klearchus, with his 15 Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by 9 Athenian triremes.⁴ But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadēs and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkēdon and Byzantium. The Chalkedonians, having notice of the project, deposited their moveable property for safety in the hands of their neighbours the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of

¹ Diodor. xiii. 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (*Hellen.* i. 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylus, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea—as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylus*—prove how much he wrote from the statements of Lacedæmonian informants.

² Diodor. xiii. 64; Plutarch, *Coriolan.* c. 14.

Aristotle, 'Αθηναῖον πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration. v. Δεκάδῶν—and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72. ed. Didot. (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 127). ³ Diodor. xiii. 65.

⁴ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 1, 36.

the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining.¹ But the precaution was frustrated by Alkibiadēs, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalkēdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion (or temple of Heraklēs) belonging to the Chalkedonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokratēs, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him—so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokratēs himself killed.²

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadēs departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenēs and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkēdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians 20 talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.³

Convention
concluded
by the
Athenians
with Phar-
nabazus.

¹ Polyb. iv. 44–45.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 5–7; Diodor. xiii. 66.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 9. ‘Τηγελεύν τὸν φόρον Χαλκηδονίους Ἀθηναῖοι ὑστορεῖ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὄφειλμένα χρήματα ἀποδούναι· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Καλλιηδονίοις, ἵνα οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα πρέσβεις ἔλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter,

whether the Athenians ever did or could realise their project of commuting the tribute (imposed upon the dependant allies) for an *ad valorem* duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydidēs (vii. 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the Chalkedonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was

Oaths to this effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alkibiadēs from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alkibiadēs should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alkibiadēs, while two relatives of Alkibiadēs came to Chalkēdon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alkibiadēs took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alkibiadēs had employed his period of absence in capturing
b.c. 408. Byzantium captured by the Athenians. Selymbria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkēdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These however the Lacedæmonian garrison, under the harmost Klearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus and Boeotians under Koeratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Klearchus, strict and harsh even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Koeratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their

the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkēdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider in his note upon the passage Ἀθηναῖος δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Χαλκηδονίοις. He notices the tenor of the

covenant, as it stands in Plutarch—τὴν Φαρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Χαλκηδονίοις he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.

suffering. But the favourable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadês with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Kœratadas, apprised of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion. They were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Kœratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Peiræus. Favourable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon.¹

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter.² Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and ensuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Besides this improvement in her position, the accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well-disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argians (all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay), were directed after the siege of Chalkêdon to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratês, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it

n.c. 408.
Pharnabazus
conveys some
Athenian
envoys to
wards Susa,
to make
terms with
the Great
King.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii. 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31. with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii. xi. 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i. 48, 2.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not consist

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 1.

was while pursuing their tract into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of King Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor. Some Lacedæmonian envoys (Boëotius and others) were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.¹

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 4, 2-3.

• CHAPTER LXIV.

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR
DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF ARGINŪSÆ.

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus by the cruel queen Parysatis, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia; as well as general of all that military division of which the muster-place was Kastôlus.

Cyrus the younger—
effects of his coming down to Asia Minor.

His command did not at this time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernê and Pharnabazus.¹ But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. Whatever this young man willed, he willed strongly: his bodily activity, rising superior to those temptations of sensual indulgence which often enervated the Persian grandees, provoked the admiration even of Spartans;² and his energetic character was combined with a certain measure of ability. Though he had not as yet conceived that deliberate plan for mounting the Persian throne which afterwards absorbed his whole mind, and was so near succeeding by the help of the Ten Thousand Greeks—yet he seems to have had from the beginning the sentiment and ambition of a king in prospect, not those of a satrap. He came down well-aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated—for the last sixty years. He therefore brought down with him a strenuous desire, to put down the Athenian power, very different from the treacherous balancing of Tissaphernê, and much

¹ The Anabasis of Xenophon (i. 1, i. 4, 3, 6–8; i. 9, 7–9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the Hellenica,

² See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lyander in Xenoph. *Econom.* iv. 21, 23.

more formidable even than the straightforward enmity of Pharnabazus, who had less money, less favour at court, and less of youthful ardour. Moreover, Pharnabazus, after having heartily espoused the cause of the Peloponnesians for the last three years, had now become weary of the allies whom he had so long kept in pay. Instead of expelling Athenian influence from his coasts with little difficulty, as he had expected to do—he found his satrapy plundered, his revenues impaired or absorbed, and an Athenian fleet all-powerful in the Propontis and Hellespont; while the Lacedæmonian fleet, which he had taken so much pains to invite, was destroyed. Decidedly sick of the Peloponnesian cause, he was even leaning towards Athens; and the envoys whom he was escorting to Susa might perhaps have laid the foundation of an altered Persian policy in Asia Minor, when the journey of Cyrus down to the coast overthrew all such calculations. The young prince brought with him a fresh, hearty, and youthful antipathy against Athens,—a power inferior only to that of the Great King himself—and an energetic determination to use it without reserve in ensuring victory to the Peloponnesians.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Bœotius, and the other Lacedæmonian envoys.

Pharnabazus detains the Athenian envoys travelling along with the young prince, made extravagant boasts of having obtained all that they asked for at Susa; while Cyrus himself announced his powers as unlimited in extent over the whole coast, all for the purpose of prosecuting vigorous war in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians. Pharnabazus, on hearing such intelligence and seeing the Great King's seal to the words—"I send down Cyrus, as lord of all those who muster at Kastôlus"—not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince; who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second—detaining them in Kappadokiâ for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast.¹

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 3-8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention — οὐθεν πρὸς τὸ κλλο — appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no

This arrival of Cyrus, overruling the treachery of Tissaphernēs as well as the weariness of Pharnabazus, and supplying the enemies of Athens with a double flow of Persian gold at a moment when the stream would otherwise have dried up—was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war.¹ But important as the event was in itself, it was rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

b.c. 407.
Lysander—
Lacedæ-
monian
admiral in
Asia.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas about December 408 b.c., or January 407 b.c.² He was the last (after Brasidas and Gyliппus) of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called Mothakes, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline. He was not only an excellent officer,³ thoroughly competent to the duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue,

camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 b.c. Xenophon inadvertently speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

¹ The words of Thucydides (ii. 65) imply this as his opinion—Κύρῳ τε ὑστεροὶ βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, &c.

² The commencement of Lysander's navarchy or year of maritime command appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis—Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ Κρατησιππίδᾳ τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθότας, Λέσβου δρόμῳ ἐξέπεμψαν ναυαρχού. 'Ο δὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ρόδον, καὶ νῦν ἐκεῖθεν λαβών, ἐς Κῶ καὶ Μίλητον ἐπλευσεν' ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Ἐφεσον καὶ ἐεἰς ἔμεινε, νῦν ἔχων ἐβδομήκοντα, μέχρις οὐ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεις ἀφίκετο (Xenoph. Hell. i. 5, 2).

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 b.c.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage—πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ—when he says—"During the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens, Lysander is sent as ναυαρχος"—Xen. Hell. i. 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadēs, and the substitution of Λαλούς δέκα, between September 407 and September 406, when Cullicritidus succeeded.

Lysander."

Now Alcibiadēs came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May 407, and staid there till the beginning of September 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alcibiadēs reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not sent out "during the stay of Alcibiadēs at Athens," but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander in September 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas perished, was fought about August 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words πρότερον τούτων, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense—"these events"—mean the general series of events which begins i. 4, 8—the proceedings of Alcibiadēs from the beginning of the spring of 407.

³ Aelian, V. H. xii. 43; Athenaeus, vi. p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of Mothakes is given by Athenaeus as coming from Phy-larchus, and I see no reason for calling it in question. Aelian states the same thing respecting Gyliппus and Kallikratidas also; I do not know on what authority.

and for organising a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure,¹ and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His family, poor as it was, enjoyed a dignified position at Sparta—belonging to the gens of the Herakleidæ, not connected by any near relationship with the kings: moreover his personal reputation as a Spartan was excellent, since his observance of the rules of discipline had been rigorous and exemplary. The habits of self-constraint thus acquired served him in good stead when it became necessary to his ambition to court the favour of the great. His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him—such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice, men by means of oaths.² A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadēs; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel; an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadēs. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadēs, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses; ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

Kratesippidas, the predecessor of Lysander, seems to have enjoyed the maritime command for more than the usual yearly period, having superseded Pasippidas during the middle of the year of the latter. But the maritime power of Sparta was then so weak (having not yet recovered from the ruinous defeat at Kyzikus), that he achieved little or nothing. We hear of him only as furthering, for his own profit, a political revolution at Chios. Bribed by a party of Chian exiles, he took possession of the acropolis, reinstated them in the island, and aided them in deposing and expelling the party then in office, to the number of 600. It is plain that this was not a question between democracy and oligarchy, but between two oligarchical

¹ Theopompos, Fragn. 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30.

² Plutarch, Lysander, c. 8.

parties, the one of which succeeded in purchasing the factious agency of the Spartan admiral. The exiles whom he expelled took possession of Atarneus, a strong post belonging to the Chians on the mainland opposite Lesbos. From hence they made war, as well as they could, upon their rivals now in possession of the island, and also upon other parts of Ionia; not without some success and profit, as will appear by their condition about ten years afterwards.¹

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, thus begun by Kratesippidas, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised—but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes and then sailed onward to Kôs (an Athenian island, so that he could only have touched there) and Milêtus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of 70 triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis (about April or May 407 b.c.), Lysander went to pay his court to him along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favour. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernês—whom they accused of having frustrated the king's orders and sacrificed the interests of the empire, under the seductions of Alkibiadês,—they entreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations of the treaty by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him (he said) 500 talents, which should be at once devoted to the cause: if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.²

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises, which were not likely to prove empty words from the lips of a vehement youth like Cyrus. So

¹ Diodor. xiii. 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by Isokratis de Pace, Sect. 128. p. 240, ed. Bekk.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 3-4; Diodor. |

xiii. 70; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favourite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it a little before from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the ~~seamen~~; which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernēs through his envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean, and when it was doubtful whether they would come—but actually paid only for the first month, and then reduced to half a drachma, furnished in practice with miserable irregularity. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it.¹ In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were treated with distinction, and feasted at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favour he could do to gratify him most. “To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay,” replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favour or present for himself—judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milētus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernēs had probably been made known to him. From such corruption, as well as from

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 5. *εἰναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνόπτικας οὐτως ἔχοντας, τράπουτα μνᾶς ἐκδοτρη νητ τοῦ μηρὸς διδόναι, δύοτας ἀν βούλοντα τρέφειν Λακεδαιμονίοι.*

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii. 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise; first a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernēs at Sparta—next, the satrap himself at Milētus cut down the drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii. 29).

Mr. Mitford says—“Lysander proposed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to

every seaman.”

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated *three oboli* as equal to not quite fourpence sterling. Of course therefore it is plain that he did not consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx. sect. i. vol. iv. p. 317, oct. ed. 1814).

That a drachma was equivalent to six oboli (that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli) is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word *eight* (in the first sentence here cited) to be a misprint for *six*. If the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to be equal to *eight* oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find

the mean carelessness of Theramenēs (the Spartan) respecting the condition of the seamen,¹ Lysander's conduct stood out in pointed and honourable contrast.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli (instead of three) per man, but also ensured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked,² in reference to Periklēs and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man—even if looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. With his Persian and princely ideas of winning adherents by munificence,³ a man who despised presents was a phænomenon commanding the higher sentiment of wonder and respect. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war, and even condescended to second his personal ambition to the detriment of this object.⁴

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, after such unexampled success in his interview with Cyrus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, procuring more complete tackle, and inviting picked crews.⁵ He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated

Abundant pay of the Peloponnesian armament furnished by Cyrus.

Factions organized by Lysander among the Asiatic cities.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 29.

basis of Xenophon, i. 9, 22–28.

² See a former volume, ch. li.

⁴ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 13; Plutarch,

³ See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the Ana-

Lysand. c. 4–9.

⁵ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 10.

these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities.¹ His newly established influence with Cyrus, and the abundant supplies of which he was now master, added double force to an invitation in itself but too seducing. And thus, while infusing increased ardour into the joint warlike efforts of these cities, he at the same time procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage; rendering the continuance of his own command almost essential to success. The fruits of his factious manœuvres will be seen in the subsequent Dekarchies or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring formidable efficacy to their side of the contest (during the summer B.C. 407. of 407 B.C.), the victorious exile Alkibiadēs had accomplished the important and delicate step of re-entering his Proceedings native city for the first time. According to the accom-
of Alkibiadēs
in Thrace
and Asia.modation with Pharnabazus, concluded after the reduction of Chalkēdon, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter: in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadēs brought them again to Samos; from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of 100 talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdēra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. A valuable contribution for the support of the fleet was doubtless among the fruits of this success. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadēs as precursors of his own return.²

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested B.C. 407. their favourable disposition towards Alkibiadēs by choosing him anew general of the armament, along His arrival at Athens. with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadēs was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied. He first stopped

¹ Diodor. xiii. 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5. though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii. 72. The chronology of Xenophon,

at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the Lacedæmonian harbour of Gytheion, where he had learnt that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his re-election as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations and encouragements of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen—at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus on a marked day—the festival of the Plynteria on the 25th of the month Thargelion—(about the end of May 407 B.C.). This was a day of melancholy solemnity, accounted unpropitious for any action of importance. The statue of the goddess Athénè was stripped of all its ornaments, covered up from every one's gaze, and washed or cleansed under a mysterious ceremonial, by the holy gens called Praxiergidæ.¹ The goddess thus seemed to turn away her face, and refuse to behold the returning exile. Such at least was the construction of his enemies; and as the subsequent turn of events tended to bear them out, it has been preserved; while the more auspicious counter-interpretation, doubtless suggested by his friends, has been forgotten.

The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendour of this return of Alkibiadēs to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity—especially by Duris at Samos, an author about two generations later. It was said that he brought with him 200 prow-ornaments belonging to captive enemies' ships, or (according to some) even the 200 captured ships themselves; that his trireme was ornamented with gilt and silvered shields, and sailed by purple sails; that Kallippidēs, one of the most distinguished actors of the day, performed the functions of Keleustēs, pronouncing the chant or word of command to the rowers; that Chrysogonus, a flute-player who had gained the first prize at the Pythian games, was also on board, playing the air of return.² All these details, invented with melancholy facility to illustrate an ideal of ostentation and insolence, are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The re-entry of Alkibiadēs was not merely unostentatious, but even

Feelings and details connected with his arrival.

¹ See the description of a similar solemnity performed by appointed priestesses and other women at Argos (the annual washing of the statue of Athénè in the river Inachus) given by the poet Kallimachus—*Hymnus in Lavacrum Palladis*—with the copious illustrative notes of Ezekiel Spanheim. Here, again, we find analogies in the existing sentiment of the Hindoo religion. Colonel

Sleeman mentions—“The water of the Ganges, with which the image of the God Vishnoo has been washed, is considered a very holy draught, fit for princes. That with which the image of the God Seva is washed, must not be drunk.” (*Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, ch. 23, p. 182).

² Diodor. xiii. 68; Plutarch, *Alkib.* c. 31; *Athenæ.* xii. p. 535.

mistrustful and apprehensive. He had with him only twenty triremes; and though encouraged, not merely by the assurances of his friends, but also by the news that he had just been re-elected general,—he was nevertheless half-afraid to disembark, even at the instant when he made fast his ship to the quay in Peiræus. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port, animated by curiosity, interest, and other emotions of every kind, to see him arrive. But so little did he trust their sentiments, that he hesitated at first to step on shore, and stood up on the deck looking about for his friends and kinsmen. Presently he saw Eurypolemus his cousin and others, by whom he was heartily welcomed, and in the midst of whom he landed. But they too were so apprehensive of his numerous enemies, that they formed themselves into a sort of body-guard to surround and protect him against any possible assault, during his march from Peiræus to Athens.¹

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the Senate and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and gently, but pathetically, deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous and so pronounced, was the sentiment in his favour, both of the Senate and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense.² The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled: the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head: the record of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead, upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea: his confiscated property was restored: lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of 100 triremes, 1500 hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and 150 horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends—amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 18, 19. 'Αλκιβίαδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν δρμισθεὶς, ἀπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τὸν ἔχθρον: ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος, ἐσκόπει τὸν αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεῖον, εἰ παρέσταν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τὸν Πεισιδάνακτον, ἔστησεν δὲ ἀνεψιδῶν, καὶ τὸν

ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ φίλους μετ' αὐτῷ, τούτῳ ἀποβὰς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παρεσκευασμένων, εἰ τις ἀπτοῖτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20; Plutarch, Alcibi. c. 33; Diodor. xiii. 69.

impressed by his friends on willing hearers, that Alkibiadēs was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens. The general expectation, which he and his friends took every possible pains to excite, was, that his victorious career of the last three years was a preparation for yet greater triumphs during the next.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadēs on entering the Peiraeus, and to the body-guard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. It intoxicated him, and led him to make light of enemies whom only just before he had so much dreaded. This mistake, together with the carelessness and insolence arising out of what seemed to be an unbounded ascendancy, proved the cause of his future ruin. But the truth is, that these enemies, however they might remain silent, had not ceased to be formidable. Alkibiadēs had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 b.c. to May 407 b.c. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation; since his overbearing private demeanour had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge; and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence. He was characterized as a patriot animated by the noblest motives, who had brought both first-rate endowments and large private wealth to the service of the commonwealth, but had been ruined by a conspiracy of corrupt and worthless speakers, every way inferior to him; men, whose only chance of success with the people arose from expelling those who were better than themselves, while he (Alkibiadēs), far from having any interest adverse to the democracy, was the natural and worthy favourite of a democratical people.¹ So far as the old causes of unpopularity were concerned, therefore, time and absence had done much to weaken their effect, and to assist his friends in countervailing them by pointing to the treacherous political manœuvres employed against him.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 14-16.

and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively manifested, by stabs but too effectively aimed at her vitals. The sending of Gylippus to Syracuse—the fortification of Dekeleia—the revolts of Chios' and Milētus—the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred—had all been emphatically the measures of Alkibiadēs. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted some excuse: it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life.¹ Such pretences, however, could not really impose upon any one. The treason of Alkibiadēs during the period of his exile remained indefensible as well as undeniable, and would have been more than sufficient as a theme for his enemies, had their tongues been free. But his position was one altogether singular: having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief: nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenēs and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadēs:² moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised to bring with him—Persian alliance and pay to Athens—had proved a complete delusion. Still the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges such as Thucydidēs, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Disposition to refrain from dwelling on his previous wrongs, and to give him a new trial. Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 b.c. The more distant past exhibited him as among the worst of criminals—the recent past, as a valuable servant and patriot—the future promised continuance in this last character, so far as there were any positive indications to judge by. Now this was a case in which discussion and recrimination could not possibly answer any useful purpose. There

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 15.

² This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos—Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6—"quoniam Theramenēs et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus pre-

fuerant." And again in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1), "Primum Peloponnesiacobello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc."

was every reason for re-appointing Alkibiadēs to his command ; but this could only be done under prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. The popular instinct felt this situation perfectly, and imposed absolute silence on his enemies.¹ We are not to infer from hence that the people had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadēs, or that they entertained for him nothing but unqualified confidence and admiration. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose ; and that his enemies should be precluded from reviving the mention of an irreparable past, so as to shut the door against him. But what was thus interdicted to men's lips as unseasonable, was not effaced from their recollections ; nor were the enemies, though silenced for the moment, rendered powerless for the future. All this train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence, perhaps even by blameless ill-success, on the part of Alkibiadēs.

At a juncture when so much depended upon his future behaviour, he showed (as we shall see presently) that he completely misinterpreted the temper of the people. Intoxicated by the unexpected triumph of his reception—according to that fatal susceptibility so common among distinguished Greeks—he forgot his own past history, and fancied that the people had forgotten and forgiven it also ; construing their studied and well-advised silence into a proof of oblivion. He conceived himself in assured possession of public confidence, and looked upon his numerous enemies as if they no longer existed, because they were not allowed to speak at a most unseasonable hour. Without doubt, his exultation was shared by his friends, and this sense of false security proved his future ruin.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadēs himself—Adeimantus and Aristokratēs—were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore.² In less than three months, his armament was ready ; but he de-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20. λέχθεντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι διγ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, &c.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 21. Both Diодорος (xiii. 69) and Cornelius Nepos (Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and

Adeimantus as his colleagues : both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοῖς.

signedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boedromion (about the beginning of September) when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place, along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadēs on this occasion caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity; assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. No such attack was hazarded; so that he had the satisfaction of reviving the full regularity of this illustrious scene, and escorting the numerous communicants out and home, without the smallest interruption;—an exploit gratifying to the religious feelings of the people, and imparting an acceptable sense of undiminished Athenian power; while in reference to his own reputation, it was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned.¹

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament.

Fruitless attempt of Agis to surprise Athens. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadēs when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Bœotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, so that the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants—said to have amounted to 28,000 men, of whom half were hoplites, with 1200 cavalry, 900 of them Bœotians—were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of Akadēmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle,

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remark.—able incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them.¹ We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants in defiance of his neighbourhood.

The first exploit of Alkibiadēs was to proceed to Andros, now under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island, he plundered the fields, defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town; which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege.² At Samos he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus—the influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus—the strong anti-Athenian dispositions of the young prince—and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. He now first became convinced of the failure of those hopes which he had conceived, not without good reason, in the preceding year—and of which he had doubtless boasted at Athens; that the alliance of Persia might be neutralised at least, if not won over, through the envoys escorted to Susa by Pharnabazus. It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernēs to mediate with Cyrus, to introduce to him some Athenian envoys, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia; that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other. Such a policy, uncongenial at all times to the vehement temper of Cyrus, had become yet more repugnant to him since his intercourse with Lysander. He would not consent even to see the envoys, nor was he probably displeased to put a slight upon a neighbour and rival satrap. Deep was the despondency among the Athenians at Samos, when painfully convinced that all hopes from Persia must be abandoned for themselves; and farther, that Persian pay was both more ample and better assured, to their enemies, than ever it had been before.³

b.c. 407.
Sept., Octob.

Alkibiadēs
gails with an
armament to
Asia—ill-
success at
Andros—ent-
ire failure
in respect to
hopes from
Persia.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 72, 73.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 22—i. 5, 18; left at Andros—which cannot be true. Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Diodor. xiii. 69. ³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 9; Plutarch,

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadēs attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phenician fleet to his aid,—which in his mouth was not intended to delude, as it had been by Tissaphernēs.¹ Unable to bring about a general battle, and having no immediate or capital enterprise to constrain his attention, Alkibiadēs became careless, and abandoned himself partly to the love of pleasure, partly to reckless predatory enterprises for the purpose of getting money to pay his army. Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont and was now engaged in fortifying Phokaea, probably for the purpose of establishing a post to be enabled to pillage the interior. Here he was joined by Alkibiadēs, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos. He left it under the command of his favourite pilot Antiochus, but with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

While employed in his visit to Phokaea and Klazomenæ, Alkibiadēs, perhaps hard-pressed for money, conceived the unwarrantable project of enriching his men by the plunder of the neighbouring territory of Kymē, an allied dependency of Athens. Landing on this territory unexpectedly, after fabricating some frivolous calumnies against the Kymæans, he at first seized much property and a considerable number of prisoners. But the inhabitants assembled in arms, bravely defended their possessions, and repelled his men to their ships; recovering the plundered property, and lodging it in safety within their walls. Stung with this miscarriage, Alkibiadēs sent for a reinforcement of hoplites from Mitylēnē, and marched up to the walls of Kymē, where he in vain challenged the citizens to come forth and fight. He then ravaged

Lysand. c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen:

¹ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

the territory at pleasure; while the Kymæans had no other resource, except to send envoys to Athens, to complain of so gross an outrage inflicted by the Athenian general upon an unoffending Athenian dependency.¹

This was a grave charge, and not the only charge which Alkibiadēs had to meet at Athens. During his absence at Phokæa and Kymē, Antiochus the pilot, whom he had left in command, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, first sailed across from Samos to Notium, the harbour of Kolophoni—and from thence to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbour with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, insulting them scornfully and defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder, and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well-marshalled and kept in hand; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium—losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain. Before retiring to Ephesus, Lysander had the satisfaction of erecting his trophy on the shore of Notium; while the Athenian fleet was carried back to its station at Samos.²

It was in vain that Alkibiadēs, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in battle order, challenging the enemy to come forth. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping off the late dishonour. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios.³

¹ Diodor. xiii. 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymē, which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (Hellen. i. 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadēs to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do not name Kymē, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or

consequences. But the plunder of Kymē is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 12-15; Diodor. xiii. 71; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 15; Diodor. xiii. 76.

I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion,

Complaints
of the
Kymæans
at Athens
—defeat of
Antiochus
at Notium
during the
absence of
Alkibiadēs.

Dissatisfaction and complaint in the armament against Alkibiadēs. Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfaction had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiadēs. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior, in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily—and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished; while, on the other side, there was to be reckoned, the disappointment on the score of Persia—which had great effect on the temper of the armament, and which, though not his fault, was contrary to expectations which he had held out—the disgraceful plunder of Kymē—and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiadēs had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight, and that the battle had been hazarded in flagrant disobedience to his injunctions. But this circumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction, of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient—if besides disobedience, he had displayed a childish vanity and an utter neglect of all military precautions—who was it that had chosen him for deputy; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting the pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost? ‘It was Alkibiadēs who placed Antiochus in this grave and responsible situation: a personal favourite, an excellent convivial companion, but destitute of all qualities befitting a commander. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadēs—his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation. The loud murmurs of the camp charged him with neglecting the interests of the service for enjoyments with jovial parties and Ionian women, and with admitting to his confidence those who best contributed to the amusement of such chosen hours.¹

Murmur and accusation against Alkibiadēs. It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens, by the mouth of Thrasybulus son of Thrason²—not the eminent Thrasybulus

which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.

¹ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favour of Alkibiadēs, then a young

man; by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

² A person named *Thrason* is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, p. 221, 222 of the Corp. Inscr. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiae in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as *Butades*: he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

(son of Lykus) who has been already often mentioned in this history, and will be mentioned again. There came at the same time to Athens the complaints from Kymê, against the unprovoked aggression and plunder of that place by Alkibiadês; and seemingly complaints from other places besides.¹ It was even urged as accusation against him, that he was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, so soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.*

Such grave and wide-spread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success—were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadês. He had no character to fall back upon; or rather, he had a character worse than none—such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free; and all the adverse recollections of his past life doubtless revived. The people had refused to listen to these, in order that he might have a fair trial, and might verify the title, claimed for him by his friends, to be judged only by his subsequent exploits, achieved since the year 411 B.C. He had now had his trial; he had been found wanting; and the popular confidence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people (however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture) as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkibiadês in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform—and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible

¹ Xenoph. Hellenc. i. 5, 16–17. Ἀλκιβίδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῷ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, &c. •Diodor. xiii. 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ' αὐτὸν, &c.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lyrias (Orat. xxi. Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadês as having been a

Alteration of
sentiment at
Athens—
displeasure
of the
Athenians
against
him.

most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alkibiadês preferred his trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Archestratus and Erasiniadês preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

expectations were not already realised. That the people entertained large expectations, from so very considerable an armament, cannot be doubted: the largest of all, probably (as in the instance of the Sicilian expedition), were those entertained by Alkibiadēs himself, and promulgated by his friends. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done, had Alkibiadēs, after performing all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed, from obstacles beyond his own control, in realising their hopes and his own promises. No such case occurred: that which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties—he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat, by his disgraceful selection of an unworthy lieutenant¹—he had violated the territory and property of an allied dependency, at a moment when Athens had a paramount interest in cultivating by every means the attachment of her remaining allies. The truth is, as I have before remarked, that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He had mistaken a hopeful public, determined, even by forced silence as to the past, to give him the full benefit of a meritorious future, but requiring as condition from him that that future should really be meritorious—for a public of assured admirers, whose favour he had already earned and might consider as his own. He became an altered man after that visit, like Miltiadēs after the battle of Marathon; or rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute and insolent, broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus—when Alkibiadēs was labouring to regain the favour of his injured countrymen and was yet uncertain whether he should succeed—he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet and leaving it under

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἡγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οὐδέμενοι δι' αὐτὸν ἐλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν ἀπολώλεκέναι τὰς ναῦς.

The expression which Thucydidēs employs in reference to Alkibiadēs requires a few words of comment: (vi. 15)—καὶ δῆμοσις κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφῆλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The “strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business” here as-

cribed to Alkibiadēs, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true (at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth) for the period before his exile.

the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If therefore Athenian sentiment towards Alkibiadēs underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in *his* character and behaviour; an alteration for the worse, just at the crisis when everything turned upon his good conduct, and upon his deserving at least, if he could not command, success.

We may indeed observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse and in reference to the coming of Gylippus, were far graver and more mischievous than those of Alkibiadēs during this turning-season of his career—and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal.

Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkibiadēs, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it,—nor even prevent them from sending him a second armament to be ruined along with the first. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long the most melancholy public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, decorum, good intentions, and high station;¹ how short-lived was the ascendancy of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station—when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none. Yet on the whole, Nikias, looking at him as a public servant, was far more destructive to his country than Alkibiadēs. The mischief done to Athens by the latter was done chiefly in the avowed service of her enemies.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkibiadēs, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command; naming ten new generals to replace him. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed. Yet his proceedings at Kymē, if they happened as we read them, richly deserved judicial animadversion; and the people, had they so dealt with him, would only have acted up to the estimable function ascribed

¹ To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgement of Thucydidēs respecting Alkibiadēs, cited in my last note, and to say—καὶ δημοσίᾳ καὶ κισταῖ διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀδικίᾳ ἔκαστος τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες, καὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφῆ-

λαν τὴν πόλιν.

The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words are *not* an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydidēs, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadēs and Nikias.

Different behaviour towards Nikias and towards Alkibiadēs.

to them by the oligarchical Phryničus—"of serving as refuge to their dependent allies, and chastising the high-handed oppressions of the optimates against them!" In the perilous position of Athens, however, with reference to the foreign war, such a political trial would have been productive of much dissension and mischief. And Alkibiadēs avoided the question by not coming to Athens. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were, Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklēs, Erasinidēs, Aristokratēs, Archestratus, Promachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenēs. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros, with the twenty ships which he had there to receive the fleet from Alkibiadēs; while Phanosthenēs proceeded with four triremes to replace Konon at Andros.²

In his way thither, Phanosthenēs fell in with Dorieus the Rhodian and two Thurian triremes, which he captured with every man aboard. The captives were sent to Athens, where all were placed in custody (in case of future exchange) except Dorieus himself. The latter had been condemned to death and banished from his native city of Rhodes, together with his kindred; probably on the score of political disaffection, at the time when Rhodes was a member of the Athenian alliance. Having since then become a citizen of Thurii,¹ he had served with distinction in the fleet of Mindarus both at Milētus and the Hellespont. The Athenians now had so much compassion upon him, that they released him at once and unconditionally, without even demanding a ransom or an equivalent. By what particular circumstance their compassion was determined, forming a pleasing exception to the melancholy habits which pervaded Grecian warfare in both belligerents—we should never have learnt from the meagre narrative of Xenophon. But we ascertain from other sources, that Dorieus (the son of Diagoras of Rhodes) was illustrious beyond all other Greeks for his victories in the pankration at the Olympic, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals—that he had gained the first prize at three Olympic festivals in succession (of which Olympiad 88 or 428 B.C. was the second), a distinction altogether without precedent, besides 8 Isthmian and 7 Nemean prizes—that his father Diagoras, his brothers, and his cousins were all celebrated as successful athletes

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν μισθήν.
^{τε} (of the allied dependencies) καταφυγὴν, ² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 18; Diodor. καὶ ἐκεῖνων (i. e. of the high persons called καλοκάγαθοι or optimates) σωφρ-

—lastly, that the family were illustrious from old date in their native island of Rhodes, and were even descended from the Messenian hero Aristomenê. When the Athenians saw before them as their prisoner a man doubtless of magnificent stature and presence (as we may conclude from his athletic success), and surrounded by such a halo of glory impressive in the highest degree to Grecian imagination—the feelings and usages of war were at once overruled. Though Dorieus had been one of their most vehement enemies, they could not bear either to touch his person, or to exact from him any condition. Released by them on this occasion, he lived to be put to death, about thirteen years afterwards, by the Lacedæmonians.¹

When Konon reached Samos to take the command, he found the armament in a state of great despondency; not merely from the dishonourable affair of Notium, but also from disappointed hopes connected with Alkibiadês, and from difficulties in procuring regular pay. So painfully was the last inconvenience felt, that the first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above 160 triremes to 70; and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the abler seamen of the larger. With this fleet he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay.²

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadês (that is, about December 407 b.c. or January 406 b.c.), the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta in annually changing her admiral—both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of the new successor.

Kallikratidas, unfortunately only shown by the Fates,³ and not suffered to continue in the Grecian world, was one of the noblest characters of his age. Besides perfect courage, energy, and

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 19; Pausan. vi. 7, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 20; compare i. 6, 16; Diodor. xiii. 77.

³ Virgil, Aeneid, vi. 870.

Ostendit terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra
Esse sinent.

incorruptibility, he was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks; entire straightforwardness of dealing—and a Pan-hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, and merciful. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse; having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally.¹ Moreover, on delivering up the fleet to Kallikratidas at Ephesus, he made boast of delivering to him at the same time the mastery of the sea, through the victory recently gained at Notium. “Conduct the fleet from Ephesus along the coast of Samos, passing by the Athenian station (replied Kallikratidas), and give it up to me at Milētus: I shall then believe in your mastery of the sea.” Lysander had nothing else to say, except that he should give himself no farther trouble, now that his command had been transferred to another.

Murmurs and ill-will against Kallikratidas—energy and rectitude whereby he represses them.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures; upon which he summoned them together, and said: “I for my part am quite content to remain at home; and if Lysander or any one else pretends to be a better admiral than I am, I have nothing to say against it. But sent here as I am by the authorities at Sparta to command the fleet, I have no choice except to execute their orders in the best way that I can. You now know how far my ambition reaches;² you know also the murmurs which are abroad against our common city (for her frequent change of admirals). Look to it, and give me your opinion—Shall I stay where I am—or shall I go home, and communicate what has happened here?”

This remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Every one replied that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

¹ How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8). The obligation to give them back to

Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 5. ὅμεις δὲ, πρὸς ἀ ἔγώ τε φιλοτιμούσαι, καὶ η πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιζέται (ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ, οὐκεπε καὶ ἔγώ) ξυμβουλεύετε, &c.

His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Of course this step was admirably calculated to make every one regret the alteration of command. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus, eager to manifest in every way his partiality for the last admiral, deferred receiving him,—first for two days, then for a farther interval, until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview. So intolerable to his feelings was the humiliation of thus begging at the palace gates, that he bitterly deplored those miserable dissensions among the Greeks which constrained both parties to truckle to the foreigner for money; swearing that if he survived the year's campaign, he would use every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta.¹

In the meantime, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea; knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was, to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milētus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the meantime he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He reminded them that the necessity of this demand sprang altogether from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back the funds in his hands:—that he had already in vain applied to Cyrus for farther money, meeting only with such insulting neglect as could no longer be endured: that they (the Milesians), dwelling amidst the Persians, and having already experienced the maximum of ill-usage at their hands, ought now to be foremost in the war, and to set an example of zeal to the other allies,² in order to get clear the sooner from dependence upon such imperious taskmasters. He promised that when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly recompense their forwardness. “Let us, with the aid of

His spirited behaviour in regard to the Persians.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 7; Plutarch, έγώ ἀξιώ προθυμοτάτους είναι ἐς τὸν Lysand. c. 6. πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6. 9. ὑμᾶς δὲ πλειστὰ κακὰ ἡδη ὅπ' αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.

the Gods, show these foreigners [he concluded] that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them."

The spectacle of this generous patriot struggling against a degrading dependence on the foreigner, which was now becoming unhappily familiar to the leading Greeks of both sides—excites our warm sympathy and admiration. We may add, that his language to the Milesians, reminding them of the misery which they had endured from the Persians as a motive to exertion in the war—is full of instruction as to the new situation opened for the Asiatic Greeks since the breaking up of the Athenian power. No such evils had they suffered while Athens was competent to protect them, and while they were willing to receive protection from her—during the interval of more than fifty years between the complete organization of the confederacy of Delos and the disaster of Nikias before Syracuse.

•The single-hearted energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all
 n.c. 406.
 He fits out a commanding fleet—his successes at Lesbos—he liberates the captives and the Athenian garrison at Methymna.

who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions; demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances.¹ He was soon able to collect at Milētus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of 140 sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman (equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate), he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian;² while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Boeotian and Eubœan.³ In his voyage towards Lesbos, Kallikratidas seems to have made himself master of Phokæa and Kymê,⁴ perhaps with the greater facility in consequence of the recent ill-treatment of

¹ Plutarch, *Apophthegm. Laconic.* p. 222 C; Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 6, 12.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 6. 34.

³ Diodor. xiii. 99.

⁴ I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginuse,

both these towns appear as adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadēs they had been both Athenian (Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 5, 11; i. 6, 33; Diodor. xiii. 73-99).

the Kymæans by Alkibiadēs. He ~~then~~ sailed to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos; a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary custom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day; declaring, that so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it.¹

No one who has not familiarized himself with the details of Grecian warfare, can feel the full grandeur and sublimity of this proceeding—which stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free: as to that point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent.

Noble character of this proceeding—exalted Pan-Hellenic patriotism of Kallikratidas.

It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances, and coupled with an explicit declaration of his resolution to abide by it in all future cases. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend. There cannot be any doubt that these allies felt personally wronged and indignant at the loss, as well as confounded with the proposition of a rule of duty so new as respected the relations of belligerents in Greece; against which too (let us add) their murmurs would not be without some foundation—“If we should come to be Konon’s prisoners, he will not treat us in this manner.” Reciprocity of dealing is absolutely essential to constant moral observance, either public or private; and doubtless Kallikratidas felt a well-grounded confidence, that two or three conspicuous examples would sensibly modify the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 14. Καὶ κελεύστων τῶν δυμάχων ἀποδέσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναῖους, οὐκ ἐφή ἑαυτοῦ γε ἀρχόντος οὐδέποτε Ἑλλήνων ἐς τούτους δύνατον ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic—in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii. 6.

future practice on both sides. But some one must begin by setting such examples, and the man who does begin—having a position which gives reasonable chance that others will follow—is the hero. An admiral like Lysander would not only sympathise heartily with the complaints of the allies, but also condemn the proceeding as a dereliction of duty to Sparta : even men better than Lysander would at first look coldly on it as a sort of Quixotism, in doubt whether the example would be copied : while the Spartan Ephors, though probably tolerating it because they interfered very sparingly with their admirals afloat, would certainly have little sympathy with the feelings in which it originated. So much the rather is Kallikratidas to be admired, as bringing out with him not only a Pan-Hellenic patriotism¹ rare either at Athens or Sparta, but also a force of individual character and conscience yet rarer—enabling him to brave unpopularity and break through routine, in the attempt to make that patriotism fruitful and operative in practice. In his career, so sadly and prematurely closed, there was at least this circumstance to be envied ; that the capture of Methymna afforded him the opportunity, which he greedily seized as if he had known that it would be the last, of putting in act and evidence the full aspirations of his magnanimous soul.

Kallikratidas sent word by the released prisoners to Konon that he blocks up Konon and the Athenian fleet at Mitylēnē. hé would presently put an end to his adulterous intercourse with the sea ;² which he now considered as his wife and lawfully appertaining to him, having 140 triremes against the 70 triremes of Konon. That admiral, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna to try and relieve it ; but finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnēsoi, off the continent bearing north-east from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to try and cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon, having diminished the number of his triremes from 100 to 70, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbour of Mitylēnē. His pursuers however were close behind, and even got into the harbour along with him, before it could be closed and

¹ The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of Ἑλληνικότατος τελίτευμα—far more than that of Nikias, to which Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 15. Κόνων δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παῦσει αὐτὸς μοχώντα τὴν βάλσαν, &c. He could hardly say this to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated: thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall.¹

The town of Mitylēnē, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait (whether bridged over or not we are not informed), the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbours, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards the promontory of Kanē on the mainland.² Both these harbours were undefended, and both now fell into the occupation of the Peloponnesian fleet; at least all the outer portion of each, near to the exit of the harbour, which Kallikratidas kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylēnē by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet (together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving³) was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

No preparations had been made at Mitylēnē for a siege: no stock of provisions had been accumulated, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succour from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition; of which, as he had not been able to do so, the Athenians remained altogether

Triumphant position of Kallikratidas.

Hopeless condition of Konon—his stratagem to send news to Athens and entreat relief.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 17; Diodor. xiii. 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i. 482), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also that he got into the harbour in time to put it into a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make

preparations for defending the harbour.

² Thucyd. iii. 6. τούς ἐφόρμους διὰ ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς λιμέσιν ἔποιεντο—(Strabo, xiii. p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbour, as if it were one; and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbour with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbour as defended by a mole—the southern harbour, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably after the revolt of Mitylēnē in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbour.

³ Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic, p. 222 E.

ignorant. All his ingenuity was required to get a trireme safe out of the harbour in the face of the enemy's guard. Putting afloat two triremes, the best sailors in his fleet, and picking out the best rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight, concealing the Epibatae or maritime soldiers in the interior of the vessel (instead of the deck, which was their usual place), with a moderate stock of provisions, and keeping the vessel still covered with hides or sails, as was customary with vessels hauled ashore to protect them against the sun.¹ These two triremes were thus made ready to depart at a moment's notice, without giving any indication to the enemy that they were so. They were fully manned before daybreak, the crews remained in their position all day, and after dark were taken out to repose. This went on for four days successively, no favourable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, and others were reposing, the moment seemed favourable, the signal was given, and both the triremes started at the same moment with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea between Lesbos and Chios—the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet: the cables were cut, the men hastened aboard, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, was caught towards evening and brought back with all her crew prisoners: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens; sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 19. Καθελκύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας δόν, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸς ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἀποσών τῶν νεῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ἔρετας ἐκλέκτας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβιβάτας ἐς κοληγνοῦνταν μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ παραρρύματα παραβαλλόντα.

The meaning of παραρρύματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (*infra*, ii. 1, 22). We may be certain that the matters meant by παραρρύματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least afford no indication that

the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like to the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavoured in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations proposed by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das Attische See-Wesen, ch. x. p. 159.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbours being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylēnē through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake or bay, approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kallikratidas, and his squadron¹ captured except two triremes, his own and another: he himself had great difficulty in escaping.¹

Kallikratidas
defeats the
squadron of
Diomedon.

Athens was all in consternation at the news of the defeat of Konon and the blockade of Mitylēnē. The whole strength and energy of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than 110 triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Ever man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward; many also of the Horsemen or "Knights"² and citizens of highest rank went aboard as Epibatæ, hanging up their bridles like Kimon before the battle of Salamis. The levy was in fact as democratical and as equalising as it had been on that memorable occasion. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes (ten of them Samian) were assembled, and the whole fleet, 150 sail, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on the mainland, opposite to Malea the south-eastern cape of Lesbos.

Prodigious effort of the Athenians to relieve Konon—large Athenian fleet equipped and sent to Arginusæ.

Kallikratidas, apprised of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylēnē, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade.* Less than fifty probably would not have been sufficient, inasmuch as two harbours were to be watched; but he was thus re-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόρωνι πολιορκουμένῳ δάδεκα ναυσὶ ἀρμίσατο ἐς τὸν εὔριπον τῷ Μιτυλήνῃ ληγαῖσιν.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylēnē—and the other Euripus of the neighbouring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii. 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylēnē with the harbour of Mitylēnē, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbiaca, p. 15).

* Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 24–25; Diodor. xiii. 97.

duced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers—120 triremes against 150. His fleet was off Cape Malea, where the crews took their suppers, on the same evening as the Athenians supped at the opposite islands of Arginusæ. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till day-light. On the ensuing morning both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war. Kallikratidas was advised by his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, to retire for the present without fighting, inasmuch as the Athenian fleet had the advantage of thirty triremes over him in number. He replied that flight was disgraceful, and that Sparta would be no worse off even if he should perish.¹ The answer was one congenial to his chivalrous nature; and we may well conceive, that having for the last two or three months been lord and master of the sea, he recollects his own haughty message to Konon, and thought it dishonour to incur or deserve, by retiring, the like taunt upon himself. We may remark, too, that the disparity of numbers, though serious, was by no means such as to render the contest hopeless, or to serve as a legitimate ground for retreat to one who prided himself on a full measure of Spartan courage.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings; in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships, distributed into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. Aristokrates and Diomedon commanded the two front squadrons of the left division, Periklês and Erasinidēs the two squadrons in the rear: on the right division, Protomachus and Thrasyllus commanded the two in front, Lysias and Aristogenēs the two in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak and all in single line: it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 32; Diodor. xiii. 97, 98—the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable

one, more than once adverted to—Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offic. i. 24.

the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians ; who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the diekplus and the periplus.¹ It would seem that the Athenian centre, having the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy “sailing through the line out to the rear and sailing round about” than the other divisions, which were in the open waters ; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this diekplus and periplus were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse ; the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed : the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies : the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians. How astonished would the Athenian admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusæ !

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet : on the left were the Boeotians and Eubœans, under the Boeotian admiral Thrasondas. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order ; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships mingled together and contending in individual combat. At length the brave Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, and he himself probably (like Brasidas² at Pylus) had planted himself on the forecastle, to be the first in boarding the enemy or in preventing the enemy from boarding him—when the shock, arising from impact, threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned.³ In spite of

Battle of
Arginusæ—
defeat of the
Lacedæmonians—
death of Kal-
likratidas.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 31. Οὗτοι δὲ ἑρχόντες (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν δύοισι χείροις γάρ ἐπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἤσαν ἀπαστατεῖται μᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διέκπλουν καὶ περιπλουν παρεσκευασμέναι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖστον.

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii. 84-89.

(the speech of Phormion), iv. 12, vii. 36.

² See Thucyd. iv. 11.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 33. ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ Καλλικρατίδας τε ἐμβαλόντος τῆς νεὸς ἀποκεσών εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ἥψαντο, &c.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas.

the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disabled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts: the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed, over and above the nine Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe—amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle.¹

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how

It would
have been
better for
Greece, and
even for
Athens, if
Kallikratidas
had been
victor at
Arginusæ.

much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their admirable leader—we must take the second as inseparable from the first, since Kallikratidas was not the man to survive a defeat—were signal misfortunes to the whole Grecian world; and in an especial manner, misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylénê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, free from corrupt personal ambition, and of a generous Pan-Hellenic patriotism—would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that in the re-organization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with devotion to the great ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The near prospect of such a benefit was opened by that rare chance which threw Kallikratidas into the command, enabled him not only to publish his lofty profession of faith, but to show that he was prepared to act upon

tidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv. 12—respecting the description given by Diodorus

of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34; Diodor. xiii. 99, 100.

it, and for a time floated him on towards complete success. Nor were the envious gods ever more envious, than when they frustrated, by the disaster of Arginusæ, the consummation which they had thus seemed to promise. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of the worthless, but able, Lysander. It was into his hands that the command was re-transferred : a transfer almost from the best of Greeks to the worst. We shall then see how much the sufferings of the Grecian world, and of Athens especially, were aggravated by his individual temper and tendencies—and we shall then feel by contrast, how much would have been gained if the commander armed with such great power of dictation had been a Pan-Hellenic patriot. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and re-arrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, with single-hearted honesty and resolution, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind such as no other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself. To his lofty character and patriotism, even in so short a career, we vainly seek a parallel.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylēnē by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to say nothing to any one, but to go again out of the harbour, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph—
Safe escape
of Eteonikus
and his
fleet from
Mitylēnē
to Chios.
crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged ; while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving ; but gave orders to all the triremes to take their meal and depart afterwards without losing a moment ; directing the masters of the trading-ships also to put their property silently aboard, and get off at the same time. And thus, with little or no delay, and without the least obstruction from Konon, all these ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbour, and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces to Methymna, burning his camp. Konon thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had

become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylénê. The fleet presently came to Mitylénê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos.¹

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Platæans at Athens—a qualified species of citizenship. Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident which became known at the same time, raising sentiments of a totally opposite character, and ending in one of the most gloomy and disgraceful proceedings in all Athenian history.

Joy of Athens for the victory indignation arising from the fact that the Athenian seamen on the disabled ships had not been picked up after the battle.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had not been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points, even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point, here an essential part of the same omission, inflamed that sentiment into shame, grief, and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively,² or at least

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 38; Diodor. xiii. 100.

² See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii. 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating dead bodies—about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many dead bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any living bodies, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews.

Whereas if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i. 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about picking up the living men—the shipwrecked men, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships —ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυάγους, τοὺς διατυχοῦντας, τοὺς καταδύντας (Hellen. ii. 3, 32); compare especially ii. 3, 35—πλέων ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεύκτας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ αὐτῶν ἀφρόποτους (i. 6, 36). The word ναυάγος does not mean a dead body, but a living man who has suffered shipwreck; Ναυάγος οὐκείνος, ζένος, ἀσ-

λητος γένος (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457): also 407—Καὶ νῦν τάδες ναυάγοις, ἀπολέσας φίλους Ἐξέπεσον ἐς γῆν τήνδε, &c., again 538. It corresponds with the Latin naufragus —“mersa rate naufragia assem Dum roget, et picta se tempestate tuerit” (Juvenal, xiv. 301). Thucydides does not use the word ναυάγος, but speaks of τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυάγια, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon, Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonticum (v. ἀναποτίσις), Stallbaum ad Platon. Apol. Socrat. c. 20. p. 32, Sievers' Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 31, Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokrates, p. 30-31. Berlin, 1837,—and others—all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word ναυάγος, which he uses four several times, means a living

with slight reference to the second; which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five Athenian triremes had been ruined along with most of their crews; that is, lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving—mere hulls partially broken by the impact of an enemy's ship, and gradually filling and sinking. The original crew of each was 200 men. The field of battle (if we may use that word for a space of sea) was strewed with these wrecks; the men remaining on board being helpless and unable to get away—for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. And there were moreover, floating about, men who had fallen overboard, or were trying to save their lives by means of accidental spars or empty casks. It was one of the privileges of a naval victory, that the party who gained it could sail over the field of battle, and thus assist their own helpless or wounded comrades aboard the disabled ships;¹ taking captive, or sometimes killing the corresponding persons belonging to the enemy. According even to the speech made in the Athenian public assembly afterwards, by Euryptolemus, the defender of the accused generals, there were twelve triremes with their crews on board lying in the condition just described. This is an admission by the defence, and therefore the minimum of the reality: there cannot possibly have been fewer, but there were probably several more, out of the whole twenty-five stated by Xenophon.² No step being taken to preserve

person, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter—Παρῆλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι ἐπιστέλλειν ὁ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, έὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δῆμῳ, δτὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὅπερ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Again (ii. 3, 35), Theramenēs, when vindicating himself, before the oligarchy of Thirty two years afterwards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence—φάσκοντες γὰρ (the generals) οἵσιν τε εἶναι σώσαι τὸν ἄνδρας, πρόεμενοι αὐτοῖς ἀπολέσθαι, ἀπολέσσειν φύσσοντο. These passages place the point beyond dispute,

that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by their neglect afterwards were drowned—not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. This misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

¹ See Thucyd. i. 50, 51.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 34. 'Απέλοντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων τῆς πόλεως καὶ εἰκοσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδρόσιν, ἐκτὸς δὲ γυναικῶν τῶν πρόσφεν χθέντων

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his History, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number twelve which appear in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number twenty-five given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions as

State of the facts about the disabled ships, and the men left in them.

them, the surviving portion, wounded as well as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down. If any of them escaped, it was by unusual goodness of swimming—by finding some fortunate plank or spar—at any rate by the disgrace of throwing away their arms, and by some method such as no wounded man would be competent to employ.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews; specifying, we may be sure, the name of each trireme which had so perished; for each trireme in the Athenian navy, like modern ships, had its own name.¹ It mentioned at the same time that no step whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen (such was the reason assigned), so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.²

to matters of fact which he gives as coming from Euryptolemus; who, as an advocate speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers at the subsequent moment when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenēs to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusae from the battle, and there determined (according to their own statement) to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action, and the order given to Theramenēs. During that interval, undoubtedly some of the disabled ships went down or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenēs to visit, even had he been ever so active ~~ever~~ ever so much favoured by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame (as we shall hereafter remark) for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks before they went back to their moorings at Arginusae.

¹ Boeckh, in his instructive volume—Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen (vii. p. 84 seq.) gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders; since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship—Εὐχαριστούς ἔργον—Σειρήν, Αριστοκράτους ἔργον—Ἐλευθερία, Αρχενέως ἔργον—Ἐπιδειξις, Λυστράτου ἔργον—Δημοκρατία, Χαιρεστράτου ἔργον, &c.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4. Ὡτὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδένος ἄλλου καθῆτο τοῦ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἀπιστόλην ἐπεδείκνυε (Theramenēs) μαρτύριον· καὶ ἐπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν Βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for—that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the fact, that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it, had been left to perish unheeded. The friends and relatives of the crews of these lost triremes were of course foremost in the expression of such indignant emotion. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramenès, Kallixenus, and a few others. But whatever may have been done by these individuals to aggravate the public excitement, or pervert it to bad purposes, assuredly the excitement itself was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. The very thought that so many of the brave partners in the victory had been left to drown miserably on the sinking hulls, without any effort, on the part of their generals and comrades near, to rescue them—was enough to stir up all the sensibilities, public as well as private, of the most passive nature, even in citizens who were not related to the deceased—much more in those who were so. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty—is, in my judgement, altogether preposterous; and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals in their public letter accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to discharge the duty, or at the least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honoured with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded, and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylénê, was not concerned in the

Justifiable wrath and wounded sympathy of the Athenians—extreme excitement among the relatives of the drowned men.

The generals are superseded, and directed to come home.

question. Two new colleagues, Philoklēs and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him.¹ The generals probably received the notice of their recall at Samos, and came home in consequence; reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October—the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogenēs, declined to come: warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, they preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklēs, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidēs, Aristokratēs, and Thrasyllos (Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylēnē²), came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedēmus, at that time an acceptable Examination popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,³ imposed of the generals before the Senate and the people at Athens. upon Erasinidēs a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the Dikastery—and accused him besides before the Dikastery; partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidēs was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned,⁴ either until the money was made good, or perhaps until farther examination could take place into the other alleged misdeeds.

This trial of Erasinidēs took place before the generals were summoned before the Senate to give their formal exposition re-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 1; Diodor. xiii. 101—ἐτι μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγὸν ἀπήνουν, ἐτὶ δὲ τῷ περιδεῖν ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας, χαλεπῶς διετέθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but *dead bodies*, in place of the living *ravayoi* spoken of by Xenophon.

² Lysias, Orat. xxi. (*Ἀπολογία Δωροδόκων*) sect. vii.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 2. Archedēmus is described as τῆς Δεκελείας οὐ μελούμενος. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some words like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκατεύσεως—having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the

proceeding of Archedēmus against Erasinidēs.

The office held by Archedēmus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedēmus with the person of that name mentioned in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, ii. 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedēmus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanes as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419–588, with the Scholia). He also is charged in a line of an oration of Lysias with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25. Orat. xiv.).

specting the recent battle and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidê exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect ; a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If however any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the Senate, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavourable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. On the proposition of the Senator Timokratês,¹ a resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidê, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.²

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. We are here told who it was that appeared as their principal accuser, along with several others ; though unfortunately we are left to guess what were the topics on which they insisted. Theramenê was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned, and of neglecting all efforts to rescue them. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory, in which letter they made no mention of having appointed any one to undertake the duty, nor of having any one to blame for not performing it. The omission therefore was wholly their own : they might have performed it, and ought to be punished for so cruel a breach of duty.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramenê. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician : he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês at Kyzikus and elsewhere ; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much, when he denied the justification which the generals had set up, founded on the severity of the storm. According to him, they might have picked up the drowning men, and ought to have done so : either they might have done so before the storm came on—or there never was any storm

Debate in the public assembly—Theramenê accuses the generals as guilty of omitting to save the drowning men.

Effect of the accusation by Theramenê upon the assembly.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους | ραδοθῆναι, ἡ βουλὴ Εἴησε.
² εἰκόνεις, ὅτι καὶ τὸς ἄλλους | ³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4.
χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον πα-

of sufficient gravity to prevent them: upon their heads lay the responsibility of omission.¹ Xenophon, in his very meagre narrative, does not tell us in express words, that Theramenēs contradicted the generals as to the storm. But that he did so contradict them, point blank, is implied distinctly in that which Xenophon alleges him to have said. It seems also that Thrasylus—another trierarch at Arginusæ, and a man not only of equal consequence, but of far more estimable character—concurred with Theramenēs in this same accusation of the generals,² though not standing forward so prominently in the case. He too therefore must have denied the reality of the storm; or at least, the fact of its being so instant after the battle or so terrible, as to forbid all effort for the relief of these drowning seamen.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenēs and Thrasylus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the Senate and elsewhere; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly (what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals, does not directly bring forward), that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it—thus putting in controversy the matter of fact, which formed their solitary justification. Moreover we come, in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenēs and Thrasylus—to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, and in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is however a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if any one was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenēs and Thrasylus themselves; for it was they two, to whom, together

Defence of the generals—they affirm that they had commissioned Theramenēs himself to undertake the duty.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀγένετο, ἐν τῷ τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρουν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θεραμένης μάλιστα, δικαίους εἶναι λέγων λόγουν ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυάγους. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλος καθῆκτος, ἐκιστολὴν ἐκδεῖκνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἔπειψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτίαμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

² That Thrasylus concurred with Theramenēs in accusing the generals, is

intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i. 7, 6)—Καὶ οὖχ, δτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφασαν ψευσόμεθα φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναρρεσίν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasylus as well as Theramenēs stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty : it was they two who were responsible for its omission, not the generals. Nevertheless they (the generals) made no charge against Theramenès and Thrasybulus—well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. They (the generals) at least could do no more than direct competent men like these two trierarchs to perform the task, and assign to them an adequate squadron for the purpose ; while they themselves with the main fleet went to attack Eteonikus, and relieve Mitylénê. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylénê : Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenès. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle, as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here then, in this debate before the assembly, were two new and important points publicly raised. First, Theramenès and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men: next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramenès and Thrasybulus themselves. If this latter were really true, how came the generals in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it ? Euryptolemus, an advocate of the generals (speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly), while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good-nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramenès and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals (he said) were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon; an unhappy dissuasion (in his judgement), which Theramenès and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.¹

Reason why
the generals
had not men-
tioned this
commission
in their
despatch.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 17. Eurypto- | δτι ἐπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας,
lemus says—Κατηγορῶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν, | βουλομένους πέμπειν γράμματα τῷ τε

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramenēs and Thrasybulus on the other; which is difficult to make out clearly, but which Diodorus represents in a manner completely different from Xenophon. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance and alarm of their own seamen, from taking any steps to pick up (what he calls) the dead bodies for burial—that they suspected Theramenēs and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people—and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly (Diodorus says), the Athenians were excessively indignant against Theramenēs; who however defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramenēs, finally brought condemnation upon themselves.¹

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramenēs and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramenēs against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramenēs himself two years afterwards in his defence before the Thirty—that he was not the first to accuse the generals—they were the first to accuse him, affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason to him from performing it—they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said from the beginning that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water; much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men.²

Βούλη καὶ ὅμιν, οὐτὶ ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ Θρασύβουλῳ τετταράκοντα καὶ ἕπτα τριήρεσιν ἀνέλεσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Εἴτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχοντιν, ἐκεῖνων ἰδεῖς ἀμαρτανόντων καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φίλωνθρωπίας, νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνων τε καὶ θῶν καλλίστην ἐπιθυμεῦντες κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe *ἔχοντας* as equivalent to *ἀνέπεισαν* or *μετέπεισαν*,

placing a comma after *ξυνδροχόντας*. This is unusual, but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or his conduct might be expressed by *πείθειν*, though it would more properly be expressed by *ἀναπειθεῖν*: see *ἐπείση*, Thucyd. iii. 32.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 100, 101.

² Xenoph. Hell. ii. 3, 35. If Theramenēs really did say, in the actual

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramenēs at the time of the Thirty—and blending them so as to reject as little as possible of either—I think it probable that the order for picking up the exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenēs, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs; but that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order—next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled—or if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. For when we read the version of the transaction even as given by Euryptolemus, we see plainly that none of the generals, except Diomedon, was eager in the performance of the task. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person, although its purpose was to save more than a thousand drowning comrades from death.¹ In a proceeding where every interval even of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon, that towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed.² Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realised; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenēs feel bound to go out upon his preserving visitation. He doubtless disliked the service—as we see that most of the generals did—while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were

discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said (viz. that the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to put to sea), his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle—before the storm arose—before they gave the order to him. But I think it most probable that he misrepresents at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as

fact and justification.

¹ The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews (speaking in round numbers) would be 5000 men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or 100 men, after the action: not more than half would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain 1000 living men, wounded and un wounded. It will be seen therefore that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 6, 33.

Probable
version of
the way in
which the
facts really
occurred.

thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations.¹ All were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavourable weather. Partly from this want of zeal, coming in addition to the original delay—partly from the bad weather—the duty remained unexecuted, and the seamen on board the damaged ships were left to perish unassisted.

But presently arose the delicate, yet unavoidable question, “How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty in our official despatch to the Athenian people? Here the generals differed among themselves, as Euryptolemus expressly states: Periklēs and Diomedon carried it, against the judgement of their colleagues, that in the official despatch (which was necessarily such as could be agreed to by all) nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenēs and others; the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament—communications not less efficacious than the official despatch in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens—they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenēs. Having thus a man like Theramenēs to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian public: it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent and unscrupulous in denouncing them as the persons really blameable.² As they had made light of the

* We read in Thucydidēs (vii. 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbour, when they were full of triumph, felicity, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on board and the floating bodies, *before* they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even

thought of asking permission (always granted by the victors when asked) to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii. 72).

² Xenoph. Hellēn. ii.'3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenēs is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenēs, under the government of the Thirty—just before he was going to put Theramenēs to death—Οὐρας δέ τοι ἐστίν, ὃς ταχθεὶς ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναῖς ἐν τῷ

alleged storm, in casting the blame upon him—so he again made light of it, and treated it as an insufficient excuse, in his denunciations against them; taking care to make good use of their official despatch, which virtually exonerated him, by its silence, from any concern in the matter.

Such is the way in which I conceive the relations to have stood between the generals on one side and Theramenès on the other; having regard to all that is said both in Xenophon and in Diodorus. But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case.

The really serious inquiry is, as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? If we take the circumstances of the case, and apply them to the habits and feelings of the English navy—if we suppose more than 1000 seamen, late comrades in the victory, distributed among twenty damaged and helpless hulls, awaiting the moment when these hulls would fill and consign them all to a watery grave—it must have been a frightful storm indeed, which would force an English admiral even to go back to his moorings, leaving these men so exposed—or which would deter him, if he were at his moorings, from sending out the very first and nearest ships at hand to save them. And granting the danger to be such, that he hesitated to give the order, there would probably be found officers and men to volunteer, against the most desperate risks, in a cause so profoundly moving all their best sympathies. Now unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ—for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions,

περ Λέσβου ναυμαχίας, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελθεὺς δύως τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, ἵνα αὐτὸς περισσωθείη (Xen. *ut sup.*).

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was (as Diodorus states expressly) that Theramenès was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks—might have done it if he had taken proper pains—and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course through communications received from the armament itself. And when Theramenès in his reply says, that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him; in spite of

Justification
of the
generals—
how
far valid?—
The alleged
storm.
Escape of
Eteonikus.

their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him—and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established even by the enemies of Theramenès, are—1. That Theramenès accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for him.

to all of them—there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest and courageous sense of duty. We have only to advert to the conduct and escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylēnē to Chios; recollecting that Mitylēnē was separated from the promontory of Kanē on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only 120 stadia broad¹—about fourteen English miles. Eteonikus, apprised of the defeat by the Peloponnesian official signal-boat, desired that boat to go out of the harbour, and then to sail into it again with deceptive false news, to the effect that the Peloponnesians had gained a complete victory: he then directed his seamen, after taking their dinners, to depart immediately, and the masters of the merchant vessels silently to put their cargoes aboard and get to sea also. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, thus went out of the harbour of Mitylēnē and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety; the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls “a fair wind.²” Now it is scarcely possible that all this could have taken place, had there blown during this time an intolerable storm between Mitylēnē and Arginusæ. If the weather was such as to allow of the safe transit of Eteonikus and all his fleet from Mitylēnē to Chios—it was not such as to form a legitimate obstacle capable of deterring any generous Athenian seaman, still less a responsible officer, from saving his comrades exposed on the wrecks near Arginusæ. Least of all was it such as ought to have hindered the attempt to save them—even if such attempt had proved unsuccessful. And here the gravity of the sin consists, in having remained inactive while the brave men on the wrecks were left to be drowned. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ;

¹ Strabo, xiii. p. 617.

² Xenoph. Hellēn. i. 6, 37. Ἐτεονίκος δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἔκεινοι (the signal-boat with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, έθνε τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σωτῆν ἐθεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποκλεῖν. ἐς Χίον, ἦν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα οὐριον, καὶ τὰς τρήπεις τὴν ταχιστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πεζὸν ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μηθύμην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσας. Κόνων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῦς, ἐπειδὴ τε πολέμους ἀποδεδράκεσαν, καὶ δὴ γε μοις εὑδιάλτερος ἦν, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις ἥδη ἀνηγμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ πεοὶ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings of Konon—that he went out of the harbour “as soon as the wind became calmer”—that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favourable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favourable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylēnē to Chios.

discussing only how much was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back?

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, indispensable to the fair appreciation of so memorable an event—in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them, rebutting the accusations of Theramenēs and recriminating in their turn against him. The assembly had before them the grave and deplorable fact, that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory—but not even any straightforward, consistent, and uncontradicted statement of facts. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements—and contradictions between them and Theramenēs, each having denied the sufficiency of the storm as a vindication for the neglect imputed to the other. It was impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals, on such a presentation of the case; nor could they well know how to apportion the blame between them and Theramenēs. The relatives of the men left to perish would be doubtless in a state of violent resentment against one or other of the two, perhaps against both. Under these circumstances, it could hardly have been the sufficiency of their defence—it must have been rather the apparent generosity of their conduct towards Theramenēs, in formally disavowing all charge of neglect against him, though he had advanced a violent charge against them—which produced the result that we read in Xenophon. The defence of the generals was listened to with favour and seemed likely to prevail with the majority.¹ Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* i. 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέα ἔκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γάρ προθέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. . . .

Toιαῦτα λέγοντες ἐπειθον τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense ἐπειθον must be noticed: “they were persuading,” or *segmed in the way to persuade*, the people: not ἐπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence (by the clepsydra or water-clock) allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt him; a time doubtless much longer

Feelings of
the Athenian
public—how
the case
stood before
them—de-
cision ad-
Journed to
a future
assembly.

the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody: but the debate had been so much prolonged (we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking) that it was now dark, so that no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved that the whole decision should be adjourned until another assembly; but that in the meantime the senate should meet to consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals—and should submit a proposition to that effect.

It so chanced, that immediately after this first assembly, during the interval before the meeting of the senate or the holding of the second assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened; early days in the month of October. This was the characteristic festival of the Ionic race.

Occurrence of the festival of Apaturia—the great family solemnity of the Ionic race.

handed down from a period anterior to the constitution of Kleisthenes, and to the ten new tribes each containing so many demes—and bringing together the citizens in their primitive unions of family, gens, phratry, &c., the aggregate of which had originally constituted the four Ionic tribes, now superannuated. At the Apaturia the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratic roll; sacrifices were jointly celebrated by these family assemblages to Zeus Phratrius, Athene, and other deities, accompanied with much festivity and enjoyment. A solemnity like this, celebrated every year, naturally provoked, in each of these little unions, questions of affectionate interest—“Who are those that were with us last year, but are not here now? The absent—where are they? The deceased—where or how did they die?” Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, (at least all those among them who were freemen) had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion. The answer to the above inquiry, in their case, would be one alike melancholy and revolting—“They fought like brave men and had their full share in the victory: their trireme was broken, disabled, and made a wreck, in the battle: aboard this wreck they were left to perish, while their victorious generals and comrades made not the smallest effort to preserve them.” To hear this about fathers, brothers, and friends—and to hear it in the midst of a sympathising family circle

than any single speaker would be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

—was well-calculated to stir up an agony of shame, sorrow, and anger, united; an intolerable sentiment, which required as a satisfaction, and seemed even to impose as a duty, the punishment of those who had left these brave comrades to perish. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, were so absorbed by this sentiment, that they clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals.¹

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as false and factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenēs,² to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which no artifice was needed. The universal and

Burst of feeling at the Apaturia—misrepresented by Xenophon.

¹ Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals—*ἥγουμενοι χρῆναι τὴν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετὴν παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν*—Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θρημένην παρεσκεύασαν ἀνθρώπους μέλανα τιμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῷ κεκαρμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐστρῆ, ίνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἥκοιεν, ὡς δὴ ἔνγενεῖς δύτες τῶν ἀπολωλέτων.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii. 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxx. vol. iv. p. 117–125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as “popular prejudices”—“excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenēs” (Dr. Thirlwall, p. 117–124). “Theramenēs (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight.”

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most unfavourable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note)—“It looks as if Xenophon had *purposely involved the whole affair in*

obscurity.” Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon (of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall), so far as to supply (without contradicting any of his main allegations) an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenēs as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would (in my judgement) have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenēs. The moment that we recognise this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen. p. 25–30), supposes Theramenēs to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them—several of whom were connected with Alkibiadēs. I confess that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary—not the grand and dominant fact of the moment.

self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the gold and machinations of a political instigator. Theramenès might do all that he could to turn the public displeasure against the generals, and to prevent it from turning against himself: it is also certain that he did much to annihilate their defence. He may thus have had some influence in directing the sentiment against them, but he could have had little or none in creating it. Nay, it is not too much to say that no factitious agency of this sort could ever have prevailed on the Athenian public to desecrate such a festival as the Apaturia by all the insignia of mourning. If they did so, it could only have been through some internal emotion alike spontaneous and violent, such as the late event was well-calculated to arouse.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well-known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening—but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenès, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals; which Xenophon himself so strongly attests, and which fell so heavily upon Kallixenus and others—nor by his bitter enemy Kritias under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenès is never mentioned as having been afterwards accused, but for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little, if any, abatement. This is one forcible reason among many others, for disbelieving the bribes and the all-pervading machinations which Xenophon represents him as having put forth, in order to procure the condemnation of the generals. His speaking in the first public assembly, and his numerous partisans voting in the second, doubtless contributed much to that result—and by his own desire. But to ascribe to his bribes and intrigues the violent and overruling emotion of the Athenian public, is, in my

judgement, a supposition alike unnatural and preposterous both with regard to them and with regard to him.

When the senate met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, and submitting their opinion for the consideration of the next assembly—the senator Kallixenus (at the instigation of Theramenès, if Xenophon is to be believed) proposed, and the majority of the senate adopted, the following resolution: “The Athenian people, having already heard in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim—All citizens who think the generals guilty for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty (by the result of the voting), they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athénè.”¹ One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.²

The unparalleled burst of mournful and vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens—and the probability thus created that the coming assembly would sanction the most violent measures against the generals—probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose and prompted the senate to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, as coming from the senate in discharge of the commission imposed upon them by the people.

It was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial, alleging, with a mere faint pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and

Proposition
of Kallixenus
in the senate
against the
generals—
adopted and
submitted to
the public
assembly.

Injustice of
the resolu-
tion,—by
depriving
the genera-
ls of the cus-
tomary se-
curities for
judicial trial.
Peoplisim of
Kannōnus.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8, 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 34.

indispensable than in that of the Athenians—formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the Dikasts; while those Dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred, and submitted, for their lives, honours, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannōnus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case—but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against each accused party. The psephism of Kannōnus, together with all the other respected maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.¹

¹ I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix III. vol. iv. p. 501 of his History —on the subject of the psephism of Kannōnus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissent.

The psephism of Kannōnus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannōnus with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision—viz. severance of trial.

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard-of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the general law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they

should all be condemned or absolved by one and the same vote, and in this last respect it sinned against the psephism of Kannōnus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavouring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannōnus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklēs to be tried *first*. The words δίχα ἐκάστοις (sect. 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with κατὰ τὸ Καννώνιον ψῆφοιμα, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissent from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented—I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by *one* vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratis turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannōnus, appears to me to have been misled by the

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as grossly illegal and unconstitutional; presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus, under the Graphê Paranomôn, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated. Nor was there ever any proposition made at Athens, to which the Graphê Paranomôn more closely and righteously applied.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus—especially the men who stood by in habits of mourning, with shaven heads, agitated with sad recollections and thirst of vengeance—were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the enate. They loudly clamoured that “it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose:” and one of their number, Lykiskus, even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read.¹ The excited

Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-discussed passage of Aristophanès, Ekklezeias, 1089:—

Τοὺς τὸ πράγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννώνων σαφῶς
Ψῆφισμα, βινεῖν δεῖ με διαλελημένον,
Πώς οὖν δικώπειν ἀμφοτέρας δυνήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes—“that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannónus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage.”

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanès does not compare his situation with that of the culprit, but with that of the dikastery which tried culprits. The psephism of Kannónus directed that each defendant should be tried separately: accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment's delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves

Opposition taken by Euryptolemus on the ground of constitutional form —Graphê Paranomôn.

Excitement of the assembly—constitutional impediment overruled.

or portions; which was perfectly practicable (whether often practised or not), as it was a numerous body. By doing this (*κρίνειν διαλελημένον*) it could try both the defendants at once; but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanès compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of *βινεῖν διαλελημένον* in place of *κρίνειν διαλελημένον*. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says—“Clearly I ought to be divided into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of Kannónus, to deal with this matter: yet how shall I be able to serve both at once?”

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in Aristophanès; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of Kannónus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled everyone else.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλ-

disposition of the large party thus congregated, farther inflamed by this menace of Lykiskus, was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said—"Athenians, I was myself a wrecked man in the battle: I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country." Even in the most tranquil state of the public mind, such a communication of the last words of these drowning men reported by an ear-witness, would have been heard with emotion; but under the actual predisposing excitement, it went to the inmost depth of the hearers' souls, and marked the generals as doomed men.¹ Doubtless there were other similar statements, not expressly mentioned to us, bringing to view the same fact in other ways, and all contributing to aggravate the

λίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες ξυγγεγραφέναι, Εύρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι τινες· τοῦ δὲ δῆμου ἔνοι ταῦτα ἐπήγουν τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἔβα, δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις ἔσσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, δὲν βούληται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ἥπερ καὶ τὸν στράτηγον, ἐὰν μὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν δῆμος, καὶ ἡναγκάσθησαν ἀφίεναι τὰς κλήσεις.

¹ All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 11. Παρῆλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι ἐπιστέλλειν δὲ αὐτῷ τὸν ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δῆμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνελούσσοντο τὸν ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing, in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss everything which goes to inculpate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage trick and falsehood. Dr.

Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon when he says (p. 119, vol. iv.)—"A man was brought forward, who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades," &c. So Mr. Mitford—"A man was produced," &c. (p. 347.)

Now *παρῆλθε* does not mean "*he was brought forward*:" it is a common word employed to signify one who *comes forward* to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii. 44, and the participle *παρελθών* in numerous places).

Next, *φάσκων*, while it sometimes means *pretending*, sometimes also means simply *affirming*: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses *φάσκων* in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i. 7, 12; Memorab. i. 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii. 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable: nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation—doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

violence of the public manifestations ; which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the Prytanes—or senators of the presiding tribe, on that occasion the tribe Antiochis—the legal presidents of the assembly, refused to entertain or put the question ; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, not only inspired them with aversion, but also rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus employed against them the same menaces which Lykiskus had uttered against Euryptolemus : he threatened, amidst encouraging clamour from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the Prytanes by the incensed manifestations of the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate Prytanis, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philosopher Sokratēs ; on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office, among the fifty senators taken by lot from the tribe Antiochis. Sokratēs could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining Prytanes without his concurrence.¹ It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate ; a proposition, which he must already have opposed once before, in his capacity of member of the senate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the Prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behaviour of Athenian citizens—patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demean-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 18; iv. 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratēs is Epistatēs, or presiding Prytanis for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only

reckons him as one among the Prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he was Epistatēs—the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names nine generals as having been condemned, instead of eight.

The Prytanes refuse to put the question — their opposition overruled, all except that of Sokratēs.

our. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable, which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Euryptolemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negativing the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develope it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us.¹

His speech is one of great skill and judgement in reference to the case before him and to the temper of the assembly. Beginning with a gentle censure on his friends the generals Periklēs and Diomedon, for having prevailed on their colleagues to abstain from mentioning, in their first official letter, the orders given to Theramenēs,—he represented them as now in danger of becoming victims to the base conspiracy of the latter, and threw himself upon the justice of the people to grant them a fair trial. He besought the people to take full time to instruct themselves before they pronounced so solemn and irrevocable a sentence—to trust only to their own judgement, but at the same time to take security that judgement should be pronounced after full information and impartial hearing—and thus to escape that bitter and unavailing remorse which would otherwise surely follow. He proposed that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannōnus—with proper notice, and ample time allowed for the defence as well as for the accusation; but that if found guilty, they should suffer the heaviest and most disgraceful penalties—his own relation Periklēs the first. This was the only way of striking the guilty, of saving the innocent, and of preserving Athens from the ingratitude and impiety of condemning to death, without trial as well as contrary to law, generals who had just rendered to her so important a service. And what could the people be afraid of? Did they fear lest the power of trial should slip out of their hands,—that they were so impatient to leap over all the delays prescribed by the law?² To the worst of public traitors, Aristarchus, they had granted a day with

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, (that is, after the cries and threats above recounted) ἀναβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν τάδε, &c.

² It is this accusation of “reckless hurry” (*πρωτέται*) which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behaviour towards the six generals (vi. 7, 2).

full notice for trial, with all the legal means for making his defence; and would they now show such flagrant contrariety of measure to victorious and faithful officers? “Be not ye (he said) the men to act thus, Athenians. The laws are your own work; it is through them that ye chiefly hold your greatness: cherish them, and attempt not any proceeding without their sanction.”¹

Euryptolemus then shortly recapitulated the proceedings after the battle, with the violence of the storm which had prevented approach to the wrecks; adding, that one of the generals, now in peril, had himself been on board a broken ship, and had only escaped by a fortunate accident.² Gaining courage from his own harangue, he concluded by reminding the Athenians of the brilliancy of the victory, and by telling them that they ought in justice to wreath the brows of the conquerors, instead of following those wicked advisers who pressed for their execution.³

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men in mourning and with shaven heads, who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Euryptolemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not mention them. It is remarkable that he does not name Thēramenēs as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Euryptolemus was, that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannōnūs; implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the Senate moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly; hands being separately held up, first for one, next for the other. The Prytanes pronounced the amendment of Euryptolemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklēs impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report, of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the Prytanes were declared partisans.

His amendment is rejected—the proposition of Kallixenus is carried.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 30. Μὴ ὑμεῖς γε, ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἀλλ' ἔστων ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δι' οὓς μάλιστα μέγιστοι ἔστε, φυλάττοντες, ἕκεν τούτους μηδὲν πράττειν πειράσθε.

δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὃν εἰς τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδίσης νεώς συνθέσθ, &c.

² The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 16-36.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 35. τοῦτων

Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manœuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklēs constrained them to put the question over again, and they were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favour of the proposition of Kallixenus.¹

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty; whether by a large or a small majority, we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The majority was composed mostly of those who acted under a feeling of genuine resentment against the generals, but in part also of the friends and partisans of Theramenēs,² not inconsiderable in number. The

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 38. Τούτων δὲ διαχειρονομουμένων, τὸ μὲν πρώτον ἔκριναν τὴν Εὐρυπτολέμουν ὑπομοσαμένουν δὲ Μενεκλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειρονοίτας γενομένης, ἔκριναν τὴν τῆς βουλῆς.

I cannot think that the explanation of this passage given either by Schömann (*De Comitiis Athen.* part ii. 1. p. 160 seq.) or by Meier and Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iii. p. 295; b. iv. p. 696) is satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratis, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratis, and could be legally put by the remaining Prytanes, in spite of his resistance. The word *ὑπαμοσία* must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment or *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. It seems to me here to denote, an objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the Prytanes or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the

show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been some power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Meneklēs here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the Prytanes, and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first—that they put the proposition of Kallixenus first, without giving due notice—or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

² Diodor. xiii. 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain before-

six generals then at Athens—Periklēs (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidēs, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratēs—were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught of hemlock ; their property being confiscated, as the decree of the senate prescribed.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognised tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonouring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, such censure is deserved ; for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure—nor against the habits and feelings which that constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed : nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonoured themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed.¹ A vote of the public assembly was passed,² decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that

hand. Accordingly the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history:—“Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter,³ Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory, since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves.” It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly can well have been held; since the sentence was peremptory, that

Injustice of
the proceed-
ing—viola-
tion of the
democratical
maxims and
sentiments.

Earnest re-
pentance of
the people
soon after-
wards—dis-
grace and
end of Kalli-
xenus.

the generals, if condemned, should be handed over to the Eleven. The sentiment, however, is one so natural for Diomedon to express, that he may well be imagined to have said something of the kind to the presiding Archon or to the Eleven, though there was no opportunity for saying it to the assembled people.

¹ I translate here literally the language of Sokratis in his Defence (Plato, Apol. c. 20)—παρανόμος, *as τι τρόπωρα χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν οἴοξε.*

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of Probole. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury.

Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. This was accordingly done, and the parties were kept under custody of the sureties themselves, who were responsible for their appearance on the day of trial. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts, as we shall see in the next chapter. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape, before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. Kallixenus then returned under the general amnesty. But the general amnesty protected him only against legal pursuit, not against the hostile memory of the people. "Detested by all, he died of hunger"—says Xenophon;¹ a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors, (as Euryptolemus himself remarked by citing the case of Aristarchus,) after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong—never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. How then came they to do it here, where the generals condemned were not only not traitors, but had just signalized themselves by a victorious combat? No Theramenēs could have brought about this phænomenon; no deep-laid oligarchical plot is, in my judgement, to be called in as an explanation.² The true explanation is different, and of serious moment to state. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of procedure: but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies; feelings, first kindled, and justly kindled, by the thought that their friends and relatives had been left to perish unheeded on the wrecks—next, inflamed into preternatural and overwhelming violence by the festival of the Apaturia, where all the religious traditions connected with the ancient family tie, all those associa-

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 40. μισού-
νερος διδού πάντων, λίμην ἀπόθανεν.

² This is the supposition of Sievers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

tions which imposed upon the relatives of a murdered man the duty of pursuing the murderer, were expanded into detail and worked up by their appropriate renovating solemnity. The garb of mourning and the shaving of the head—phænomena unknown at Athens either in a political assembly or in a religious festival—were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to ensure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail :¹ nay, in this case it appeared the only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days according to the psephism of Kammōnus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the Senate and of the Ekklesia, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot—and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. Such is the natural behaviour of those who, having for the moment forgotten their sense of political commonwealth, become degraded into exclusive family-men. The family affections, productive as they are of much gentle sympathy and mutual happiness in the interior circle, are also liable to generate disregard, malice, sometimes even ferocious vengeance, towards others. Powerful towards good generally, they are not less powerful occasionally towards evil ; and require, not less than the selfish propensities, constant subordinating control from that moral reason which contemplates for its end the security and happiness of all. And when a man, either from low civilization, has never known this large moral reason—or when from some accidental stimulus, righteous in the origin, but wrought up into fanaticism by the conspiring force of religious as well as family sympathies, he comes to place his pride

¹ If Thucydides had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event, he would have found occasion to notice τὸ ξυγγένεια (kinship) as being not less capable of ἀτροφάστος τόλμα (unscrupulous daring) than τὸ ἐπαιρικόν (faction). In his reflections on the Korkyraean disturbances (iii. 82) he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter—the antipathies of

faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power—as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

and virtue in discarding its supremacy—there is scarcely any amount of evil or injustice which he may not be led to perpetrate, by a blind obedience to the narrow instincts of relationship. “*Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout*”—was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words, understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves ^{Generals—} were also largely responsible in the case. Through the ^{not innocent men.} unjustifiable fury of the movement against them, they perished like innocent men—without trial—“*inauditi et indefensi, tamquam innocentes, perierunt*;” but it does not follow that they were really innocent. I feel persuaded that neither with an English, nor French, nor American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. Neither admiral nor seamen, after gaining a victory and driving off the enemy, could have endured the thoughts of going back to their anchorage, leaving their own disabled wrecks unmanageable on the waters, with many living comrades aboard, helpless, and depending upon extraneous succour for all their chance of escape. That the generals at Arginusæ did this, stands confessed by their own advocate Euryptolemus,¹ though they must have known well the condition of disabled ships after a naval combat, and some ships even of the victorious fleet were sure to be disabled. If these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theramenès, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we

¹ Xenoph. Hellén. i. 7, 31. ‘Επειδὴ καὶ δοξάντων τούτων, &c.

γὰρ κρατήσαντες τὴν ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν, Διομέδων μὲν ἐκέλευεν, ἀναχθέντας ἐπὶ κέρων ἀπαντας ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς ναυαγούς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς Μιτυλήνην πολεμίους τὴν ταχίστην τελεῖ ἀπαντας: Θράσυλλος δ' ἀμφότεροι ἔψη γενέσθαι, ἣν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλπώσι, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πλέωσι.

I remarked a few pages before, that the case of Erasiniidēs stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Euryptolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylēnē; which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost the lives probably of more than 1000 brave men. At least the Athenian people at home, when they heard the criminations and recriminations between the generals on one side and Theramenès on the other—each of them in his character of accuser implying that the storm was no valid obstacle, though each, if pushed for a defence, fell back upon it as a resource in case of need—the Athenian people could not but look upon the storm more as an afterthought to excuse previous omissions, than as a terrible reality nullifying all the ardour and resolution of men bent on doing their duty. It was in this way that the intervention of Theramenès chiefly contributed to the destruction of the generals, not by those manœuvres ascribed to him in Xenophon : he destroyed all belief in the storm as a real and all-covering hindrance. The general impression of the public at Athens—in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression—was that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished. This negligence dishonours, more or less, the armament at Arginusæ as well as the generals : but the generals were the persons responsible to the public at home, who felt for the fate of the deserted seamen more justly as well as more generously than their comrades in the fleet.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of such sentiment drove the Athenians—in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for the condemned generals—the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well-founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. The Athenian people might with justice proclaim to them—“ Whatever be the grandeur of your victory, we can neither rejoice in it ourselves, nor allow you to reap honour from it, if we find that you have left many hundreds of those who helped in gaining it to be drowned on board the wrecks, without making any effort to save them, when such effort might well have proved successful.” And the condemnation here pronounced, while it served as a painful admonition to subsequent Athenian generals, provided at the same time an efficacious guarantee for the preservation of combatants on the wrecks or swimming for their lives after a naval victory. One express case in point may be mentioned. Thirty years afterwards (B.C. 376) the Athenian admiral Chabrias defeated, though not

without considerable loss, the Lacedæmonian fleet near Naxos. Had he pursued them vigorously, he might have completed his victory by destroying all or most of them; but recollecting what had happened after the battle of Arginusæ, he abstained from pursuit, devoted his attention to the wrecks of his own fleet, saved from death those citizens who were yet living, and picked up the dead for interment.¹

¹ Diodor. xv. 35.

Γενόμενος δὲ (Χαβρᾶς) ἐπὶ τοῦ προτερήματος, καὶ πάσας τὰς τῶν πολεμίων νάυς φυγεῖν ἀναγκάσσας, ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διώγμου, ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς νικήσαντας στρατηγὸν δὲ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν, αἰτιασμένος διτὶ τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ ἔθαψαν, εὐλαβήθη μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως δμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ἀποστάς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέ-

σωσε, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταῦτην ἐγένετο τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅρδις ἀν διαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.

Here Diodorus, in alluding to the battle of Arginusæ, repeats the mistake which he had before made, as if the omission there concerned only dead bodies and not living men. But when he describes what was done by Chabrias at Naxos, he puts forward the preservation of living citizens not merely as a reality, but as the most prominent reality of the proceeding.

CHAPTER LXV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF
THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF
THE THIRTY.

THE victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made.¹ Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained them-

B.C. 406.
Alleged pro-
positions of
peace from
Sparta to
Athens—
doubtful.

Eteonikus
at Chios—
distress of
his seamen—
conspiracy—
suppressed.

¹ The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the Ranaæ of Aristophanës. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 406) says that Aeschines (*De Fals. Legat.* p. 38. c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace—I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to find any inference upon it.

Against it we may observe—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, viz.—

To evacuate Dekeleia—and each party to stand as they were. Not only the

terms are the same—but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same—*Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon—appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgement, the silence of Xenophon; but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

selves by labouring for hire on the Chian lands ; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes. In such forlorn condition, many of them entered into a conspiracy to assail and plunder the town of Chios ; a day was named for the enterprise, and it was agreed that the conspirators should know each other by wearing a straw or reed. Informed of the design, Eteonikus was at the same time intimidated by the number of these straw-bearers : he saw that if he dealt with the conspirators openly and ostensibly, they might perhaps rush to arms and succeed in plundering the town : at any rate a conflict would arise in which many of the allies would be slain, which would produce the worst effect upon all future operations. Accordingly, resorting to stratagem, he took with him a guard of fifteen men armed with daggers, and marched through the town of Chios. Meeting presently one of these straw-bearers —a man with a complaint in his eyes, coming out of a surgeon's house—he directed his guards to put the man to death on the spot. A crowd gathered round, with astonishment as well as sympathy, and inquired on what ground the man was put to death ; upon which Eteonikus ordered his guards to reply, that it was because he wore a straw. The news being diffused, the remaining persons who wore straws became so alarmed as to throw their straws away.¹

Eteonikus availed himself of such panic to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away his starving and perilous armament. Having obtained from them a month's pay, he immediately put the troops on ship-board, taking pains to encourage them and make them fancy that he was unacquainted with the recent conspiracy.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the Ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time as admiral. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless the Ephors complied with the request substantially ; sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigour to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The

B.C. 405.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 1-4.

partisans in the various allied cities, whose favour he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command—the clubs and factious combinations which he had organized and stimulated into a partnership of mutual ambition—all hailed his return with exultation. Dis-
Arrival of
Lysander at
Ephesus—
zeal of his
partisans
—Cyrus.
 countenanced and kept down by the generous patriotism of his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The young prince said in reply that all the funds which he had received from Susa had already been expended, with much more besides; in testimony of which he exhibited a specification of the sums furnished to each Peloponnesian officer. Nevertheless such was his partiality for Lysander, that he complied even with the additional demand now made, so as to send him away satisfied. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen—constituted new trierarchs—summoned Etconikus with the fleet from Chios together with all the other scattered squadrons—and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.¹

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Milētus. He had there a powerful faction or association of friends, who had done their best to hamper and annoy Kallikratidas Violent re-
volution at
Milētus by
the partisans
of Lysander. on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal; by the straightforward resolution of that noble-minded admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined (if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited) to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we cannot believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milētus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents—and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 10-12.

himself to the scheme—fanned the ambition of the conspirators, who were at one time disposed to a compromise—and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating, the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized, probably men who had gone heartily along with Kallikratidas, were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than 1000, fled into exile. Milêtus thus passed completely into the hands of the friends and partisans of Lysander.¹

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia; placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendency among the allies, Lysander received a summons from Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was both old and dangerously ill in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, with which he had only recently contracted acquaintance—and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, attested as it had been by the conduct of the latter in the first visit and banquet at Sardis—Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee. At the same time that he handed over all his tributes and his reserved funds to Lysander, he assured him of his steady friendship both towards himself and towards the Lacedæmonians; and concluded by entreating that he would by no means engage in any general action with the Athenians, unless at great advantage in point of numbers. The defeat of Arginusæ having strengthened his preference for this dilatory policy, he promised that not only the Persian treasures, but also the Phenician fleet, should be brought into active employment for the purpose of crushing Athens.²

¹ Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Ly- | ² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 14; Plutarch, sand. c. 8. | Lysand. c. 9.

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendant factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well-paid, he could keep it united and direct it whither he chose without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos : for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon—together with Philoklēs and Adeimantus ; to whom were added, during the spring of 405 b.c., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramenēs also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the Dokimasy.¹ The fleet comprised 180 triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander ; to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast ; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus—stormed and plundered a semi-Hellenic town in the Kerameikan Gulf, named Kedreiæ, which was in alliance with Athens—and thence proceeded to Rhodes.² He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast.³ The Athenians were preparing to follow him thither when they learnt that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, occupied by Thorax as harmost with a land-force ; and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighbouring town of Lampsaku, which was taken by storm. It was wealthy in every way, and abundantly stocked with bread and wine, so that

a.c. 405.
Inaction of
the Athenian
fleet after the
battle of
Arginusæ.
Operations
of Lysander.

¹ Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 15, 16.

³ This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and

Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Ly- sand. c. 9).

the soldiers obtained a large booty; but Lysander left the free inhabitants untouched.¹

*The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were partly inactive, partly behindhand with Lysander, throughout all the summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, sailing out on the sea-side of Chios and Lesbos, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of 180 triremes, just in time to hear, while at their morning meal, that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up—to a place called Ægospotami.²

Ægospotami or Goat's River—a name of fatal sound to all Athenian subsequent Athenians—was a place which had nothing to fleet at Ægospotami. recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. It was an open beach, without harbour, without good anchorage, without either houses or inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly inconvenient and dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; for the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was at Lampsakus in a good harbour, with a well-furnished town in his rear and a land-force to coöperate, had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned,—the men having already taken their morning meal,—and ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii. 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 20, 21.

assistance ; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, yet unable to draw him out by manœuvring all the day, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami. But Lysander directed a few swift sailing vessels to follow them, nor would he suffer his own men to disembark until he thus ascertained that their seamen had actually dispersed ashore.¹

For four successive days this same scene was repeated ; the Athenians becoming each day more confident in their own superior strength, and more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadēs—who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing—rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore ; urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, where they would be both close to their own supplies and safe from attack, as Lysander was at Lampsakus—and from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he.² Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more and more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth day, Lysander ordered the scout ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami, while Thorax marched along the strand with the land-force in case of need. Nothing could be more complete or decisive than the

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 22–24; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Diodor. xiii. 105.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii. 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadēs as wishing to be re-admitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37) alludes

also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadēs.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadēs should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

surprise of the Athenian fleet. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore; some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers which formed their complement. Out of all the total of 180, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation;¹ the trireme of Konon himself, together with a squadron of seven under his immediate orders—and the consecrated ship called Paralus, always manned by picked Athenian seamen, being among them. It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance. The attempt was desperate, and the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve, including the Paralus. All the remaining triremes, nearly 170 in number, were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighbouring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man.²

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander—which must have been very great, since the total crews of 180 triremes were not less than 36,000 men³—we hear only of 3000 or 4000 native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklēs and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which however surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else; for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that it would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well-aware that to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city; and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well-deserved by the generals

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi. (*Ἄτολ. Δωρεῶν*) s. 12.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 28; Plutārch, Lysand. c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos. Lysand. c. 8; Polyean. i. 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii. 106) gives a different representation of this important military

n; far less clear and trustworthy
part of Xenophon.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 28. τὰς δὲ
αλλας πόλεις (ναῦς) Λύσανδρος ἔλαβε πρὸς
τὴν γῆν τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ
γῇ ξυνέλεξεν· οἱ δὲ καὶ έφυγον ἐς τὰ
τειχύδρια.

collectively. Accordingly he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in the island of Cyprus, sending the Paralus with some others of the twelve fugitive triremes to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait—with singular daring under the circumstances—to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes (always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting) lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus.¹

On the very day of the victory, Lysander sent off the Milesian privateer Theopompus to proclaim it at Sparta, who, by a wonderful speed of rowing, arrived there and made it known on the third day after starting. The captured ships were towed off, and the prisoners carried across, to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly the most bitter inculpations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklēs, having captured a Corinthian and an Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. It was not difficult, in Grecian warfare, for each of the belligerents to cite precedents of cruelty against the other. In this debate some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had deliberated what they should do with their prisoners, in case they had been victorious at Aegospotami; and that they had determined—chiefly on the motion of Philoklēs, but in spite of the opposition of Adeimantus—that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. Whatever opinion Philoklēs may have expressed personally, it is highly improbable that any such determination was ever taken by the Athenians.² In this assembly of the allies, however, besides all that could be said against Athens with truth, doubtless the most extravagant falsehoods found ready credence. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Aegospotami, 3000 or 4000 in number, were massacred forthwith—Philoklēs himself at their head.³ The latter, taunted by Lysander with his cruel execution of the Corin-

Slaughter of
the captive
generals and
prisoners.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 29; Diodor. xiii. 106: the latter is discordant, however, on many points.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9, and by Cicero de

Offic. iii. 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off—and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Aeginetans.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32; Pausan. ix. 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

thian and Andrian crews, disdained to return any answer, but placed himself in conspicuous vestments at the head of the prisoners led out to execution. If we may believe Pausanias, even the bodies of the prisoners were left unburied.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals taken collectively, than that of *Aegospotami*. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for the general belief afterwards —not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also—held that the Athenian fleet had been sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of such a suspicion both Konon and Philoklēs stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him.¹ Konon even preferred an accusation against Adeimantus to this effect,² probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards, when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 b.c., conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting one or more of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of *Aegospotami* took place about September 405 b.c. It was made known at Peiraeus by the Paralus, which arrived there during the night, coming straight from the Hellespont. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The terrible disaster in Sicily had become

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 1, 32; Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv. 17, 2; x. 9, 5; Isokrates ad Philipp. Or. v. sect. 70. Lysias, in his *Ἄδοντος Επιτρόποιος* (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty. We cannot make out distinctly how many of the Athenian generals were captured at *Aegospotami*.

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption

of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii. 165).¹

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompos, in describing the battle of *Aegospotami*. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (Theopomp. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

² Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401. c. 57.

known to the people by degrees, without any authorized reporter ; but here was the official messenger, fresh from the scene, leaving no room to question the magnitude of the disaster or the irreparable ruin impending over the city. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. “On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept ; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the Æginetans, Melians, Skionæans, and others.” After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.¹ For Athens thus to renounce her maritime action, the pride and glory of the city ever since the battle of Salamis—and to confine herself to a defensive attitude within her own walls—was a humiliation which left nothing worse to be endured except actual famine and surrender.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, ^{Proceedings of Lysander.} and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens ; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited ; the more limited, the greater the numbers accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else.² His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium, where he placed the Lacedæmonian Sthenelaus as harmost with a garrison. Next he passed to Lesbos, where he made similar arrangements at Mitylénê and other cities. In them, as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring and unscrupulous partisans, and called a Dekarchy, or Dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian[•] harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens to introduce similar changes. In Thasus, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed : there was a numerous philo-Athenian party whom Lysander caused to be allured out of their place of concealment into the temple of Heraklês, under the false assurance of an

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 3 ; Diodor. xiii. 107. | ² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 2 ; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

amnesty ; when assembled under this pledge, they were all put to death.¹ Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself, together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Spartan for Athenian ascendancy.² But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos they still held out : the people had too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 b.c., to yield without a farther struggle.³ With this single reserve, every city in alliance or dependence upon Athens submitted without resistance both to the supremacy and the subversive measures of the Lacedæmonian admiral.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful—all her Kleruchs or out-citizens whom she had formerly planted in *Ægina*, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home.⁴ The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasus, Byzantium, and other dependent

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i. 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however—if we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch's Life of Lysander.

² Plutarch. Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγνόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἔχθρούς, &c.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 6. εὗθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλλὰ Ἐλλὰς ἀφεισθῆκει Ἀθηναῖσιν, πλὴν Σαμίων ὅντοι δὲ, σφαγαῖς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατείχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγαῖς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες to refer to the violent revolution at Samos described in Thucyd. viii. 21—whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word σφαγαῖς is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v. 4, 14) in a subsequent passage to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle πεποιηκότες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is

not uncommon with Xenophon : see κατηγυρίσας, δέξας—i. 1, 31; γενομένους—i. 7, 11; ii. 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have chosen this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their oligarchical citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised through the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did when he had them substantially in his power (ii. 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh political massacre.

⁴ Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 8, 1; ii. 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympo. iv. 31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24. p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 8, 5).

cities,¹ were forced to abandon their nomes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Everything thus contributed to aggravate the impoverishment, and the manifold suffering, physical as well as moral, within her walls. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared as best they could for an honourable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. Accordingly ^{Amnesty proposed by Patrokleidēs, and adopted.} Patrokleidēs—having first obtained special permission from the people, without which it would have been unconstitutional to make any proposition for abrogating sentences judicially passed, or releasing debtors regularly inscribed in the public registers—submitted a decree such as had never been mooted since the period when Athens was in a condition equally desperate, during the advancing march of Xerxes. All debtors to the state, either recent or of long standing—all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office—all persons who were liquidating by instalment debts due to the public, or had given bail for sums thus owing—all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disqualification or disability—nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties—all these persons were pardoned and released; every register of the penalty or condemnation being directed to be destroyed. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted—Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their trial—Those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes.²

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14. p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτέλεια, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

² This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidēs is given at length in the

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty and forgiveness adopted by the people in this decree of Patrokleidēs, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis.¹ The reconciliation thus introduced enabled them the better to bear up under their distress;² especially as the persons relieved by the amnesty were for the most part not men politically disaffected, like the exiles. To restore the latter, was a measure which no one thought of; indeed a large proportion of them had been and were still at Dekeleia, assisting the Lacedæmonians in their warfare against Athens.³ But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty—that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia: she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied,⁴ in spite of the menacing prohibitions of Lysander, preceding his arrival to block it up effectually; but to accumulate any stock for a siege was utterly impossible.

At length, about November 405 b.c., Lysander reached the Saronic Gulf, having sent intimation beforehand both to Agis and to the Lacedæmonians that he was approaching with a fleet of 200 triremes. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under King Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped in the precinct of Akadēmus, at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of 150 sail,—next, ravaging Salamis,—blocked up completely the harbour of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the

Arrival of
Lysander.
Athens is
blocked up
by sea and
land.

Oration of Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 76-80.—*A δέ εἰρηται ἔξαλεῖψαι, μὴ κεκτήσθαι ιδίᾳ μηδενὶ ἔξειναι, μηδὲ μυησικῆσαι μηδέποτε.*

¹ Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πίστιν ἀλλήλοις περὶ δουνολας δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαρτες ἐκαρτέρουν.

³ Andokidēs de Mysteriis, s. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii. De Bonis Nicie Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the se-

vere condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia—we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. sect. 122, 123. p. 164.

⁴ Isokratēs adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71: compare Andokidēs de Reditu suo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii. sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed; and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.¹

Though all hope had now fled, the pride, the resolution, and the despair of Athens, still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger that they sent propositions to entreat peace. Even then their propositions were not without dignity. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbour of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the Ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the Ephors, not deigning even to admit the envoys to an interview, sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible—and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. With this gloomy reply the envoys returned. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the senate and people would not consent even to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A senator named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in custody, and a general vote was passed,² on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Such a vote demonstrates the courageous patience both of the senate and the people; but unhappily it supplied no improved prospects, while the suffering within the walls continued to become more and more aggravated. Under these circumstances, Theramenès offered to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the Ephors was in regard to Athens,—whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended farther to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably ensure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others; yet with no express powers to conclude, but simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander,

Resolve holding-out of the Athenians—their propositions for capitulating are refused.

Pretences for Theramenès—he is sent as envoy—his studied delay.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 9; Diodor. xiii. 107. | ² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 12–15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 10–12.

who (he alleged) had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the Ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenês, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer.¹

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments Misery and of imperial Athens. We find only an heroic endurance displayed, to such a point that numbers actually died of death of Kleophon. starvation, without any offer to surrender on humiliating conditions.² Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the senate, whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the Dikastery which tried him—contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures.³ Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosthen. sect. 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xénophon, Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 15-21: compare Isokratis, Areopagit. Or. vii. sect. 73.

³ Lysias, Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat. sect. 15, 16, 37; Orat. xxx. cont. Nikomach. sect. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i. 7, 35), is not to be recon-

ciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (*στρατεύως τυρος γενομένης ἐν ἡ κατοφῶ ἀπέθανε*), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison, before trial—nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance—were at all in Athenian habits.

By the time that Theramenēs returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the Ephors that he brought with him unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves; who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians.¹ Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power, to Sparta apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: That the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræs should be destroyed: That the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory: That they should surrender all their ships of war: That they should re-admit all their exiles: That they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognising the same enemies and friends.²

The famine becomes intolerable—Theramenēs is sent to obtain peace on any terms—debate about the terms at Sparta.

Peace is granted by Sparta, against the general sentiment of the allies.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 19; vi. 5, 35–46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Boeotian contingent serving under Lysander at Egæopotami, honoured in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x. 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations frequent with Isokratēs, to serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the *only* parties among

all the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratēs, Orat. Plataic. Or. xiv. sect. 34).

Demosthenes says that the Phokians gave their vote in the same synod against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat. c. 22. p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv. 63, and Polyen. i. 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xiii. 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the

With this document, written according to Lacedæmonian practice on a Skytalē (or roll intended to go round a stick, of which the Lacedæmonian commander had always one, and the Ephors another, corresponding), Theramenès went back to Athens. As he entered the city, a miserable crowd flocked round him, in distress and terror lest he should have failed altogether in his mission. The dead and the dying had now become so numerous, that peace at any price was a boon; nevertheless, when he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open—there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority however accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander.¹

It was on the 16th day of the Attic month Munychion² (about B.C. 404. the beginning of April) that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus—twenty-seven years (almost exactly) after that surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appeared to have been serving with his army,³ and assisting him with their counsel. To the population of Athens generally, his entry was an immediate relief, in spite of the cruel degradation, or indeed political extinction, with which it was accompanied. At least it averted the sufferings and horrors of famine, and permitted a decent interment of the many unhappy victims who had already perished. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the Ephors in their Skytalē had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow.⁴ The unfinished ships in the dockyards were burnt, and

Lacedæmonian decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann — *αὶ χρῆσοτε* instead of *καὶ χρῆστες* — has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems very uncertain.

bear it: compare Lysias, *Orat. xiii. cont. Agorat.* s. 12-20.

² Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15. He says however that this was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 18.

⁴ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 20-ii. 3, 8; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 14.

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 23. Lysias (*Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth.* s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenès, who plainly ought not to be required to

the arsenals themselves ruined.¹ To demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was however a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom.² How many days were allowed for the humiliating duty imposed upon Athenian hands, of demolishing the elaborate, tutelary, and commanding works of their forefathers—we are not told. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore by strict construction forfeited their title to the peace granted.³ The interval seems however to have been prolonged; probably considering that for the real labour, as well as the melancholy character, of the work to be done, too short a time had been allowed at first.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, and making such a breach as left Athens without any substantial means of resistance—did not remain to complete the work, but withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos, which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled.⁴ After so long an endurance of extreme misery, doubtless the general population thought of little except relief from famine and its accompaniments, without any disposition to contend against the fiat of their conquerors. If some high-spirited men formed an exception to the pervading depression, and still kept up their courage against better days—there was at the same time a party of totally opposite character, to whom the prostrate condition of Athens was a source of revenge for the past, exultation for the present, and ambitious projects for the future. These were partly

The exiles
and the oli-
garchical
party in
Athens—
their tri-
umphant
behaviour
and devotion
to Lysander.

¹ Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15; *Lysias* cont. *Agorat.* sect. 50. οὐ δὲ τὰ τείχη ὡς κατέσκαψη, καὶ αἱ νῆσει τοῖς πολεμοῖς παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθρέθη, &c.

² Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 23. Καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαπτον ὁπ' αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμῷ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15.

³ *Lysias* cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. sect. 75. p. 431 R; Plutarch, *Lysand.* c. 15; Diodor. xiv. 3.

⁴ Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athéné in the acropolis—which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Insc. Attic. Nos. 150-152. p. 235.

the remnant of that faction which had set up (seven years before) the oligarchy of Four Hundred—and still more, the exiles, including several members of the Four Hundred,¹ who now flocked in from all quarters. Many of them had been long serving at Dekeleia, and had formed a part of the force blockading Athens. These exiles now revisited the acropolis as conquerors, and saw with delight the full accomplishment of that foreign occupation at which many of them had aimed seven years before, when they constructed the fortress of Eetioneia, as a means of ensuring their own power. Though the conditions imposed extinguished at once the imperial character, the maritime power, the honour, and the independence of Athens, these men were as eager as Lysander to carry them all into execution; because the continuance of the Athenian democracy was now entirely at his mercy, and because his establishment of oligarchies in the other subdued cities plainly intimated what he would do in this great focus of Grecian democratical impulse.

Among these exiles were comprised Aristodemus and Aris-totelēs,—both seemingly persons of importance, the former having at one time been one of the Hellenotamiae, of Kritias. the first financial office of the imperial democracy, and the latter an active member of the Four Hundred;² also Chariklēs, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ—and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical knowledge in detail—Kritias, soñ of Kallæschrus. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the literary, and the philosophical world of Athens. To all three, his abilities qualified him to do honour. Both his poetry, in the Solonian or moralising vein,—and his eloquence, published specimens of which remained in the Augustan age,—were of no ordinary merit. His wealth was large, and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens: one of his ancestors had been friend and companion of the lawgiver Solōn. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato,³ and had fre-

¹ Lysias, Or. xiii. cont. Agorat. s. 80.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 18-ii. 3, 46; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. Vit. Lycurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so that the person therein specified as exile would be, not

Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lycurg. Vitâ, p. iv. (Hall, 1847).

Respecting Chariklēs, see Isokratēs, Orat. xvi. De Bigis, s. 52.

³ See Stallbaum's Preface to the Char-midēs of Plato, his note on the Timaeus

quented the society of Sokratēs so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred—and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ.¹ He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced, along with a leader named (or surnamed) Prometheus, what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly; arming the Penestæ or serfs against their masters.² What the conduct and dispositions of Kritias had been before this period, we are unable to say. But he brought with him now, on returning from exile, not merely an unmeasured and unprincipled lust of power, but also a rancorous impulse towards spoliation and bloodshed³ which outran even his ambition, and ultimately ruined both his party and himself.

Of all these returning exiles, animated with mingled vengeance and ambition, Kritias was decidedly the leading man, like Antiphon among the Four Hundred; partly from his abilities, partly from the superior violence with which he carried out the common sentiment. At the present juncture, he and his fellow-exiles became the most important persons in the city, as enjoying most the friendship and confidence of the conquerors. But the oligarchical party at home were noway behind them, either in servility or in revolutionary fervour, and an understanding was soon established between the two. Probably the old faction of the Four Hundred, though put down, had never wholly died out. At any rate, the political Hetæries or clubs, out of which it was composed, still remained, prepared for fresh co-operation when a favourable moment should arrive; and the

Kritias at the head of the oligarchs at Athens.

of Plato, p. 20 E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues—Protagoras, Charmidēs, Timaeus, and Kritias (the last, as it now exists, only a fragment)—not to mention the Eryxias.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, Delect. Poet. Graec. p. 136 seq. Both Cicero (De Orat. ii. 22, 93) and Dionys. Hal. (Judic. de Lysis, c. 2. p. 454; Jud. de Isaeo, p. 627)

notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the Hermae, as affirmed by Diognétus, see Andokidēs de Mystra, s. 47. He was first cousin of Andokidēs by the mother's side.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 35.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 35; Memorab. i. 2, 24.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2. ἐπει δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν (Kritias) προκείθη ήν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτεῖναι, δέ τε καὶ φυγῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου, &c.

catastrophe of *Aigospotami* had made it plain to every one that such moment could not be far distant. Accordingly a large portion, if not the majority, of the senators, became ready to lend themselves to the destruction of the democracy, and only anxious to ensure places among the oligarchy in prospect:¹ while the supple Theramenēs—resuming his place as oligarchical leader, and abusing his mission as envoy to wear out the patience of his half-famished countrymen—had, during his three months' absence in the tent of Lysander, concerted arrangements with the exiles for future proceedings.²

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organise itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of Five, called Ephors in compliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party—to convene meetings when needful—to appoint subordinate managers for the various tribes—and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly.³ Among these five Ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenēs; probably Theramenēs also.

But the oligarchical party, though thus organized and ascendant, with a compliant senate and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession—still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended changes without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders. Accordingly a citizen named Theokritus tendered an accusation to the senate against the general Strombichidēs, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs; supported by the deposition of a slave or lowborn man, named Agoratus. Although Nikias and several other citizens tried to prevail upon Agoratus to leave Athens, furnished him with the means of escape, and offered to go away with him themselves from Munychia until the political state of Athens should come into a more assured condition⁴—yet he refused to retire, appeared

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 23. p. 132.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. s. 78. p. 128. Theramenēs is described (in his subsequent defence) ὄνειδίων μὲν τοῖς φεύγοντις δι' αὐτὸν κατέλθουεν, &c.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonises with this.

³ Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. s. 44. p. 124. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ

ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο. δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὐστις, δύεν τῆς οτάρεως ἥρξαν, πέντε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐταίρων, συναγωγεῖς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀρχόντες δὲ τῶν συναμοτῶν, ἐνάρτια δὲ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πράττοντες.

⁴ Lysias, cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 28. (p. 132)—s. 35. p. 133. Καὶ παρορμῶντες δύο πλοῖα Μουνυχίσιον, ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ (Ἀγοράτου) παντὶ κρίσιψι ἀπελθεῖν

before the senate, and accused the generals of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace ; pretending to be himself their accomplice. Upon his information, given both before the senate and before an assembly at Munychia, the generals, the taxiarchs, and several other citizens, men of high worth and courageous patriots, were put into prison, as well as Agoratus himself, to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of 2000 members. One of the parties thus accused, Menestratus, being admitted by the public assembly (on the proposition of Hagnodōrus the brother-in-law of Kritias) to become accusing witness, named several additional accomplices, who were also forthwith placed in custody.¹

Though the most determined defenders of the democratical constitution were thus eliminated, Kritias and Theramenēs still farther ensured the success of their pro-positions by invoking the presence of Lysander from Samos. The demolition of the walls had been completed, the main blockading army had disbanded, and the immediate pressure of famine had been removed—when an assembly was held to determine on future modifications of the constitution. A citizen named Drakontidēs² moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed. Among the Thirty persons proposed, pre-arranged by Theramenēs and the oligarchical five Ephors, the most pro-

Nomination
of the Thirty,
under the
dictation of
Lysander.

*Αθήνησεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφασαν συνεκπλευ-
σεῖσθαι, ὡς τὰ πράγματα κατα-
σταίη, &c.*

Lysias represents the accusation of the generals, and this behaviour of Agoratus, as having occurred *before* the surrender of the city, but *after* the return of Theramenēs bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians. He thus so colours it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals out of the way, was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenēs was accepted. Had the generals remained at large (he affirms), they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and would have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (see Lysias cont. Agor. s. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 90), I believe that he

misdates them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenēs came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible : the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed ; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph. Hellēn. ii. 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbour was closely blocked up ? and what is the meaning of *ὡς τὰ πράγματα κατασταίη*, referred to a moment just before the surrender?

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. s. 38, 60, 68.

² Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii. s. 74; compare Aristotle ap. Schol. ad Aristophan. Vesp. 157.

minent names were those of Kritias and Theramenēs : there were, besides, Drakontidēs himself—Onomaklēs, one of the Four Hundred who had escaped—Aristotelēs and Chariklēs, both exiles newly returned—Eratosthenēs—and others whom we do not know, but of whom probably several had also been exiles or members of the Four Hundred.¹ Though this was a complete abrogation of the constitution, yet so conscious were the conspirators of their own strength, that they did not deem it necessary to propose the formal suspension of the Graphē Paratomōn, as had been done prior to the installation of the former oligarchy. Still, notwithstanding the seizure of the leaders and the general intimidation prevalent, a loud murmur of repugnance was heard in the assembly at the motion of Drakontidēs. But Theramenēs rose up to defy the murmur, telling the assembly that the proposition numbered many partisans even among the citizens themselves, and that it had farther the approbation of Lysander and the Lacedæmonians. This was presently confirmed by Lysander himself, who addressed the assembly in person. He told them, in a menacing and contemptuous tone, that Athens was now at his mercy, since the walls had not been demolished before the day specified, and consequently the conditions of the promised peace had been violated. He added that if they did not adopt the recommendation of Theramenēs, they would be forced to take thought for their personal safety instead of for their political constitution. After a notice at once so plain and so crushing, farther resistance was vain. The dissentients all quitted the assembly in sadness and indignation ; while a remnant—according to Lysias, inconsiderable in number as well as worthless in character—stayed to vote acceptance of the motion.²

Seven years before, Theramenēs had carried, in conjunction with Antiphon and Phrynicus, a similar motion for the installation of the Four Hundred ; extorting acquiescence by domestic terrorism as well as by multiplied assassinations. He now, in conjunction with Kritias and the rest, a second time extinguished the constitution of his country, by the still greater humiliation of a foreign conqueror dictating terms to the Athenian people assembled in their own Pnyx. Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by land and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for some months longer until the

Conquest of
Samos by
Lysander—
oligarchy
restored
there.

close of the summer. It was not until the last extremity that they capitulated ; obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety, but with no other property except a single garment. Lysander handed over the city and the properties to the ancient citizens—that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his Dekarchies, or oligarchy of Ten Samians chosen by himself ; leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.¹

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbour of Peiræus, except twelve left to the Athenians as a concession : he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere : he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities : and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than 470 talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war.² That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed, and who sullied by such mean peculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse.³ Nor was it merely the triumphant evidences of past exploits which now decorated this returning admiral. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta—as she had now become—was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular Asiatic and Thracian cities, by means of the harmosts and the native Dekarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures. To this state of things we shall presently return, when we have followed the eventful history of the Thirty at Athens.

These Thirty men—the parallel of the Dekarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities—were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a state of humiliation and dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander as the representative of Lacedæmon. Though appointed, in the pretended view of drawing up a scheme

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 6–8.
² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 8.

³ Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16; Diordor. xiii. 106.

Triumphant
return of
Lysander to
Sparta—his
prodigious
ascendancy
throughout
Greece.

Proceedings
of the Thirty
at Athens—
feelings of
oligarchical
men like
Plato.

announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers.⁴ The philosopher Plato—then a young man about twenty-four years old, of anti-democratical politics, and nephew of Kritias—was at first misled, together with various others, by these splendid professions. He conceived hopes, and even received encouragement from his relations, that he might play an active part under the new oligarchy.⁵ Though he soon came to discern how little congenial his feelings were with theirs, yet in the beginning doubtless such honest illusions contributed materially to strengthen their hands.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy—"men (says Xenophon) whom every one knew to live by making calumnious accusations (called Sycophancy), and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens." How far most of these men had been honest or dishonest in their previous political conduct under the democracy, we have no means of determining. But among them were comprised Strombichidēs and the other democratical officers who

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 11; Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii. sect. 23-80.

Tisias, the brother-in-law of Chariklēs, was a member of this senate (Isokratēs, Or. xvi. De Bigis, s. 53).

² Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 B; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 54.

³ Isokratēs cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii. s. 6, p. 372.

⁴ Lysias, Orat. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 5. p. 121. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ τριάκοντα πονηροὶ μὲν καὶ συκόφανται ὅντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκοντες χρῆναι τῶν ἄδικων καθαρὰν ποίησαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπέσθαι, &c.

⁵ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 B. C.

benches previously occupied by the Prytanes : two tables were placed before them, one signifying condemnation—the other, acquittal ; and each senator was required to deposit his pebble, openly before them, either on one or on the other.² It was not merely judgement by the senate—but judgement by the senate under pressure and intimidation by the all-powerful Thirty. It seems probable that neither any semblance of defence, nor any exculpatory witnesses, were allowed ; but even if such formalities were not wholly dispensed with, it is certain that there was no real trial, and that condemnation was assured beforehand. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the senate, not a single man was acquitted except the informer Agoratus, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with Strombichidès and his companions, but was liberated in recompense for the information which he had given against them.³ The statement of Isokratès, Lysias, and others—that the victims of the Thirty, even when brought before the senate, were put to death untried—is authentic and trustworthy : many were even put to death by simple order from the Thirty themselves, without any cognizance of the senate.⁴

In regard to the persons first brought to trial, however,—whether we consider them, as Xenophon intimates, to have been notorious evil-doers, or to have been innocent sufferers by the reactionary vengeance of returning oligarchical exiles, as was the case certainly with Strom-

The senate
began by
condemning
willingly
every one
brought be-
fore them.

¹ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 38.

² Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 40.

³ Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

⁴ Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 18; Xe-
noph. Hellen. ii. 3, 51; Isokrat. Orat.
xx. cont. Lochit. s. 15. p. 597.